bpf: Fix off-by-one for area size in creating mask to left

retrieve_ptr_limit() computes the ptr_limit for registers with stack and
map_value type. ptr_limit is the size of the memory area that is still
valid / in-bounds from the point of the current position and direction
of the operation (add / sub). This size will later be used for masking
the operation such that attempting out-of-bounds access in the speculative
domain is redirected to remain within the bounds of the current map value.

When masking to the right the size is correct, however, when masking to
the left, the size is off-by-one which would lead to an incorrect mask
and thus incorrect arithmetic operation in the non-speculative domain.
Piotr found that if the resulting alu_limit value is zero, then the
BPF_MOV32_IMM() from the fixup_bpf_calls() rewrite will end up loading
0xffffffff into AX instead of sign-extending to the full 64 bit range,
and as a result, this allows abuse for executing speculatively out-of-
bounds loads against 4GB window of address space and thus extracting the
contents of kernel memory via side-channel.

Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 10d2bb2e6b1d8c4576c56a748f697dbeb8388899 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git)
CVE-2020-27171
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 7272548604bbcb8adb2328a464ede59e76530ba3..c5b596f41adae2b5f6dafec7587e94db8f2acff5 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5398,13 +5398,13 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
                 */
                off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
                if (mask_to_left)
-                       *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
+                       *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off + 1;
                else
                        *ptr_limit = -off;
                return 0;
        case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
                if (mask_to_left) {
-                       *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
+                       *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off + 1;
                } else {
                        off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
                        *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off;