use Digest::SHA;
use IO::File;
use File::stat;
+use JSON;
use PVE::OTP;
use PVE::Ticket;
my $pve_auth_key_cache = {};
-my $ticket_lifetime = 3600*2; # 2 hours
-# TODO: set to 24h for PVE 6.0
-my $authkey_lifetime = 3600*0; # rotation disabled
+my $ticket_lifetime = 3600 * 2; # 2 hours
+my $auth_graceperiod = 60 * 5; # 5 minutes
+my $authkey_lifetime = 3600 * 24; # rotate every 24 hours
Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed();
cfs_register_file('user.cfg',
\&parse_user_config,
\&write_user_config);
+cfs_register_file('priv/tfa.cfg',
+ \&parse_priv_tfa_config,
+ \&write_priv_tfa_config);
sub verify_username {
PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_);
warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n" if !$quiet;
return 0;
} else {
- if (time() - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) {
+ my $now = time();
+ if ($now - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) {
warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;;
return 0;
+ } elsif ($mtime > $now + $auth_graceperiod) {
+ # a nodes RTC had a time set in the future during key generation -> ticket
+ # validity is clamped to 0+5 min grace period until now >= mtime again
+ my (undef, $old_mtime) = get_pubkey(1);
+ if ($old_mtime && $mtime >= $old_mtime && $mtime - $old_mtime < $ticket_lifetime) {
+ warn "auth key pair generated in the future (key $mtime > host $now),"
+ ." but old key still exists and in valid grace period so avoid automatic"
+ ." fixup. Cluster time not in sync?\n" if !$quiet;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ warn "auth key pair generated in the future (key $mtime > host $now), rotating..\n" if !$quiet;
+ return 0;
} else {
warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;;
return 1;
return if check_authkey();
my $old = get_pubkey();
+ my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048);
if ($old) {
eval {
my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ # mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation
PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem);
};
die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
}
- my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048);
eval {
my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ # mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation,
+ # should be close to that of pubold above
PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
};
if ($@) {
die $@ if $@;
}
+PVE::JSONSchema::register_standard_option('tokenid', {
+ description => "API token identifier.",
+ type => "string",
+ format => "pve-tokenid",
+});
+
+our $token_subid_regex = $PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex;
+
+# username@realm username realm tokenid
+our $token_full_regex = qr/((${PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex})\@(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex}))!(${token_subid_regex})/;
+
+our $userid_or_token_regex = qr/^$PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex\@$PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex(?:!$token_subid_regex)?$/;
+
+sub split_tokenid {
+ my ($tokenid, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ if ($tokenid =~ /^${token_full_regex}$/) {
+ return ($1, $4);
+ }
+
+ die "'$tokenid' is not a valid token ID - not able to split into user and token parts\n" if !$noerr;
+
+ return undef;
+}
+
+sub join_tokenid {
+ my ($username, $tokensubid) = @_;
+
+ my $joined = "${username}!${tokensubid}";
+
+ return pve_verify_tokenid($joined);
+}
+
+PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-tokenid', \&pve_verify_tokenid);
+sub pve_verify_tokenid {
+ my ($tokenid, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ if ($tokenid =~ /^${token_full_regex}$/) {
+ return wantarray ? ($tokenid, $2, $3, $4) : $tokenid;
+ }
+
+ die "value '$tokenid' does not look like a valid token ID\n" if !$noerr;
+
+ return undef;
+}
+
+
my $csrf_prevention_secret;
+my $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
my $get_csrfr_secret = sub {
if (!$csrf_prevention_secret) {
my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($pve_www_key_fn);
- $csrf_prevention_secret = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64($input);
+ $csrf_prevention_secret = Digest::SHA::hmac_sha256_base64($input);
+ $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64($input);
}
return $csrf_prevention_secret;
};
sub verify_csrf_prevention_token {
my ($username, $token, $noerr) = @_;
- my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
+ my $secret = $get_csrfr_secret->();
+
+ # FIXME: remove with PVE 7 and/or refactor all into PVE::Ticket ?
+ if ($token =~ m/^([A-Z0-9]{8}):(\S+)$/) {
+ my $sig = $2;
+ if (length($sig) == 27) {
+ # the legacy secret got populated by above get_csrfr_secret call
+ $secret = $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
+ }
+ }
return PVE::Ticket::verify_csrf_prevention_token(
- $secret, $username, $token, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr);
+ $secret, $username, $token, -$auth_graceperiod, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr);
}
my $get_ticket_age_range = sub {
my $key_age = $now - $mtime;
$key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0;
- my $min = -300;
+ my $min = -$auth_graceperiod;
my $max = $ticket_lifetime;
if ($rotated) {
# ticket creation after rotation is not allowed
- $min = $key_age - 300;
+ $min = $key_age - $auth_graceperiod;
} else {
if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) {
if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) {
}
}
- $max = $key_age + 300 if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime;
+ $max = $key_age + $auth_graceperiod if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime;
}
return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime;
};
sub assemble_ticket {
- my ($username) = @_;
+ my ($data) = @_;
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
- return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $username);
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data);
}
sub verify_ticket {
return undef if !$rsa_pub;
my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old);
- return undef if !$min;
+ return undef if !defined($min);
return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
$rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, $min, $max, 1);
};
- my ($username, $age) = $check->();
+ my ($data, $age) = $check->();
# check with old, rotated key if current key failed
- ($username, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($username);
+ ($data, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($data);
- if (!defined($username)) {
+ my $auth_failure = sub {
if ($noerr) {
return undef;
} else {
# raise error via undef ticket
PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE');
}
+ };
+
+ if (!defined($data)) {
+ return $auth_failure->();
+ }
+
+ my ($username, $tfa_info);
+ if ($data =~ m{^u2f!([^!]+)!([0-9a-zA-Z/.=_\-+]+)$}) {
+ # Ticket for u2f-users:
+ ($username, my $challenge) = ($1, $2);
+ if ($challenge eq 'verified') {
+ # u2f challenge was completed
+ $challenge = undef;
+ } elsif (!wantarray) {
+ # The caller is not aware there could be an ongoing challenge,
+ # so we treat this ticket as invalid:
+ return $auth_failure->();
+ }
+ $tfa_info = {
+ type => 'u2f',
+ challenge => $challenge,
+ };
+ } elsif ($data =~ /^tfa!(.*)$/) {
+ # TOTP and Yubico don't require a challenge so this is the generic
+ # 'missing 2nd factor ticket'
+ $username = $1;
+ $tfa_info = { type => 'tfa' };
+ } else {
+ # Regular ticket (full access)
+ $username = $data;
}
return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);
- return wantarray ? ($username, $age) : $username;
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $age, $tfa_info) : $username;
+}
+
+sub verify_token {
+ my ($api_token) = @_;
+
+ die "no API token specified\n" if !$api_token;
+
+ my ($tokenid, $value);
+ if ($api_token =~ /^(.*)=(.*)$/) {
+ $tokenid = $1;
+ $value = $2;
+ } else {
+ die "no tokenid specified\n";
+ }
+
+ my ($username, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid);
+
+ my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);
+ check_token_exist($usercfg, $username, $token);
+
+ my $ctime = time();
+
+ my $user = $usercfg->{users}->{$username};
+ die "account expired\n" if $user->{expire} && ($user->{expire} < $ctime);
+
+ my $token_info = $user->{tokens}->{$token};
+ die "token expired\n" if $token_info->{expire} && ($token_info->{expire} < $ctime);
+
+ die "invalid token value!\n" if !PVE::Cluster::verify_token($tokenid, $value);
+
+ return wantarray ? ($tokenid) : $tokenid;
}
+
# VNC tickets
# - they do not contain the username in plain text
# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey();
- if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime)) {
+ if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0)) {
if ($noerr) {
return undef;
} else {
return undef;
}
-sub verify_one_time_pw {
- my ($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
+sub check_token_exist {
+ my ($usercfg, $username, $tokenid, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ my $user = check_user_exist($usercfg, $username, $noerr);
+ return undef if !$user;
+
+ return $user->{tokens}->{$tokenid}
+ if defined($user->{tokens}) && $user->{tokens}->{$tokenid};
+
+ die "no such token '$tokenid' for user '$username'\n" if !$noerr;
+
+ return undef;
+}
- my $type = $tfa_cfg->{type};
+sub verify_one_time_pw {
+ my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
die "missing one time password for two-factor authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp;
my $proxy;
if ($type eq 'yubico') {
- my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys};
PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url},
$tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy);
} elsif ($type eq 'oath') {
- my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys};
PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits});
} else {
die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n";
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
- die "auth domain '$realm' does not exists\n" if !$cfg;
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg;
my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
$plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password);
- if ($cfg->{tfa}) {
- my $tfa_cfg = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($cfg->{tfa});
- verify_one_time_pw($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp);
+ my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm);
+ if ($type) {
+ if ($type eq 'u2f') {
+ # Note that if the user did not manage to complete the initial u2f registration
+ # challenge we have a hash containing a 'challenge' entry in the user's tfa.cfg entry:
+ $tfa_data = undef if exists $tfa_data->{challenge};
+ } elsif (!defined($otp)) {
+ # The user requires a 2nd factor but has not provided one. Return success but
+ # don't clear $tfa_data.
+ } else {
+ my $keys = $tfa_data->{keys};
+ my $tfa_cfg = $tfa_data->{config};
+ verify_one_time_pw($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp);
+ $tfa_data = undef;
+ }
+
+ # Return the type along with the rest:
+ if ($tfa_data) {
+ $tfa_data = {
+ type => $type,
+ data => $tfa_data,
+ };
+ }
}
- return $username;
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_data) : $username;
}
sub domain_set_password {
],
user => [
'VM.Config.CDROM', # change CDROM media
+ 'VM.Config.Cloudinit',
'VM.Console',
'VM.Backup',
'VM.PowerMgmt',
'Datastore.Audit',
],
},
+ SDN => {
+ root => [],
+ admin => [
+ 'SDN.Allocate',
+ 'SDN.Audit',
+ ],
+ audit => [
+ 'SDN.Audit',
+ ],
+ },
User => {
root => [
'Realm.Allocate',
if ($cfg->{users}->{$user}) { # user exists
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
- $cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$user} = 1;
} else {
warn "user config - ignore invalid group member '$user'\n";
}
+ $cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$user} = 1;
}
} elsif ($et eq 'role') {
if (defined ($valid_privs->{$priv})) {
$cfg->{roles}->{$role}->{$priv} = 1;
} else {
- warn "user config - ignore invalid priviledge '$priv'\n";
+ warn "user config - ignore invalid privilege '$priv'\n";
}
}
} elsif ($et eq 'acl') {
my ($propagate, $pathtxt, $uglist, $rolelist) = @data;
+ $propagate = $propagate ? 1 : 0;
+
if (my $path = normalize_path($pathtxt)) {
foreach my $role (split_list($rolelist)) {
next;
}
+ if (!$cfg->{roles}->{$role}) {
+ warn "user config - ignore invalid acl role '$role'\n";
+ next;
+ }
+
foreach my $ug (split_list($uglist)) {
- if ($ug =~ m/^@(\S+)$/) {
- my $group = $1;
- if ($cfg->{groups}->{$group}) { # group exists
- $cfg->{acl}->{$path}->{groups}->{$group}->{$role} = $propagate;
- } else {
+ my ($group) = $ug =~ m/^@(\S+)$/;
+
+ if ($group && verify_groupname($group, 1)) {
+ if (!$cfg->{groups}->{$group}) { # group does not exist
warn "user config - ignore invalid acl group '$group'\n";
}
+ $cfg->{acl}->{$path}->{groups}->{$group}->{$role} = $propagate;
} elsif (PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($ug, 1)) {
- if ($cfg->{users}->{$ug}) { # user exists
- $cfg->{acl}->{$path}->{users}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
- } else {
+ if (!$cfg->{users}->{$ug}) { # user does not exist
warn "user config - ignore invalid acl member '$ug'\n";
}
+ $cfg->{acl}->{$path}->{users}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
+ } elsif (my ($user, $token) = split_tokenid($ug, 1)) {
+ if (check_token_exist($cfg, $user, $token, 1)) {
+ $cfg->{acl}->{$path}->{tokens}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
+ } else {
+ warn "user config - ignore invalid acl token '$ug'\n";
+ }
} else {
warn "user config - invalid user/group '$ug' in acl\n";
}
}
$cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{storage}->{$storeid} = 1;
}
+ } elsif ($et eq 'token') {
+ my ($tokenid, $expire, $privsep, $comment) = @data;
+
+ my ($user, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid, 1);
+ if (!($user && $token)) {
+ warn "user config - ignore invalid tokenid '$tokenid'\n";
+ next;
+ }
+
+ $privsep = $privsep ? 1 : 0;
+
+ $expire = 0 if !$expire;
+
+ if ($expire !~ m/^\d+$/) {
+ warn "user config - ignore token '$tokenid' - (illegal characters in expire '$expire')\n";
+ next;
+ }
+ $expire = int($expire);
+
+ if (my $user_cfg = $cfg->{users}->{$user}) { # user exists
+ $user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token} = {} if !$user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token};
+ my $token_cfg = $user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token};
+ $token_cfg->{privsep} = $privsep;
+ $token_cfg->{expire} = $expire;
+ $token_cfg->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
+ } else {
+ warn "user config - ignore token '$tokenid' - user does not exist\n";
+ }
} else {
warn "user config - ignore config line: $line\n";
}
my $data = '';
- foreach my $user (keys %{$cfg->{users}}) {
+ foreach my $user (sort keys %{$cfg->{users}}) {
my $d = $cfg->{users}->{$user};
my $firstname = $d->{firstname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{firstname}) : '';
my $lastname = $d->{lastname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{lastname}) : '';
my $enable = $d->{enable} ? 1 : 0;
my $keys = $d->{keys} ? $d->{keys} : '';
$data .= "user:$user:$enable:$expire:$firstname:$lastname:$email:$comment:$keys:\n";
+
+ my $user_tokens = $d->{tokens};
+ foreach my $token (sort keys %$user_tokens) {
+ my $td = $user_tokens->{$token};
+ my $full_tokenid = join_tokenid($user, $token);
+ my $comment = $td->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($td->{comment}) : '';
+ my $expire = int($td->{expire} || 0);
+ my $privsep = $td->{privsep} ? 1 : 0;
+ $data .= "token:$full_tokenid:$expire:$privsep:$comment:\n";
+ }
}
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $group (keys %{$cfg->{groups}}) {
+ foreach my $group (sort keys %{$cfg->{groups}}) {
my $d = $cfg->{groups}->{$group};
- my $list = join (',', keys %{$d->{users}});
+ my $list = join (',', sort keys %{$d->{users}});
my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
$data .= "group:$group:$list:$comment:\n";
}
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $pool (keys %{$cfg->{pools}}) {
+ foreach my $pool (sort keys %{$cfg->{pools}}) {
my $d = $cfg->{pools}->{$pool};
- my $vmlist = join (',', keys %{$d->{vms}});
- my $storelist = join (',', keys %{$d->{storage}});
+ my $vmlist = join (',', sort keys %{$d->{vms}});
+ my $storelist = join (',', sort keys %{$d->{storage}});
my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
$data .= "pool:$pool:$comment:$vmlist:$storelist:\n";
}
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $role (keys %{$cfg->{roles}}) {
+ foreach my $role (sort keys %{$cfg->{roles}}) {
next if $special_roles->{$role};
my $d = $cfg->{roles}->{$role};
- my $list = join (',', keys %$d);
+ my $list = join (',', sort keys %$d);
$data .= "role:$role:$list:\n";
}
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $path (sort keys %{$cfg->{acl}}) {
- my $d = $cfg->{acl}->{$path};
+ my $collect_rolelist_members = sub {
+ my ($acl_members, $result, $prefix, $exclude) = @_;
- my $ra = {};
+ foreach my $member (keys %$acl_members) {
+ next if $exclude && $member eq $exclude;
- foreach my $group (keys %{$d->{groups}}) {
my $l0 = '';
my $l1 = '';
- foreach my $role (sort keys %{$d->{groups}->{$group}}) {
- my $propagate = $d->{groups}->{$group}->{$role};
+ foreach my $role (sort keys %{$acl_members->{$member}}) {
+ my $propagate = $acl_members->{$member}->{$role};
if ($propagate) {
$l1 .= ',' if $l1;
$l1 .= $role;
$l0 .= $role;
}
}
- $ra->{0}->{$l0}->{"\@$group"} = 1 if $l0;
- $ra->{1}->{$l1}->{"\@$group"} = 1 if $l1;
+ $result->{0}->{$l0}->{"${prefix}${member}"} = 1 if $l0;
+ $result->{1}->{$l1}->{"${prefix}${member}"} = 1 if $l1;
}
+ };
- foreach my $user (keys %{$d->{users}}) {
- # no need to save, because root is always 'Administrator'
- next if $user eq 'root@pam';
+ foreach my $path (sort keys %{$cfg->{acl}}) {
+ my $d = $cfg->{acl}->{$path};
- my $l0 = '';
- my $l1 = '';
- foreach my $role (sort keys %{$d->{users}->{$user}}) {
- my $propagate = $d->{users}->{$user}->{$role};
- if ($propagate) {
- $l1 .= ',' if $l1;
- $l1 .= $role;
- } else {
- $l0 .= ',' if $l0;
- $l0 .= $role;
- }
+ my $rolelist_members = {};
+
+ $collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'groups'}, $rolelist_members, '@');
+
+ # no need to save 'root@pam', it is always 'Administrator'
+ $collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'users'}, $rolelist_members, '', 'root@pam');
+
+ $collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'tokens'}, $rolelist_members, '');
+
+ foreach my $propagate (0,1) {
+ my $filtered = $rolelist_members->{$propagate};
+ foreach my $rolelist (sort keys %$filtered) {
+ my $uglist = join (',', sort keys %{$filtered->{$rolelist}});
+ $data .= "acl:$propagate:$path:$uglist:$rolelist:\n";
}
- $ra->{0}->{$l0}->{$user} = 1 if $l0;
- $ra->{1}->{$l1}->{$user} = 1 if $l1;
+
}
+ }
+
+ return $data;
+}
+
+# The TFA configuration in priv/tfa.cfg format contains one line per user of
+# the form:
+# USER:TYPE:DATA
+# DATA is a base64 encoded json string and its format depends on the type.
+sub parse_priv_tfa_config {
+ my ($filename, $raw) = @_;
- foreach my $rolelist (sort keys %{$ra->{0}}) {
- my $uglist = join (',', keys %{$ra->{0}->{$rolelist}});
- $data .= "acl:0:$path:$uglist:$rolelist:\n";
+ my $users = {};
+ my $cfg = { users => $users };
+
+ $raw = '' if !defined($raw);
+ while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) {
+ my $line = $1;
+ my ($user, $type, $data) = split(/:/, $line, 3);
+
+ my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
+ if (!$realm) {
+ warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
+ next;
}
- foreach my $rolelist (sort keys %{$ra->{1}}) {
- my $uglist = join (',', keys %{$ra->{1}->{$rolelist}});
- $data .= "acl:1:$path:$uglist:$rolelist:\n";
+
+ $data = decode_json(decode_base64($data));
+
+ $users->{$user} = {
+ type => $type,
+ data => $data,
+ };
+ }
+
+ return $cfg;
+}
+
+sub write_priv_tfa_config {
+ my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
+
+ my $output = '';
+
+ my $users = $cfg->{users};
+ foreach my $user (sort keys %$users) {
+ my $info = $users->{$user};
+ next if !%$info; # skip empty entries
+
+ $info = {%$info}; # copy to verify contents:
+
+ my $type = delete $info->{type};
+ my $data = delete $info->{data};
+
+ if (my @keys = keys %$info) {
+ die "invalid keys in TFA config for user $user: " . join(', ', @keys) . "\n";
}
+
+ $data = encode_base64(encode_json($data), '');
+ $output .= "${user}:${type}:${data}\n";
}
- return $data;
+ return $output;
}
sub roles {
my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_;
# NOTE: we do not consider pools here.
- # You need to use $rpcenv->roles() instead if you want that.
+ # NOTE: for privsep tokens, this does not filter roles by those that the
+ # corresponding user has.
+ # Use $rpcenv->permission() for any actual permission checks!
return 'Administrator' if $user eq 'root@pam'; # root can do anything
- my $perm = {};
+ if (pve_verify_tokenid($user, 1)) {
+ my $tokenid = $user;
+ my ($username, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid);
+
+ my $token_info = $cfg->{users}->{$username}->{tokens}->{$token};
+ return () if !$token_info;
+
+ my $user_roles = roles($cfg, $username, $path);
+
+ # return full user privileges
+ return $user_roles if !$token_info->{privsep};
+ }
+
+ my $roles = {};
foreach my $p (sort keys %{$cfg->{acl}}) {
my $final = ($path eq $p);
#print "CHECKACL $path $p\n";
#print "ACL $path = " . Dumper ($acl);
+ if (my $ri = $acl->{tokens}->{$user}) {
+ my $new;
+ foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
+ my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
+ if ($final || $propagate) {
+ #print "APPLY ROLE $p $user $role\n";
+ $new = {} if !$new;
+ $new->{$role} = $propagate;
+ }
+ }
+ if ($new) {
+ $roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
+ next;
+ }
+ }
if (my $ri = $acl->{users}->{$user}) {
my $new;
if ($final || $propagate) {
#print "APPLY ROLE $p $user $role\n";
$new = {} if !$new;
- $new->{$role} = 1;
+ $new->{$role} = $propagate;
}
}
if ($new) {
- $perm = $new; # overwrite previous settings
+ $roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
next; # user privs always override group privs
}
}
if ($final || $propagate) {
#print "APPLY ROLE $p \@$g $role\n";
$new = {} if !$new;
- $new->{$role} = 1;
+ $new->{$role} = $propagate;
}
}
}
}
if ($new) {
- $perm = $new; # overwrite previous settings
+ $roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
next;
}
}
- return ('NoAccess') if defined ($perm->{NoAccess});
- #return () if defined ($perm->{NoAccess});
+ return { 'NoAccess' => $roles->{NoAccess} } if defined ($roles->{NoAccess});
+ #return () if defined ($roles->{NoAccess});
- #print "permission $user $path = " . Dumper ($perm);
-
- my @ra = keys %$perm;
+ #print "permission $user $path = " . Dumper ($roles);
#print "roles $user $path = " . join (',', @ra) . "\n";
- return @ra;
-}
-
-sub permission {
- my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_;
-
- $user = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
- return {} if !$user;
-
- my @ra = roles($cfg, $user, $path);
-
- my $privs = {};
-
- foreach my $role (@ra) {
- if (my $privset = $cfg->{roles}->{$role}) {
- foreach my $p (keys %$privset) {
- $privs->{$p} = 1;
- }
- }
- }
-
- #print "priviledges $user $path = " . Dumper ($privs);
-
- return $privs;
-}
-
-sub check_permissions {
- my ($username, $path, $privlist) = @_;
-
- $path = normalize_path($path);
- my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
- my $perm = permission($usercfg, $username, $path);
-
- foreach my $priv (split_list($privlist)) {
- return undef if !$perm->{$priv};
- };
-
- return 1;
+ return $roles;
}
sub remove_vm_access {
lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
}
+my $USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES = {
+ u2f => 1,
+ oath => 1,
+};
+
+# Delete an entry by setting $data=undef in which case $type is ignored.
+# Otherwise both must be valid.
+sub user_set_tfa {
+ my ($userid, $realm, $type, $data, $cached_usercfg, $cached_domaincfg) = @_;
+
+ if (defined($data) && !defined($type)) {
+ # This is an internal usage error and should not happen
+ die "cannot set tfa data without a type\n";
+ }
+
+ my $user_cfg = $cached_usercfg || cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$userid}
+ or die "user '$userid' not found\n";
+
+ my $domain_cfg = $cached_domaincfg || cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
+ my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+
+ my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
+ if (defined($realm_tfa)) {
+ $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa);
+ # If the realm has a TFA setting, we're only allowed to use that.
+ if (defined($data)) {
+ my $required_type = $realm_tfa->{type};
+ if ($required_type ne $type) {
+ die "realm '$realm' only allows TFA of type '$required_type\n";
+ }
+
+ if (defined($data->{config})) {
+ # XXX: Is it enough if the type matches? Or should the configuration also match?
+ }
+
+ # realm-configured tfa always uses a simple key list, so use the user.cfg
+ $user->{keys} = $data->{keys};
+ } else {
+ die "realm '$realm' does not allow removing the 2nd factor\n";
+ }
+ } else {
+ # Without a realm-enforced TFA setting the user can add a u2f or totp entry by themselves.
+ # The 'yubico' type requires yubico server settings, which have to be configured on the
+ # realm, so this is not supported here:
+ die "domain '$realm' does not support TFA type '$type'\n"
+ if defined($data) && !$USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES->{$type};
+ }
+
+ # Custom TFA entries are stored in priv/tfa.cfg as they can be more complet: u2f uses a
+ # public key and a key handle, TOTP requires the usual totp settings...
+
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ my $tfa = ($tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid} //= {});
+
+ if (defined($data)) {
+ $tfa->{type} = $type;
+ $tfa->{data} = $data;
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+
+ $user->{keys} = "x!$type";
+ } else {
+ delete $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid};
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+
+ delete $user->{keys};
+ }
+
+ cfs_write_file('user.cfg', $user_cfg);
+}
+
+sub user_get_tfa {
+ my ($username, $realm) = @_;
+
+ my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username}
+ or die "user '$username' not found\n";
+
+ my $keys = $user->{keys};
+
+ my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
+ my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+
+ my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
+ $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa)
+ if $realm_tfa;
+
+ if (!$keys) {
+ return if !$realm_tfa;
+ die "missing required 2nd keys\n";
+ }
+
+ # new style config starts with an 'x' and optionally contains a !<type> suffix
+ if ($keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)?$/) {
+ # old style config, find the type via the realm
+ return if !$realm_tfa;
+ return ($realm_tfa->{type}, {
+ keys => $keys,
+ config => $realm_tfa,
+ });
+ } else {
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ my $tfa = $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$username};
+ return if !$tfa; # should not happen (user.cfg wasn't cleaned up?)
+
+ if ($realm_tfa) {
+ # if the realm has a tfa setting we need to verify the type:
+ die "auth domain '$realm' and user have mismatching TFA settings\n"
+ if $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type} ne $tfa->{type};
+ }
+
+ return ($tfa->{type}, $tfa->{data});
+ }
+}
+
# bash completion helpers
register_standard_option('userid-completed',
projects / pve-access-control.git / blobdiff