]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/commit
usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Sat, 19 May 2018 01:13:42 +0000 (20:13 -0500)
committerKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Wed, 5 Sep 2018 08:30:45 +0000 (10:30 +0200)
commitabd33af99c69c03a6d773aa3e21ef846be2d96c6
treeb4ff0be083e68951302bf42a852991ba4e7eb9e6
parent13b3c1f15529ae3c5717c125c7d8fa5a477f6096
usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790188
commit a0d6ec88090d7b1b008429c44532a388e29bb1bd upstream.

pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'

Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c