]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-eoan-kernel.git/commitdiff
arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Fri, 12 Apr 2019 20:39:32 +0000 (15:39 -0500)
committerWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Wed, 1 May 2019 13:48:07 +0000 (14:48 +0100)
Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

index 6a929258faf71054387412e0e8382362813e8f11..ce226f7ee5663d9038a513d98ecc526c5dde2fcf 100644 (file)
                        http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
        mitigations=
-                       [X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-                       vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+                       [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+                       CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
                        arch-independent options, each of which is an
                        aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
                                improves system performance, but it may also
                                expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
                                Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+                                              kpti=0 [ARM64]
                                               nospectre_v1 [PPC]
                                               nobp=0 [S390]
-                                              nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+                                              nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
                                               spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
                                               spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+                                              ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
                                               l1tf=off [X86]
 
                        auto (default)
index 44ef98be001e9f9997c24f3a37f603319c394d70..1b9ce0fdd81de87595a15e0440c1e05095ae4fa9 100644 (file)
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -386,6 +387,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 
        WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
+       if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+               ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
        /* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
        if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
                this_cpu_safe = true;
@@ -589,7 +593,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
        }
 
        /* forced off */
-       if (__nospectre_v2) {
+       if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
                __hardenbp_enab = false;
                return false;
index 703ee8564fbda158824d28036719cdf773780d3f..f3b32d88f1654eabe96cdee4b9f54b599c582119 100644 (file)
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -966,7 +967,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
                MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
                { /* sentinel */ }
        };
-       char const *str = "command line option";
+       char const *str = "kpti command line option";
        bool meltdown_safe;
 
        meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -996,6 +997,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
                }
        }
 
+       if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+               str = "mitigations=off";
+               __kpti_forced = -1;
+       }
+
        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
                pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
                return false;