x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS

[mirror_ubuntu-artful-kernel.git] / arch / x86 / include / asm / nospec-branch.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index ad0a04671e3643fa26164879b26ed0ce75b1bd4d..67a5cbf150bdc2e4bf8e52a3ef8585cb9c435d51 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -165,6 +165,27 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
        SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
+/*
+ * The Intel specification for the SPEC_CTRL MSR requires that we
+ * preserve any already set reserved bits at boot time (e.g. for
+ * future additions that this kernel is not currently aware of).
+ * We then set any additional mitigation bits that we want
+ * ourselves and always use this as the base for SPEC_CTRL.
+ * We also use this when handling guest entry/exit as below.
+ */
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
+
+/*
+ * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
+ * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
+ * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
+ * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
+ * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
+ */
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
+
 /*
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both