* **BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH** (set *skb*\ **->hash**, *skb*\
* **->swhash** and *skb*\ **->l4hash** to 0).
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* flexibility and can handle sizes larger than 2 or 4 for the
* checksum to update.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* flexibility and can handle sizes larger than 2 or 4 for the
* checksum to update.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* efficient, but it is handled through an action code where the
* redirection happens only after the eBPF program has returned.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* **ETH_P_8021Q** and **ETH_P_8021AD**, it is considered to
* be **ETH_P_8021Q**.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* Description
* Pop a VLAN header from the packet associated to *skb*.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must
* be left at zero.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* implicitly linearizes, unclones and drops offloads from the
* *skb*.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* **bpf_skb_pull_data()** to effectively unclone the *skb* from
* the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must
* be left at zero.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* can be used to prepare the packet for pushing or popping
* headers.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO**: Do not adjust gso_size.
* Adjusting mss in this way is not allowed for datagrams.
*
- * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L3_IPV4 **:
- * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L3_IPV6 **:
+ * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L3_IPV4**,
+ * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L3_IPV6**:
* Any new space is reserved to hold a tunnel header.
* Configure skb offsets and other fields accordingly.
*
- * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L4_GRE **:
- * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L4_UDP **:
+ * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L4_GRE**,
+ * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L4_UDP**:
* Use with ENCAP_L3 flags to further specify the tunnel type.
*
- * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L2(len) **:
+ * * **BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_ENCAP_L2**\ (*len*):
* Use with ENCAP_L3/L4 flags to further specify the tunnel
- * type; **len** is the length of the inner MAC header.
+ * type; *len* is the length of the inner MAC header.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* more flexibility as the user is free to store whatever meta
* data they need.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* copied if necessary (i.e. if data was not linear and if start
* and end pointers do not point to the same chunk).
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* only possible to shrink the packet as of this writing,
* therefore *delta* must be a negative integer.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_IP**
* IP encapsulation (GRE/GUE/IPIP/etc). The outer header
* must be IPv4 or IPv6, followed by zero or more
- * additional headers, up to LWT_BPF_MAX_HEADROOM total
- * bytes in all prepended headers. Please note that
- * if skb_is_gso(skb) is true, no more than two headers
- * can be prepended, and the inner header, if present,
- * should be either GRE or UDP/GUE.
- *
- * BPF_LWT_ENCAP_SEG6*** types can be called by bpf programs of
- * type BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN; BPF_LWT_ENCAP_IP type can be called
- * by bpf programs of types BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN and
- * BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT.
- *
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * additional headers, up to **LWT_BPF_MAX_HEADROOM**
+ * total bytes in all prepended headers. Please note that
+ * if **skb_is_gso**\ (*skb*) is true, no more than two
+ * headers can be prepended, and the inner header, if
+ * present, should be either GRE or UDP/GUE.
+ *
+ * **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_SEG6**\ \* types can be called by BPF programs
+ * of type **BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN**; **BPF_LWT_ENCAP_IP** type can
+ * be called by bpf programs of types **BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN** and
+ * **BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT**.
+ *
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* inside the outermost IPv6 Segment Routing Header can be
* modified through this helper.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* after the segments are accepted. *delta* can be as well
* positive (growing) as negative (shrinking).
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* Type of *param*: **int**.
* **SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_B6**
* End.B6 action: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 policy.
- * Type of param: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**.
+ * Type of *param*: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**.
* **SEG6_LOCAL_ACTION_END_B6_ENCAP**
* End.B6.Encap action: Endpoint bound to an SRv6
* encapsulation policy.
- * Type of param: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**.
+ * Type of *param*: **struct ipv6_sr_hdr**.
*
- * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlaying
+ * A call to this helper is susceptible to change the underlying
* packet buffer. Therefore, at load time, all checks on pointers
* previously done by the verifier are invalidated and must be
* performed again, if the helper is used in combination with
* Return
* Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure.
* For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock**
- * result is from **reuse->socks**\ [] using the hash of the tuple.
+ * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the
+ * tuple.
*
* struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_lookup_udp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags)
* Description
* Return
* Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure.
* For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock**
- * result is from **reuse->socks**\ [] using the hash of the tuple.
+ * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the
+ * tuple.
*
* int bpf_sk_release(struct bpf_sock *sock)
* Description
* network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked,
* and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ ().
*
- * This function is identical to bpf_sk_lookup_tcp, except that it
- * also returns timewait or request sockets. Use bpf_sk_fullsock
- * or bpf_tcp_socket to access the full structure.
+ * This function is identical to **bpf_sk_lookup_tcp**\ (), except
+ * that it also returns timewait or request sockets. Use
+ * **bpf_sk_fullsock**\ () or **bpf_tcp_sock**\ () to access the
+ * full structure.
*
* This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with
* **CONFIG_NET** configuration option.
* Return
* Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure.
* For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock**
- * result is from **reuse->socks**\ [] using the hash of the tuple.
+ * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the
+ * tuple.
*
* int bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len)
* Description
- * Check whether iph and th contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for
- * the listening socket in sk.
+ * Check whether *iph* and *th* contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for
+ * the listening socket in *sk*.
*
- * iph points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while
- * iph_len contains sizeof(struct iphdr) or sizeof(struct ip6hdr).
+ * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while
+ * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or
+ * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**).
*
- * th points to the start of the TCP header, while th_len contains
- * sizeof(struct tcphdr).
+ * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len*
+ * contains **sizeof**\ (**struct tcphdr**).
*
* Return
- * 0 if iph and th are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative error
- * otherwise.
+ * 0 if *iph* and *th* are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative
+ * error otherwise.
*
* int bpf_sysctl_get_name(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags)
* Description
* and save the result in *res*.
*
* The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space
- * (as determined by isspace(3)) followed by a single optional '-'
- * sign.
+ * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)) followed by a single
+ * optional '**-**' sign.
*
* Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits
* are currently unused.
*
* Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically
- * similar to user space strtol(3).
+ * similar to user space **strtol**\ (3).
* Return
* Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but
- * no more than buf_len.
+ * no more than *buf_len*.
*
* **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base
* was provided.
* given base and save the result in *res*.
*
* The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space
- * (as determined by isspace(3)).
+ * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)).
*
* Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits
* are currently unused.
*
* Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically
- * similar to user space strtoul(3).
+ * similar to user space **strtoul**\ (3).
* Return
* Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but
- * no more than buf_len.
+ * no more than *buf_len*.
*
* **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base
* was provided.
*
* void *bpf_sk_storage_get(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_sock *sk, void *value, u64 flags)
* Description
- * Get a bpf-local-storage from a sk.
+ * Get a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*.
*
* Logically, it could be thought of getting the value from
* a *map* with *sk* as the **key**. From this
* perspective, the usage is not much different from
- * **bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &sk)** except this
- * helper enforces the key must be a **bpf_fullsock()**
- * and the map must be a BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE also.
+ * **bpf_map_lookup_elem**\ (*map*, **&**\ *sk*) except this
+ * helper enforces the key must be a full socket and the map must
+ * be a **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE** also.
*
* Underneath, the value is stored locally at *sk* instead of
- * the map. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage **type**.
- * The bpf-local-storage **type** (i.e. the *map*) is searched
- * against all bpf-local-storages residing at sk.
+ * the *map*. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage
+ * "type". The bpf-local-storage "type" (i.e. the *map*) is
+ * searched against all bpf-local-storages residing at *sk*.
*
- * An optional *flags* (BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE) can be
+ * An optional *flags* (**BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE**) can be
* used such that a new bpf-local-storage will be
* created if one does not exist. *value* can be used
- * together with BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE to specify
+ * together with **BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE** to specify
* the initial value of a bpf-local-storage. If *value* is
- * NULL, the new bpf-local-storage will be zero initialized.
+ * **NULL**, the new bpf-local-storage will be zero initialized.
* Return
* A bpf-local-storage pointer is returned on success.
*
*
* int bpf_sk_storage_delete(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_sock *sk)
* Description
- * Delete a bpf-local-storage from a sk.
+ * Delete a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*.
* Return
* 0 on success.
*
projects / mirror_iproute2.git / commitdiff