Visual inspection of the usbvision driver shows that it suffers from
three races between its open, close, and disconnect handlers. In
particular, the driver is careful to update its usbvision->user and
usbvision->remove_pending flags while holding the private mutex, but:
usbvision_v4l2_close() and usbvision_radio_close() don't hold
the mutex while they check the value of
usbvision->remove_pending;
usbvision_disconnect() doesn't hold the mutex while checking
the value of usbvision->user; and
also, usbvision_v4l2_open() and usbvision_radio_open() don't
check whether the device has been unplugged before allowing
the user to open the device files.
Each of these can potentially lead to usbvision_release() being called
twice and use-after-free errors.
This patch fixes the races by reading the flags while the mutex is
still held and checking for pending removes before allowing an open to
succeed.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The syzbot fuzzer found two invalid-access bugs in the usbvision
driver. These bugs occur when userspace keeps the device file open
after the device has been disconnected and usbvision_disconnect() has
set usbvision->dev to NULL:
When the device file is closed, usbvision_radio_close() tries
to issue a usb_set_interface() call, passing the NULL pointer
as its first argument.
If userspace performs a querycap ioctl call, vidioc_querycap()
calls usb_make_path() with the same NULL pointer.
This patch fixes the problems by making the appropriate tests
beforehand. Note that vidioc_querycap() is protected by
usbvision->v4l2_lock, acquired in a higher layer of the V4L2
subsystem.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7fa38a608b1075dfd634@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
There is the same incorrect approach to locking implemented in
vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(), vivid_stop_generating_vid_out() and
sdr_cap_stop_streaming().
These functions are called during streaming stopping with vivid_dev.mutex
locked. And they all do the same mistake while stopping their kthreads,
which need to lock this mutex as well. See the example from
vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap():
/* shutdown control thread */
vivid_grab_controls(dev, false);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
kthread_stop(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
But when this mutex is unlocked, another vb2_fop_read() can lock it
instead of vivid_thread_vid_cap() and manipulate the buffer queue.
That causes a use-after-free access later.
To fix those issues let's:
1. avoid unlocking the mutex in vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(),
vivid_stop_generating_vid_out() and sdr_cap_stop_streaming();
2. use mutex_trylock() with schedule_timeout_uninterruptible() in
the loops of the vivid kthread handlers.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # for v3.18 and up Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
When vbi stream is started, followed by video streaming,
the vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming were not being set to true,
which would cause the video stream to stop when vbi stream is stopped.
This patch allows to set vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming to true.
According to Hans Verkuil it appears that these 'if (dev->kthread_vid_cap)'
checks are a left-over from the original vivid development and should never
have been there.
Signed-off-by: Vandana BN <bnvandana@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # for v3.18 and up Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The s6i6_gen2_info.ports[] array had the Mixer and PCM port type
entries in the wrong place. Use designators to explicitly specify the
array elements being set.
Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g@b4.vu> Tested-by: Alex Fellows <alex.fellows@gmail.com> Tested-by: Markus Schroetter <project.m.schroetter@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110134356.GA31589@b4.vu Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
snd_usb_mixer_controls_badd() that parses UAC3 BADD profiles misses a
NULL check for the given interfaces. When a malformed USB descriptor
is passed, this may lead to an Oops, as spotted by syzkaller.
Skip the iteration if the interface doesn't exist for avoiding the
crash.
Robust futexes utilize the robust_list mechanism to allow the kernel to
release futexes which are held when a task exits. The exit can be voluntary
or caused by a signal or fault. This prevents that waiters block forever.
The futex operations in user space store a pointer to the futex they are
either locking or unlocking in the op_pending member of the per task robust
list.
After a lock operation has succeeded the futex is queued in the robust list
linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.
After an unlock operation has succeeded the futex is removed from the
robust list linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.
The robust list exit code checks for the pending operation and any futex
which is queued in the linked list. It carefully checks whether the futex
value is the TID of the exiting task. If so, it sets the OWNER_DIED bit and
tries to wake up a potential waiter.
This is race free for the lock operation but unlock has two race scenarios
where waiters might not be woken up. These issues can be observed with
regular robust pthread mutexes. PI aware pthread mutexes are not affected.
(1) Unlocking task is killed after unlocking the futex value in user space
before being able to wake a waiter.
pthread_mutex_unlock()
|
V
atomic_exchange_rel (&mutex->__data.__lock, 0)
<------------------------killed
lll_futex_wake () |
|
|(__lock = 0)
|(enter kernel)
|
V
do_exit()
exit_mm()
mm_release()
exit_robust_list()
handle_futex_death()
|
|(__lock = 0)
|(uval = 0)
|
V
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
return 0;
The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned by
the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters which in consequence
block infinitely.
(2) Waiting task is killed after a wakeup and before it can acquire the
futex in user space.
OWNER WAITER
futex_wait()
pthread_mutex_unlock() |
| |
|(__lock = 0) |
| |
V |
futex_wake() ------------> wakeup()
|
|(return to userspace)
|(__lock = 0)
|
V
oldval = mutex->__data.__lock
<-----------------killed
atomic_compare_and_exchange_val_acq (&mutex->__data.__lock, |
id | assume_other_futex_waiters, 0) |
|
|
(enter kernel)|
|
V
do_exit()
|
|
V
handle_futex_death()
|
|(__lock = 0)
|(uval = 0)
|
V
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
return 0;
The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned
by the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters, which seems to
be correct as the exiting task does not own the futex value, but
the consequence is that other waiters wont be woken up and block
infinitely.
In both scenarios the following conditions are true:
- task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
- user space futex value == 0
- Regular futex (not PI)
If these conditions are met then it is reasonably safe to wake up a
potential waiter in order to prevent the above problems.
As this might be a false positive it can cause spurious wakeups, but the
waiter side has to handle other types of unrelated wakeups, e.g. signals
gracefully anyway. So such a spurious wakeup will not affect the
correctness of these operations.
This workaround must not touch the user space futex value and cannot set
the OWNER_DIED bit because the lock value is 0, i.e. uncontended. Setting
OWNER_DIED in this case would result in inconsistent state and subsequently
in malfunction of the owner died handling in user space.
The rest of the user space state is still consistent as no other task can
observe the list_op_pending entry in the exiting tasks robust list.
The eventually woken up waiter will observe the uncontended lock value and
take it over.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog and comment. Made the return explicit and not
depend on the subsequent check and added constants to hand into
handle_futex_death() instead of plain numbers. Fixed a few coding
style issues. ]
Fixes: 0771dfefc9e5 ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core") Signed-off-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573010582-35297-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224555.943191378@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK needs to read the GDT, and the GDT mapping that
can be accessed via %fs is not mapped in the user pagetables. Use
SGDT to find the cpu_entry_area mapping and read the espfix offset
from that instead.
Reported-and-tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
When two recent commits that increased the size of the 'struct cpu_entry_area'
were merged in -tip, the 32-bit defconfig build started failing on the following
build time assert:
./include/linux/compiler.h:391:38: error: call to ‘__compiletime_assert_189’ declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c:189:2: note: in expansion of macro ‘BUILD_BUG_ON’
In function ‘setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes’,
Which corresponds to the following build time assert:
The purpose of this assert is to sanity check the fixed-value definition of
CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h:
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 41)
The '41' is supposed to match sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area)/PAGE_SIZE, which value
we didn't want to define in such a low level header, because it would cause
dependency hell.
Every time the size of cpu_entry_area is changed, we have to adjust CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES
accordingly - and this assert is checking that constraint.
But the assert is both imprecise and buggy, primarily because it doesn't
include the single readonly IDT page that is mapped at CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE
(which begins at a PMD boundary).
This bug was hidden by the fact that by accident CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES is defined
too large upstream (v5.4-rc8):
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 40)
While 'struct cpu_entry_area' is 155648 bytes, or 38 pages. So we had two extra
pages, which hid the bug.
The following commit (not yet upstream) increased the size to 40 pages:
x86/iopl: ("Restrict iopl() permission scope")
... but increased CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES only 41 - i.e. shortening the gap
to just 1 extra page.
Then another not-yet-upstream commit changed the size again:
880a98c33996: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit")
Which increased the cpu_entry_area size from 38 to 39 pages, but
didn't change CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (kept it at 40). This worked
fine, because we still had a page left from the accidental 'reserve'.
But when these two commits were merged into the same tree, the
combined size of cpu_entry_area grew from 38 to 40 pages, while
CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES finally caught up to 40 as well.
Which is fine in terms of functionality, but the assert broke:
This takes the IDT page into account, and also connects the size-based
define of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE with the address-subtraction based
define of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE.
Also clean up some of the names which made it rather confusing:
- 'CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOT_SIZE' wasn't actually the 'total' size of
the cpu-entry-area, but the per-cpu array size, so rename this
to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_ARRAY_SIZE.
- Introduce CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE that _is_ the total mapping
size, with the IDT included.
- Add comments where '+1' denotes the IDT mapping - it wasn't
obvious and took me about 3 hours to decode...
Finally, because this particular commit is actually applied after
this patch:
880a98c33996: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit")
Fix the CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES value from 40 pages to the correct 39 pages.
All future commits that change cpu_entry_area will have to adjust
this value precisely.
As a side note, we should probably attempt to remove CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES
and derive its value directly from the structure, without causing
header hell - but that is an adventure for another day! :-)
Fixes: 880a98c33996: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit") Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
If the kernel accidentally uses DS or ES while the user values are
loaded, it will work fine for sane userspace. In the interest of
simulating maximally insane userspace, make sigreturn_32 zero out DS
and ES for the nasty parts so that inadvertent use of these segments
will crash.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
For reasons that I haven't quite fully diagnosed, running
mov_ss_trap_32 on a 32-bit kernel results in an infinite loop in
userspace. This appears to be because the hacky SYSENTER test
doesn't segfault as desired; instead it corrupts the program state
such that it infinite loops.
Fix it by explicitly clearing EBP before doing SYSENTER. This will
give a more reliable segfault.
Fixes: 59c2a7226fc5 ("x86/selftests: Add mov_to_ss test") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
When the NMI lands on an ESPFIX_SS, we are on the entry stack and must
swizzle, otherwise we'll run do_nmi() on the entry stack, which is
BAD.
Also, similar to the normal exception path, we need to correct the
ESPFIX magic before leaving the entry stack, otherwise pt_regs will
present a non-flat stack pointer.
Tested by running sigreturn_32 concurrent with perf-record.
Fixes: e5862d0515ad ("x86/entry/32: Leave the kernel via trampoline stack") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Right now, we do some fancy parts of the exception entry path while SS
might have a nonzero base: we fill in regs->ss and regs->sp, and we
consider switching to the kernel stack. This results in regs->ss and
regs->sp referring to a non-flat stack and it may result in
overflowing the entry stack. The former issue means that we can try to
call iret_exc on a non-flat stack, which doesn't work.
Tested with selftests/x86/sigreturn_32.
Fixes: 45d7b255747c ("x86/entry/32: Enter the kernel via trampoline stack") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
When re-building the IRET frame we use %eax as an destination %esp,
make sure to then also match the segment for when there is a nonzero
SS base (ESPFIX).
[peterz: Changelog and minor edits] Fixes: 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
As reported by Lai, the commit 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32:
Provide consistent pt_regs") wrecked the IRET EXTABLE entry by making
.Lirq_return not point at IRET.
Fix this by placing IRET_FRAME in RESTORE_REGS, to mirror how
FIXUP_FRAME is part of SAVE_ALL.
Fixes: 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs") Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The entry stack in the cpu entry area is protected against overflow by the
readonly GDT on 64-bit, but on 32-bit the GDT needs to be writeable and
therefore does not trigger a fault on stack overflow.
Add a guard page.
Fixes: c482feefe1ae ("x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Commit 945fd17ab6ba ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Sync cpu_entry_area to
initial_page_table") introduced the sync for the initial page table for
32bit.
sync_initial_page_table() uses clone_pgd_range() which does the update for
the kernel page table. If PTI is enabled it also updates the user space
page table counterpart, which is assumed to be in the next page after the
target PGD.
At this point in time 32-bit did not have PTI support, so the user space
page table update was not taking place.
The support for PTI on 32-bit which was introduced later on, did not take
that into account and missed to add the user space counter part for the
initial page table.
As a consequence sync_initial_page_table() overwrites any data which is
located in the page behing initial_page_table causing random failures,
e.g. by corrupting doublefault_tss and wreckaging the doublefault handler
on 32bit.
Fix it by adding a "user" page table right after initial_page_table.
Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ("x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
This can be had with two instead of six insns, by just checking the high
CS.RPL bit.
Also adjust the comment - there would be no #GP in the mentioned cases, as
there's no segment limit violation or alike. Instead there'd be #PF, but
that one reports the target EIP of said branch, not the address of the
branch insn itself.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a5986837-01eb-7bf8-bf42-4d3084d6a1f5@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Now that SS:ESP always get saved by SAVE_ALL, this also needs to be
accounted for in xen_iret_crit_fixup(). Otherwise the old_ax value gets
interpreted as EFLAGS, and hence VM86 mode appears to be active all the
time, leading to random "vm86_32: no user_vm86: BAD" log messages alongside
processes randomly crashing.
Since following the previous model (sitting after SAVE_ALL) would further
complicate the code _and_ retain the dependency of xen_iret_crit_fixup() on
frame manipulations done by entry_32.S, switch things around and do the
adjustment ahead of SAVE_ALL.
Fixes: 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/32d8713d-25a7-84ab-b74b-aa3e88abce6b@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Once again RPL checks have been introduced which don't account for a 32-bit
kernel living in ring 1 when running in a PV Xen domain. The case in
FIXUP_FRAME has been preventing boot.
Adjust BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 as well to guard against future uses of the macro
on a code path reachable when running in PV mode under Xen; I have to admit
that I stopped at a certain point trying to figure out whether there are
present ones.
Fixes: 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0fad341f-b7f5-f859-d55d-f0084ee7087e@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
In nbd_add_socket when krealloc succeeds, if nsock's allocation fail the
reallocted memory is leak. The correct behaviour should be assigning the
reallocted memory to config->socks right after success.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Since MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related for processors that are
affected by both vulnerabilities, the followiing confusing messages can
be printed in the kernel log:
MDS: Vulnerable
MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers
To avoid the first incorrect message, defer the printing of MDS
mitigation after the TAA mitigation selection has been done. However,
that has the side effect of printing TAA mitigation first before MDS
mitigation.
[ bp: Check box is affected/mitigations are disabled first before
printing and massage. ]
Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.
For example, with only the "mds=off" option:
vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.
Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.
Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.
[ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]
Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort") Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
gawk 5.0.1 generates the following regexp warnings:
GEN /home/sasha/torvalds/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/inat-tables.c
awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:260: warning: regexp escape sequence `\:' is not a known regexp operator
awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:350: (FILENAME=../arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt FNR=41) warning: regexp escape sequence `\&' is not a known regexp operator
Ealier versions of gawk are not known to generate these warnings. The
gawk manual referenced below does not list characters ':' and '&' as
needing escaping, so 'unescape' them. See
Due to unneeded multiplication in the out_free_pages portion of
r10buf_pool_alloc(), when using a 3-copy raid10 layout, it is
possible to access a resync_pages offset that has not been
initialized. This access translates into a crash of the system
within resync_free_pages() while passing a bad pointer to
put_page(). Remove the multiplication, preventing access to the
uninitialized area.
Fixes: f0250618361db ("md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+ Signed-off-by: John Pittman <jpittman@redhat.com> Suggested-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
As nice as it would be to update firmware faster, that patch broke
at least two different boards, an OMAP4+WL1285 based Motorola Droid
4, as reported by Sebasian Reichel and the Logic PD i.MX6Q +
WL1837MOD.
This patch restores the old behavior that read
the chip_id on the QCA988x before resetting the
chip. This needs to be done in this order since
the unsupported QCA988x AR1A chips fall off the
bus when resetted. Otherwise the next MMIO Op
after the reset causes a BUS ERROR and panic.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1a7fecb766c8 ("ath10k: reset chip before reading chip_id in probe") Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The introduction of 768ec4c012ac ("ath10k: update HOST capability QMI
message") served the purpose of supporting the new and extended HOST
capability QMI message.
But while the new message adds a slew of optional members it changes the
data type of the "daemon_support" member, which means that older
versions of the firmware will fail to decode the incoming request
message.
There is no way to detect this breakage from Linux and there's no way to
recover from sending the wrong message (i.e. we can't just try one
format and then fallback to the other), so a quirk is introduced in
DeviceTree to indicate to the driver that the firmware requires the 8bit
version of this message.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 768ec4c012ac ("ath10k: update HOST capability qmi message") Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The `ar_usb` field of `ath10k_usb_pipe_usb_pipe` objects
are initialized to point to the containing `ath10k_usb` object
according to endpoint descriptors read from the device side, as shown
below in `ath10k_usb_setup_pipe_resources`:
for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
// get the address from endpoint descriptor
pipe_num = ath10k_usb_get_logical_pipe_num(ar_usb,
endpoint->bEndpointAddress,
&urbcount);
......
// select the pipe object
pipe = &ar_usb->pipes[pipe_num];
// initialize the ar_usb field
pipe->ar_usb = ar_usb;
}
The driver assumes that the addresses reported in endpoint
descriptors from device side to be complete. If a device is
malicious and does not report complete addresses, it may trigger
NULL-ptr-deref `ath10k_usb_alloc_urb_from_pipe` and
`ath10k_usb_free_urb_to_pipe`.
This patch fixes the bug by preventing potential NULL-ptr-deref.
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[groeck: Add driver tag to subject, fix build warning] Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Currently, data variable in ar9003_hw_thermo_cal_apply() could be
uninitialized if ar9300_otp_read_word() will fail to read the value.
Initialize data variable with 0 to prevent an undefined behavior. This
will be enough to handle error case when ar9300_otp_read_word() fails.
Fixes: 80fe43f2bbd5 ("ath9k_hw: Read and configure thermocal for AR9462") Cc: Rajkumar Manoharan <rmanohar@qca.qualcomm.com> Cc: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Imre Deak [Wed, 13 Nov 2019 11:14:21 +0000 (19:14 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: drm/i915: Fix detection for a CMP-V PCH
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1852386
According to internal documents I found for CMP PCHs the PCI ID 0xA3C1
belongs to a CMP-V chipset. Based on the same docs the programming of
the PCH is compatible with that of KBP. Fix up my previous wrong
assumption accordingly using the SPT programming which in turn is the
basis for KBP.
The original bug reporter verified that this is the correct PCH
identification (the only way we'll program valid DDC pin-pair values to
the GMBUS register) and the Windows team uses the same identification
(that is using the KBP programming model for this PCH).
I filed the necessary Bspec update requests (BSpec/33734).
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112051 Fixes: 37c92dc303dd ("drm/i915: Add new CNL PCH ID seen on a CML platform") Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrus <cyrus.lien@canonical.com> Cc: Cyrus <cyrus.lien@canonical.com> Cc: Timo Aaltonen <tjaalton@ubuntu.com> Cc: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
(backported from 5d77aa07bd2f4aa940c80a0d97471201b4a6a282 linux-next) Signed-off-by: You-Sheng Yang <vicamo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Imre Deak [Wed, 13 Nov 2019 11:14:20 +0000 (19:14 +0800)]
drm/i915: Add new CNL PCH ID seen on a CML platform
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1852386
Atm we don't detect a PCH with PCI ID 0xA3C1 which showed up now on a CML
platform. We don't have the official assignment of the PCH PCI IDs, but
this looks like a CNP which was already used on CML platforms. Let's add
the new ID->PCH type mapping accordingly.
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112051 Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrus <cyrus.lien@canonical.com> Cc: Cyrus <cyrus.lien@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191022095155.30991-1-imre.deak@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 37c92dc303dd0977134d1c8501f057de407473ec linux-next) Signed-off-by: You-Sheng Yang <vicamo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Daniel Schultz [Fri, 22 Nov 2019 08:48:06 +0000 (16:48 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: mfd: rk808: Fix RK818 ID template
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1853192
The Rockchip PMIC driver can automatically detect connected component
versions by reading the ID_MSB and ID_LSB registers. The probe function
will always fail with RK818 PMICs because the ID_MSK is 0xFFF0 and the
RK818 template ID is 0x8181.
This patch changes this value to 0x8180.
Fixes: 9d6105e19f61 ("mfd: rk808: Fix up the chip id get failed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Elaine Zhang <zhangqing@rock-chips.com> Cc: Joseph Chen <chenjh@rock-chips.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Schultz <d.schultz@phytec.de> Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37ef8c2c15bdc1322b160e38986c187de2b877b2 linux-next) Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-By: You-Sheng Yang <vicamo.yang@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Aaron Ma [Tue, 26 Nov 2019 05:24:29 +0000 (13:24 +0800)]
HID: i2c-hid: fix no irq after reset on raydium 3118
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1849721
On some ThinkPad L390 some raydium 3118 touchscreen devices
doesn't response any data after reset, but some does.
Add this ID to no irq quirk,
then don't wait for any response alike on these touchscreens.
All kinds of raydium 3118 devices work fine.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1849721 Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <aaron.ma@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
(cherry picked from commit 0c8432236dea20a95f68fa17989ea3f8af0186a5 linux-next) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Anthony Wong <anthony.wong@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tuowen Zhao [Tue, 26 Nov 2019 05:03:08 +0000 (13:03 +0800)]
mfd: intel-lpss: Use devm_ioremap_uc for MMIO
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1851901
Some BIOS erroneously specifies write-combining BAR for intel-lpss-pci
in MTRR. This will cause the system to hang during boot. If possible,
this bug could be corrected with a firmware update.
This patch use devm_ioremap_uc to overwrite/ignore the MTRR settings
by forcing the use of strongly uncachable pages for intel-lpss.
The BIOS bug is present on Dell XPS 13 7390 2-in-1:
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203485 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Tested-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tuowen Zhao <ztuowen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Roman Gilg <subdiff@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit a8ff78f7f773142eb8a8befe5a95dd6858ebd635 linux-next) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Anthony Wong <anthony.wong@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Tested-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Tuowen Zhao <ztuowen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit e537654b7039aacfe8ae629d49655c0e5692ad44 linux-next) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Anthony Wong <anthony.wong@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Anthony Wong <anthony.wong@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The device supports macpassthru, but it failed to pass the test of -AD,
-BND and -BD. Simply bypass these tests since the device supports this
feature just fine.
Also the ACPI objects have some differences between Dell's and Lenovo's,
so make those ACPI infos no longer hardcoded.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827961 Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 9647722befbedcd6735e00655ffec392c05f0c56) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Seth Forshee [Tue, 19 Nov 2019 19:19:30 +0000 (13:19 -0600)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: selftests/bpf: Comment out BPF_CORE_READ's which cause clang to segfault
The test_core_reloc_arrays causes clang to segfault during
compilation, see discussion at [1] and clang bug report at [2].
Comment out the offending lines to allow testing to proceed.
Seth Forshee [Fri, 1 Nov 2019 18:35:25 +0000 (13:35 -0500)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: shiftfs: Correct id translation for lower fs operations
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1850867
Several locations which shift ids translate user/group ids before
performing operations in the lower filesystem are translating
them into init_user_ns, whereas they should be translated into
the s_user_ns for the lower filesystem. This will result in using
ids other than the intended ones in the lower fs, which will
likely not map into the shifts s_user_ns.
Change these sites to use shift_k[ug]id() to do a translation
into the s_user_ns of the lower filesystem.
Quoting Jann Horn:
#################### Bug 2: Type confusion ####################
shiftfs_btrfs_ioctl_fd_replace() calls fdget(oldfd), then without further checks
passes the resulting file* into shiftfs_real_fdget(), which does this:
/* Did the flags change since open? */
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & ~lowerfd->file->f_flags))
return shiftfs_change_flags(lowerfd->file, file->f_flags);
return 0;
}
file->private_data is a void* that points to a filesystem-dependent type; and
some filesystems even use it to store a type-cast number instead of a pointer.
The implicit cast to a "struct shiftfs_file_info *" can therefore be a bad cast.
As a PoC, here I'm causing a type confusion between struct shiftfs_file_info
(with ->realfile at offset 0x10) and struct mm_struct (with vmacache_seqnum at
offset 0x10), and I use that to cause a memory dereference somewhere around
0x4242:
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
[ saf: use f_op->open instead as special inodes in shiftfs sbs
will not use shiftfs open f_ops ] Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
CVE-2019-15792
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Seth Forshee [Fri, 1 Nov 2019 15:41:03 +0000 (10:41 -0500)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: shiftfs: Fix refcount underflow in btrfs ioctl handling
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1850867
shiftfs_btrfs_ioctl_fd_replace() installs an fd referencing a
file from the lower filesystem without taking an additional
reference to that file. After the btrfs ioctl completes this fd
is closed, which then puts a reference to that file, leading to a
refcount underflow. Original bug report and test case from Jann
Horn is below.
Fix this, and at the sametime simplify the management of the fd
to the lower file for the ioctl. In
shiftfs_btrfs_ioctl_fd_replace(), take the missing reference to
the lower file and set FDPUT_FPUT so that this reference will get
dropped on fdput() in error paths. Do not maintain the struct fd
in the caller, as it the fd installed in the fd table is
sufficient to properly clean up. Finally, remove the fdput() in
shiftfs_btrfs_ioctl_fd_restore() as it is redundant with the
__close_fd() call.
Original report from Jann Horn:
In shiftfs_btrfs_ioctl_fd_replace() ("//" comments added by me):
src = fdget(oldfd);
if (!src.file)
return -EINVAL;
// src holds one reference (assuming multithreaded execution)
ret = shiftfs_real_fdget(src.file, lfd);
// lfd->file is a file* now, but shiftfs_real_fdget didn't take any
// extra references
fdput(src);
// this drops the only reference we were holding on src, and src was
// the only thing holding a reference to lfd->file. lfd->file may be
// dangling at this point.
if (ret)
return ret;
*newfd = get_unused_fd_flags(lfd->file->f_flags);
if (*newfd < 0) {
// always a no-op
fdput(*lfd);
return *newfd;
}
fd_install(*newfd, lfd->file);
// fd_install() consumes a counted reference, but we don't hold any
// counted references. so at this point, if lfd->file hasn't been freed
// yet, its refcount is one lower than it ought to be.
[...]
// the following code is refcount-neutral, so the refcount stays one too
// low.
if (ret)
shiftfs_btrfs_ioctl_fd_restore(cmd, *lfd, *newfd, arg, v1, v2);
/* Did the flags change since open? */
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & ~lowerfd->file->f_flags))
return shiftfs_change_flags(lowerfd->file, file->f_flags);
return 0;
}
Therefore, the following PoC will cause reference count overdecrements; I ran it
with SLUB debugging enabled and got the following splat:
=======================================
user@ubuntu1910vm:~/shiftfs$ cat run.sh
sync
unshare -mUr ./run2.sh
t run2user@ubuntu1910vm:~/shiftfs$ cat run2.sh
set -e
This is an attempted dereference of 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b, which is POISON_FREE; I
think this corresponds to the load of "realfile->f_op->mmap" in the source code.
We are seeing some EFI based machines failing to boot hard in the EFI
stub:
exit_boot() failed!
efi_main() failed!
This seems to occur when the bootloader (grub2 in this case) has had
to manipulate some additional files due to a change in the way MAAS
boots the machines. We tracked this down to the memory map dance
efi_get_memory_map(). Basically we attempt to close boot services and
it informs us it cannot do so because it failed to record the updated
memory map. This occurs when there is insufficient space in the passed
memory map buffer to record changes during the operation. At the point
when this occurs we are unable to call the allocation functions to
reallocate the buffer so we panic.
To avoid this we allocate some additional entries in the buffer to cover
any additional entries. This headroom is currently insufficient for
these machines under this use case. Increase EFI_MMAP_NR_SLACK_SLOTS to
provide space for more memory map modifications.
UBUNTU: SAUCE: seccomp: rework define for SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE
Switch from BIT(0) to (1UL << 0).
First, there are already two different forms used in the header, so there's
no need to add a third. Second, the BIT() macros is kernel internal and
afaict not actually exposed to userspace. Maybe there's some magic there
I'm missing but it definitely causes issues when compiling a program that
tries to use SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. It currently fails in the
following way:
# github.com/lxc/lxd/lxd
/usr/bin/ld: $WORK/b001/_x003.o: in function
`__do_user_notification_continue':
lxd/main_checkfeature.go:240: undefined reference to `BIT'
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
Switching to (1UL << 0) should prevent that and is more in line what is
already done in the rest of the header.
Andy Whitcroft [Fri, 1 Nov 2019 21:48:21 +0000 (21:48 +0000)]
UBUNTU: [Packaging] dkms -- try launchpad librarian for pool downloads
When we build a kernel we capture the current dkms package versions.
This allows us to keep the versions syncronised in an entire SRU cycle
between the master and derivative kernels. It also allows us to maintain
the same versions on respin. This suffers from the issue that they may
expire from the archive pool if the dkms packages are revved.
The same packages are available in the launchpad librarian and indeed
(now) via well known names. So when are attempting to download from the
archive pool first attempt to get the package from the primary archive
librarian first. If this fails continue to do the pool scan as normal.
This increases the chance we will find an appropriate package regardless
of the currently published packages, whilst retaining the ability to build
in a more restricted environment (such as when we have no internet access).
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1850958 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Kai-Heng Feng [Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:01:49 +0000 (22:01 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/intel: Disable HPET on Intel Ice Lake platforms
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1840239
Ice Lake platform have similar behavior as Coffee Lake, have skewed HPET
timer once the SoCs entered PC10 so let's disable HPET on Ice Lake.
as result.
UBUNTU: SAUCE: shiftfs: drop CAP_SYS_RESOURCE from effective capabilities
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1849483
Currently shiftfs allows to exceed project quota and reserved space on
e.g. ext2. See [1] and especially [2] for a bug report. This is very
much not what we want. Quotas and reserverd space settings set on the
host need to respected. The cause for this issue is overriding the
credentials with the superblock creator's credentials whenever we
perform operations such as fallocate() or writes while retaining
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
The fix is to drop CAP_SYS_RESOURCE from the effective capability set
after we have made a copy of the superblock creator's credential at
superblock creation time. This very likely gives us more security than
we had before and the regression potential seems limited. I would like
to try this apporach first before coming up with something potentially
more sophisticated. I don't see why CAP_SYS_RESOURCE should become a
limiting factor in most use-cases.
[1]: https://github.com/lxc/lxd/issues/6333
[2]: https://github.com/lxc/lxd/issues/6333#issuecomment-545154838 Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1849482
Set the s_maxbytes limit to MAX_LFS_FILESIZE.
Currently shiftfs limits the maximum size for fallocate() needlessly
causing calls such as fallocate --length 2GB ./file to fail. This
limitation is arbitrary since it's not caused by the underlay but
rather by shiftfs itself capping the s_maxbytes. This causes bugs such
as the one reported in [1].
[1]: https://github.com/lxc/lxd/issues/6333 Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
AceLan Kao [Thu, 7 Nov 2019 06:36:44 +0000 (14:36 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: platform/x86: dell-uart-backlight: add quirk for old platforms
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1813877
Old platforms do not support DELL_UART_GET_SCALAR command and the
behavior of DELL_UART_GET_FIRMWARE_VER command is different as the new
firmware, so the new way to check if the backlight is controlled by
scalar IC doesn't work on old platforms. We now add them into a list and
use the old way to do the check.
Signed-off-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
AceLan Kao [Thu, 7 Nov 2019 06:36:43 +0000 (14:36 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: platform/x86: dell-uart-backlight: add force parameter
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1813877
Add force parameter to force load the driver if the platform doesn't
provide a working scalar status command.
Signed-off-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
AceLan Kao [Thu, 7 Nov 2019 06:36:41 +0000 (14:36 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: platform/x86: dell-uart-backlight: add missing status command
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1813877
DELL_UART_GET_SCALAR has been declared in
drivers/platform/x86/dell-uart-backlight.h, but its definition is
missing. It won't lead to issues on old AIO platforms, since this
command is newly introduced and is not supported by all old AIOs.
Signed-off-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Seth Forshee [Wed, 6 Nov 2019 15:02:19 +0000 (09:02 -0600)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: fs: Move SB_I_NOSUID to the top of s_iflags
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1851677
SB_I_NOSUID was added by a sauce patch, and over time it has come
to occpy the same bit in s_iflags as SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE without
being noticed. overlayfs will set SB_I_NOSUID when any lower
mount is nosuid. When this happens for a user namespace mount,
mount_too_revealing() will perform additional, unnecessary checks
which may block mounting when it should be allowed.
Move SB_I_NOSUID to prevent this conflict, and move it to the top
of s_iflags to make future conflicts less likely.
Seth Forshee [Wed, 6 Nov 2019 15:57:30 +0000 (09:57 -0600)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: ovl: Restore vm_file value when lower fs mmap fails
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1850994
ovl_mmap() overwrites vma->vm_file before calling the lower
filesystem mmap but does not restore the original value on
failure. This means it is giving a pointer to the lower fs file
back to the caller with no reference, which is a bad practice.
However, it does not lead to any issues with upstream kernels as
no caller accesses vma->vm_file after call_mmap().
With the aufs patches applied the story is different. Whereas
mmap_region() previously fput a local variable containing the
file it assigned to vm_file, it now calls vma_fput() which will
fput vm_file, for which it has no reference, and the reference
for the original vm_file is not put.
Fix this by restoring vma->vm_file to the original value when the
mmap call into the lower fs fails.
Seth Forshee [Wed, 6 Nov 2019 15:38:57 +0000 (09:38 -0600)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: shiftfs: Restore vm_file value when lower fs mmap fails
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1850994
shiftfs_mmap() overwrites vma->vm_file before calling the lower
filesystem mmap but does not restore the original value on
failure. This means it is giving a pointer to the lower fs file
back to the caller with no reference, which is a bad practice.
However, it does not lead to any issues with upstream kernels as
no caller accesses vma->vm_file after call_mmap().
With the aufs patches applied the story is different. Whereas
mmap_region() previously fput a local variable containing the
file it assigned to vm_file, it now calls vma_fput() which will
fput vm_file, for which it has no reference, and the reference
for the original vm_file is not put.
Fix this by restoring vma->vm_file to the original value when the
mmap call into the lower fs fails.
Kai-Heng Feng [Wed, 23 Oct 2019 14:25:27 +0000 (22:25 +0800)]
ALSA: hda: Allow HDA to be runtime suspended when dGPU is not bound to a driver
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1840835
Nvidia proprietary driver doesn't support runtime power management, so
when a user only wants to use the integrated GPU, it's a common practice
to let dGPU not to bind any driver, and let its upstream port to be
runtime suspended. At the end of runtime suspension the port uses
platform power management to disable power through _OFF method of power
resource, which is listed by _PR3.
After commit b516ea586d71 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers"), when
the dGPU comes with an HDA function, the HDA won't be suspended if the
dGPU is unbound, so the power resource can't be turned off by its
upstream port driver.
Commit 37a3a98ef601 ("ALSA: hda - Enable runtime PM only for
discrete GPU") only allows HDA to be runtime suspended once GPU is
bound, to keep APU's HDA working.
However, HDA on dGPU isn't that useful if dGPU is not bound to any
driver. So let's relax the runtime suspend requirement for dGPU's HDA
function, to disable the power source to save lots of power.
Kai-Heng Feng [Wed, 23 Oct 2019 14:25:25 +0000 (22:25 +0800)]
PCI: Add a helper to check Power Resource Requirements _PR3 existence
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1840835
A driver may want to know the existence of _PR3, to choose different
runtime suspend behavior. A user will be add in next patch.
Seth Forshee [Mon, 28 Oct 2019 14:45:03 +0000 (09:45 -0500)]
UBUNTU: [Packaging] Leave unsigned modules unsigned after adding .gnu_debuglink
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1850234
When adding .gnu_debuglink sections to modules we sign modules
without regard to whether or not they were signed previously. As
a result modules from staging which should not have been signed
are ending up with signature. Change this to check for a module
signature before modifying the binary, then sign the result only
if the original module was signed.
UBUNTU: SAUCE: seccomp: fix SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE test
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1849281
The ifndef for SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE was placed under the
ifndef for the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER feature. This will not
work on systems that do support SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER but do not
support SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. So move the latter ifndef out of
the former ifndef's scope.
2019-10-20 11:14:01 make run_tests -C seccomp
make: Entering directory '/usr/src/perf_selftests-x86_64-rhel-7.6-0eebfed2954f152259cae0ad57b91d3ea92968e8/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp'
gcc -Wl,-no-as-needed -Wall seccomp_bpf.c -lpthread -o seccomp_bpf
seccomp_bpf.c: In function ‘user_notification_continue’:
seccomp_bpf.c:3562:15: error: ‘SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE’ undeclared (first use in this function)
resp.flags = SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
seccomp_bpf.c:3562:15: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
Makefile:12: recipe for target 'seccomp_bpf' failed
make: *** [seccomp_bpf] Error 1
make: Leaving directory '/usr/src/perf_selftests-x86_64-rhel-7.6-0eebfed2954f152259cae0ad57b91d3ea92968e8/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp'
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Fixes: 0eebfed2954f ("seccomp: test SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE") Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191021091055.4644-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2aa8d8d04ca29c3269154e1d48855e498be8882f
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git) Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>