use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
use Net::SSLeay;
use Net::IP;
+use MIME::Base32;
use MIME::Base64;
use Digest::SHA;
use IO::File;
use File::stat;
use JSON;
+use Scalar::Util 'weaken';
+use URI::Escape;
use PVE::OTP;
use PVE::Ticket;
use PVE::Cluster qw(cfs_register_file cfs_read_file cfs_write_file cfs_lock_file);
use PVE::JSONSchema qw(register_standard_option get_standard_option);
+use PVE::RS::TFA;
+
use PVE::Auth::Plugin;
use PVE::Auth::AD;
use PVE::Auth::LDAP;
use PVE::Auth::PVE;
use PVE::Auth::PAM;
+use PVE::Auth::OpenId;
# load and initialize all plugins
PVE::Auth::LDAP->register();
PVE::Auth::PVE->register();
PVE::Auth::PAM->register();
+PVE::Auth::OpenId->register();
PVE::Auth::Plugin->init();
# $authdir must be writable by root only!
PVE::Auth::Plugin::pve_verify_realm(@_);
}
+# Locking both config files together is only ever allowed in one order:
+# 1) tfa config
+# 2) user config
+# If we permit the other way round, too, we might end up deadlocking!
+my $user_config_locked;
sub lock_user_config {
my ($code, $errmsg) = @_;
+ my $locked = 1;
+ $user_config_locked = \$locked;
+ weaken $user_config_locked; # make this scope guard signal safe...
+
cfs_lock_file("user.cfg", undef, $code);
+ $user_config_locked = undef;
if (my $err = $@) {
$errmsg ? die "$errmsg: $err" : die $err;
}
}
+sub lock_tfa_config {
+ my ($code, $errmsg) = @_;
+
+ die "tfa config lock cannot be acquired while holding user config lock\n"
+ if ($user_config_locked && $$user_config_locked);
+
+ my $res = cfs_lock_file("priv/tfa.cfg", undef, $code);
+ if (my $err = $@) {
+ $errmsg ? die "$errmsg: $err" : die $err;
+ }
+
+ return $res;
+}
+
my $cache_read_key = sub {
my ($type) = @_;
return ($min, $max);
};
-sub assemble_ticket {
- my ($data) = @_;
+sub assemble_ticket : prototype($;$) {
+ my ($data, $aad) = @_;
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
- return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data);
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data, $aad);
}
-sub verify_ticket {
- my ($ticket, $noerr) = @_;
+# Returns the username, "age" and tfa info.
+#
+# Note that for the new-style outh, tfa info is never set, as it only uses the `/ticket` api call
+# via the new 'tfa-challenge' parameter, so this part can go with PVE-8.
+#
+# New-style auth still uses this function, but sets `$tfa_ticket` to true when validating the tfa
+# ticket.
+sub verify_ticket : prototype($;$$) {
+ my ($ticket, $noerr, $tfa_ticket_aad) = @_;
my $now = time();
return undef if !defined($min);
return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
- $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, $min, $max, 1);
+ $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, $tfa_ticket_aad, $min, $max, 1);
};
my ($data, $age) = $check->();
return $auth_failure->();
}
+ if ($tfa_ticket_aad) {
+ # We're validating a ticket-call's 'tfa-challenge' parameter, so just return its data.
+ if ($data =~ /^!tfa!(.*)$/) {
+ return $1;
+ }
+ die "bad ticket\n";
+ }
+
my ($username, $tfa_info);
+ if ($data =~ /^!tfa!(.*)$/) {
+ # PBS style half-authenticated ticket, contains a json string form of a `TfaChallenge`
+ # object.
+ # This type of ticket does not contain the user name.
+ return { type => 'new', data => $1 };
+ }
if ($data =~ m{^u2f!([^!]+)!([0-9a-zA-Z/.=_\-+]+)$}) {
# Ticket for u2f-users:
($username, my $challenge) = ($1, $2);
check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);
check_token_exist($usercfg, $username, $token);
- my $ctime = time();
-
my $user = $usercfg->{users}->{$username};
- die "account expired\n" if $user->{expire} && ($user->{expire} < $ctime);
-
my $token_info = $user->{tokens}->{$token};
+
+ my $ctime = time();
die "token expired\n" if $token_info->{expire} && ($token_info->{expire} < $ctime);
die "invalid token value!\n" if !PVE::Cluster::verify_token($tokenid, $value);
return wantarray ? ($tokenid) : $tokenid;
}
-
-# VNC tickets
-# - they do not contain the username in plain text
-# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
-sub assemble_vnc_ticket {
- my ($username, $path) = @_;
+my $assemble_short_lived_ticket = sub {
+ my ($prefix, $username, $path) = @_;
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket(
- $rsa_priv, 'PVEVNC', undef, $secret_data);
-}
+ $rsa_priv, $prefix, undef, $secret_data);
+};
-sub verify_vnc_ticket {
- my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+my $verify_short_lived_ticket = sub {
+ my ($ticket, $prefix, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ $path = normalize_path($path);
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
return undef;
} else {
# raise error via undef ticket
- PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC');
+ PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, $prefix);
}
}
return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
- $rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC', $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
+ $rsa_pub, $prefix, $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
+};
+
+# VNC tickets
+# - they do not contain the username in plain text
+# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
+sub assemble_vnc_ticket {
+ my ($username, $path) = @_;
+
+ return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVEVNC', $username, $path);
+}
+
+sub verify_vnc_ticket {
+ my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVEVNC', $username, $path, $noerr);
+}
+
+# Tunnel tickets
+# - they do not contain the username in plain text
+# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100', '/socket/run/qemu-server/123.storage')
+sub assemble_tunnel_ticket {
+ my ($username, $path) = @_;
+
+ return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVETUNNEL', $username, $path);
+}
+
+sub verify_tunnel_ticket {
+ my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVETUNNEL', $username, $path, $noerr);
}
sub assemble_spice_ticket {
die "user '$username' is disabled\n" if !$noerr;
+ my $ctime = time();
+ my $expire = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{expire};
+
+ die "account expired\n" if $expire && ($expire < $ctime);
+
return undef;
}
return undef;
}
+# deprecated
sub verify_one_time_pw {
my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
# password should be utf8 encoded
# Note: some plugins delay/sleep if auth fails
-sub authenticate_user {
- my ($username, $password, $otp) = @_;
+sub authenticate_user : prototype($$$$;$) {
+ my ($username, $password, $otp, $new_format, $tfa_challenge) = @_;
die "no username specified\n" if !$username;
check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);
- my $ctime = time();
- my $expire = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{expire};
-
- die "account expired\n" if $expire && ($expire < $ctime);
-
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg;
my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
+
+ if ($tfa_challenge) {
+ # This is the 2nd factor, use the password for the OTP response.
+ my $tfa_challenge = authenticate_2nd_new($username, $realm, $password, $tfa_challenge);
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_challenge) : $username;
+ }
+
$plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password);
- my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm);
+ if ($new_format) {
+ # This is the first factor with an optional immediate 2nd factor for TOTP:
+ my $tfa_challenge = authenticate_2nd_new($username, $realm, $otp, $tfa_challenge);
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_challenge) : $username;
+ } else {
+ return authenticate_2nd_old($username, $realm, $otp);
+ }
+}
+
+sub authenticate_2nd_old : prototype($$$) {
+ my ($username, $realm, $otp) = @_;
+
+ my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm, 0);
if ($type) {
- if ($type eq 'u2f') {
+ if ($type eq 'incompatible') {
+ die "old login api disabled, user has incompatible TFA entries\n";
+ } elsif ($type eq 'u2f') {
# Note that if the user did not manage to complete the initial u2f registration
# challenge we have a hash containing a 'challenge' entry in the user's tfa.cfg entry:
$tfa_data = undef if exists $tfa_data->{challenge};
return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_data) : $username;
}
+# Returns a tfa challenge or undef.
+sub authenticate_2nd_new : prototype($$$$) {
+ my ($username, $realm, $otp, $tfa_challenge) = @_;
+
+ my $result = lock_tfa_config(sub {
+ my ($tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm, 1);
+
+ if (!defined($tfa_cfg)) {
+ return undef;
+ }
+
+ my $realm_type = $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type};
+ # verify realm type unless using recovery keys:
+ if (defined($realm_type)) {
+ $realm_type = 'totp' if $realm_type eq 'oath'; # we used to call it that
+ if ($realm_type eq 'yubico') {
+ # Yubico auth will not be supported in rust for now...
+ if (!defined($tfa_challenge)) {
+ my $challenge = { yubico => JSON::true };
+ # Even with yubico auth we do allow recovery keys to be used:
+ if (my $recovery = $tfa_cfg->recovery_state($username)) {
+ $challenge->{recovery} = $recovery;
+ }
+ return to_json($challenge);
+ }
+
+ if ($otp =~ /^yubico:(.*)$/) {
+ $otp = $1;
+ # Defer to after unlocking the TFA config:
+ return sub {
+ authenticate_yubico_new(
+ $tfa_cfg, $username, $realm_tfa, $tfa_challenge, $otp,
+ );
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ my $response_type;
+ if (defined($otp)) {
+ if ($otp !~ /^([^:]+):/) {
+ die "bad otp response\n";
+ }
+ $response_type = $1;
+ }
+
+ die "realm requires $realm_type authentication\n"
+ if $response_type && $response_type ne 'recovery' && $response_type ne $realm_type;
+ }
+
+ configure_u2f_and_wa($tfa_cfg);
+
+ my $must_save = 0;
+ if (defined($tfa_challenge)) {
+ $tfa_challenge = verify_ticket($tfa_challenge, 0, $username);
+ $must_save = $tfa_cfg->authentication_verify($username, $tfa_challenge, $otp);
+ $tfa_challenge = undef;
+ } else {
+ $tfa_challenge = $tfa_cfg->authentication_challenge($username);
+ if (defined($otp)) {
+ if (defined($tfa_challenge)) {
+ $must_save = $tfa_cfg->authentication_verify($username, $tfa_challenge, $otp);
+ } else {
+ die "no such challenge\n";
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ($must_save) {
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+ }
+
+ return $tfa_challenge;
+ });
+
+ # Yubico auth returns the authentication sub:
+ if (ref($result) eq 'CODE') {
+ $result = $result->();
+ }
+
+ return $result;
+}
+
+sub authenticate_yubico_new : prototype($$$) {
+ my ($tfa_cfg, $username, $realm, $tfa_challenge, $otp) = @_;
+
+ $tfa_challenge = verify_ticket($tfa_challenge, 0, $username);
+ $tfa_challenge = from_json($tfa_challenge);
+
+ if (!$tfa_challenge->{yubico}) {
+ die "no such challenge\n";
+ }
+
+ my $keys = $tfa_cfg->get_yubico_keys($username);
+ die "no keys configured\n" if !defined($keys) || !length($keys);
+
+ authenticate_yubico_do($otp, $keys, $realm);
+
+ # return `undef` to clear the tfa challenge.
+ return undef;
+}
+
+sub authenticate_yubico_do : prototype($$$) {
+ my ($value, $keys, $realm) = @_;
+
+ # fixme: proxy support?
+ my $proxy = undef;
+
+ PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($value, $keys, $realm->{url}, $realm->{id}, $realm->{key}, $proxy);
+}
+
+sub configure_u2f_and_wa : prototype($) {
+ my ($tfa_cfg) = @_;
+
+ my $rpc_origin;
+ my $get_origin = sub {
+ return $rpc_origin if defined($rpc_origin);
+ my $rpcenv = PVE::RPCEnvironment::get();
+ if (my $origin = $rpcenv->get_request_host(1)) {
+ $rpc_origin = "https://$origin";
+ return $rpc_origin;
+ }
+ die "failed to figure out origin\n";
+ };
+
+ my $dc = cfs_read_file('datacenter.cfg');
+ if (my $u2f = $dc->{u2f}) {
+ eval {
+ $tfa_cfg->set_u2f_config({
+ origin => $u2f->{origin} // $get_origin->(),
+ appid => $u2f->{appid},
+ });
+ };
+ warn "u2f unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
+ }
+ if (my $wa = $dc->{webauthn}) {
+ eval {
+ $tfa_cfg->set_webauthn_config({
+ origin => $wa->{origin} // $get_origin->(),
+ rp => $wa->{rp},
+ id => $wa->{id},
+ });
+ };
+ warn "webauthn unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
+ }
+}
+
sub domain_set_password {
my ($realm, $username, $password) = @_;
|/pool/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|/sdn
|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
+ |/sdn/vnets/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|/storage
|/storage/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|/vms
return $data;
}
-# The TFA configuration in priv/tfa.cfg format contains one line per user of
-# the form:
-# USER:TYPE:DATA
-# DATA is a base64 encoded json string and its format depends on the type.
+# Creates a `PVE::RS::TFA` instance from the raw config data.
+# Its contained hash will also support the legacy functionality.
sub parse_priv_tfa_config {
my ($filename, $raw) = @_;
- my $users = {};
- my $cfg = { users => $users };
-
$raw = '' if !defined($raw);
- while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) {
- my $line = $1;
- my ($user, $type, $data) = split(/:/, $line, 3);
+ my $cfg = PVE::RS::TFA->new($raw);
+ # Purge invalid users:
+ foreach my $user ($cfg->users()->@*) {
my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
if (!$realm) {
warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
- next;
+ $cfg->remove_user($user);
}
-
- $data = decode_json(decode_base64($data));
-
- $users->{$user} = {
- type => $type,
- data => $data,
- };
}
return $cfg;
sub write_priv_tfa_config {
my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
- my $output = '';
-
- my $users = $cfg->{users};
- foreach my $user (sort keys %$users) {
- my $info = $users->{$user};
- next if !%$info; # skip empty entries
-
- $info = {%$info}; # copy to verify contents:
-
- my $type = delete $info->{type};
- my $data = delete $info->{data};
-
- if (my @keys = keys %$info) {
- die "invalid keys in TFA config for user $user: " . join(', ', @keys) . "\n";
- }
-
- $data = encode_base64(encode_json($data), '');
- $output .= "${user}:${type}:${data}\n";
- }
+ assert_new_tfa_config_available();
- return $output;
+ return $cfg->write();
}
sub roles {
oath => 1,
};
-# Delete an entry by setting $data=undef in which case $type is ignored.
-# Otherwise both must be valid.
-sub user_set_tfa {
- my ($userid, $realm, $type, $data, $cached_usercfg, $cached_domaincfg) = @_;
-
- if (defined($data) && !defined($type)) {
- # This is an internal usage error and should not happen
- die "cannot set tfa data without a type\n";
+sub assert_new_tfa_config_available() {
+ PVE::Cluster::cfs_update();
+ my $version_info = PVE::Cluster::get_node_kv('version-info');
+ die "cannot update tfa config, please make sure all cluster nodes are up to date\n"
+ if !$version_info;
+ my $members = PVE::Cluster::get_members() or return; # get_members returns undef on no cluster
+ my $old = '';
+ foreach my $node (keys $members->%*) {
+ my $info = $version_info->{$node};
+ if (!$info) {
+ $old .= " cluster node '$node' is too old, did not broadcast its version info\n";
+ next;
+ }
+ $info = from_json($info);
+ my $ver = $info->{version};
+ if ($ver !~ /^(\d+\.\d+)-(\d+)/) {
+ $old .= " cluster node '$node' provided an invalid version string: '$ver'\n";
+ next;
+ }
+ my ($maj, $rel) = ($1, $2);
+ if (!($maj > 7.0 || ($maj == 7.0 && $rel >= 15))) {
+ $old .= " cluster node '$node' is too old ($ver < 7.0-15)\n";
+ next;
+ }
}
+ die "cannot update tfa config, following nodes are not up to date:\n$old" if length($old);
+}
- my $user_cfg = $cached_usercfg || cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
- my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$userid}
- or die "user '$userid' not found\n";
+sub user_remove_tfa : prototype($) {
+ my ($userid) = @_;
- my $domain_cfg = $cached_domaincfg || cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
- my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
- die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+ assert_new_tfa_config_available();
- my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
- if (defined($realm_tfa)) {
- $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa);
- # If the realm has a TFA setting, we're only allowed to use that.
- if (defined($data)) {
- my $required_type = $realm_tfa->{type};
- if ($required_type ne $type) {
- die "realm '$realm' only allows TFA of type '$required_type\n";
- }
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ $tfa_cfg->remove_user($userid);
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+}
- if (defined($data->{config})) {
- # XXX: Is it enough if the type matches? Or should the configuration also match?
- }
+my sub add_old_yubico_keys : prototype($$$) {
+ my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $keys) = @_;
- # realm-configured tfa always uses a simple key list, so use the user.cfg
- $user->{keys} = $data->{keys};
- } else {
- die "realm '$realm' does not allow removing the 2nd factor\n";
- }
+ my $count = 0;
+ foreach my $key (split_list($keys)) {
+ my $description = "<old userconfig key $count>";
+ ++$count;
+ $tfa_cfg->add_yubico_entry($userid, $description, $key);
+ }
+}
+
+my sub normalize_totp_secret : prototype($) {
+ my ($key) = @_;
+
+ my $binkey;
+ # See PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp:
+ if ($key =~ /^v2-0x([0-9a-fA-F]+)$/) {
+ # v2, hex
+ $binkey = pack('H*', $1);
+ } elsif ($key =~ /^v2-([A-Z2-7=]+)$/) {
+ # v2, base32
+ $binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($1);
+ } elsif ($key =~ /^[A-Z2-7=]{16}$/) {
+ $binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($key);
+ } elsif ($key =~ /^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$/) {
+ $binkey = pack('H*', $key);
} else {
- # Without a realm-enforced TFA setting the user can add a u2f or totp entry by themselves.
- # The 'yubico' type requires yubico server settings, which have to be configured on the
- # realm, so this is not supported here:
- die "domain '$realm' does not support TFA type '$type'\n"
- if defined($data) && !$USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES->{$type};
+ return undef;
}
- # Custom TFA entries are stored in priv/tfa.cfg as they can be more complet: u2f uses a
- # public key and a key handle, TOTP requires the usual totp settings...
+ return MIME::Base32::encode_rfc3548($binkey);
+}
- my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
- my $tfa = ($tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid} //= {});
+my sub add_old_totp_keys : prototype($$$$) {
+ my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys) = @_;
+
+ my $issuer = 'Proxmox%20VE';
+ my $account = uri_escape("Old key for $userid");
+ my $digits = $realm_tfa->{digits} || 6;
+ my $step = $realm_tfa->{step} || 30;
+ my $uri = "otpauth://totp/$issuer:$account?digits=$digits&period=$step&algorithm=SHA1&secret=";
+
+ my $count = 0;
+ foreach my $key (split_list($keys)) {
+ $key = normalize_totp_secret($key);
+ # and just skip invalid keys:
+ next if !defined($key);
+
+ my $description = "<old userconfig key $count>";
+ ++$count;
+ eval { $tfa_cfg->add_totp_entry($userid, $description, $uri . $key) };
+ warn $@ if $@;
+ }
+}
- if (defined($data)) {
- $tfa->{type} = $type;
- $tfa->{data} = $data;
- cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+sub add_old_keys_to_realm_tfa : prototype($$$$) {
+ my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys) = @_;
- $user->{keys} = "x!$type";
- } else {
- delete $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid};
- cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+ # if there's no realm tfa configured, we don't know what the keys mean, so we just ignore
+ # them...
+ return if !$realm_tfa;
- delete $user->{keys};
+ my $type = $realm_tfa->{type};
+ if ($type eq 'oath') {
+ add_old_totp_keys($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys);
+ } elsif ($type eq 'yubico') {
+ add_old_yubico_keys($userid, $tfa_cfg, $keys);
+ } else {
+ # invalid keys, we'll just drop them now...
}
-
- cfs_write_file('user.cfg', $user_cfg);
}
-sub user_get_tfa {
- my ($username, $realm) = @_;
+sub user_get_tfa : prototype($$$) {
+ my ($username, $realm, $new_format) = @_;
my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username}
die "missing required 2nd keys\n";
}
+ if ($new_format) {
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ if (defined($keys) && $keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)$/) {
+ add_old_keys_to_realm_tfa($username, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys);
+ }
+ return ($tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa);
+ }
+
# new style config starts with an 'x' and optionally contains a !<type> suffix
if ($keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)?$/) {
# old style config, find the type via the realm
projects / pve-access-control.git / blobdiff