mm: fix dereferencing possible ERR_PTR

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1995517
commit 4eb5bbde3ccb710d3b85bfb13466612e56393369 upstream.

Smatch checker complains that 'secretmem_mnt' dereferencing possible
ERR_PTR().  Let the function return if 'secretmem_mnt' is ERR_PTR, to
avoid deferencing it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220904074647.GA64291@cloud-MacBookPro
Fixes: 1507f51255c9f ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: Binyi Han <dantengknight@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foudation.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Ammar Faizi <ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 14f49c0aa66e206e6753c79d942e3b6fba65fc61..d1986ce2e7c7790ae4df0112037b62afc74a02f1 100644 (file)
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static int secretmem_init(void)
 
        secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
        if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt))
-               ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt);
+               return PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt);
 
        /* prevent secretmem mappings from ever getting PROT_EXEC */
        secretmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;