]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/commit
HID: hiddev: fix potential Spectre v1
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Fri, 29 Jun 2018 22:08:44 +0000 (17:08 -0500)
committerKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Mon, 14 Jan 2019 09:28:55 +0000 (09:28 +0000)
commitc803da50a0e8f39b9dbf619a5c86cbe96166dfd6
treeee5996111acb212bd63036caeb271def02cabe65
parente1f37eeb23cf6741ed2d910ffdba1518ace814b2
HID: hiddev: fix potential Spectre v1

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1808399
commit 4f65245f2d178b9cba48350620d76faa4a098841 upstream.

uref->field_index, uref->usage_index, finfo.field_index and cinfo.index can be
indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:473 hiddev_ioctl_usage() warn: potential spectre issue 'report->field' (local cap)
drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:477 hiddev_ioctl_usage() warn: potential spectre issue 'field->usage' (local cap)
drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:757 hiddev_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'report->field' (local cap)
drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:801 hiddev_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'hid->collection' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing such structure fields before using them to index
report->field, field->usage and hid->collection

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c