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1) Update code to use PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName and PcdMaxVaria...
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
10\r
11 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
12 variable authentication.\r
13\r
14 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
15 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
16 to verify the signature.\r
17\r
18Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
19This program and the accompanying materials\r
20are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
21which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
22http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
23\r
24THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
25WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
26\r
27**/\r
28\r
29#include "Variable.h"\r
30#include "AuthService.h"\r
31\r
32///\r
33/// Global database array for scratch\r
34///\r
35UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;\r
36UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
37UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;\r
38UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;\r
39UINT8 *mCertDbStore;\r
40UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;\r
41UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
42UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r
43\r
44EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
45//\r
46// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
47//\r
48CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
49//\r
50// Hash context pointer\r
51//\r
52VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
53\r
54//\r
55// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
56// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
57// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
58// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
59//\r
60UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
61\r
62//\r
63// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
64// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
65//\r
66EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
67//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
68 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
69 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
70 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
72 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
74 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
76 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
77};\r
78\r
79/**\r
80 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
81\r
82 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
83 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
84\r
85 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
86 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
87 \r
88**/\r
89BOOLEAN\r
90NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
91 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
92 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
93 )\r
94{\r
95 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
96 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
97 return TRUE;\r
98 }\r
99 \r
100 return FALSE;\r
101}\r
102\r
103/**\r
104 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
105\r
106 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
107 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
108\r
109**/\r
110BOOLEAN\r
111InCustomMode (\r
112 VOID\r
113 )\r
114{\r
115 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
116\r
117 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
118 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
119 return TRUE;\r
120 }\r
121 \r
122 return FALSE;\r
123}\r
124\r
125\r
126/**\r
127 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
128 required.\r
129\r
130 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
131 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
132\r
133 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
134 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
135\r
136**/\r
137EFI_STATUS\r
138DeleteVariable (\r
139 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
140 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
141 )\r
142{\r
143 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
144 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
145\r
146 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
147 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
148 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
149 }\r
150\r
151 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
152 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
153}\r
154\r
155/**\r
156 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
157\r
158 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
159 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
160\r
161**/\r
162EFI_STATUS\r
163AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
164 VOID\r
165 )\r
166{\r
167 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
168 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
169 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
170 UINT8 VarValue;\r
171 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
172 UINT8 *Data;\r
173 UINTN DataSize;\r
174 UINTN CtxSize;\r
175 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
176 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
177 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
178 UINT32 ListSize;\r
179\r
180 //\r
181 // Initialize hash context.\r
182 //\r
183 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
184 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
185 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
186 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
187 }\r
188\r
189 //\r
190 // Reserve runtime buffer for public key database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
191 //\r
192 mMaxKeyDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME);\r
193 mMaxKeyNumber = mMaxKeyDbSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
194 mPubKeyStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxKeyDbSize);\r
195 if (mPubKeyStore == NULL) {\r
196 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
197 }\r
198\r
199 //\r
200 // Reserve runtime buffer for certificate database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
201 //\r
202 mMaxCertDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (EFI_CERT_DB_NAME);\r
203 mCertDbStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxCertDbSize);\r
204 if (mCertDbStore == NULL) {\r
205 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
206 }\r
207\r
208 //\r
209 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
210 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
211 //\r
212 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
213 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
214 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
215 }\r
216\r
217 //\r
218 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
219 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
220 //\r
221 Status = FindVariable (\r
222 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
223 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
224 &Variable,\r
225 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
226 FALSE\r
227 );\r
228\r
229 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
230 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
231 VarValue = 0;\r
232 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
233 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
234 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
235 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
236 &VarValue,\r
237 sizeof(UINT8),\r
238 VarAttr,\r
239 0,\r
240 0,\r
241 &Variable,\r
242 NULL\r
243 );\r
244 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
245 return Status;\r
246 }\r
247 } else {\r
248 //\r
249 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
250 //\r
251 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
252 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
253 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
254 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
255 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
256 }\r
257\r
258 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
259 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
260 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
261 } else {\r
262 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
263 }\r
264 \r
265 //\r
266 // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
267 //\r
268 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
269 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
270 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
271 } else {\r
272 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
273 }\r
274 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
275 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
276 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
277 &mPlatformMode,\r
278 sizeof(UINT8),\r
279 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
280 0,\r
281 0,\r
282 &Variable,\r
283 NULL\r
284 );\r
285 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
286 return Status;\r
287 }\r
288 \r
289 //\r
290 // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
291 //\r
292 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
293 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
294 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
295 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
296 mSignatureSupport,\r
297 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
298 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
299 0,\r
300 0,\r
301 &Variable,\r
302 NULL\r
303 );\r
304 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
305 return Status;\r
306 }\r
307\r
308 //\r
309 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
310 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
311 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
312 //\r
313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
314 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
315 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
316 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
317 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
318 //\r
319 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
320 //\r
321 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
322 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
323 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
324 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
325 &SecureBootEnable,\r
326 sizeof (UINT8),\r
327 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
328 0,\r
329 0,\r
330 &Variable,\r
331 NULL\r
332 );\r
333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
334 return Status;\r
335 }\r
336 }\r
337\r
338 //\r
339 // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
340 //\r
341 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
342 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
343 } else {\r
344 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
345 }\r
346 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
347 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
348 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
349 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
350 &SecureBootMode,\r
351 sizeof (UINT8),\r
352 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
353 0,\r
354 0,\r
355 &Variable,\r
356 NULL\r
357 );\r
358 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
359 return Status;\r
360 }\r
361\r
362 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
363 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
364 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
365\r
366 //\r
367 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r
368 //\r
369 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
370 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
371 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
372 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
373 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
374 &CustomMode,\r
375 sizeof (UINT8),\r
376 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
377 0,\r
378 0,\r
379 &Variable,\r
380 NULL\r
381 );\r
382 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
383 return Status;\r
384 }\r
385 \r
386 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
387\r
388 //\r
389 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
390 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
391 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
392 //\r
393 Status = FindVariable (\r
394 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
395 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
396 &Variable,\r
397 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
398 FALSE\r
399 );\r
400\r
401 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
402 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
403 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
404 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
405 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
406 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
407 &ListSize,\r
408 sizeof (UINT32),\r
409 VarAttr,\r
410 0,\r
411 0,\r
412 &Variable,\r
413 NULL\r
414 );\r
415 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
416 return Status;\r
417 }\r
418 } \r
419\r
420 //\r
421 // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r
422 //\r
423 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
424 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
425 mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
426 } else {\r
427 //\r
428 // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r
429 //\r
430 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r
431 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
432 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
433 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
434 &mVendorKeyState,\r
435 sizeof (UINT8),\r
436 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
437 0,\r
438 0,\r
439 &Variable,\r
440 NULL\r
441 );\r
442 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
443 return Status;\r
444 }\r
445 }\r
446\r
447 //\r
448 // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
449 //\r
450 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
451 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
452 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
453 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
454 &mVendorKeyState,\r
455 sizeof (UINT8),\r
456 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
457 0,\r
458 0,\r
459 &Variable,\r
460 NULL\r
461 );\r
462 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
463 return Status;\r
464 }\r
465\r
466 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r
467\r
468 return Status;\r
469}\r
470\r
471/**\r
472 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
473\r
474 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
475 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry \r
476\r
477 @return Index of new added item\r
478\r
479**/\r
480UINT32\r
481AddPubKeyInStore (\r
482 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
483 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
484 )\r
485{\r
486 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
487 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
488 UINT32 Index;\r
489 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
490 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
491 UINT8 *Data;\r
492 UINTN DataSize;\r
493 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
494 UINT32 Attributes;\r
495\r
496 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
497 return 0;\r
498 }\r
499\r
500 Status = FindVariable (\r
501 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
502 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
503 &Variable,\r
504 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
505 FALSE\r
506 );\r
507 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
508 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
509 return 0;\r
510 }\r
511\r
512 //\r
513 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
514 //\r
515 IsFound = FALSE;\r
516 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
517 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
518 IsFound = TRUE;\r
519 break;\r
520 }\r
521 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
522 }\r
523\r
524 if (!IsFound) {\r
525 //\r
526 // Add public key in database.\r
527 //\r
528 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
529 //\r
530 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r
531 //\r
532 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
533 //\r
534 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r
535 //\r
536 return 0;\r
537 }\r
538 \r
539 Status = Reclaim (\r
540 mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r
541 &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r
542 FALSE,\r
543 NULL,\r
544 NULL,\r
545 0,\r
546 TRUE\r
547 );\r
548 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
549 return 0;\r
550 }\r
551\r
552 Status = FindVariable (\r
553 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
554 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
555 &Variable,\r
556 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
557 FALSE\r
558 );\r
559 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
560 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
561 return 0;\r
562 }\r
563\r
564 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
565 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
566 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
567 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
568 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
569\r
570 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
571 return 0;\r
572 } \r
573 }\r
574\r
575 //\r
576 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
577 //\r
578 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
579 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
580 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
581 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
582\r
583 if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
584 //\r
585 // No enough variable space.\r
586 //\r
587 return 0;\r
588 }\r
589\r
590 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
591 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
592 //\r
593 // Update public key database variable.\r
594 //\r
595 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
596 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
597 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
598 mPubKeyStore,\r
599 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
600 Attributes,\r
601 0,\r
602 0,\r
603 &Variable,\r
604 NULL\r
605 );\r
606 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
607 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
608 return 0;\r
609 }\r
610 }\r
611\r
612 return Index;\r
613}\r
614\r
615/**\r
616 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
617 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
618\r
619 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
620 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
621 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
622 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
623 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
624\r
625 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
626 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
627 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
628\r
629 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
630 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
631 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
632\r
633**/\r
634EFI_STATUS\r
635VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
636 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
637 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
638 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
639 )\r
640{\r
641 BOOLEAN Status;\r
642 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
643 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
644 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
645 VOID *Rsa;\r
646 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
647 \r
648 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
649 Rsa = NULL;\r
650 CertData = NULL;\r
651 CertBlock = NULL;\r
652\r
653 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
654 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
655 }\r
656\r
657 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
658 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
659\r
660 //\r
661 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
662 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
663 //\r
664 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
665 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
666 ) {\r
667 //\r
668 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
669 //\r
670 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
671 }\r
672 //\r
673 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
674 //\r
675 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
676 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
677 if (!Status) {\r
678 goto Done;\r
679 }\r
680 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
681 if (!Status) {\r
682 goto Done;\r
683 }\r
684 //\r
685 // Hash Size.\r
686 //\r
687 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
688 if (!Status) {\r
689 goto Done;\r
690 }\r
691 //\r
692 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
693 //\r
694 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
695 if (!Status) {\r
696 goto Done;\r
697 }\r
698 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
699 if (!Status) {\r
700 goto Done;\r
701 }\r
702 //\r
703 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
704 //\r
705 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
706 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
707 //\r
708 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
709 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
710 //\r
711 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
712 if (!Status) {\r
713 goto Done;\r
714 }\r
715 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
716 if (!Status) {\r
717 goto Done;\r
718 }\r
719 //\r
720 // Verify the signature.\r
721 //\r
722 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
723 Rsa,\r
724 Digest,\r
725 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
726 CertBlock->Signature,\r
727 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
728 );\r
729\r
730Done:\r
731 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
732 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
733 }\r
734 if (Status) {\r
735 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
736 } else {\r
737 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
738 }\r
739}\r
740\r
741/**\r
742 Update platform mode.\r
743\r
744 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
745\r
746 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
747 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
748\r
749**/\r
750EFI_STATUS\r
751UpdatePlatformMode (\r
752 IN UINT32 Mode\r
753 )\r
754{\r
755 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
756 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
757 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
758 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
759 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
760\r
761 Status = FindVariable (\r
762 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
763 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
764 &Variable,\r
765 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
766 FALSE\r
767 );\r
768 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
769 return Status;\r
770 }\r
771\r
772 //\r
773 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
774 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
775 //\r
776 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
777 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
778\r
779 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
780 //\r
781 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
782 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
783 // Variable in runtime.\r
784 //\r
785 return Status;\r
786 }\r
787\r
788 //\r
789 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
790 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
791 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
792 //\r
793 Status = FindVariable (\r
794 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
795 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
796 &Variable,\r
797 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
798 FALSE\r
799 );\r
800 //\r
801 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
802 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
803 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
804 //\r
805 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
806 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
807 } else {\r
808 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
809 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
810 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
811 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
812 } else {\r
813 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
814 }\r
815 }\r
816\r
817 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
818 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
819 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
820 &SecureBootMode,\r
821 sizeof(UINT8),\r
822 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
823 0,\r
824 0,\r
825 &Variable,\r
826 NULL\r
827 );\r
828 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
829 return Status;\r
830 }\r
831\r
832 //\r
833 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
834 //\r
835 Status = FindVariable (\r
836 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
837 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
838 &Variable,\r
839 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
840 FALSE\r
841 );\r
842\r
843 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
844 //\r
845 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
846 //\r
847 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
848 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
849 } else {\r
850 //\r
851 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
852 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
853 //\r
854 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
855 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
856 }\r
857 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
858 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
859 }\r
860\r
861 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
862 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
863 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
864 &SecureBootEnable,\r
865 VariableDataSize,\r
866 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
867 0,\r
868 0,\r
869 &Variable,\r
870 NULL\r
871 );\r
872 return Status;\r
873}\r
874\r
875/**\r
876 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r
877\r
878 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
879 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
880 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
881 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
882\r
883 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
884 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
885 \r
886**/\r
887EFI_STATUS\r
888CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
889 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
890 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
891 IN VOID *Data,\r
892 IN UINTN DataSize\r
893 )\r
894{\r
895 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
896 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
897 UINT32 Index;\r
898 UINT32 SigCount;\r
899 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
900 VOID *RsaContext;\r
901 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
902 UINTN CertLen;\r
903\r
904 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
905 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
906 }\r
907\r
908 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
909\r
910 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
911 IsPk = TRUE;\r
912 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r
913 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r
914 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r
915 IsPk = FALSE;\r
916 } else {\r
917 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
918 }\r
919\r
920 SigCount = 0;\r
921 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
922 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
923 RsaContext = NULL;\r
924\r
925 //\r
926 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
927 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
928 //\r
929 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
930 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
931 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
932 //\r
933 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
934 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
935 //\r
936 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
937 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
938 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
939 }\r
940 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
941 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
942 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
943 }\r
944 break;\r
945 }\r
946 }\r
947\r
948 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
949 //\r
950 // Undefined signature type.\r
951 //\r
952 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
953 }\r
954\r
955 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
956 //\r
957 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
958 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
959 //\r
960 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
961 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
962 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
963 }\r
964 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
965 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
966 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
967 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
968 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
969 }\r
970 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
971 }\r
972\r
973 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
974 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
975 }\r
976 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
977 \r
978 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
979 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
980 }\r
981\r
982 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
983 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
984 }\r
985\r
986 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
987 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
988 }\r
989\r
990 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
991}\r
992\r
993/**\r
994 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
995\r
996 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
997 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
998 \r
999**/\r
1000EFI_STATUS\r
1001VendorKeyIsModified (\r
1002 VOID\r
1003 )\r
1004{\r
1005 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1006 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
1007\r
1008 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
1009 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1010 }\r
1011 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
1012 \r
1013 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1014 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1015 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1016 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
1017 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1018 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1019 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
1020 0,\r
1021 0,\r
1022 &Variable,\r
1023 NULL\r
1024 );\r
1025 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1026 return Status;\r
1027 }\r
1028\r
1029 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1030 return UpdateVariable (\r
1031 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1032 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1033 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1034 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1035 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
1036 0,\r
1037 0,\r
1038 &Variable,\r
1039 NULL\r
1040 );\r
1041}\r
1042\r
1043/**\r
1044 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
1045\r
1046 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1047 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1048 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1049 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1050 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1051 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1052\r
1053 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1054 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1055 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1056 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1057 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1058 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1059 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
1060 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
1061\r
1062 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1063 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
1064 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1065 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
1066\r
1067**/\r
1068EFI_STATUS\r
1069ProcessVarWithPk (\r
1070 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1071 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1072 IN VOID *Data,\r
1073 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1074 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1075 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
1076 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
1077 )\r
1078{\r
1079 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1080 BOOLEAN Del;\r
1081 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1082 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1083\r
1084 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r
1085 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1086 //\r
1087 // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1088 // authenticated variable.\r
1089 //\r
1090 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1091 }\r
1092\r
1093 Del = FALSE;\r
1094 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
1095 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1096 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1097 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1098 Del = TRUE;\r
1099 }\r
1100\r
1101 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1102 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1103 return Status;\r
1104 }\r
1105\r
1106 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1107 VariableName,\r
1108 VendorGuid,\r
1109 Payload,\r
1110 PayloadSize,\r
1111 Attributes,\r
1112 0,\r
1113 0,\r
1114 Variable,\r
1115 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1116 );\r
1117 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1118 return Status;\r
1119 }\r
1120\r
1121 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
1122 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1123 }\r
1124 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
1125 //\r
1126 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
1127 //\r
1128 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1129 VariableName,\r
1130 VendorGuid,\r
1131 Data,\r
1132 DataSize,\r
1133 Variable,\r
1134 Attributes,\r
1135 AuthVarTypePk,\r
1136 &Del\r
1137 );\r
1138 } else {\r
1139 //\r
1140 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
1141 //\r
1142 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1143 VariableName,\r
1144 VendorGuid,\r
1145 Data,\r
1146 DataSize,\r
1147 Variable,\r
1148 Attributes,\r
1149 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
1150 &Del\r
1151 );\r
1152 }\r
1153\r
1154 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
1155 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
1156 //\r
1157 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
1158 //\r
1159 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
1160 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
1161 //\r
1162 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1163 //\r
1164 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
1165 }\r
1166 }\r
1167\r
1168 return Status;\r
1169}\r
1170\r
1171/**\r
1172 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1173\r
1174 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1175 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1176 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1177 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1178 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1179 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1180\r
1181 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1182 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1183 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1184 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1185 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1186 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1187 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1188\r
1189 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1190 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1191 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1192 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1193\r
1194**/\r
1195EFI_STATUS\r
1196ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1197 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1198 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1199 IN VOID *Data,\r
1200 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1201 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1202 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1203 )\r
1204{\r
1205 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1206 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1207 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1208\r
1209 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1210 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1211 //\r
1212 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1213 // authenticated variable.\r
1214 //\r
1215 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1216 }\r
1217\r
1218 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1219 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
1220 //\r
1221 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1222 //\r
1223 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1224 VariableName,\r
1225 VendorGuid,\r
1226 Data,\r
1227 DataSize,\r
1228 Variable,\r
1229 Attributes,\r
1230 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1231 NULL\r
1232 );\r
1233 } else {\r
1234 //\r
1235 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
1236 //\r
1237 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1238 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1239\r
1240 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1241 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1242 return Status;\r
1243 }\r
1244 \r
1245 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1246 VariableName,\r
1247 VendorGuid,\r
1248 Payload,\r
1249 PayloadSize,\r
1250 Attributes,\r
1251 0,\r
1252 0,\r
1253 Variable,\r
1254 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1255 );\r
1256 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1257 return Status;\r
1258 }\r
1259\r
1260 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
1261 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1262 }\r
1263 }\r
1264\r
1265 return Status;\r
1266}\r
1267\r
1268/**\r
1269 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1270\r
1271 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1272 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1273 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1274 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1275 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1276 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1277\r
1278 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1279 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1280\r
1281 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1282 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1283 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1284 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1285 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1286\r
1287 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1288 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1289 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1290 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
1291 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1292 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1293 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1294 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1295\r
1296**/\r
1297EFI_STATUS\r
1298ProcessVariable (\r
1299 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1300 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1301 IN VOID *Data,\r
1302 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1303 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1304 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1305 )\r
1306{\r
1307 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1308 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1309 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1310 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1311 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1312 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1313 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1314 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1315 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
1316\r
1317 KeyIndex = 0;\r
1318 CertData = NULL;\r
1319 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1320 PubKey = NULL;\r
1321 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1322\r
1323 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1324 //\r
1325 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1326 //\r
1327 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1328 }\r
1329 \r
1330 //\r
1331 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1332 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1333 // \r
1334 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r
1335 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1336 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1337 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1338 }\r
1339 \r
1340 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r
1341 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1342 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1343 }\r
1344 }\r
1345 \r
1346 //\r
1347 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1348 //\r
1349 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1350 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1351 VariableName,\r
1352 VendorGuid,\r
1353 Data,\r
1354 DataSize,\r
1355 Variable,\r
1356 Attributes,\r
1357 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1358 NULL\r
1359 );\r
1360 }\r
1361\r
1362 //\r
1363 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1364 //\r
1365 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1366 //\r
1367 // Determine current operation type.\r
1368 //\r
1369 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1370 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1371 }\r
1372 //\r
1373 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1374 //\r
1375 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1376 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1377 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1378 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1379 } else {\r
1380 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1381 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1382 }\r
1383 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1384 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1385 ) {\r
1386 //\r
1387 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1388 //\r
1389 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1390 } else {\r
1391 //\r
1392 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1393 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1394 //\r
1395 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1396 return Status;\r
1397 }\r
1398\r
1399 //\r
1400 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1401 //\r
1402 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1403 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1404 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1405\r
1406 //\r
1407 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1408 //\r
1409 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1410\r
1411 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1412 //\r
1413 // Check input PubKey.\r
1414 //\r
1415 if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1416 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1417 }\r
1418 //\r
1419 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1420 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1421 //\r
1422 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1423 //\r
1424 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1425 //\r
1426 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1427 }\r
1428 }\r
1429 //\r
1430 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1431 //\r
1432 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1433 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1434 return Status;\r
1435 }\r
1436\r
1437 //\r
1438 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1439 //\r
1440 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1441 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1442 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
1443 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
1444\r
1445 //\r
1446 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1447 //\r
1448 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
1449 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1450 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1451 }\r
1452 }\r
1453\r
1454 //\r
1455 // Verification pass.\r
1456 //\r
1457 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1458}\r
1459\r
1460/**\r
1461 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1462 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1463 will be ignored.\r
1464\r
1465 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1466 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1467 @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer \r
1468 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1469 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1470 @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r
1471\r
1472 @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r
1473\r
1474**/\r
1475EFI_STATUS\r
1476AppendSignatureList (\r
1477 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1478 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1479 IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r
1480 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1481 IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r
1482 OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r
1483 )\r
1484{\r
1485 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1486 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1487 UINTN CertCount;\r
1488 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1489 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1490 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1491 UINTN Index;\r
1492 UINTN Index2;\r
1493 UINTN Size;\r
1494 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1495 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1496 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1497 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1498\r
1499 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1500\r
1501 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1502 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1503 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1504 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1505\r
1506 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1507 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1508 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1509\r
1510 Size = DataSize;\r
1511 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1512 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1513 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1514 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1515 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1516 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1517 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1518 //\r
1519 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1520 //\r
1521 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1522 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1523 break;\r
1524 }\r
1525 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1526 }\r
1527 }\r
1528\r
1529 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1530 break;\r
1531 }\r
1532 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1533 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1534 }\r
1535\r
1536 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1537 //\r
1538 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1539 //\r
1540 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1541 if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r
1542 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1543 }\r
1544\r
1545 //\r
1546 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1547 //\r
1548\r
1549 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1550 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1551 FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1552 }\r
1553\r
1554 if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r
1555 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1556 }\r
1557 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1558 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1559 FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1560 CopiedCount++;\r
1561 }\r
1562\r
1563 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1564 }\r
1565\r
1566 //\r
1567 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1568 //\r
1569 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1570 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1571 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1572 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1573 }\r
1574\r
1575 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1576 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1577 }\r
1578\r
1579 *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1580 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1581}\r
1582\r
1583/**\r
1584 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1585\r
1586\r
1587 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1588 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1589\r
1590 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1591 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1592\r
1593**/\r
1594BOOLEAN\r
1595CompareTimeStamp (\r
1596 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1597 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1598 )\r
1599{\r
1600 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1601 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1602 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1603 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1604 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1605 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1606 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1607 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1608 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1609 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
1610 }\r
1611\r
1612 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1613}\r
1614\r
1615/**\r
1616 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1617 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1618\r
1619 The data format of "certdb":\r
1620 //\r
1621 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1622 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1623 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1624 // /// ...\r
1625 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1626 //\r
1627\r
1628 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1629 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1630 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1631 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1632 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1633 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1634 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1635 starting of Data.\r
1636 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1637\r
1638 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1639 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1640 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1641\r
1642**/\r
1643EFI_STATUS\r
1644FindCertsFromDb (\r
1645 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1646 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1647 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1648 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1649 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1650 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1651 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1652 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1653 )\r
1654{\r
1655 UINT32 Offset;\r
1656 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1657 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1658 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1659 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1660 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1661\r
1662 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1663 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1664 }\r
1665\r
1666 //\r
1667 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1668 //\r
1669 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1670 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1671 }\r
1672\r
1673 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1674\r
1675 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1676 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1677 }\r
1678\r
1679 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1680\r
1681 //\r
1682 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1683 //\r
1684 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1685 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1686 //\r
1687 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1688 //\r
1689 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1690 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1691 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1692 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1693\r
1694 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1695 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1696 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1697 }\r
1698\r
1699 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1700 //\r
1701 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1702 //\r
1703 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1704 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1705 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1706\r
1707 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1708 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1709 }\r
1710\r
1711 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1712 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1713 }\r
1714\r
1715 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1716 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1717 }\r
1718\r
1719 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1720 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1721 }\r
1722\r
1723 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1724 } else {\r
1725 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1726 }\r
1727 } else {\r
1728 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1729 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1730 }\r
1731 }\r
1732\r
1733 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1734}\r
1735\r
1736/**\r
1737 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1738 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1739\r
1740 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1741 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1742 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1743 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1744\r
1745 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1746 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1747 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1748\r
1749**/\r
1750EFI_STATUS\r
1751GetCertsFromDb (\r
1752 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1753 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1754 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1755 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1756 )\r
1757{\r
1758 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1759 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1760 UINT8 *Data;\r
1761 UINTN DataSize;\r
1762 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1763\r
1764 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1765 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1766 }\r
1767 \r
1768 //\r
1769 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1770 //\r
1771 Status = FindVariable (\r
1772 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1773 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1774 &CertDbVariable,\r
1775 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1776 FALSE\r
1777 ); \r
1778 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1779 return Status;\r
1780 }\r
1781\r
1782 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1783 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1784 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1785 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1786 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1787 }\r
1788\r
1789 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1790 VariableName,\r
1791 VendorGuid,\r
1792 Data,\r
1793 DataSize,\r
1794 &CertOffset,\r
1795 CertDataSize,\r
1796 NULL,\r
1797 NULL\r
1798 );\r
1799\r
1800 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1801 return Status;\r
1802 }\r
1803\r
1804 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1805 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1806}\r
1807\r
1808/**\r
1809 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1810 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1811\r
1812 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1813 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1814\r
1815 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1816 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1817 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1818 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1819\r
1820**/\r
1821EFI_STATUS\r
1822DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1823 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1824 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1825 )\r
1826{\r
1827 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1828 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1829 UINT8 *Data;\r
1830 UINTN DataSize;\r
1831 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1832 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1833 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1834 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1835 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1836\r
1837 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1838 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1839 }\r
1840 \r
1841 //\r
1842 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1843 //\r
1844 Status = FindVariable (\r
1845 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1846 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1847 &CertDbVariable,\r
1848 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1849 FALSE\r
1850 ); \r
1851 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1852 return Status;\r
1853 }\r
1854\r
1855 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1856 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1857 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1858 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1859 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1860 }\r
1861\r
1862 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1863 //\r
1864 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1865 //\r
1866 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1867 }\r
1868\r
1869 //\r
1870 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1871 //\r
1872 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1873 VariableName,\r
1874 VendorGuid,\r
1875 Data,\r
1876 DataSize,\r
1877 NULL,\r
1878 NULL,\r
1879 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1880 &CertNodeSize\r
1881 );\r
1882\r
1883 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1884 return Status;\r
1885 }\r
1886\r
1887 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1888 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1889 }\r
1890\r
1891 //\r
1892 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1893 //\r
1894 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1895 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1896\r
1897 //\r
1898 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1899 //\r
1900 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1901 //\r
1902 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1903 //\r
1904 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1905 //\r
1906 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1907 //\r
1908 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1909 CopyMem (\r
1910 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1911 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1912 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1913 );\r
1914 }\r
1915\r
1916 //\r
1917 // Set "certdb".\r
1918 // \r
1919 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1920 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1921 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1922 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1923 NewCertDb,\r
1924 NewCertDbSize,\r
1925 VarAttr,\r
1926 0,\r
1927 0,\r
1928 &CertDbVariable,\r
1929 NULL\r
1930 );\r
1931\r
1932 return Status;\r
1933}\r
1934\r
1935/**\r
1936 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1937 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1938\r
1939 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1940 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1941 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1942 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1943\r
1944 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1945 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1946 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1947 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1948 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1949\r
1950**/\r
1951EFI_STATUS\r
1952InsertCertsToDb (\r
1953 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1954 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1955 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1956 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1957 )\r
1958{\r
1959 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1960 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1961 UINT8 *Data;\r
1962 UINTN DataSize;\r
1963 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1964 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1965 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1966 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1967 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1968 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1969\r
1970 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1971 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1972 }\r
1973 \r
1974 //\r
1975 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1976 //\r
1977 Status = FindVariable (\r
1978 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1979 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1980 &CertDbVariable,\r
1981 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1982 FALSE\r
1983 ); \r
1984 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1985 return Status;\r
1986 }\r
1987\r
1988 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1989 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1990 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1991 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1992 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1993 }\r
1994\r
1995 //\r
1996 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1997 // If yes return error.\r
1998 //\r
1999 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2000 VariableName,\r
2001 VendorGuid,\r
2002 Data,\r
2003 DataSize,\r
2004 NULL,\r
2005 NULL,\r
2006 NULL,\r
2007 NULL\r
2008 );\r
2009\r
2010 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2011 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2012 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
2013 }\r
2014\r
2015 //\r
2016 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
2017 //\r
2018 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
2019 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
2020 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
2021 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
2022 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2023 }\r
2024 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
2025\r
2026 //\r
2027 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
2028 //\r
2029 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
2030 //\r
2031 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
2032 //\r
2033 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2034 //\r
2035 // Construct new cert node.\r
2036 //\r
2037 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
2038 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
2039 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2040 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2041 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2042 \r
2043 CopyMem (\r
2044 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
2045 VariableName,\r
2046 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
2047 );\r
2048\r
2049 CopyMem (\r
2050 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
2051 CertData,\r
2052 CertDataSize\r
2053 );\r
2054 \r
2055 //\r
2056 // Set "certdb".\r
2057 // \r
2058 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
2059 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2060 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2061 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2062 NewCertDb,\r
2063 NewCertDbSize,\r
2064 VarAttr,\r
2065 0,\r
2066 0,\r
2067 &CertDbVariable,\r
2068 NULL\r
2069 );\r
2070\r
2071 return Status;\r
2072}\r
2073\r
2074/**\r
2075 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2076\r
2077 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2078 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2079 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2080 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2081 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2082\r
2083 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2084 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2085 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2086 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2087 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2088 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
2089 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2090 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2091 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2092\r
2093 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2094 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2095 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2096 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2097 of resources.\r
2098 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2099\r
2100**/\r
2101EFI_STATUS\r
2102VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2103 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2104 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2105 IN VOID *Data,\r
2106 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2107 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
2108 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2109 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2110 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2111 )\r
2112{\r
2113 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2114 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2115 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2116 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2117 UINTN Index;\r
2118 UINTN CertCount;\r
2119 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2120 UINT32 Attr;\r
2121 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2122 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
2123 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2124 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2125 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2126 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2127 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
2128 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2129 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2130 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2131 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2132 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2133 UINTN Length;\r
2134 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
2135 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
2136 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2137 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2138 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
2139\r
2140 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2141 CertData = NULL;\r
2142 NewData = NULL;\r
2143 Attr = Attributes;\r
2144 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
2145 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2146 RootCert = NULL;\r
2147 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
2148\r
2149 //\r
2150 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
2151 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2152 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2153 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2154 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
2155 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2156 //\r
2157 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2158\r
2159 //\r
2160 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2161 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2162 //\r
2163 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2164 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2165 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2166 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2167 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2168 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2169 }\r
2170\r
2171 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2172 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
2173 //\r
2174 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2175 //\r
2176 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2177 }\r
2178 }\r
2179\r
2180 //\r
2181 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2182 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2183 //\r
2184 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2185 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
2186 //\r
2187 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2188 //\r
2189 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2190 }\r
2191\r
2192 //\r
2193 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2194 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2195 //\r
2196 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2197 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
2198\r
2199 //\r
2200 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2201 //\r
2202 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2203 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
2204\r
2205 //\r
2206 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
2207 //\r
2208 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2209 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2210 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
2211\r
2212 Buffer = NewData;\r
2213 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2214 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2215 Buffer += Length;\r
2216\r
2217 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2218 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2219 Buffer += Length;\r
2220\r
2221 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2222 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2223 Buffer += Length;\r
2224\r
2225 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2226 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2227 Buffer += Length;\r
2228\r
2229 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2230\r
2231 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
2232 //\r
2233 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
2234 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2235 //\r
2236 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2237 SigData,\r
2238 SigDataSize,\r
2239 &SignerCerts,\r
2240 &CertStackSize,\r
2241 &RootCert,\r
2242 &RootCertSize\r
2243 );\r
2244 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2245 goto Exit;\r
2246 }\r
2247\r
2248 //\r
2249 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
2250 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2251 //\r
2252 Status = FindVariable (\r
2253 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2254 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2255 &PkVariable,\r
2256 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2257 FALSE\r
2258 );\r
2259 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2260 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2261 goto Exit;\r
2262 }\r
2263 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2264 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2265 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
2266 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
2267 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2268 goto Exit;\r
2269 }\r
2270\r
2271 //\r
2272 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2273 //\r
2274 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2275 SigData,\r
2276 SigDataSize,\r
2277 RootCert,\r
2278 RootCertSize,\r
2279 NewData,\r
2280 NewDataSize\r
2281 );\r
2282\r
2283 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2284\r
2285 //\r
2286 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2287 //\r
2288 Status = FindVariable (\r
2289 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2290 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2291 &KekVariable,\r
2292 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2293 FALSE\r
2294 );\r
2295 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2296 return Status;\r
2297 }\r
2298\r
2299 //\r
2300 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2301 //\r
2302 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2303 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2304 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2305 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2306 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2307 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2308 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2309 //\r
2310 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2311 //\r
2312 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2313 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2314\r
2315 //\r
2316 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2317 //\r
2318 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2319 SigData,\r
2320 SigDataSize,\r
2321 RootCert,\r
2322 RootCertSize,\r
2323 NewData,\r
2324 NewDataSize\r
2325 );\r
2326 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2327 goto Exit;\r
2328 }\r
2329 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2330 }\r
2331 }\r
2332 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2333 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2334 }\r
2335 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2336\r
2337 //\r
2338 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2339 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2340 //\r
2341 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2342 SigData,\r
2343 SigDataSize,\r
2344 &SignerCerts,\r
2345 &CertStackSize,\r
2346 &RootCert,\r
2347 &RootCertSize\r
2348 );\r
2349 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2350 goto Exit;\r
2351 }\r
2352\r
2353 //\r
2354 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2355 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2356 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2357 //\r
2358 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2359 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2360\r
2361 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2362 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2363 goto Exit;\r
2364 }\r
2365 \r
2366 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2367 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2368 goto Exit;\r
2369 }\r
2370 }\r
2371\r
2372 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2373 SigData,\r
2374 SigDataSize,\r
2375 RootCert,\r
2376 RootCertSize,\r
2377 NewData,\r
2378 NewDataSize\r
2379 );\r
2380 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2381 goto Exit;\r
2382 }\r
2383\r
2384 //\r
2385 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2386 //\r
2387 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2388 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2389 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2390 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2391 goto Exit;\r
2392 }\r
2393 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r
2394 //\r
2395 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2396 //\r
2397 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2398 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2399 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2400 goto Exit;\r
2401 }\r
2402 }\r
2403 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2404 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2405 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2406 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2407 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2408 \r
2409 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2410 //\r
2411 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2412 SigData,\r
2413 SigDataSize,\r
2414 RootCert,\r
2415 RootCertSize,\r
2416 NewData,\r
2417 NewDataSize\r
2418 );\r
2419 } else {\r
2420 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2421 }\r
2422\r
2423Exit:\r
2424\r
2425 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2426 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2427 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2428 }\r
2429\r
2430 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2431 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2432 }\r
2433\r
2434 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2435 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2436 return Status;\r
2437 }\r
2438\r
2439 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
2440 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2441 }\r
2442\r
2443 //\r
2444 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2445 //\r
2446 return UpdateVariable (\r
2447 VariableName,\r
2448 VendorGuid,\r
2449 PayloadPtr,\r
2450 PayloadSize,\r
2451 Attributes,\r
2452 0,\r
2453 0,\r
2454 Variable,\r
2455 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2456 );\r
2457}\r
2458\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE