x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass

[mirror_ubuntu-artful-kernel.git] / arch / x86 / include / asm / nospec-branch.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 67a5cbf150bdc2e4bf8e52a3ef8585cb9c435d51..5ce68e3e5bc94350fd71fdfbafa1e520ec50e26c 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -176,31 +176,13 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
 
-/*
- * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
- * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
- * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
- * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
- * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
- */
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
-
-/*
- * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
- * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
- * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
- */
-static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-       alternative_input("",
-                         "call __fill_rsb",
-                         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,
-                         ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory"));
-#endif
-}
+/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
+enum ssb_mitigation {
+       SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
+       SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
+       SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
+       SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
+};
 
 static __always_inline
 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)