Default is 'flush'.
- For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+ For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
l2cr= [PPC]
Format: <first>,<last>
Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
+ mds= [X86,INTEL]
+ Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+ Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+ Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+ internal buffers which can forward information to a
+ disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+ In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+ forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+ attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+ not have direct access.
+
+ This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+ full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+ SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+ off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ mds=full.
+
+ For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
mem=nn[KMG] [KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
to see the whole system memory or for test.
in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
+ mitigations=
+ [X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+ vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
+ arch-independent options, each of which is an
+ aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+ off
+ Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This
+ improves system performance, but it may also
+ expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+ Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+ nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+ nobp=0 [S390]
+ nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+ spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+ l1tf=off [X86]
+ mds=off [X86]
+
+ auto (default)
+ Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+ enabled, even if it's vulnerable. This is for
+ users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+ getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+ have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+ Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+ auto,nosmt
+ Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+ if needed. This is for users who always want to
+ be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+ Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+ mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
enforced by spectre_v2=off
+ prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+ per thread. The mitigation control state
+ is inherited on fork.
+
+ prctl,ibpb
+ - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different user
+ space processes.
+
+ seccomp
+ - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+ threads will enable the mitigation unless
+ they explicitly opt out.
+
+ seccomp,ibpb
+ - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different
+ user space processes.
+
auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
the available CPU features and vulnerability.
- Default is off.
+
+ Default mitigation:
+ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2_user=auto.