return wantarray ? ($tokenid) : $tokenid;
}
-
-# VNC tickets
-# - they do not contain the username in plain text
-# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
-sub assemble_vnc_ticket {
- my ($username, $path) = @_;
+my $assemble_short_lived_ticket = sub {
+ my ($prefix, $username, $path) = @_;
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket(
- $rsa_priv, 'PVEVNC', undef, $secret_data);
-}
+ $rsa_priv, $prefix, undef, $secret_data);
+};
-sub verify_vnc_ticket {
- my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+my $verify_short_lived_ticket = sub {
+ my ($ticket, $prefix, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ $path = normalize_path($path);
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
return undef;
} else {
# raise error via undef ticket
- PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC');
+ PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, $prefix);
}
}
return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
- $rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC', $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
+ $rsa_pub, $prefix, $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
+};
+
+# VNC tickets
+# - they do not contain the username in plain text
+# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
+sub assemble_vnc_ticket {
+ my ($username, $path) = @_;
+
+ return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVEVNC', $username, $path);
+}
+
+sub verify_vnc_ticket {
+ my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVEVNC', $username, $path, $noerr);
+}
+
+# Tunnel tickets
+# - they do not contain the username in plain text
+# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100', '/socket/run/qemu-server/123.storage')
+sub assemble_tunnel_ticket {
+ my ($username, $path) = @_;
+
+ return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVETUNNEL', $username, $path);
+}
+
+sub verify_tunnel_ticket {
+ my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
+
+ return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVETUNNEL', $username, $path, $noerr);
}
sub assemble_spice_ticket {
my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm, 0);
if ($type) {
- if ($type eq 'u2f') {
+ if ($type eq 'incompatible') {
+ die "old login api disabled, user has incompatible TFA entries\n";
+ } elsif ($type eq 'u2f') {
# Note that if the user did not manage to complete the initial u2f registration
# challenge we have a hash containing a 'challenge' entry in the user's tfa.cfg entry:
$tfa_data = undef if exists $tfa_data->{challenge};
}
my $realm_type = $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type};
- $realm_type = 'totp' if $realm_type eq 'oath'; # we used to call it that
# verify realm type unless using recovery keys:
if (defined($realm_type)) {
+ $realm_type = 'totp' if $realm_type eq 'oath'; # we used to call it that
if ($realm_type eq 'yubico') {
# Yubico auth will not be supported in rust for now...
if (!defined($tfa_challenge)) {
sub configure_u2f_and_wa : prototype($) {
my ($tfa_cfg) = @_;
+ my $rpc_origin;
+ my $get_origin = sub {
+ return $rpc_origin if defined($rpc_origin);
+ my $rpcenv = PVE::RPCEnvironment::get();
+ if (my $origin = $rpcenv->get_request_host(1)) {
+ $rpc_origin = "https://$origin";
+ return $rpc_origin;
+ }
+ die "failed to figure out origin\n";
+ };
+
my $dc = cfs_read_file('datacenter.cfg');
if (my $u2f = $dc->{u2f}) {
- my $origin = $u2f->{origin};
- if (!defined($origin)) {
- my $rpcenv = PVE::RPCEnvironment::get();
- $origin = $rpcenv->get_request_host(1);
- if ($origin) {
- $origin = "https://$origin";
- } else {
- die "failed to figure out u2f origin\n";
- }
- }
- $tfa_cfg->set_u2f_config({
- origin => $origin,
- appid => $u2f->{appid},
- });
+ eval {
+ $tfa_cfg->set_u2f_config({
+ origin => $u2f->{origin} // $get_origin->(),
+ appid => $u2f->{appid},
+ });
+ };
+ warn "u2f unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
}
if (my $wa = $dc->{webauthn}) {
- $tfa_cfg->set_webauthn_config($wa);
+ eval {
+ $tfa_cfg->set_webauthn_config({
+ origin => $wa->{origin} // $get_origin->(),
+ rp => $wa->{rp},
+ id => $wa->{id},
+ });
+ };
+ warn "webauthn unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
}
}
sub write_priv_tfa_config {
my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
- # FIXME: Only allow this if the complete cluster has been upgraded to understand the json
- # config format.
+ assert_new_tfa_config_available();
+
return $cfg->write();
}
};
sub assert_new_tfa_config_available() {
- # FIXME: Assert cluster-wide new-tfa-config support!
+ PVE::Cluster::cfs_update();
+ my $version_info = PVE::Cluster::get_node_kv('version-info');
+ die "cannot update tfa config, please make sure all cluster nodes are up to date\n"
+ if !$version_info;
+ my $members = PVE::Cluster::get_members() or return; # get_members returns undef on no cluster
+ my $old = '';
+ foreach my $node (keys $members->%*) {
+ my $info = $version_info->{$node};
+ if (!$info) {
+ $old .= " cluster node '$node' is too old, did not broadcast its version info\n";
+ next;
+ }
+ $info = from_json($info);
+ my $ver = $info->{version};
+ if ($ver !~ /^(\d+\.\d+)-(\d+)/) {
+ $old .= " cluster node '$node' provided an invalid version string: '$ver'\n";
+ next;
+ }
+ my ($maj, $rel) = ($1, $2);
+ if (!($maj > 7.0 || ($maj == 7.0 && $rel >= 15))) {
+ $old .= " cluster node '$node' is too old ($ver < 7.0-15)\n";
+ next;
+ }
+ }
+ die "cannot update tfa config, following nodes are not up to date:\n$old" if length($old);
}
sub user_remove_tfa : prototype($) {