A test case was reported where two linked reads with registered buffers
failed the second link always. This is because we set the expected value
of a request in req->result, and if we don't get this result, then we
fail the dependent links. For some reason the registered buffer import
returned -ERROR/0, while the normal import returns -ERROR/length. This
broke linked commands with registered buffers.
Fix this by making io_import_fixed() correctly return the mapped length.
We need to get the underlying dentry of parent; sure, absent the races
it is the parent of underlying dentry, but there's nothing to prevent
losing a timeslice to preemtion in the middle of evaluation of
lower_dentry->d_parent->d_inode, having another process move lower_dentry
around and have its (ex)parent not pinned anymore and freed on memory
pressure. Then we regain CPU and try to fetch ->d_inode from memory
that is freed by that point.
dentry->d_parent *is* stable here - it's an argument of ->lookup() and
we are guaranteed that it won't be moved anywhere until we feed it
to d_add/d_splice_alias. So we safely go that way to get to its
underlying dentry.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # since 2009 or so Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
lower_dentry can't go from positive to negative (we have it pinned),
but it *can* go from negative to positive. So fetching ->d_inode
into a local variable, doing a blocking allocation, checking that
now ->d_inode is non-NULL and feeding the value we'd fetched
earlier to a function that won't accept NULL is not a good idea.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Some Coffee Lake platforms have a skewed HPET timer once the SoCs entered
PC10, which in consequence marks TSC as unstable because HPET is used as
watchdog clocksource for TSC.
Harry Pan tried to work around it in the clocksource watchdog code [1]
thereby creating a circular dependency between HPET and TSC. This also
ignores the fact, that HPET is not only unsuitable as watchdog clocksource
on these systems, it becomes unusable in general.
Many cheap devices use Silead touchscreen controllers. Testing has shown
repeatedly that these touchscreen controllers work fine at 400KHz, but for
unknown reasons do not work properly at 100KHz. This has been seen on
both ARM and x86 devices using totally different i2c controllers.
On some devices the ACPI tables list another device at the same I2C-bus
as only being capable of 100KHz, testing has shown that these other
devices work fine at 400KHz (as can be expected of any recent I2C hw).
This commit makes i2c_acpi_find_bus_speed() always return 400KHz if a
Silead touchscreen controller is present, fixing the touchscreen not
working on devices which ACPI tables' wrongly list another device on the
same bus as only being capable of 100KHz.
Specifically this fixes the touchscreen on the Jumper EZpad 6 m4 not
working.
Reported-by: youling 257 <youling257@gmail.com> Tested-by: youling 257 <youling257@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
[wsa: rewording warning a little] Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
If an hfi1 card is inserted in a Gen4 systems, the driver will avoid the
gen3 speed bump and the card will operate at half speed.
This is because the driver avoids the gen3 speed bump when the parent bus
speed isn't identical to gen3, 8.0GT/s. This is not compatible with gen4
and newer speeds.
Fix by relaxing the test to explicitly look for the lower capability
speeds which inherently allows for gen4 and all future speeds.
Fixes: 7724105686e7 ("IB/hfi1: add driver files") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191101192059.106248.1699.stgit@awfm-01.aw.intel.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Erwin <james.erwin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Normal RDMA WRITE request never returns IB_WC_RNR_RETRY_EXC_ERR to ULPs
because it does not need post receive buffer on the responder side.
Consequently, as an enhancement to normal RDMA WRITE request inside the
hfi1 driver, TID RDMA WRITE request should not return such an error status
to ULPs, although it does receive RNR NAKs from the responder when TID
resources are not available. This behavior is violated when
qp->s_rnr_retry_cnt is set in current hfi1 implementation.
This patch enforces these semantics by avoiding any reaction to the updates
of the RNR QP attributes.
Fixes: 3c6cb20a0d17 ("IB/hfi1: Add TID RDMA WRITE functionality into RDMA verbs") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191025195842.106825.71532.stgit@awfm-01.aw.intel.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
For a TID RDMA WRITE request, a QP on the responder side could be put into
a queue when a hardware flow is not available. A RNR NAK will be returned
to the requester with a RNR timeout value based on the position of the QP
in the queue. The tid_rdma_flow_wt variable is used to calculate the
timeout value and is determined by using a MTU of 4096 at the module
loading time. This could reduce the timeout value by half from the desired
value, leading to excessive RNR retries.
This patch fixes the issue by calculating the flow weight with the real
MTU assigned to the QP.
Fixes: 07b923701e38 ("IB/hfi1: Add functions to receive TID RDMA WRITE request") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191025195836.106825.77769.stgit@awfm-01.aw.intel.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The index r_tid_ack is used to indicate the next TID RDMA WRITE request to
acknowledge in the ring s_ack_queue[] on the responder side and should be
set to a valid index other than its initial value before r_tid_tail is
advanced to the next TID RDMA WRITE request and particularly before a TID
RDMA ACK is built. Otherwise, a NULL pointer dereference may result:
This problem can happen if a RESYNC request is received before r_tid_ack
is modified.
This patch fixes the issue by making sure that r_tid_ack is set to a valid
value before a TID RDMA ACK is built. Functions are defined to simplify
the code.
Fixes: 07b923701e38 ("IB/hfi1: Add functions to receive TID RDMA WRITE request") Fixes: 7cf0ad679de4 ("IB/hfi1: Add a function to receive TID RDMA RESYNC packet") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191025195830.106825.44022.stgit@awfm-01.aw.intel.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Explicitly exempt ZONE_DEVICE pages from kvm_is_reserved_pfn() and
instead manually handle ZONE_DEVICE on a case-by-case basis. For things
like page refcounts, KVM needs to treat ZONE_DEVICE pages like normal
pages, e.g. put pages grabbed via gup(). But for flows such as setting
A/D bits or shifting refcounts for transparent huge pages, KVM needs to
to avoid processing ZONE_DEVICE pages as the flows in question lack the
underlying machinery for proper handling of ZONE_DEVICE pages.
This fixes a hang reported by Adam Borowski[*] in dev_pagemap_cleanup()
when running a KVM guest backed with /dev/dax memory, as KVM straight up
doesn't put any references to ZONE_DEVICE pages acquired by gup().
Note, Dan Williams proposed an alternative solution of doing put_page()
on ZONE_DEVICE pages immediately after gup() in order to simplify the
auditing needed to ensure is_zone_device_page() is called if and only if
the backing device is pinned (via gup()). But that approach would break
kvm_vcpu_{un}map() as KVM requires the page to be pinned from map() 'til
unmap() when accessing guest memory, unlike KVM's secondary MMU, which
coordinates with mmu_notifier invalidations to avoid creating stale
page references, i.e. doesn't rely on pages being pinned.
The driver for F54 just polls the status and doesn't even have a IRQ
handler registered. Make sure to disable all F54 IRQs, so we don't crash
the kernel on a nonexistent handler.
Currently, rmi_f11_attention() and rmi_f12_attention() functions update
the attn_data data pointer and size based on the size of the expected
size of the attention data. However, if the actual valid data in the
attn buffer is less then the expected value then the updated data
pointer will point to memory beyond the end of the attn buffer. Using
the calculated valid_bytes instead will prevent this from happening.
This patch fixes an issue seen on HID touchpads which report finger
positions using RMI4 Function 12. The issue manifests itself as
spurious button presses as described in:
https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-input/msg58618.html
Commit 24d28e4f1271 ("Input: synaptics-rmi4 - convert irq distribution
to irq_domain") switched the RMI4 driver to using an irq_domain to handle
RMI4 function interrupts. Functions with more then one interrupt now have
each interrupt mapped to their own IRQ and IRQ handler. The result of
this change is that the F12 IRQ handler was now getting called twice. Once
for the absolute data interrupt and once for the relative data interrupt.
For HID devices, calling rmi_f12_attention() a second time causes the
attn_data data pointer and size to be set incorrectly. When the touchpad
button is pressed, F30 will generate an interrupt and attempt to read the
F30 data from the invalid attn_data data pointer and report incorrect
button events.
This patch disables the F12 relative interrupt which prevents
rmi_f12_attention() from being called twice.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duggan <aduggan@synaptics.com> Reported-by: Simon Wood <simon@mungewell.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191025002527.3189-2-aduggan@synaptics.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The video buffer used by the queue is a vb2_v4l2_buffer, not a plain
vb2_buffer. Using the wrong type causes the allocation of the buffer
storage to be too small, causing a out of bounds write when
__init_vb2_v4l2_buffer initializes the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Fixes: 3a762dbd5347 ("[media] Input: synaptics-rmi4 - add support for F54 diagnostics") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104114454.10500-1-l.stach@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
ptrace_stop() does preempt_enable_no_resched() to avoid the preemption,
but after that cgroup_enter_frozen() does spin_lock/unlock and this adds
another preemption point.
During rename exchange we might have successfully log the new name in the
source root's log tree, in which case we leave our log context (allocated
on stack) in the root's list of log contextes. However we might fail to
log the new name in the destination root, in which case we fallback to
a transaction commit later and never sync the log of the source root,
which causes the source root log context to remain in the list of log
contextes. This later causes invalid memory accesses because the context
was allocated on stack and after rename exchange finishes the stack gets
reused and overwritten for other purposes.
The kernel's linked list corruption detector (CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y) can
detect this and report something like the following:
This started happening recently when running some test cases from fstests
like btrfs/004 for example, because support for rename exchange was added
last week to fsstress from fstests.
So fix this by deleting the log context for the source root from the list
if we have logged the new name in the source root.
Reported-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com> Fixes: d4682ba03ef618 ("Btrfs: sync log after logging new name") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Tested-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The recently introduced unit descriptor validation had some bug for
processing and extension units, it counts a bControlSize byte twice so
it expected a bigger size than it should have been. This seems
resulting in a probe error on a few devices.
Fix the calculation for proper checks of PU and EU.
Fixes: 57f8770620e9 ("ALSA: usb-audio: More validations of descriptor units") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191114165613.7422-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The commit 60849562a5db ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix possible NULL
dereference at create_yamaha_midi_quirk()") added NULL checks in
create_yamaha_midi_quirk(), but there was an overlook. The code
allows one of either injd or outjd is NULL, but the second if check
made returning -ENODEV if any of them is NULL. Fix it in a proper
form.
Fixes: 60849562a5db ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix possible NULL dereference at create_yamaha_midi_quirk()") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191113111259.24123-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
While output urb's snd_complete_urb() is executing, calling
prepare_outbound_urb() may cause endpoint stopped before
prepare_outbound_urb() returns and result in next urb submitted
to stopped endpoint. usb-audio driver cannot re-use it afterwards as
the urb is still hold by usb stack.
This change checks EP_FLAG_RUNNING flag after prepare_outbound_urb() again
to let snd_complete_urb() know the endpoint already stopped and does not
submit next urb. Below kind of error will be fixed:
[ 213.153103] usb 1-2: timeout: still 1 active urbs on EP #1
[ 213.164121] usb 1-2: cannot submit urb 0, error -16: unknown error
Signed-off-by: Henry Lin <henryl@nvidia.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191113021420.13377-1-henryl@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
A check of the return value from get_cur_mix_raw() is missing at the
resolution test code in get_min_max_with_quirks(), which may leave the
variable untouched, leading to a random uninitialized value, as
detected by syzkaller fuzzer.
Add the missing return error check for fixing that.
If an SMC socket is immediately terminated after a non-blocking connect()
has been called, a memory leak is possible.
Due to the sock_hold move in
commit 301428ea3708 ("net/smc: fix refcounting for non-blocking connect()")
an extra sock_put() is needed in smc_connect_work(), if the internal
TCP socket is aborted and cancels the sk_stream_wait_connect() of the
connect worker.
Reported-by: syzbot+4b73ad6fc767e576e275@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 301428ea3708 ("net/smc: fix refcounting for non-blocking connect()") Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
When setting the dump's time-stamp, use ktime_get_real in addition to
jiffies. This simplifies the user space implementation and bypasses
some inconsistent behavior with translating jiffies to current time.
The time taken is transformed into nsec, to comply with y2038 issue.
Fixes: c8e1da0bf923 ("devlink: Add health report functionality") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <ayal@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The setup_dpio() function tries to allocate a number of channels equal
to the number of CPUs online. When there are not enough DPCON objects
already probed, the function will return EPROBE_DEFER. When this
happens, the already allocated channels are not freed. This results in
the incapacity of properly probing the next time around.
Fix this by freeing the channels on the error path.
Fixes: d7f5a9d89a55 ("dpaa2-eth: defer probe on object allocate") Signed-off-by: Ioana Ciornei <ioana.ciornei@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
This removes '\n' from trace event class tcp_event_sk_skb to avoid
redundant new blank line and make output compact.
Fixes: af4325ecc24f ("tcp: expose sk_state in tcp_retransmit_skb tracepoint") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Driver/net/can/slcan.c is derived from slip.c. Memory leak was detected
by Syzkaller in slcan. Same issue exists in slip.c and this patch is
addressing the leak in slip.c.
Here is the slcan memory leak trace reported by Syzkaller:
Signed-off-by: Aleksander Morgado <aleksander@aleksander.es> Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
FASTOPEN does not work with SMC-sockets. Since SMC allows fallback to
TCP native during connection start, the FASTOPEN setsockopts trigger
this fallback, if the SMC-socket is still in state SMC_INIT.
But if a FASTOPEN setsockopt is called after a non-blocking connect(),
this is broken, and fallback does not make sense.
This change complements
commit cd2063604ea6 ("net/smc: avoid fallback in case of non-blocking connect")
and fixes the syzbot reported problem "WARNING in smc_unhash_sk".
Reported-by: syzbot+8488cc4cf1c9e09b8b86@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e1bbdd570474 ("net/smc: reduce sock_put() for fallback sockets") Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
In route.c, inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb() creates an skb with no
headroom. This skb is then used by inet_rtm_getroute() which may pass
it to rt_fill_info() and, from there, to ipmr_get_route(). The later
might try to reuse this skb by cloning it and prepending an IPv4
header. But since the original skb has no headroom, skb_push() triggers
skb_under_panic():
Actually the original skb used to have enough headroom, but the
reserve_skb() call was lost with the introduction of
inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb() by commit 404eb77ea766 ("ipv4: support
sport, dport and ip_proto in RTM_GETROUTE").
We could reserve some headroom again in inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb(),
but this function shouldn't be responsible for handling the special
case of ipmr_get_route(). Let's handle that directly in
ipmr_get_route() by calling skb_realloc_headroom() instead of
skb_clone().
Fixes: 404eb77ea766 ("ipv4: support sport, dport and ip_proto in RTM_GETROUTE") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
There is a race between driver code that does setup/cleanup of device
and devlink reload operation that in some drivers works with the same
code. Use after free could we easily obtained by running:
while true; do
echo "0000:00:10.0" >/sys/bus/pci/drivers/mlxsw_spectrum2/bind
devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:10.0 &
echo "0000:00:10.0" >/sys/bus/pci/drivers/mlxsw_spectrum2/unbind
done
Fix this by enabling reload only after setup of device is complete and
disabling it at the beginning of the cleanup process.
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Fixes: 2d8dc5bbf4e7 ("devlink: Add support for reload") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
If a malicious device gives a short MAC it can elicit up to
5 bytes of leaked memory out of the driver. We need to check for
ETH_ALEN instead.
Reported-by: syzbot+a8d4acdad35e6bbca308@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
In scsi_mq_setup_tags(), cmd_size is calculated based on zero size for the
scatter-gather list in case the low level driver uses SG_NONE in its host
template.
cmd_size is passed on to the block layer for calculation of the request
size, and we've seen NULL pointer dereference errors from the block layer
in drivers where SG_NONE is used and a mq IO scheduler is active,
apparently as a consequence of this (see commit 68ab2d76e4be ("scsi:
cxlflash: Set sg_tablesize to 1 instead of SG_NONE"), and a recent patch by
Finn Thain converting the three m68k NFR5380 drivers to avoid setting
SG_NONE).
Try to avoid these errors by accounting for at least one sg list entry when
calculating cmd_size, regardless of whether the low level driver set a zero
sg_tablesize.
Tested on 030 m68k with the atari_scsi driver - setting sg_tablesize to
SG_NONE no longer results in a crash when loading this driver.
CC: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572922150-4358-1-git-send-email-schmitzmic@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution. This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.
By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Add a function to create a kernel thread associated with a given VM. In
particular, it ensures that the worker thread inherits the priority and
cgroups of the calling thread.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.
Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.
Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen. With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.
[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
Originally-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The largepages debugfs entry is incremented/decremented as shadow
pages are created or destroyed. Clearing it will result in an
underflow, which is harmless to KVM but ugly (and could be
misinterpreted by tools that use debugfs information), so make
this particular statistic read-only.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
A kernel module may need to check the value of the "mitigations=" kernel
command line parameter as part of its setup when the module needs
to perform software mitigations for a CPU flaw.
Uninline and export the helper functions surrounding the cpu_mitigations
enum to allow for their usage from a module.
Lastly, privatize the enum and cpu_mitigations variable since the value of
cpu_mitigations can be checked with the exported helper functions.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:
There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.
This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.
It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.
Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.
For new IBRS_ALL CPUs, the Enhanced IBRS check at the beginning of
cpu_bugs_smt_update() causes the function to return early, unintentionally
skipping the MDS and TAA logic.
This is not a problem for MDS, because there appears to be no overlap
between IBRS_ALL and MDS-affected CPUs. So the MDS mitigation would be
disabled and nothing would need to be done in this function anyway.
But for TAA, the TAA_MSG_SMT string will never get printed on Cascade
Lake and newer.
The check is superfluous anyway: when 'spectre_v2_enabled' is
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, 'spectre_v2_user' is always
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, and so the 'spectre_v2_user' switch statement
handles it appropriately by doing nothing. So just remove the check.
There is a general consensus that TSX usage is not largely spread while
the history shows there is a non trivial space for side channel attacks
possible. Therefore the tsx is disabled by default even on platforms
that might have a safe implementation of TSX according to the current
knowledge. This is a fair trade off to make.
There are, however, workloads that really do benefit from using TSX and
updating to a newer kernel with TSX disabled might introduce a
noticeable regressions. This would be especially a problem for Linux
distributions which will provide TAA mitigations.
Introduce config options X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF, X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
and X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO to control the TSX feature. The config
setting can be overridden by the tsx cmdline options.
Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of
the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation,
guidance for system administrators.
[ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ]
Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature
enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto
disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX.
More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
[ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ]
Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX
Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated
microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain,
"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers.
Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is
enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is
not exported to the guests.
In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA.
Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.
This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.
A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:
* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).
* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.
The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More
details on this approach can be found here:
The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.
Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.
[ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
- Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
- Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.
The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.
[ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]
Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.
TSX has two sub-features:
1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
"old" style locks are used by software.
Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.
There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
XBEGIN instruction).
Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
(i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
When a jump_whitelist bitmap is reused, it needs to be cleared.
Currently this is done with memset() and the size calculation assumes
bitmaps are made of 32-bit words, not longs. So on 64-bit
architectures, only the first half of the bitmap is cleared.
If some whitelist bits are carried over between successive batches
submitted on the same context, this will presumably allow embedding
the rogue instructions that we're trying to reject.
Use bitmap_zero() instead, which gets the calculation right.
Fixes: f8c08d8faee5 ("drm/i915/cmdparser: Add support for backward jumps") Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
In some circumstances the RC6 context can get corrupted. We can detect
this and take the required action, that is disable RC6 and runtime PM.
The HW recovers from the corrupted state after a system suspend/resume
cycle, so detect the recovery and re-enable RC6 and runtime PM.
v2: rebase (Mika)
v3:
- Move intel_suspend_gt_powersave() to the end of the GEM suspend
sequence.
- Add commit message.
v4:
- Rebased on intel_uncore_forcewake_put(i915->uncore, ...) API
change.
v5: rebased on gem/gt split (Mika)
Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
In BXT/APL, device 2 MMIO reads from MIPI controller requires its PLL
to be turned ON. When MIPI PLL is turned off (MIPI Display is not
active or connected), and someone (host or GT engine) tries to read
MIPI registers, it causes hard hang. This is a hardware restriction
or limitation.
Driver by itself doesn't read MIPI registers when MIPI display is off.
But any userspace application can submit unprivileged batch buffer for
execution. In that batch buffer there can be mmio reads. And these
reads are allowed even for unprivileged applications. If these
register reads are for MIPI DSI controller and MIPI display is not
active during that time, then the MMIO read operation causes system
hard hang and only way to recover is hard reboot. A genuine
process/application won't submit batch buffer like this and doesn't
cause any issue. But on a compromised system, a malign userspace
process/app can generate such batch buffer and can trigger system
hard hang (denial of service attack).
The fix is to lower the internal MMIO timeout value to an optimum
value of 950us as recommended by hardware team. If the timeout is
beyond 1ms (which will hit for any value we choose if MMIO READ on a
DSI specific register is performed without PLL ON), it causes the
system hang. But if the timeout value is lower than it will be below
the threshold (even if timeout happens) and system will not get into
a hung state. This will avoid a system hang without losing any
programming or GT interrupts, taking the worst case of lowest CDCLK
frequency and early DC5 abort into account.
Signed-off-by: Uma Shankar <uma.shankar@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Some of the gen instruction macros (e.g. MI_DISPLAY_FLIP) have the
length directly encoded in them. Since these are used directly in
the tables, the Length becomes part of the comparison used for
matching during parsing. Thus, if the cmd being parsed has a
different length to that in the table, it is not matched and the
cmd is accepted via the default variable length path.
Fix by masking out everything except the Opcode in the cmd tables
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
To keep things manageable, the pre-gen9 cmdparser does not
attempt to track any form of nested BB_START's. This did not
prevent usermode from using nested starts, or even chained
batches because the cmdparser is not strictly enforced pre gen9.
Instead, the existence of a nested BB_START would cause the batch
to be emitted in insecure mode, and any privileged capabilities
would not be available.
For Gen9, the cmdparser becomes mandatory (for BCS at least), and
so not providing any form of nested BB_START support becomes
overly restrictive. Any such batch will simply not run.
We make heavy use of backward jumps in igt, and it is much easier
to add support for this restricted subset of nested jumps, than to
rewrite the whole of our test suite to avoid them.
Add the required logic to support limited backward jumps, to
instructions that have already been validated by the parser.
Note that it's not sufficient to simply approve any BB_START
that jumps backwards in the buffer because this would allow an
attacker to embed a rogue instruction sequence within the
operand words of a harmless instruction (say LRI) and jump to
that.
We introduce a bit array to track every instr offset successfully
validated, and test the target of BB_START against this. If the
target offset hits, it is re-written to the same offset in the
shadow buffer and the BB_START cmd is allowed.
Note: This patch deliberately ignores checkpatch issues in the
cmdtables, in order to match the style of the surrounding code.
We'll correct the entire file in one go in a later patch.
v2: set dispatch secure late (Mika)
v3: rebase (Mika)
v4: Clear whitelist on each parse
Minor review updates (Chris)
v5: Correct backward jump batching
v6: fix compilation error due to struct eb shuffle (Mika)
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
In the next patch we will be adding a second valid
termination condition which will require a small
amount of refactoring to share logic with the BB_END
case.
Refactor all error conditions to jump to a dedicated
exit path, with 'break' reserved only for a successful
parse.
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
For gen9 we enable cmdparsing on the BCS ring, specifically
to catch inadvertent accesses to sensitive registers
Unlike gen7/hsw, we use the parser only to block certain
registers. We can rely on h/w to block restricted commands,
so the command tables only provide enough info to allow the
parser to delineate each command, and identify commands that
access registers.
Note: This patch deliberately ignores checkpatch issues in
favour of matching the style of the surrounding code. We'll
correct the entire file in one go in a later patch.
v3: rebase (Mika)
v4: Add RING_TIMESTAMP registers to whitelist (Jon)
Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
In "drm/i915: Add support for mandatory cmdparsing" we introduced the
concept of mandatory parsing. This allows the cmdparser to be invoked
even when user passes batch_len=0 to the execbuf ioctl's.
However, the cmdparser needs to know the extents of the buffer being
scanned. Refactor the code to ensure the cmdparser uses the actual
object size, instead of the incoming length, if user passes 0.
Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
For Gen7, the original cmdparser motive was to permit limited
use of register read/write instructions in unprivileged BB's.
This worked by copying the user supplied bb to a kmd owned
bb, and running it in secure mode, from the ggtt, only if
the scanner finds no unsafe commands or registers.
For Gen8+ we can't use this same technique because running bb's
from the ggtt also disables access to ppgtt space. But we also
do not actually require 'secure' execution since we are only
trying to reduce the available command/register set. Instead we
will copy the user buffer to a kmd owned read-only bb in ppgtt,
and run in the usual non-secure mode.
Note that ro pages are only supported by ppgtt (not ggtt), but
luckily that's exactly what we need.
Add the required paths to map the shadow buffer to ppgtt ro for Gen8+
v2: IS_GEN7/IS_GEN (Mika)
v3: rebase
v4: rebase
v5: rebase
Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
The existing cmdparser for gen7 can be bypassed by specifying
batch_len=0 in the execbuf call. This is safe because bypassing
simply reduces the cmd-set available.
In a later patch we will introduce cmdparsing for gen9, as a
security measure, which must be strictly enforced since without
it we are vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Introduce the concept of 'required' cmd parsing that cannot be
bypassed by submitting zero-length bb's.
v2: rebase (Mika)
v2: rebase (Mika)
v3: fix conflict on engine flags (Mika)
Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Retroactively stop reporting support for secure batches
through the api for gen6+ so that older binaries trigger
the fallback path instead.
Older binaries use secure batches pre gen6 to access resources
that are not available to normal usermode processes. However,
all known userspace explicitly checks for HAS_SECURE_BATCHES
before relying on the secure batch feature.
Since there are no known binaries relying on this for newer gens
we can kill secure batches from gen6, via I915_PARAM_HAS_SECURE_BATCHES.
v2: rebase (Mika)
v3: rebase (Mika)
Signed-off-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Commit a5681e20b541 ("net/ibmnvic: Fix deadlock problem in reset")
made the change to hold the RTNL lock during a reset to avoid deadlock
but linkwatch_event is fired during the reset and needs the RTNL lock.
That keeps linkwatch_event process from proceeding until the reset
is complete. The reset process cannot tolerate the linkwatch_event
processing after reset completes, so release the RTNL lock during the
process to allow a chance for linkwatch_event to run during reset.
This does not guarantee that the linkwatch_event will be processed as
soon as link state changes, but is an improvement over the current code
where linkwatch_event processing is always delayed, which prevents
transmissions on the device from being deactivated leading transmit
watchdog timer to time-out.
Release the RTNL lock before link state change and re-acquire after
the link state change to allow linkwatch_event to grab the RTNL lock
and run during the reset.
Fixes: a5681e20b541 ("net/ibmnvic: Fix deadlock problem in reset") Signed-off-by: Juliet Kim <julietk@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Commit 73f381660959 ("arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack
thereof") renamed the caller of the install_bp_hardening_cb() function
but forgot to update a comment, which can be confusing when trying to
follow the code flow.
Fixes: 73f381660959 ("arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof") Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
projects / mirror_ubuntu-eoan-kernel.git / log