* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits)
MAINTAINERS: Add tomoyo-dev-en ML.
SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messages
encrypted-keys: style and other cleanup
encrypted-keys: verify datablob size before converting to binary
trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup
trusted-keys: additional TSS return code and other error handling
syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict
Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories
selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid results
SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystems
This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running.
SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_others
selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array
selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array
flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C
SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfs
selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.c
...
--- /dev/null
+ Trusted and Encrypted Keys
+
+Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel
+key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys,
+and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees,
+stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability
+of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while Encrypted
+Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded
+in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified.
+
+Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys. Keys are sealed
+under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally sealed to specified PCR
+(integrity measurement) values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob
+integrity verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
+(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as
+when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many saved
+blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported.
+
+By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default
+authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership time with the
+trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
+
+Usage:
+ keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
+ keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
+ keyctl update key "update [options]"
+ keyctl print keyid
+
+ options:
+ keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK)
+ keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
+ (40 ascii zeros)
+ blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
+ (40 ascii zeros)
+ blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
+ (40 ascii zeros)
+ pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
+ pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
+ migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
+ default 1 (resealing allowed)
+
+"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
+TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
+Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit
+within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding.
+
+Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for
+encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel generated random
+numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified 'master' key. The
+'master' key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main
+disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key,
+they are only as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key
+should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in
+boot.
+
+Usage:
+ keyctl add encrypted name "new key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring
+ keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
+ keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
+
+where 'key-type' is either 'trusted' or 'user'.
+
+Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage:
+
+Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes:
+
+ $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
+ 440502848
+
+ $ keyctl show
+ Session Keyring
+ -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses
+ 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500
+ 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk
+
+ $ keyctl print 440502848
+ 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
+ 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
+ 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
+ a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
+ d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
+ dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
+ f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
+ e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
+
+ $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob
+
+Load a trusted key from the saved blob:
+
+ $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u
+ 268728824
+
+ $ keyctl print 268728824
+ 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915
+ 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b
+ 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722
+ a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec
+ d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d
+ dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0
+ f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
+ e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
+
+Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:
+
+ $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
+ $ keyctl print 268728824
+ 010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805
+ 77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73
+ d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e
+ df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4
+ 9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6
+ e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610
+ 94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9
+ 7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef
+ df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8
+
+Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk":
+
+ $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u
+ 159771175
+
+ $ keyctl print 159771175
+ trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55
+ be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64
+ 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
+ $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob
+
+Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:
+
+ $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u
+ 831684262
+
+ $ keyctl print 831684262
+ trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55
+ be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64
+ 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
+
+The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high
+quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a
+trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been
+compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to specific boot PCR
+values, protects against boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and
+encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated.
This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using
dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log buffer. When
dmesg_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions. When
-dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use
+dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYSLOG to use
dmesg(8).
The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT sets the default
TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE
M: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
M: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
-L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English)
+L: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in English)
+L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in English)
L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf);
- module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
+ tpm_chip_put(chip);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
- module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
+ tpm_chip_put(chip);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
+int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd");
+
+ tpm_chip_put(chip);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send);
+
ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
#define to_tpm_chip(n) container_of(n, struct tpm_chip, vendor)
+static inline void tpm_chip_put(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
+}
+
static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index)
{
outb(index, base);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+struct encrypted_key_payload {
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ char *master_desc; /* datablob: master key name */
+ char *datalen; /* datablob: decrypted key length */
+ u8 *iv; /* datablob: iv */
+ u8 *encrypted_data; /* datablob: encrypted data */
+ unsigned short datablob_len; /* length of datablob */
+ unsigned short decrypted_datalen; /* decrypted data length */
+ u8 decrypted_data[0]; /* decrypted data + datablob + hmac */
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
+#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320
+
+struct trusted_key_payload {
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ unsigned int key_len;
+ unsigned int blob_len;
+ unsigned char migratable;
+ unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
+ unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */
/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
/* Allow administration of the random device */
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
-/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
/* Allow setting the domainname */
/* Allow setting the hostname */
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
+
+#define CAP_SYSLOG 34
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYSLOG
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
int flex_array_shrink(struct flex_array *fa);
#define flex_array_put_ptr(fa, nr, src, gfp) \
- flex_array_put(fa, nr, &(void *)(src), gfp)
+ flex_array_put(fa, nr, (void *)&(src), gfp)
void *flex_array_get_ptr(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr);
#define FIELD_SIZEOF(t, f) (sizeof(((t*)0)->f))
#define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d))
+
+/* The `const' in roundup() prevents gcc-3.3 from calling __divdi3 */
#define roundup(x, y) ( \
{ \
const typeof(y) __y = y; \
}
extern int hex_to_bin(char ch);
+extern void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count);
/*
* General tracing related utility functions - trace_printk(),
* @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
* evaluate the security data on the key.
* @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
- * Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the
- * normal permissions model should be effected.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
* @key_getsecurity:
* Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
* for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function
extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
+extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
#else
static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
return -ENODEV;
static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
return -ENODEV;
}
+static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) {
+ return -ENODEV;
+}
#endif
#endif
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__
+#define __LINUX_TPM_COMMAND_H__
+
+/*
+ * TPM Command constants from specifications at
+ * http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ */
+
+/* Command TAGS */
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198
+
+/* Command Ordinals */
+#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70
+#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11
+#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10
+#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23
+#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24
+
+/* Other constants */
+#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000
+#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20
+
+#endif
#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE"
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
* at open time.
*/
if (type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN || !from_file) {
- if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+ goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+ goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
}
error = security_syslog(type);
}
out:
return error;
+warn:
+ /* remove after 2.6.39 */
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
+ "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated and denied).\n");
+ return -EPERM;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin);
+/**
+ * hex2bin - convert an ascii hexadecimal string to its binary representation
+ * @dst: binary result
+ * @src: ascii hexadecimal string
+ * @count: result length
+ */
+void hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count)
+{
+ while (count--) {
+ *dst = hex_to_bin(*src++) << 4;
+ *dst += hex_to_bin(*src++);
+ dst++;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex2bin);
+
/**
* hex_dump_to_buffer - convert a blob of data to "hex ASCII" in memory
* @buf: data blob to dump
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+ tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ help
+ This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
+ keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+ generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
+ if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
+ see encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+ tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
+ help
+ This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
+ in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
+ which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
+ 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
+ Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS
request_key_auth.o \
user_defined.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+
+#include "encrypted_defined.h"
+
+static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
+static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
+static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
+static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)";
+static unsigned int ivsize;
+static int blksize;
+
+#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096
+#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20
+
+struct sdesc {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {Opt_new, "new"},
+ {Opt_load, "load"},
+ {Opt_update, "update"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+static int aes_get_sizes(void)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ blksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key
+ *
+ * key-type:= "trusted:" | "encrypted:"
+ * desc:= master-key description
+ *
+ * Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update,
+ * only the master key description is permitted to change, not the key-type.
+ * The key-type remains constant.
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
+{
+ if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+ if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
+ goto out;
+ if (orig_desc)
+ if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+ goto out;
+ } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+ if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
+ goto out;
+ if (orig_desc)
+ if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ goto out;
+ return 0;
+out:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
+ *
+ * datablob format:
+ * new <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * load <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data>
+ * update <new-master-key name>
+ *
+ * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
+ * which is null terminated.
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc,
+ char **decrypted_datalen, char **hex_encoded_iv)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd;
+ char *p;
+
+ p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!p)
+ return ret;
+ key_cmd = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+
+ *master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!*master_desc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (decrypted_datalen) {
+ *decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!*decrypted_datalen)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_new:
+ if (!decrypted_datalen)
+ break;
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_load:
+ if (!decrypted_datalen)
+ break;
+ *hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!*hex_encoded_iv)
+ break;
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_update:
+ if (decrypted_datalen)
+ break;
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_format - format as an ascii string, before copying to userspace
+ */
+static char *datablob_format(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ size_t asciiblob_len)
+{
+ char *ascii_buf, *bufp;
+ u8 *iv = epayload->iv;
+ int len;
+ int i;
+
+ ascii_buf = kmalloc(asciiblob_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ goto out;
+
+ ascii_buf[asciiblob_len] = '\0';
+
+ /* copy datablob master_desc and datalen strings */
+ len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s ", epayload->master_desc,
+ epayload->datalen);
+
+ /* convert the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data and HMAC to ascii */
+ bufp = &ascii_buf[len];
+ for (i = 0; i < (asciiblob_len - len) / 2; i++)
+ bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, iv[i]);
+out:
+ return ascii_buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
+ *
+ * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
+ * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
+ * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
+ */
+static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+ u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
+ struct key *tkey;
+
+ tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(tkey))
+ goto error;
+
+ down_read(&tkey->sem);
+ tpayload = rcu_dereference(tkey->payload.data);
+ *master_key = tpayload->key;
+ *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
+error:
+ return tkey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * request_user_key - request the user key
+ *
+ * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
+ */
+static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key,
+ size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ struct key *ukey;
+
+ ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(ukey))
+ goto error;
+
+ down_read(&ukey->sem);
+ upayload = rcu_dereference(ukey->payload.data);
+ *master_key = upayload->data;
+ *master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
+error:
+ return ukey;
+}
+
+static struct sdesc *alloc_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ int size;
+
+ size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
+ sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sdesc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
+ sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
+ return sdesc;
+}
+
+static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
+ const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ int ret;
+
+ sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hmacalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int calc_hash(u8 *digest, const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ int ret;
+
+ sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hashalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest);
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
+
+/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
+static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
+ const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+ u8 *derived_buf;
+ unsigned int derived_buf_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ derived_buf_len = strlen("AUTH_KEY") + 1 + master_keylen;
+ if (derived_buf_len < HASH_SIZE)
+ derived_buf_len = HASH_SIZE;
+
+ derived_buf = kzalloc(derived_buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!derived_buf) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: out of memory\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ if (key_type)
+ strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY");
+ else
+ strcpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY");
+
+ memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
+ master_keylen);
+ ret = calc_hash(derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
+ kfree(derived_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int key_len, const u8 *iv,
+ unsigned int ivsize)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
+ blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(desc->tfm, iv, ivsize);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct key *mkey = NULL;
+
+ if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
+ KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+ mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc +
+ KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN,
+ master_key, master_keylen);
+ } else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX,
+ KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+ mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc +
+ KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN,
+ master_key, master_keylen);
+ } else
+ goto out;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found",
+ epayload->master_desc);
+ if (mkey)
+ dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen);
+out:
+ return mkey;
+}
+
+/* Before returning data to userspace, encrypt decrypted data. */
+static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const u8 *derived_key,
+ unsigned int derived_keylen)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg_in[2];
+ struct scatterlist sg_out[1];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ unsigned int padlen;
+ char pad[16];
+ int ret;
+
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+ padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
+
+ ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
+ epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
+
+ memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
+ sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
+
+ sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
+ sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
+
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret);
+ else
+ dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+ u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+ u8 *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ digest = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
+ ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
+ epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
+ if (!ret)
+ dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* verify HMAC before decrypting encrypted key */
+static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+ u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+ u8 digest[HASH_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
+ epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
+ sizeof digest);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ dump_hmac("datablob",
+ epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
+ HASH_SIZE);
+ dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE);
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const u8 *derived_key,
+ unsigned int derived_keylen)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg_in[1];
+ struct scatterlist sg_out[2];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ char pad[16];
+ int ret;
+
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+ ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
+ epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
+
+ memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
+ sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
+ sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad);
+
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Allocate memory for decrypted key and datablob. */
+static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
+ const char *master_desc,
+ const char *datalen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
+ unsigned short datablob_len;
+ unsigned short decrypted_datalen;
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ long dlen;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
+ if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ decrypted_datalen = dlen;
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+
+ datablob_len = strlen(master_desc) + 1 + strlen(datalen) + 1
+ + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, decrypted_datalen + datablob_len
+ + HASH_SIZE + 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + decrypted_datalen +
+ datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!epayload)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+ epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len;
+ return epayload;
+}
+
+static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+{
+ struct key *mkey;
+ u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+ u8 *master_key;
+ u8 *hmac;
+ const char *hex_encoded_data;
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ size_t master_keylen;
+ size_t asciilen;
+ int ret;
+
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+ asciilen = (ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen + HASH_SIZE) * 2;
+ if (strlen(hex_encoded_iv) != asciilen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hex_encoded_data = hex_encoded_iv + (2 * ivsize) + 2;
+ hex2bin(epayload->iv, hex_encoded_iv, ivsize);
+ hex2bin(epayload->encrypted_data, hex_encoded_data, encrypted_datalen);
+
+ hmac = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
+ hex2bin(hmac, hex_encoded_data + (encrypted_datalen * 2), HASH_SIZE);
+
+ mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+ ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: bad hmac (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = derived_key_decrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to decrypt key (%d)\n", ret);
+out:
+ up_read(&mkey->sem);
+ key_put(mkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const char *master_desc, const char *datalen)
+{
+ epayload->master_desc = epayload->decrypted_data
+ + epayload->decrypted_datalen;
+ epayload->datalen = epayload->master_desc + strlen(master_desc) + 1;
+ epayload->iv = epayload->datalen + strlen(datalen) + 1;
+ epayload->encrypted_data = epayload->iv + ivsize + 1;
+
+ memcpy(epayload->master_desc, master_desc, strlen(master_desc));
+ memcpy(epayload->datalen, datalen, strlen(datalen));
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
+ *
+ * For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data
+ * itself. For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
+ */
+static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
+ const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ __ekey_init(epayload, master_desc, datalen);
+ if (!hex_encoded_iv) {
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ } else
+ ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, hex_encoded_iv);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
+ *
+ * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
+ * based on a kernel random number.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
+ char *datablob = NULL;
+ char *master_desc = NULL;
+ char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
+ char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ datablob[datalen] = 0;
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen,
+ &hex_encoded_iv);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, master_desc, decrypted_datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = encrypted_init(epayload, master_desc, decrypted_datalen,
+ hex_encoded_iv);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(epayload);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, epayload);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
+
+ epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
+ memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ kfree(epayload);
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_update - update the master key description
+ *
+ * Change the master key description for an existing encrypted key.
+ * The next read will return an encrypted datablob using the new
+ * master key description.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
+ char *buf;
+ char *new_master_desc = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ buf[datalen] = 0;
+ memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
+ ret = datablob_parse(buf, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = valid_master_desc(new_master_desc, epayload->master_desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, new_master_desc,
+ epayload->datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ __ekey_init(new_epayload, new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+
+ memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ memcpy(new_epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_epayload);
+ call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
+out:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace
+ *
+ * The resulting datablob format is:
+ * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data>
+ *
+ * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
+ struct key *mkey;
+ u8 *master_key;
+ size_t master_keylen;
+ char derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
+ char *ascii_buf;
+ size_t asciiblob_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
+ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+
+ /* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
+ asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
+ + roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize)
+ + (HASH_SIZE * 2);
+
+ if (!buffer || buflen < asciiblob_len)
+ return asciiblob_len;
+
+ mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = derived_key_encrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = datablob_hmac_append(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ascii_buf = datablob_format(epayload, asciiblob_len);
+ if (!ascii_buf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ up_read(&mkey->sem);
+ key_put(mkey);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+
+ return asciiblob_len;
+out:
+ up_read(&mkey->sem);
+ key_put(mkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ *
+ * Before freeing the key, clear the memory containing the decrypted
+ * key data.
+ */
+static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
+
+ if (!epayload)
+ return;
+
+ memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ kfree(key->payload.data);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
+ .name = "encrypted",
+ .instantiate = encrypted_instantiate,
+ .update = encrypted_update,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .destroy = encrypted_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = encrypted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted);
+
+static void encrypted_shash_release(void)
+{
+ if (hashalg)
+ crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
+ if (hmacalg)
+ crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+}
+
+static int __init encrypted_shash_alloc(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ hmac_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
+ }
+
+ hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ hash_alg);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
+ goto hashalg_fail;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+hashalg_fail:
+ crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init init_encrypted(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = encrypted_shash_alloc();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ return aes_get_sizes();
+out:
+ encrypted_shash_release();
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
+{
+ encrypted_shash_release();
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_encrypted);
+module_exit(cleanup_encrypted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
+#define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
+
+#define ENCRYPTED_DEBUG 0
+
+#if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "master key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+ master_key, master_keylen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "decrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+ epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "encrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+ epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest,
+ unsigned int hmac_size)
+{
+ if (str)
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: %s", str);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "hmac: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, digest,
+ hmac_size, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest,
+ unsigned int hmac_size)
+{
+}
+#endif
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+
+#include "trusted_defined.h"
+
+static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+
+struct sdesc {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+
+static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ int size;
+
+ size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
+ sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sdesc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
+ sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
+ return sdesc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
+ unsigned char *digest)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ int ret;
+
+ sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ va_list argp;
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int ret;
+
+ sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ va_start(argp, keylen);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
+out:
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
+ unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
+{
+ unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char c;
+ int ret;
+ va_list argp;
+
+ sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+
+ c = h3;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ va_start(argp, h3);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ va_end(argp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+out:
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+ const uint32_t command,
+ const unsigned char *ononce,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+ uint32_t bufsize;
+ uint16_t tag;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t result;
+ unsigned char *enonce;
+ unsigned char *continueflag;
+ unsigned char *authdata;
+ unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int dpos;
+ va_list argp;
+ int ret;
+
+ bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+ ordinal = command;
+ result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+ if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ continueflag = authdata - 1;
+ enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+ sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
+ sizeof result);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
+ sizeof ordinal);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ va_start(argp, keylen);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ va_end(argp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
+ 1, continueflag, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
+ const uint32_t command,
+ const unsigned char *ononce,
+ const unsigned char *key1,
+ unsigned int keylen1,
+ const unsigned char *key2,
+ unsigned int keylen2, ...)
+{
+ uint32_t bufsize;
+ uint16_t tag;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t result;
+ unsigned char *enonce1;
+ unsigned char *continueflag1;
+ unsigned char *authdata1;
+ unsigned char *enonce2;
+ unsigned char *continueflag2;
+ unsigned char *authdata2;
+ unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int dpos;
+ va_list argp;
+ int ret;
+
+ bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+ ordinal = command;
+ result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+ if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1
+ + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
+ continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
+ enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+ enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+ sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+ }
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
+ sizeof result);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
+ sizeof ordinal);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ va_start(argp, keylen2);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ va_end(argp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ kfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
+ * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
+ */
+static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+ dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get a random value from TPM
+ */
+static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
+ store32(tb, len);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
+ if (!ret)
+ memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
+
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
+ *
+ * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
+ * This uses the tpm driver's extend function.
+ */
+static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
+{
+ unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
+ */
+static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
+ const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
+{
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
+ store16(tb, type);
+ store32(tb, handle);
+ storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
+ */
+static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct tpm_digests {
+ unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
+ unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
+ * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
+ */
+static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
+ uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+ const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen,
+ const unsigned char *blobauth,
+ const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
+{
+ struct osapsess sess;
+ struct tpm_digests *td;
+ unsigned char cont;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t pcrsize;
+ uint32_t datsize;
+ int sealinfosize;
+ int encdatasize;
+ int storedsize;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
+ td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!td)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* get session for sealing key */
+ ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ dump_sess(&sess);
+
+ /* calculate encrypted authorization value */
+ memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+ datsize = htonl(datalen);
+ pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
+ cont = 0;
+
+ /* encrypt data authorization key */
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
+ td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
+
+ /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+ if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
+ /* no pcr info specified */
+ ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+ sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+ sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
+ 0);
+ } else {
+ /* pcr info specified */
+ ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+ sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+ pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
+ &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* build and send the TPM request packet */
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+ store32(tb, keyhandle);
+ storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, pcrinfosize);
+ storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
+ store32(tb, datalen);
+ storebytes(tb, data, datalen);
+ store32(tb, sess.handle);
+ storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
+ sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t));
+ encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+ sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize);
+ storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize +
+ sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize;
+
+ /* check the HMAC in the response */
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0,
+ 0);
+
+ /* copy the returned blob to caller */
+ if (!ret) {
+ memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
+ *bloblen = storedsize;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
+ */
+static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+ uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+ const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
+ const unsigned char *blobauth,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
+{
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
+ uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
+ unsigned char cont = 0;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t keyhndl;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* sessions for unsealing key and data */
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+ keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+ &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+ &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* build and send TPM request packet */
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+ store32(tb, keyhandle);
+ storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
+ store32(tb, authhandle1);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, authhandle2);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
+ keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+ *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
+ 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+ struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
+ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
+
+ ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+ p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
+ o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+ struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
+ o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ else
+ /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
+
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+ Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
+ Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {Opt_new, "new"},
+ {Opt_load, "load"},
+ {Opt_update, "update"},
+ {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
+ {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
+ {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
+ {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
+ {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
+ {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/* can have zero or more token= options */
+static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
+ struct trusted_key_options *opt)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ char *p = c;
+ int token;
+ int res;
+ unsigned long handle;
+ unsigned long lock;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_pcrinfo:
+ opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+ if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len);
+ break;
+ case Opt_keyhandle:
+ res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
+ opt->keyhandle = handle;
+ break;
+ case Opt_keyauth:
+ if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_blobauth:
+ if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_migratable:
+ if (*args[0].from == '0')
+ pay->migratable = 0;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case Opt_pcrlock:
+ res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ opt->pcrlock = lock;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
+ * payload and options structures
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+ struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ long keylen;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd;
+ char *c;
+
+ /* main command */
+ c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_new:
+ /* first argument is key size */
+ c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+ if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->key_len = keylen;
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = Opt_new;
+ break;
+ case Opt_load:
+ /* first argument is sealed blob */
+ c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+ if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = Opt_load;
+ break;
+ case Opt_update:
+ /* all arguments are options */
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = Opt_update;
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_options *options;
+
+ options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (options) {
+ /* set any non-zero defaults */
+ options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
+ options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+ }
+ return options;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return p;
+ p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (p)
+ p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+ struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+ char *datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int key_cmd;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+
+ options = trusted_options_alloc();
+ if (!options) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!payload) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
+ if (key_cmd < 0) {
+ ret = key_cmd;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dump_payload(payload);
+ dump_options(options);
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_load:
+ ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
+ dump_payload(payload);
+ dump_options(options);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ break;
+ case Opt_new:
+ ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = key_seal(payload, options);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
+ ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ kfree(options);
+ if (!ret)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload);
+ else
+ kfree(payload);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+ p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+ memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+ kfree(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+ struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
+ char *datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!p->migratable)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
+ if (!new_o) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!new_p) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
+ if (ret != Opt_update) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+ new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
+ new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+ memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+ dump_payload(p);
+ dump_payload(new_p);
+
+ ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ kfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (new_o->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ kfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p);
+ call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ kfree(new_o);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ char *ascii_buf;
+ char *bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
+ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+ ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bufp = ascii_buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+ if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+ kfree(key->payload.data);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+ .name = "trusted",
+ .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+ .update = trusted_update,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .destroy = trusted_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = trusted_read,
+};
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static void trusted_shash_release(void)
+{
+ if (hashalg)
+ crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
+ if (hmacalg)
+ crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+}
+
+static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ hmac_alg);
+ return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
+ }
+
+ hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+ hash_alg);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
+ goto hashalg_fail;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+hashalg_fail:
+ crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ trusted_shash_release();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+ trusted_shash_release();
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+
+/* implementation specific TPM constants */
+#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64
+#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
+#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
+#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
+#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
+#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
+#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
+#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
+#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
+
+#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
+#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+
+struct tpm_buf {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
+};
+
+#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
+
+struct osapsess {
+ uint32_t handle;
+ unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
+enum {
+ SEAL_keytype = 1,
+ SRK_keytype = 4
+};
+
+struct trusted_key_options {
+ uint16_t keytype;
+ uint32_t keyhandle;
+ unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+ unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+ int pcrlock;
+};
+
+#define TPM_DEBUG 0
+
+#if TPM_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
+ len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
+{
+ buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
+}
+
+static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
+{
+ *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
+ buf->len += sizeof value;
+}
+
+static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
+{
+ *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
+ buf->len += sizeof value;
+}
+
+static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
+ const int len)
+{
+ memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
+ buf->len += len;
+}
+#endif
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
+ (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
+ newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
"node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
- { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
+ { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ RTM_NEWADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_DELADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_GETADDRLABEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_GETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] =
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *page;
+ char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *page;
+ char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
extern int selinux_disable(void);
+ length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ goto out;;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
if (new_value) {
length = selinux_disable();
- if (length < 0)
+ if (length)
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
"selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int ret;
ssize_t length;
void *data = NULL;
if (length)
goto out;
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- length = -EINVAL;
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
- }
- if ((count > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
- || (data = vmalloc(count)) == NULL) {
- length = -ENOMEM;
+ length = -EFBIG;
+ if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ data = vmalloc(count);
+ if (!data)
goto out;
- }
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
if (length)
goto out;
- ret = sel_make_bools();
- if (ret) {
- length = ret;
+ length = sel_make_bools();
+ if (length)
goto out1;
- }
- ret = sel_make_classes();
- if (ret) {
- length = ret;
+ length = sel_make_classes();
+ if (length)
goto out1;
- }
- ret = sel_make_policycap();
- if (ret)
- length = ret;
- else
- length = count;
+ length = sel_make_policycap();
+ if (length)
+ goto out1;
+
+ length = count;
out1:
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *canon;
+ char *canon = NULL;
u32 sid, len;
ssize_t length;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid);
- if (length < 0)
- return length;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
- if (length < 0)
- return length;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+ length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
- length = -ERANGE;
goto out;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *page;
+ char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
unsigned int new_value;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *scon, *tcon;
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
- return length;
+ goto out;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
- goto out2;
+ goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
avd.seqno, avd.flags);
-out2:
- kfree(tcon);
out:
+ kfree(tcon);
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *scon, *tcon;
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
u16 tclass;
ssize_t length;
- char *newcon;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
- return length;
+ goto out;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
- goto out2;
+ goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+ length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
- length = -ERANGE;
- goto out3;
+ goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
length = len;
-out3:
+out:
kfree(newcon);
-out2:
kfree(tcon);
-out:
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *scon, *tcon;
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
u16 tclass;
ssize_t length;
- char *newcon;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
- return length;
+ goto out;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
- goto out2;
+ goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
- if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- length = -ERANGE;
- goto out3;
- }
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT)
+ goto out;
memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
length = len;
-out3:
+out:
kfree(newcon);
-out2:
kfree(tcon);
-out:
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *con, *user, *ptr;
- u32 sid, *sids;
+ char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
+ u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
ssize_t length;
char *newcon;
int i, rc;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;;
length = -ENOMEM;
con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con)
- return length;
+ goto out;;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
- goto out2;
+ goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
ptr = buf + length;
rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
if (rc) {
length = rc;
- goto out3;
+ goto out;
}
if ((length + len) >= SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
kfree(newcon);
length = -ERANGE;
- goto out3;
+ goto out;
}
memcpy(ptr, newcon, len);
kfree(newcon);
ptr += len;
length += len;
}
-out3:
+out:
kfree(sids);
-out2:
kfree(user);
-out:
kfree(con);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *scon, *tcon;
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
u16 tclass;
ssize_t length;
- char *newcon;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER);
if (length)
- return length;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
- return length;
+ goto out;;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
- goto out2;
+ goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
- if (length < 0)
- goto out2;
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+ length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
- length = -ERANGE;
- goto out3;
+ goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
length = len;
-out3:
+out:
kfree(newcon);
-out2:
kfree(tcon);
-out:
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
if (ret) {
- ret->i_ino = get_next_ino();
ret->i_mode = mode;
ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
}
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
- if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index])) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
goto out;
- }
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!page)
goto out;
- }
cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
- if (page)
- free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
return ret;
}
if (length)
goto out;
- if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index])) {
- length = -EINVAL;
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
goto out;
- }
- if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
- length = -ENOMEM;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
- }
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- length = -EINVAL;
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
- }
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!page)
goto out;
- }
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
- if (page)
- free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
if (length)
goto out;
- if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
- length = -ENOMEM;
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
- }
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
- }
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!page)
goto out;
- }
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
+ length = 0;
if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
- security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
+ length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
- length = count;
+ if (!length)
+ length = count;
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
- if (page)
- free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
static int sel_make_bools(void)
{
- int i, ret = 0;
+ int i, ret;
ssize_t len;
struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
struct dentry *dir = bool_dir;
sel_remove_entries(dir);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (ret)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, names[i]);
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
- if (!inode) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
- if (len < 0) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
- } else if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
- ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
- goto err;
- }
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
if (ret)
- goto err;
+ goto out;
+
isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = 1;
inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
bool_num = num;
bool_pending_names = names;
bool_pending_values = values;
+
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return 0;
out:
free_page((unsigned long)page);
- return ret;
-err:
+
if (names) {
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
kfree(names[i]);
}
kfree(values);
sel_remove_entries(dir);
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
+
+ return ret;
}
#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *page;
+ char *page = NULL;
ssize_t ret;
int new_value;
- if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
- }
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!page)
goto out;
- }
- if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
- if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
- }
- if (new_value != avc_cache_threshold) {
- ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
- if (ret)
- goto out_free;
- avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
- }
+ avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
+
ret = count;
-out_free:
- free_page((unsigned long)page);
out:
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
return ret;
}
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page;
- ssize_t ret = 0;
+ ssize_t length;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- ret = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
- if (ret >= 0)
- ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, ret);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+ if (length >= 0)
+ length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
-out:
- return ret;
+
+ return length;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
{
- int i, ret = 0;
+ int i;
static struct tree_descr files[] = {
{ "cache_threshold",
&sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
- if (!inode) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
-out:
- return ret;
+
+ return 0;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
sid = inode->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret)
return ret;
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, con, len);
static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
{
- int i, ret = 0;
+ int i;
for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, security_get_initial_sid_context(i));
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
- if (!inode) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
-out:
- return ret;
+
+ return 0;
}
static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
-out:
+
return rc;
}
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
-out:
+
return rc;
}
static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
struct dentry *dir)
{
- int i, rc = 0, nperms;
+ int i, rc, nperms;
char **perms;
rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
- if (!dentry) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out1;
- }
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
- if (!inode) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out1;
- }
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+
inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
-
-out1:
+ rc = 0;
+out:
for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
kfree(perms[i]);
kfree(perms);
-out:
return rc;
}
int rc;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
- if (!dentry) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
- if (!inode) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
d_add(dentry, inode);
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "perms");
- if (!dentry) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
rc = sel_make_dir(dir->d_inode, dentry, &last_class_ino);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry);
-out:
return rc;
}
static int sel_make_classes(void)
{
- int rc = 0, nclasses, i;
+ int rc, nclasses, i;
char **classes;
/* delete any existing entries */
sel_remove_classes();
rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
- if (rc < 0)
- goto out;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
class_name_dir = d_alloc_name(class_dir, classes[i]);
- if (!class_name_dir) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out1;
- }
+ if (!class_name_dir)
+ goto out;
rc = sel_make_dir(class_dir->d_inode, class_name_dir,
&last_class_ino);
if (rc)
- goto out1;
+ goto out;
/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
class_name_dir);
if (rc)
- goto out1;
+ goto out;
}
-
-out1:
+ rc = 0;
+out:
for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
kfree(classes[i]);
kfree(classes);
-out:
return rc;
}
static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned long *ino)
{
- int ret = 0;
struct inode *inode;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
- if (!inode) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
d_add(dentry, inode);
/* bump link count on parent directory, too */
inc_nlink(dir);
-out:
- return ret;
+
+ return 0;
}
static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME);
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry)
goto err;
- }
ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
bool_dir = dentry;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry)
goto err;
- }
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
- if (!inode) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!inode)
goto err;
- }
+
inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
d_add(dentry, inode);
selinux_null = dentry;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "avc");
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry)
goto err;
- }
ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
if (ret)
goto err;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts");
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry)
goto err;
- }
ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
if (ret)
goto err;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "class");
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry)
goto err;
- }
ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
class_dir = dentry;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities");
- if (!dentry) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry)
goto err;
- }
ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
policycap_dir = dentry;
-out:
- return ret;
+ return 0;
err:
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
__func__);
- goto out;
+ return ret;
}
static struct dentry *sel_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
if (!selinux_enabled)
return 0;
err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
- if (!err) {
- selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
- if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
- err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
- selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
- }
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
+ err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
+ selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
}
+
return err;
}
{
struct policydb *p;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
booldatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_bool_val_to_name[booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, booldatum->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
return 0;
len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
- len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[index_sens - 1]);
+ len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
/* categories */
head = -2;
if (i - prev > 1) {
/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
if (head != prev) {
- nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
- nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
+ nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
head = i;
}
prev = i;
}
if (prev != head) {
- nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
if (l == 0) {
scontextp++;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
- strcpy(scontextp,
- policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS,
+ context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
/* categories */
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
- nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
*scontextp++ = ':';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
- nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
+ nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
head = i;
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
- nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
strcpy(scontextp, nm);
scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return 0;
levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
- p->p_sens_val_to_name[l->sens - 1]);
+ sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return 0;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
- oldp->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
+ c->range.level[l].sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
int rc;
catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
- oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
+ sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
int rc;
struct role_datum *role;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!role) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!role)
goto out;
- }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
- if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_free_role;
- }
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_role;
- }
+ if (!key)
+ goto out;
+
rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_key;
-out:
- return rc;
+ goto out;
-out_free_key:
+ return 0;
+out:
kfree(key);
-out_free_role:
kfree(role);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], symtab_sizes[i]);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_symtab;
+ goto out;
}
rc = avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_symtab;
+ goto out;
rc = roles_init(p);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_symtab;
+ goto out;
rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_symtab;
+ goto out;
p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
if (!p->range_tr)
- goto out_free_symtab;
+ goto out;
ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
+ return 0;
out:
- return rc;
-
-out_free_symtab:
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
/*
{
struct policydb *p;
struct common_datum *comdatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
comdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_common_val_to_name[comdatum->value - 1] = key;
+
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, comdatum->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
return 0;
}
{
struct policydb *p;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
cladatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_class_val_to_name[cladatum->value - 1] = key;
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, cladatum->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
return 0;
}
{
struct policydb *p;
struct role_datum *role;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
role = datum;
p = datap;
|| role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
|| role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1] = key;
+
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, role->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
return 0;
}
{
struct policydb *p;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
typdatum = datum;
p = datap;
|| typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
|| typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_type_val_to_name[typdatum->value - 1] = key;
- p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, typdatum->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
+
+ fa = p->type_val_to_struct_array;
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, typdatum->value - 1, typdatum,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
}
return 0;
{
struct policydb *p;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
usrdatum = datum;
p = datap;
|| usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
|| usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_user_val_to_name[usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
+
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, usrdatum->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
return 0;
}
{
struct policydb *p;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
levdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_sens_val_to_name[levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key;
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, levdatum->level->sens - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
}
return 0;
{
struct policydb *p;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ struct flex_array *fa;
catdatum = datum;
p = datap;
if (!catdatum->isalias) {
if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
return -EINVAL;
- p->p_cat_val_to_name[catdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ fa = p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS];
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(fa, catdatum->value - 1, key,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO))
+ BUG();
}
return 0;
cat_index,
};
-/*
- * Define the common val_to_name array and the class
- * val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays in a policy
- * database structure.
- *
- * Caller must clean up upon failure.
- */
-static int policydb_index_classes(struct policydb *p)
-{
- int rc;
-
- p->p_common_val_to_name =
- kmalloc(p->p_commons.nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->p_common_val_to_name) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = hashtab_map(p->p_commons.table, common_index, p);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- p->class_val_to_struct =
- kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->class_val_to_struct) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- p->p_class_val_to_name =
- kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->p_class_val_to_name) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = hashtab_map(p->p_classes.table, class_index, p);
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
{
*
* Caller must clean up on failure.
*/
-static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
+static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
{
- int i, rc = 0;
+ int i, rc;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
#endif
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ p->class_val_to_struct =
+ kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
p->role_val_to_struct =
kmalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->role_val_to_struct) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
goto out;
- }
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
p->user_val_to_struct =
kmalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->user_val_to_struct) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
goto out;
- }
- p->type_val_to_struct =
- kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(*(p->type_val_to_struct)),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->type_val_to_struct) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ /* Yes, I want the sizeof the pointer, not the structure */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ p->type_val_to_struct_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct type_datum *),
+ p->p_types.nprim,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!p->type_val_to_struct_array)
goto out;
- }
- if (cond_init_bool_indexes(p)) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_val_to_struct_array, 0,
+ p->p_types.nprim - 1, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (rc)
goto out;
- }
- for (i = SYM_ROLES; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
- p->sym_val_to_name[i] =
- kmalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i]) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (cond_init_bool_indexes(p))
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ p->sym_val_to_name[i] = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(char *),
+ p->symtab[i].nprim,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
goto out;
- }
+
+ rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->sym_val_to_name[i],
+ 0, p->symtab[i].nprim - 1,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
-
+ rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
struct common_datum *comdatum;
kfree(key);
- comdatum = datum;
- hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
- hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
+ if (datum) {
+ comdatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
+ }
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
kfree(key);
- cladatum = datum;
- hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
- hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
- constraint = cladatum->constraints;
- while (constraint) {
- e = constraint->expr;
- while (e) {
- ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
- etmp = e;
- e = e->next;
- kfree(etmp);
+ if (datum) {
+ cladatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
+ constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ kfree(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
}
- ctemp = constraint;
- constraint = constraint->next;
- kfree(ctemp);
- }
-
- constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
- while (constraint) {
- e = constraint->expr;
- while (e) {
- ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
- etmp = e;
- e = e->next;
- kfree(etmp);
+
+ constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ kfree(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
}
- ctemp = constraint;
- constraint = constraint->next;
- kfree(ctemp);
- }
- kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+ kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+ }
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
struct role_datum *role;
kfree(key);
- role = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
- ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+ if (datum) {
+ role = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+ }
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
kfree(key);
- usrdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
- ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+ if (datum) {
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+ }
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
struct level_datum *levdatum;
kfree(key);
- levdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
- kfree(levdatum->level);
+ if (datum) {
+ levdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ kfree(levdatum->level);
+ }
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
}
- for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
- kfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ if (p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+ flex_array_free(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+ }
kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
- kfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
+ if (p->type_val_to_struct_array)
+ flex_array_free(p->type_val_to_struct_array);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!c->context[0].user) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: SID %s was never "
- "defined.\n", c->u.name);
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n",
+ c->u.name);
goto out;
}
- if (sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0])) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load initial "
- "SID %s.\n", c->u.name);
- rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+ c->u.name);
goto out;
}
}
+ rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
* Role must be authorized for the type.
*/
role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
- if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types,
- c->type - 1))
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
/* role may not be associated with type */
return 0;
if (!usrdatum)
return 0;
- if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles,
- c->role - 1))
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles, c->role - 1))
/* user may not be associated with role */
return 0;
}
int rc;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: range overflow\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
+
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated range\n");
goto out;
}
+
r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (items > 1)
r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading low "
- "categories\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n");
goto out;
}
if (items > 1) {
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading high "
- "categories\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n");
goto bad_high;
}
} else {
}
}
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad_high:
ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
- goto out;
+out:
+ return rc;
}
/*
int rc;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: context truncated\n");
goto out;
}
c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
- if (mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: error reading MLS range of "
- "context\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
goto out;
}
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: invalid security context\n");
context_destroy(c);
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
+ rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
__le32 buf[2];
u32 len;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!perdatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!perdatum)
+ goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
+
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
+
+ return 0;
bad:
perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
u32 len, nel;
int i, rc;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!comdatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!comdatum)
+ goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
+
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, comdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
*nodep = c;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
return rc;
c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
c->expr = e;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
return rc;
e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
return -EINVAL;
depth++;
- if (ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp))
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
int i, rc;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cladatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!cladatum)
+ goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
+
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
if (len2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cladatum->comkey) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cladatum->comkey)
goto bad;
- }
rc = next_entry(cladatum->comkey, fp, len2);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->comkey[len2] = '\0';
- cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table,
- cladatum->comkey);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, cladatum->comkey);
if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unknown common %s\n",
- cladatum->comkey);
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unknown common %s\n", cladatum->comkey);
goto bad;
}
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
/* grab the validatetrans rules */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1, fp);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!role) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!role)
+ goto bad;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 3;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
+
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
goto bad;
if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
OBJECT_R, role->value);
- rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
rc = 0;
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, role);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[4];
u32 len;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!typdatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- return rc;
- }
+ if (!typdatum)
+ goto bad;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 4;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
}
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
- goto bad;
+ return rc;
}
lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- if (ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading level "
- "categories\n");
- goto bad;
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n");
+ return rc;
}
-
return 0;
-
-bad:
- return -EINVAL;
}
static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!usrdatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto bad;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 3;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, usrdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[2];
u32 len;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!levdatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!levdatum)
+ goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!levdatum->level) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!levdatum->level)
goto bad;
- }
- if (mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
- }
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, levdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!catdatum) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!catdatum)
+ goto bad;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!key) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!key)
goto bad;
- }
rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
-out:
- return rc;
-
+ return 0;
bad:
cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) =
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
"user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
- p->p_user_val_to_name[user->value - 1],
- p->p_role_val_to_name[bit],
- p->p_user_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, upper->value - 1));
return -EINVAL;
}
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
"role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
- p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1],
- p->p_type_val_to_name[bit],
- p->p_role_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, upper->value - 1));
return -EINVAL;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
- upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ upper = flex_array_get_ptr(p->type_val_to_struct_array,
+ upper->bounds - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!upper);
+
if (upper->attribute) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
"bounded by attribute %s",
(char *) key,
- p->p_type_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
return -EINVAL;
}
}
rc = policydb_init(p);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
/* Read the magic number and string length. */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
"not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
goto bad;
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string length %d does not "
len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
goto bad;
}
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!policydb_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
"string of length %d\n", len);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
+
rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
kfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
}
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
policydb_str[len] = '\0';
if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
/* Read the version and table sizes. */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
p->mls_enabled = 1;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: security policydb version %d "
"(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
- if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP &&
- ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp) != 0)
- goto bad;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
- if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE &&
- ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp) != 0)
- goto bad;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if (!info) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
goto bad;
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ltr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
tr = kzalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tr) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!tr)
goto bad;
- }
if (ltr)
ltr->next = tr;
else
p->role_tr = tr;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
- !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role))
goto bad;
- }
ltr = tr;
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
lra = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
ra = kzalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ra) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!ra)
goto bad;
- }
if (lra)
lra->next = ra;
else
p->role_allow = ra;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
- !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role))
goto bad;
- }
lra = ra;
}
- rc = policydb_index_classes(p);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
-
- rc = policydb_index_others(p);
+ rc = policydb_index(p);
if (rc)
goto bad;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
if (!p->process_class)
goto bad;
- p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class,
- "transition");
- p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class,
- "dyntransition");
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
+ p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
if (!p->process_trans_perms)
goto bad;
out:
return rc;
bad:
- if (!rc)
- rc = -EINVAL;
policydb_destroy(p);
goto out;
}
if (!info) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
"version %d", p->policyvers);
- return rc;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
- char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
-#define p_common_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS]
-#define p_class_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES]
-#define p_role_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES]
-#define p_type_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES]
-#define p_user_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS]
-#define p_bool_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS]
-#define p_sens_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS]
-#define p_cat_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS]
+ struct flex_array *sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
- struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
+ struct flex_array *type_val_to_struct_array;
/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
struct avtab te_avtab;
return 0;
}
+static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned int element_nr)
+{
+ struct flex_array *fa = p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num];
+
+ return flex_array_get_ptr(fa, element_nr);
+}
+
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
if (!permissions)
return;
- tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+ tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
struct context lo_scontext;
struct context lo_tcontext;
struct av_decision lo_avd;
- struct type_datum *source
- = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
- struct type_datum *target
- = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+ struct type_datum *source;
+ struct type_datum *target;
u32 masked = 0;
+ source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+ scontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!source);
+
+ target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+ tcontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!target);
+
if (source->bounds) {
memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
- if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
+ if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
goto out;
- if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+ if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
goto out;
- if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"security_validate_transition: denied for"
" oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
- o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+ o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
out:
kfree(o);
kfree(n);
struct context *old_context, *new_context;
struct type_datum *type;
int index;
- int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
if (!old_context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
goto out;
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
if (!new_context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
goto out;
}
+ rc = 0;
/* type/domain unchanged */
- if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
- rc = 0;
+ if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
goto out;
- }
index = new_context->type;
while (true) {
- type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
+ type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+ index - 1);
BUG_ON(!type);
/* not bounded anymore */
- if (!type->bounds) {
- rc = -EPERM;
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (!type->bounds)
break;
- }
/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
- if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
- rc = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
break;
- }
+
index = type->bounds;
}
}
/* Compute the size of the context. */
- *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
- *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
- *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
if (!scontext)
* Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
*/
sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
- policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
- policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
- policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
- 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
- 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+ sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+ sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+ sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+ scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) +
+ 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) +
+ 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
if (rc)
goto out;
- if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
goto out;
- }
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
- if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
- }
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc)
if (force) {
/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
- if (!str) {
- kfree(scontext2);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (!str)
+ goto out;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
- rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
- scontext2, scontext_len,
- &context, def_sid);
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
+ scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
context.len = scontext_len;
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
- goto out;
+ goto out_unlock;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
context_destroy(&context);
-out:
+out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+out:
kfree(scontext2);
kfree(str);
return rc;
char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
- if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
+ if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
goto out;
- if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+ if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
goto out;
- if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+ if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
" for scontext=%s"
" tcontext=%s"
" tclass=%s",
- n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+ n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
out:
kfree(s);
kfree(t);
static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
- if (selinux_enforcing) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- } else {
- char *s;
- u32 len;
-
- if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
- s);
- kfree(s);
- }
+ if (selinux_enforcing)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
+ kfree(s);
}
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
struct convert_context_args {
if (c->str) {
struct context ctx;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!s) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!s)
goto out;
- }
+
rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(s);
if (!rc) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
c->str);
/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
kfree(c->str);
goto out;
} else {
/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
c->str, -rc);
goto out;
}
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = -EINVAL;
-
/* Convert the user. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
- args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
c->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Convert the role. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
- args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
if (!role)
goto bad;
c->role = role->value;
/* Convert the type. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
- args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
c->type = typdatum->value;
oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
oc = oc->next;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!oc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
" the initial SIDs list\n");
}
context_destroy(&oldc);
+
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
bad:
/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
- if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
context_destroy(&oldc);
context_destroy(c);
c->str = s;
c->len = len;
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
c->str);
rc = 0;
goto out;
u32 addrlen,
u32 *out_sid)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;
struct ocontext *c;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
case AF_INET: {
u32 addr;
- if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
goto out;
- }
addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
}
case AF_INET6:
- if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
goto out;
- }
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
while (c) {
if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
break;
default:
+ rc = 0;
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
goto out;
}
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
}
+ rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
context_init(&usercon);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
- if (!fromcon) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!fromcon)
goto out_unlock;
- }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
- if (!user) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!user)
goto out_unlock;
- }
+
usercon.user = user->value;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!mysids) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!mysids)
goto out_unlock;
- }
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
if (mynel < maxnel) {
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
} else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!mysids2) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!mysids2)
goto out_unlock;
- }
memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
kfree(mysids);
mysids = mysids2;
}
}
}
-
+ rc = 0;
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc || !mynel) {
goto out;
}
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mysids2) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
kfree(mysids);
goto out;
}
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
+ int rc, cmp = 0;
while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
break;
}
- if (!genfs || cmp) {
- *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- rc = -ENOENT;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ if (!genfs || cmp)
goto out;
- }
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
break;
}
- if (!c) {
- *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- rc = -ENOENT;
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ if (!c)
goto out;
- }
if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
*sid = c->sid[0];
+ rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
if (c) {
*behavior = c->v.behavior;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
&c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
{
- int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
+ int i, rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
*names = NULL;
*values = NULL;
+ rc = 0;
*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if (!*len) {
- rc = 0;
+ if (!*len)
goto out;
- }
- *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*names)
goto err;
- *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*values)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
size_t name_len;
+
(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
- name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
- (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*names)[i])
goto err;
- strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
+
+ strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len);
(*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
}
rc = 0;
int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
{
- int i, rc = 0;
+ int i, rc;
int lenp, seqno = 0;
struct cond_node *cur;
write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = -EFAULT;
lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if (len != lenp) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
+ if (len != lenp)
goto out;
- }
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
- policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+ sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
!!values[i],
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
}
seqno = ++latest_granting;
-
+ rc = 0;
out:
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
if (!rc) {
int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;
int len;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = -EFAULT;
len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if (bool >= len) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
+ if (bool >= len)
goto out;
- }
rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
out:
struct context newcon;
char *s;
u32 len;
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc;
+ rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
*new_sid = sid;
goto out;
context_init(&newcon);
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context1) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, sid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
if (!context2) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, mls_sid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
- if (rc)
- goto bad;
+ if (rc) {
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
}
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
- goto out_unlock;
-
-bad:
- if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
- audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
- kfree(s);
- }
-
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcon);
struct context *nlbl_ctx;
struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
/* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
* right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
* single or absent peer SID/label */
/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
* nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
* security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
- if (!policydb.mls_enabled) {
- *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
return 0;
- }
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
if (!nlbl_ctx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, nlbl_sid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_slowpath;
+ goto out;
}
+ rc = -EINVAL;
xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
if (!xfrm_ctx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, xfrm_sid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_slowpath;
+ goto out;
}
rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
-out_slowpath:
+ /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+ * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+ * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+ * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+ * expressive */
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
- if (rc == 0)
- /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
- * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
- * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
- * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
- * expressive */
- *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
- else
- *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
return rc;
}
int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
{
- int rc = -ENOMEM;
+ int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*classes)
rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
*classes);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
kfree((*classes)[i]);
int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
{
- int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
+ int rc, i;
struct class_datum *match;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
if (!match) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
__func__, class);
- rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
*nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
*perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*perms)
if (match->comdatum) {
rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
get_permissions_callback, *perms);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto err;
}
rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
*perms);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc)
goto err;
out:
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
if (!userdatum)
- rc = -EINVAL;
- else
- tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
if (!roledatum)
- rc = -EINVAL;
- else
- tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
if (!typedatum)
- rc = -EINVAL;
- else
- tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
break;
}
-
+ rc = 0;
+out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc) {
int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid)
{
- int rc = -EIDRM;
+ int rc;
struct context *ctx;
struct context ctx_new;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
- if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
- rc = 0;
- } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
- rc = 0;
- } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+ rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
if (ctx == NULL)
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
+ goto out;
context_init(&ctx_new);
ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
- if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
- secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
+ rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
+ secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
}
- if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
+ goto out_free;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
- if (rc != 0)
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
- } else {
+ } else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
- rc = 0;
- }
-netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
- return rc;
-netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
+ return 0;
+out_free:
ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
- goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
}
/**
return 0;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- rc = -ENOENT;
- goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
- }
- secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
- }
+ if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
secattr->attr.secid = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
- if (rc != 0)
- goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
- read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
-
- return 0;
-
-netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
+out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
return rc;
}
+static void sidtab_update_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_node *n, int loc)
+{
+ BUG_ON(loc >= SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN);
+
+ while (loc > 0) {
+ s->cache[loc] = s->cache[loc - 1];
+ loc--;
+ }
+ s->cache[0] = n;
+}
+
static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
struct context *context)
{
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
cur = s->htable[i];
while (cur) {
- if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context))
+ if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context)) {
+ sidtab_update_cache(s, cur, SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN - 1);
return cur->sid;
+ }
cur = cur->next;
}
}
return 0;
}
+static inline u32 sidtab_search_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct sidtab_node *node;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++) {
+ node = s->cache[i];
+ if (unlikely(!node))
+ return 0;
+ if (context_cmp(&node->context, context)) {
+ sidtab_update_cache(s, node, i);
+ return node->sid;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
struct context *context,
u32 *out_sid)
*out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
- sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+ sid = sidtab_search_cache(s, context);
+ if (!sid)
+ sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
if (!sid) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
/* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
spin_lock_irqsave(&src->lock, flags);
dst->htable = src->htable;
dst->nel = src->nel;
dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
dst->shutdown = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++)
+ dst->cache[i] = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->lock, flags);
}
unsigned int nel; /* number of elements */
unsigned int next_sid; /* next SID to allocate */
unsigned char shutdown;
+#define SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN 3
+ struct sidtab_node *cache[SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN];
spinlock_t lock;
};
*/
struct inode_smack {
char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
+ char *smk_task; /* label of the task */
struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
};
+struct task_smack {
+ char *smk_task; /* label used for access control */
+ char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
+};
+
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
+#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
/*
* A label access rule.
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL 255 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 239 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+/*
+ * Flag for transmute access
+ */
+#define MAY_TRANSMUTE 64
/*
* Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
*/
/*
* These functions are in smack_access.c
*/
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *);
int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
}
+/*
+ * Is the directory transmuting?
+ */
+static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
+}
+
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob.
*/
return sip->smk_inode;
}
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+ return tsp->smk_task;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+ return tsp->smk_forked;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
+{
+ return smk_of_task(current_security());
+}
+
/*
* logging functions
*/
*/
int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+/**
+ * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found,
+ * NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * NOTE:
+ * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
+ * labels that come in off the network can't be imported
+ * and added to the list for locking reasons.
+ *
+ * Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels,
+ * not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels
+ * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
+ * optimization.
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
+{
+ u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+ struct smack_rule *srp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+ if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
+ strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
+ if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
+ strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) {
+ may = srp->smk_access;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return may;
+}
+
/**
* smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
u32 may = MAY_NOT;
- struct smack_rule *srp;
int rc = 0;
/*
* access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
* good.
*/
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
- if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
- strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
- if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
- strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) {
- may = srp->smk_access;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label);
/*
* This is a bit map operation.
*/
int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
int rc;
- char *sp = current_security();
+ char *sp = smk_of_current();
rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
* only one that gets privilege and current does not
* have that label.
*/
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
+ if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
goto out_audit;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
*
* This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
*
- * Author:
+ * Authors:
* Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
+#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
+#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
+
/**
* smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
* @ip: a pointer to the inode
* Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
* or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
*/
-static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
+static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
{
int rc;
char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
return NULL;
- rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
+ rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
if (rc < 0)
return NULL;
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- sp = current_security();
- tsp = task_security(ctp);
+ sp = smk_of_current();
+ tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
- sp = current_security();
- tsp = task_security(ptp);
+ sp = smk_of_current();
+ tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
{
int rc = 0;
- char *sp = current_security();
+ char *sp = smk_of_current();
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
+/*
+ * BPRM hooks
+ */
+
+static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct dentry *dp;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ dp = bprm->file->f_dentry;
+
+ if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
+
+ if (isp->smk_task != NULL)
+ tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Inode hooks
*/
*/
static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current_security());
+ inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
{
char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+ char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+ u32 may;
if (name) {
*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (value) {
+ may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp);
+
+ /*
+ * If the access rule allows transmutation and
+ * the directory requests transmutation then
+ * by all means transmute.
+ */
+ if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
+ isp = dsp;
+
*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
if (*value == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
/*
if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
rc = -EINVAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
+ strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
} else
rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- struct inode_smack *isp;
char *nsp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
- /*
- * Not SMACK
- */
- if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
- return;
-
- isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
-
- /*
- * No locking is done here. This is a pointer
- * assignment.
- */
- nsp = smk_import(value, size);
- if (nsp != NULL)
- isp->smk_inode = nsp;
- else
- isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+ nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+ if (nsp != NULL)
+ isp->smk_inode = nsp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+ nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+ if (nsp != NULL)
+ isp->smk_task = nsp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
return;
}
*/
static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
if (rc == 0)
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ isp->smk_task = NULL;
+ }
+
return rc;
}
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = current_security();
+ file->f_security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
*/
static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = current_security();
+ file->f_security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
{
struct file *file;
int rc;
- char *tsp = tsk->cred->security;
+ char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
/*
*/
static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- cred->security = NULL;
+ cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
*/
static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- cred->security = NULL;
+ kfree(cred->security);
}
/**
static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- new->security = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+
+ new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+ if (new_tsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ new->security = new_tsp;
return 0;
}
*/
static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- new->security = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+
+ new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
}
/**
*/
static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
if (smack == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- new->security = smack;
+ new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
return 0;
}
struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
- new->security = isp->smk_inode;
+ tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
+ tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
return 0;
}
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), access, &ad);
+ return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
}
/**
*/
static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = smack_to_secid(task_security(p));
+ *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
}
/**
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0)
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
+ &ad);
/*
* If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p),
- MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
+ smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *sp = current_security();
- char *tsp = task_security(p);
+ char *sp = smk_of_current();
+ char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
int rc;
/* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
- rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+ rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
goto out_log;
out_log:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
- smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+ smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- isp->smk_inode = task_security(p);
+ isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
}
/*
*/
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
- char *csp = current_security();
+ char *csp = smk_of_current();
struct socket_smack *ssp;
ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
ssp->smk_in = sp;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
ssp->smk_out = sp;
- rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
- if (rc != 0)
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
- __func__, -rc);
+ if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
+ rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
+ __func__, -rc);
+ }
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- msg->security = current_security();
+ msg->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
- isp->security = current_security();
+ isp->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
- isp->security = current_security();
+ isp->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
- kisp->security = current_security();
+ kisp->security = smk_of_current();
return 0;
}
struct super_block *sbp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
struct inode_smack *isp;
- char *csp = current_security();
+ char *csp = smk_of_current();
char *fetched;
char *final;
+ char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
+ int transflag = 0;
struct dentry *dp;
if (inode == NULL)
break;
case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
/*
- * Casey says sockets get the smack of the task.
+ * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+ * structures associated with the task involved.
*/
- final = csp;
+ final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
break;
case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
/*
/*
* This isn't an understood special case.
* Get the value from the xattr.
- *
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
+ */
+ if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+ final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
* No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
* Use the aforeapplied default.
* It would be curious if the label of the task
* Get the dentry for xattr.
*/
dp = dget(opt_dentry);
- fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp);
- if (fetched != NULL)
+ fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+ if (fetched != NULL) {
final = fetched;
+ if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+ trattr[0] = '\0';
+ inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+ trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
+ if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
+ TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0)
+ transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ }
+ }
+ isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+
dput(dp);
break;
}
else
isp->smk_inode = final;
- isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+ isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
unlockandout:
mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- cp = kstrdup(task_security(p), GFP_KERNEL);
+ cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (cp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct task_smack *oldtsp;
struct cred *new;
char *newsmack;
if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
return -EPERM;
+ oldtsp = p->cred->security;
new = prepare_creds();
if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- new->security = newsmack;
+ tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (tsp == NULL) {
+ kfree(new);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
+ tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked;
+ new->security = tsp;
commit_creds(new);
return size;
}
static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock->sk_socket);
- struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other->sk_socket);
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
- return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op),
- MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+ return rc;
}
/**
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
- return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+
+ return rc;
}
/**
/**
* smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
- * @sock: the socket
+ * @sock: the peer socket
* @skb: packet data
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sock *sk;
+ struct socket_smack *sp;
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
- int family = PF_INET;
- u32 s;
+ int family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
int rc;
- /*
- * Only works for families with packets.
- */
- if (sock != NULL) {
- sk = sock->sk;
- if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
- return 0;
- family = sk->sk_family;
+ if (skb != NULL) {
+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+ family = PF_INET6;
}
- /*
- * Translate what netlabel gave us.
- */
- netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
- rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
- if (rc == 0)
- smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
- netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
+ family = sock->sk->sk_family;
- /*
- * Give up if we couldn't get anything
- */
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-
- s = smack_to_secid(smack);
+ if (family == PF_UNIX) {
+ sp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ s = smack_to_secid(sp->smk_out);
+ } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+ /*
+ * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+ */
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
+ s = smack_to_secid(smack);
+ }
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ }
+ *secid = s;
if (s == 0)
return -EINVAL;
-
- *secid = s;
return 0;
}
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
- ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
+ ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
}
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- key->security = cred->security;
+ key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
return 0;
}
{
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (keyp == NULL)
/*
* This should not occur
*/
- if (cred->security == NULL)
+ if (tsp == NULL)
return -EACCES;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
#endif
- return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security,
+ return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.sb_mount = smack_sb_mount,
.sb_umount = smack_sb_umount,
+ .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
+
.inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
.inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
.inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
struct cred *cred;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
- if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (tsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) {
+ kfree(tsp);
return 0;
+ }
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
* Set the security state for the initial task.
*/
cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
- cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ cred->security = tsp;
/* initialize the smack_know_list */
init_smack_know_list();
* SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field
* SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length
*/
-#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxa"
-#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
-#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
+#define SMK_OACCESS "rwxa"
+#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxat"
+#define SMK_OACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_OLOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN)
+#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
/**
* smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
{
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+ nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
}
/*
seq_putc(s, 'x');
if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
seq_putc(s, 'a');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+ seq_putc(s, 't');
if (srp->smk_access == 0)
seq_putc(s, '-');
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (*ppos != 0 || count != SMK_LOADLEN)
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Minor hack for backward compatability
+ */
+ if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
return -EINVAL;
- data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ data = kzalloc(SMK_LOADLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+ /*
+ * More on the minor hack for backward compatability
+ */
+ if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN))
+ data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-';
+
rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
if (rule == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_rule;
}
+ switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 4]) {
+ case '-':
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ case 'T':
+ rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out_free_rule;
+ }
+
rc = smk_set_access(rule);
if (!rc)
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
- char *sp = current->cred->security;
+ char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
projects / mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git / commitdiff