2 Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.
4 Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
5 This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
9 DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
10 read is within the image buffer.
12 DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept
13 untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.
15 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
16 This program and the accompanying materials
17 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
18 which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
19 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
21 THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
22 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
26 #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"
29 // Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.
30 // These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.
32 EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader
;
33 UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
;
37 // Information on current PE/COFF image
40 UINT8
*mImageBase
= NULL
;
41 UINT8 mImageDigest
[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
];
42 UINTN mImageDigestSize
;
45 // Notify string for authorization UI.
47 CHAR16 mNotifyString1
[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN
] = L
"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";
48 CHAR16 mNotifyString2
[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN
] = L
"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";
50 // Public Exponent of RSA Key.
52 CONST UINT8 mRsaE
[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
56 // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms
58 UINT8 mHashOidValue
[] = {
59 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1
60 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224
61 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256
62 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384
63 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512
66 HASH_TABLE mHash
[] = {
67 { L
"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue
[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize
, Sha1Init
, Sha1Update
, Sha1Final
},
68 { L
"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue
[5], 9, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
},
69 { L
"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue
[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize
, Sha256Init
, Sha256Update
, Sha256Final
},
70 { L
"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue
[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize
, Sha384Init
, Sha384Update
, Sha384Final
},
71 { L
"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue
[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize
, Sha512Init
, Sha512Update
, Sha512Final
}
75 SecureBoot Hook for processing image verification.
77 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
78 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
79 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
80 data, this value contains the required size.
81 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
87 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
88 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
94 Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.
96 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
97 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
98 read is within the image buffer.
100 @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
101 @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
102 @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
103 On output, the number of bytes actually read.
104 @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.
106 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
110 DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (
113 IN OUT UINTN
*ReadSize
,
119 if (FileHandle
== NULL
|| ReadSize
== NULL
|| Buffer
== NULL
) {
120 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
123 if (MAX_ADDRESS
- FileOffset
< *ReadSize
) {
124 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
127 EndPosition
= FileOffset
+ *ReadSize
;
128 if (EndPosition
> mImageSize
) {
129 *ReadSize
= (UINT32
)(mImageSize
- FileOffset
);
132 if (FileOffset
>= mImageSize
) {
136 CopyMem (Buffer
, (UINT8
*)((UINTN
) FileHandle
+ FileOffset
), *ReadSize
);
145 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
148 @return UINT32 Image Type
153 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*File
157 EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle
;
158 EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*TempDevicePath
;
159 EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL
*BlockIo
;
162 return IMAGE_UNKNOWN
;
166 // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
169 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
170 Status
= gBS
->LocateDevicePath (
171 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
,
175 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
176 Status
= gBS
->OpenProtocol (
178 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
,
182 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
184 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
185 return IMAGE_FROM_FV
;
190 // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
193 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
194 Status
= gBS
->LocateDevicePath (
195 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid
,
199 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
201 Status
= gBS
->OpenProtocol (
203 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid
,
207 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
209 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
) && BlockIo
!= NULL
) {
210 if (BlockIo
->Media
!= NULL
) {
211 if (BlockIo
->Media
->RemovableMedia
) {
213 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable
215 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
;
218 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable
220 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
;
227 // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
228 // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
231 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
232 Status
= gBS
->LocateDevicePath (
233 &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid
,
237 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
239 // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.
241 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
;
245 // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
246 // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
248 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
249 while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath
)) {
250 switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath
)) {
252 case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH
:
253 if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath
) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP
) {
254 return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM
;
258 case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH
:
259 if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath
) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP
) {
260 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
;
267 TempDevicePath
= NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath
);
269 return IMAGE_UNKNOWN
;
273 Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
274 PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
276 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
277 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
278 within this image buffer before use.
280 @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
282 @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
283 @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
293 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*Section
;
298 UINTN SumOfBytesHashed
;
299 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*SectionHeader
;
303 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
306 SectionHeader
= NULL
;
309 if ((HashAlg
>= HASHALG_MAX
)) {
314 // Initialize context of hash.
316 ZeroMem (mImageDigest
, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
);
320 mImageDigestSize
= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
;
321 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha1Guid
;
325 mImageDigestSize
= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
;
326 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha256Guid
;
330 mImageDigestSize
= SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE
;
331 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha384Guid
;
335 mImageDigestSize
= SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
;
336 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha512Guid
;
343 CtxSize
= mHash
[HashAlg
].GetContextSize();
345 HashCtx
= AllocatePool (CtxSize
);
346 if (HashCtx
== NULL
) {
350 // 1. Load the image header into memory.
352 // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
353 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashInit(HashCtx
);
360 // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
361 // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
363 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.Machine
== IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64
&& mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
365 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
366 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
367 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
368 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
370 Magic
= EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
;
373 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
375 Magic
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
;
379 // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
380 // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
382 HashBase
= mImageBase
;
383 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
387 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
) - HashBase
);
388 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
389 } else if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
) {
393 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
) - HashBase
);
394 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
397 // Invalid header magic number.
403 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
409 // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
411 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
<= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
413 // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything
414 // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.
416 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
420 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
421 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
426 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
427 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
431 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
438 // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
440 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
444 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
445 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
]) - HashBase
);
450 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
451 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
]) - HashBase
);
455 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
462 // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
463 // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
465 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
469 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
+ 1];
470 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
475 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
+ 1];
476 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
480 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
488 // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.
490 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
494 SumOfBytesHashed
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
;
499 SumOfBytesHashed
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
;
503 Section
= (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*) (
505 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
+
507 sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
) +
508 mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.SizeOfOptionalHeader
512 // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
513 // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
514 // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
515 // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
517 SectionHeader
= (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
) * mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.NumberOfSections
);
518 if (SectionHeader
== NULL
) {
523 // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
524 // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
525 // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
528 for (Index
= 0; Index
< mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.NumberOfSections
; Index
++) {
530 while ((Pos
> 0) && (Section
->PointerToRawData
< SectionHeader
[Pos
- 1].PointerToRawData
)) {
531 CopyMem (&SectionHeader
[Pos
], &SectionHeader
[Pos
- 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
));
534 CopyMem (&SectionHeader
[Pos
], Section
, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
));
539 // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section
540 // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'
541 // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).
542 // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .
543 // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.
545 for (Index
= 0; Index
< mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.NumberOfSections
; Index
++) {
546 Section
= &SectionHeader
[Index
];
547 if (Section
->SizeOfRawData
== 0) {
550 HashBase
= mImageBase
+ Section
->PointerToRawData
;
551 HashSize
= (UINTN
) Section
->SizeOfRawData
;
553 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
558 SumOfBytesHashed
+= HashSize
;
562 // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra
563 // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins
564 // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:
565 // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)
567 if (mImageSize
> SumOfBytesHashed
) {
568 HashBase
= mImageBase
+ SumOfBytesHashed
;
570 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
<= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
573 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
577 CertSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
].Size
;
582 CertSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
].Size
;
586 if (mImageSize
> CertSize
+ SumOfBytesHashed
) {
587 HashSize
= (UINTN
) (mImageSize
- CertSize
- SumOfBytesHashed
);
589 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
593 } else if (mImageSize
< CertSize
+ SumOfBytesHashed
) {
599 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashFinal(HashCtx
, mImageDigest
);
602 if (HashCtx
!= NULL
) {
605 if (SectionHeader
!= NULL
) {
606 FreePool (SectionHeader
);
612 Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of
613 Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
616 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
617 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
618 within this image buffer before use.
620 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.
621 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
623 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
624 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
630 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
635 for (Index
= 0; Index
< HASHALG_MAX
; Index
++) {
637 // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
638 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
639 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
641 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
642 // contentInfo ContentInfo,
644 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
645 // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
646 // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
648 if ((*(AuthData
+ 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE
) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE
) {
650 // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
655 if (AuthDataSize
< 32 + mHash
[Index
].OidLength
) {
656 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED
;
659 if (CompareMem (AuthData
+ 32, mHash
[Index
].OidValue
, mHash
[Index
].OidLength
) == 0) {
664 if (Index
== HASHALG_MAX
) {
665 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED
;
669 // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
671 if (!HashPeImage(Index
)) {
672 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED
;
680 Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.
682 This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by
683 ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.
685 @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.
687 @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.
688 @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.
692 GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
693 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*ImageExeInfoTable
697 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*ImageExeInfoItem
;
700 if (ImageExeInfoTable
== NULL
) {
704 ImageExeInfoItem
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*) ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoTable
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
));
705 TotalSize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
);
706 for (Index
= 0; Index
< ImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
; Index
++) {
707 TotalSize
+= ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) &ImageExeInfoItem
->InfoSize
);
708 ImageExeInfoItem
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*) ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoItem
+ ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) &ImageExeInfoItem
->InfoSize
));
715 Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.
717 @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.
718 @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.
719 @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.
720 @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.
721 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.
726 IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action
,
727 IN CHAR16
*Name OPTIONAL
,
728 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*DevicePath
,
729 IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*Signature OPTIONAL
,
730 IN UINTN SignatureSize
733 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*ImageExeInfoTable
;
734 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*NewImageExeInfoTable
;
735 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*ImageExeInfoEntry
;
736 UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize
;
737 UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
;
739 UINTN DevicePathSize
;
741 ImageExeInfoTable
= NULL
;
742 NewImageExeInfoTable
= NULL
;
743 ImageExeInfoEntry
= NULL
;
746 if (DevicePath
== NULL
) {
751 NameStringLen
= StrSize (Name
);
753 NameStringLen
= sizeof (CHAR16
);
756 EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
**) &ImageExeInfoTable
);
757 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
759 // The table has been found!
760 // We must enlarge the table to accomodate the new exe info entry.
762 ImageExeInfoTableSize
= GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable
);
766 // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.
768 ImageExeInfoTableSize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
);
771 DevicePathSize
= GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath
);
772 NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
) - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NameStringLen
+ DevicePathSize
+ SignatureSize
;
773 NewImageExeInfoTable
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize
+ NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
);
774 if (NewImageExeInfoTable
== NULL
) {
778 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
779 CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable
, ImageExeInfoTable
, ImageExeInfoTableSize
);
781 NewImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
= 0;
783 NewImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
++;
784 ImageExeInfoEntry
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*) ((UINT8
*) NewImageExeInfoTable
+ ImageExeInfoTableSize
);
786 // Update new item's information.
788 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
, Action
);
789 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION
)), (UINT32
) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
);
792 CopyMem ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION
) + sizeof (UINT32
), Name
, NameStringLen
);
794 ZeroMem ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION
) + sizeof (UINT32
), sizeof (CHAR16
));
797 (UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION
) + sizeof (UINT32
) + NameStringLen
,
801 if (Signature
!= NULL
) {
803 (UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION
) + sizeof (UINT32
) + NameStringLen
+ DevicePathSize
,
809 // Update/replace the image execution table.
811 gBS
->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
*) NewImageExeInfoTable
);
814 // Free Old table data!
816 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
817 FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable
);
822 Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).
824 @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.
825 @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.
826 @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.
827 @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.
828 @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.
830 @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.
831 @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.
835 IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
836 IN UINT8
*Certificate
,
838 IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignatureList
,
839 IN UINTN SignatureListSize
,
840 OUT EFI_TIME
*RevocationTime
845 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*DbxList
;
847 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*CertHash
;
852 UINT8 CertDigest
[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
];
854 UINTN SiglistHeaderSize
;
859 DbxList
= SignatureList
;
860 DbxSize
= SignatureListSize
;
862 HashAlg
= HASHALG_MAX
;
864 if ((RevocationTime
== NULL
) || (DbxList
== NULL
)) {
869 // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate.
871 if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate
, CertSize
, &TBSCert
, &TBSCertSize
)) {
875 while ((DbxSize
> 0) && (SignatureListSize
>= DbxList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
877 // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.
879 if (CompareGuid (&DbxList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid
)) {
880 HashAlg
= HASHALG_SHA256
;
881 } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid
)) {
882 HashAlg
= HASHALG_SHA384
;
883 } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid
)) {
884 HashAlg
= HASHALG_SHA512
;
886 DbxSize
-= DbxList
->SignatureListSize
;
887 DbxList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) DbxList
+ DbxList
->SignatureListSize
);
892 // Calculate the hash value of current TBSCertificate for comparision.
894 if (mHash
[HashAlg
].GetContextSize
== NULL
) {
897 ZeroMem (CertDigest
, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
);
898 HashCtx
= AllocatePool (mHash
[HashAlg
].GetContextSize ());
899 if (HashCtx
== NULL
) {
902 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashInit (HashCtx
);
906 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate (HashCtx
, TBSCert
, TBSCertSize
);
910 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashFinal (HashCtx
, CertDigest
);
915 SiglistHeaderSize
= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + DbxList
->SignatureHeaderSize
;
916 CertHash
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) DbxList
+ SiglistHeaderSize
);
917 CertHashCount
= (DbxList
->SignatureListSize
- SiglistHeaderSize
) / DbxList
->SignatureSize
;
918 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertHashCount
; Index
++) {
920 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
922 DbxCertHash
= CertHash
->SignatureData
;
923 if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash
, CertDigest
, mHash
[HashAlg
].DigestLength
) == 0) {
925 // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.
930 // Return the revocation time.
932 CopyMem (RevocationTime
, (EFI_TIME
*)(DbxCertHash
+ mHash
[HashAlg
].DigestLength
), sizeof (EFI_TIME
));
935 CertHash
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertHash
+ DbxList
->SignatureSize
);
938 DbxSize
-= DbxList
->SignatureListSize
;
939 DbxList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) DbxList
+ DbxList
->SignatureListSize
);
943 if (HashCtx
!= NULL
) {
951 Check whether signature is in specified database.
953 @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.
954 @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.
955 @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.
956 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.
958 @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.
959 @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.
963 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
964 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
966 IN EFI_GUID
*CertType
,
967 IN UINTN SignatureSize
971 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
972 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
980 // Read signature database variable.
985 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (VariableName
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, NULL
);
986 if (Status
!= EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
990 Data
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
995 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (VariableName
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, Data
);
996 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1000 // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.
1002 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1003 while ((DataSize
> 0) && (DataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1004 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1005 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1006 if ((CertList
->SignatureSize
== sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1 + SignatureSize
) && (CompareGuid(&CertList
->SignatureType
, CertType
))) {
1007 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1008 if (CompareMem (Cert
->SignatureData
, Signature
, SignatureSize
) == 0) {
1010 // Find the signature in database.
1013 SecureBootHook (VariableName
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, CertList
->SignatureSize
, Cert
);
1017 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1025 DataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1026 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1038 Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.
1040 @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.
1041 @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.
1043 @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.
1044 @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.
1048 IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (
1049 IN EFI_TIME
*SigningTime
,
1050 IN EFI_TIME
*RevocationTime
1053 if (SigningTime
->Year
!= RevocationTime
->Year
) {
1054 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Year
< RevocationTime
->Year
);
1055 } else if (SigningTime
->Month
!= RevocationTime
->Month
) {
1056 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Month
< RevocationTime
->Month
);
1057 } else if (SigningTime
->Day
!= RevocationTime
->Day
) {
1058 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Day
< RevocationTime
->Day
);
1059 } else if (SigningTime
->Hour
!= RevocationTime
->Hour
) {
1060 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Hour
< RevocationTime
->Hour
);
1061 } else if (SigningTime
->Minute
!= RevocationTime
->Minute
) {
1062 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Minute
< RevocationTime
->Minute
);
1065 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Second
<= RevocationTime
->Second
);
1069 Check if the given time value is zero.
1071 @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.
1073 @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.
1074 @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.
1082 if ((Time
->Year
== 0) && (Time
->Month
== 0) && (Time
->Day
== 0) &&
1083 (Time
->Hour
== 0) && (Time
->Minute
== 0) && (Time
->Second
== 0)) {
1091 Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than
1092 the revocation time.
1094 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
1095 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
1096 @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.
1098 @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the
1100 @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the
1105 PassTimestampCheck (
1107 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
,
1108 IN EFI_TIME
*RevocationTime
1112 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus
;
1113 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1114 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
1121 EFI_TIME SigningTime
;
1124 // Variable Initialization
1126 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
1134 // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
1136 if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime
)) {
1141 // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.
1142 // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.
1145 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbtDataSize
, NULL
);
1146 if (Status
!= EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1149 DbtData
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize
);
1150 if (DbtData
== NULL
) {
1153 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbtDataSize
, (VOID
*) DbtData
);
1154 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1158 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) DbtData
;
1159 while ((DbtDataSize
> 0) && (DbtDataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1160 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
1161 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1162 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1163 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1165 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
1167 RootCert
= Cert
->SignatureData
;
1168 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
1170 // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.
1172 if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, RootCert
, RootCertSize
, &SigningTime
)) {
1174 // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.
1176 if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime
, RevocationTime
)) {
1177 VerifyStatus
= TRUE
;
1181 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1184 DbtDataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1185 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1189 if (DbtData
!= NULL
) {
1193 return VerifyStatus
;
1197 Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).
1198 The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.
1200 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.
1201 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
1203 @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.
1204 @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.
1210 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
1214 BOOLEAN IsForbidden
;
1217 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1219 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*CertData
;
1227 UINTN TrustedCertLength
;
1232 EFI_TIME RevocationTime
;
1235 // Variable Initialization
1237 IsForbidden
= FALSE
;
1247 TrustedCertLength
= 0;
1250 // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.
1253 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, NULL
);
1254 if (Status
!= EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1257 Data
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
1262 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, (VOID
*) Data
);
1263 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1268 // Verify image signature with RAW X509 certificates in DBX database.
1269 // If passed, the image will be forbidden.
1271 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1272 CertListSize
= DataSize
;
1273 while ((CertListSize
> 0) && (CertListSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1274 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
1275 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1276 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1278 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1280 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
1282 RootCert
= CertData
->SignatureData
;
1283 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
1286 // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
1288 IsForbidden
= AuthenticodeVerify (
1297 SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, CertList
->SignatureSize
, CertData
);
1301 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertData
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1305 CertListSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1306 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1310 // Check X.509 Certificate Hash & Possible Timestamp.
1314 // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData
1315 // The output CertStack format will be:
1316 // UINT8 CertNumber;
1317 // UINT32 Cert1Length;
1319 // UINT32 Cert2Length;
1322 // UINT32 CertnLength;
1325 Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &CertBuffer
, &BufferLength
, &TrustedCert
, &TrustedCertLength
);
1326 if ((BufferLength
== 0) || (CertBuffer
== NULL
)) {
1332 // Check if any hash of certificates embedded in AuthData is in the forbidden database.
1334 CertNumber
= (UINT8
) (*CertBuffer
);
1335 CertPtr
= CertBuffer
+ 1;
1336 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertNumber
; Index
++) {
1337 CertSize
= (UINTN
) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*)CertPtr
);
1338 Cert
= (UINT8
*)CertPtr
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
1340 if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert
, CertSize
, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*)Data
, DataSize
, &RevocationTime
)) {
1342 // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
1345 if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &RevocationTime
)) {
1346 IsForbidden
= FALSE
;
1351 CertPtr
= CertPtr
+ sizeof (UINT32
) + CertSize
;
1359 Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer
);
1360 Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert
);
1366 Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.
1368 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
1369 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
1371 @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.
1372 @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.
1378 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
1382 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus
;
1383 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1384 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
1393 EFI_TIME RevocationTime
;
1401 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
1404 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, NULL
);
1405 if (Status
== EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1406 Data
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
1408 return VerifyStatus
;
1411 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, (VOID
*) Data
);
1412 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1417 // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
1419 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1420 while ((DataSize
> 0) && (DataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1421 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
1422 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1423 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1425 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1427 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
1429 RootCert
= Cert
->SignatureData
;
1430 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
1433 // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
1435 VerifyStatus
= AuthenticodeVerify (
1445 // Here We still need to check if this RootCert's Hash is revoked
1447 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbxDataSize
, NULL
);
1448 if (Status
== EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1451 DbxData
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
1452 if (DbxData
== NULL
) {
1456 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbxDataSize
, (VOID
*) DbxData
);
1457 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1461 if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert
, RootCertSize
, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*)DbxData
, DbxDataSize
, &RevocationTime
)) {
1463 // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
1465 VerifyStatus
= PassTimestampCheck (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &RevocationTime
);
1471 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1475 DataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1476 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1482 SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, CertList
->SignatureSize
, Cert
);
1488 if (DbxData
!= NULL
) {
1492 return VerifyStatus
;
1496 Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
1497 and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
1498 MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
1500 In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
1501 Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
1503 The image verification policy is:
1504 If the image is signed,
1505 At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record
1506 in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may
1507 be reflected in the security database "dbx".
1508 Otherwise, the image is not signed,
1509 The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and
1510 not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
1512 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1513 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
1514 within this image buffer before use.
1516 @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
1517 This is the authentication status returned from the security
1518 measurement services for the input file.
1519 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
1520 being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
1521 @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
1522 @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
1523 @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.
1525 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
1526 FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
1527 that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
1528 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
1529 and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
1530 policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
1532 @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
1533 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
1534 the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
1535 in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
1537 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
1538 authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
1539 Foundation many not use File.
1544 DxeImageVerificationHandler (
1545 IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus
,
1546 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*File
,
1547 IN VOID
*FileBuffer
,
1549 IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
1554 EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*DosHdr
;
1555 EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus
;
1556 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignatureList
;
1557 UINTN SignatureListSize
;
1558 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Signature
;
1559 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action
;
1560 WIN_CERTIFICATE
*WinCertificate
;
1563 PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext
;
1564 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
1565 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS
*PkcsCertData
;
1566 WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
*WinCertUefiGuid
;
1569 EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*SecDataDir
;
1573 SignatureList
= NULL
;
1574 SignatureListSize
= 0;
1575 WinCertificate
= NULL
;
1577 PkcsCertData
= NULL
;
1578 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED
;
1579 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1580 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1583 // Check the image type and get policy setting.
1585 switch (GetImageType (File
)) {
1588 Policy
= ALWAYS_EXECUTE
;
1591 case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM
:
1592 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy
);
1595 case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
:
1596 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy
);
1599 case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
:
1600 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy
);
1604 Policy
= DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1608 // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
1610 if (Policy
== ALWAYS_EXECUTE
) {
1612 } else if (Policy
== NEVER_EXECUTE
) {
1613 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1617 // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
1618 // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
1620 ASSERT (Policy
!= QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
&& Policy
!= ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
);
1621 if (Policy
== QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
|| Policy
== ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
) {
1625 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
, (VOID
**)&SecureBoot
, NULL
);
1627 // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.
1629 if (SecureBoot
== NULL
) {
1634 // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled.
1636 if (*SecureBoot
== SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE
) {
1637 FreePool (SecureBoot
);
1640 FreePool (SecureBoot
);
1643 // Read the Dos header.
1645 if (FileBuffer
== NULL
) {
1646 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1649 mImageBase
= (UINT8
*) FileBuffer
;
1650 mImageSize
= FileSize
;
1652 ZeroMem (&ImageContext
, sizeof (ImageContext
));
1653 ImageContext
.Handle
= (VOID
*) FileBuffer
;
1654 ImageContext
.ImageRead
= (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE
) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead
;
1657 // Get information about the image being loaded
1659 Status
= PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext
);
1660 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1662 // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
1667 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1669 DosHdr
= (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*) mImageBase
;
1670 if (DosHdr
->e_magic
== EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE
) {
1672 // DOS image header is present,
1673 // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
1675 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
= DosHdr
->e_lfanew
;
1677 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
= 0;
1680 // Check PE/COFF image.
1682 mNtHeader
.Pe32
= (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32
*) (mImageBase
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset
);
1683 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->Signature
!= EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE
) {
1685 // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
1690 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.Machine
== IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64
&& mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
1692 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
1693 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
1694 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
1695 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
1697 Magic
= EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
;
1700 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
1702 Magic
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
;
1705 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
1709 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
1710 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
> EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
1711 SecDataDir
= (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
];
1715 // Use PE32+ offset.
1717 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
1718 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
> EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
1719 SecDataDir
= (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
];
1724 // Start Image Validation.
1726 if (SecDataDir
== NULL
|| SecDataDir
->Size
== 0) {
1728 // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",
1729 // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
1731 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256
)) {
1735 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
1737 // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
1742 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
1744 // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
1750 // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.
1756 // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7
1757 // "Attribute Certificate Table".
1758 // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.
1760 for (OffSet
= SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
;
1761 OffSet
< (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
);
1762 OffSet
+= (WinCertificate
->dwLength
+ ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate
->dwLength
))) {
1763 WinCertificate
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE
*) (mImageBase
+ OffSet
);
1764 if ((SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
- OffSet
) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE
) ||
1765 (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
- OffSet
) < WinCertificate
->dwLength
) {
1770 // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.
1772 if (WinCertificate
->wCertificateType
== WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA
) {
1774 // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the
1775 // Authenticode specification.
1777 PkcsCertData
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS
*) WinCertificate
;
1778 if (PkcsCertData
->Hdr
.dwLength
<= sizeof (PkcsCertData
->Hdr
)) {
1781 AuthData
= PkcsCertData
->CertData
;
1782 AuthDataSize
= PkcsCertData
->Hdr
.dwLength
- sizeof(PkcsCertData
->Hdr
);
1783 } else if (WinCertificate
->wCertificateType
== WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID
) {
1785 // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.
1787 WinCertUefiGuid
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
*) WinCertificate
;
1788 if (WinCertUefiGuid
->Hdr
.dwLength
<= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
)) {
1791 if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid
->CertType
, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid
)) {
1794 AuthData
= WinCertUefiGuid
->CertData
;
1795 AuthDataSize
= WinCertUefiGuid
->Hdr
.dwLength
- OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
);
1797 if (WinCertificate
->dwLength
< sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE
)) {
1803 Status
= HashPeImageByType (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
);
1804 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1809 // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).
1811 if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
)) {
1812 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
;
1813 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1818 // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).
1820 if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus
)) {
1821 if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
)) {
1822 VerifyStatus
= EFI_SUCCESS
;
1827 // Check the image's hash value.
1829 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
1830 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND
;
1831 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1833 } else if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus
)) {
1834 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
1835 VerifyStatus
= EFI_SUCCESS
;
1840 if (OffSet
!= (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
)) {
1842 // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.
1844 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1847 if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus
)) {
1850 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1851 if (Action
== EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
|| Action
== EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND
) {
1853 // Get image hash value as executable's signature.
1855 SignatureListSize
= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1 + mImageDigestSize
;
1856 SignatureList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize
);
1857 if (SignatureList
== NULL
) {
1858 Status
= EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
1861 SignatureList
->SignatureHeaderSize
= 0;
1862 SignatureList
->SignatureListSize
= (UINT32
) SignatureListSize
;
1863 SignatureList
->SignatureSize
= (UINT32
) mImageDigestSize
;
1864 CopyMem (&SignatureList
->SignatureType
, &mCertType
, sizeof (EFI_GUID
));
1865 Signature
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) SignatureList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
));
1866 CopyMem (Signature
->SignatureData
, mImageDigest
, mImageDigestSize
);
1871 if (Status
!= EFI_SUCCESS
) {
1873 // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.
1875 NameStr
= ConvertDevicePathToText (File
, FALSE
, TRUE
);
1876 AddImageExeInfo (Action
, NameStr
, File
, SignatureList
, SignatureListSize
);
1877 if (NameStr
!= NULL
) {
1878 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO
, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr
));
1881 Status
= EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1884 if (SignatureList
!= NULL
) {
1885 FreePool (SignatureList
);
1892 On Ready To Boot Services Event notification handler.
1894 Add the image execution information table if it is not in system configuration table.
1896 @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked
1897 @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context
1907 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*ImageExeInfoTable
;
1908 UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize
;
1910 EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
**) &ImageExeInfoTable
);
1911 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
1915 ImageExeInfoTableSize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
);
1916 ImageExeInfoTable
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize
);
1917 if (ImageExeInfoTable
== NULL
) {
1921 ImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
= 0;
1922 gBS
->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
*) ImageExeInfoTable
);
1927 Register security measurement handler.
1929 @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.
1930 @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.
1932 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.
1936 DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
1937 IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle
,
1938 IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE
*SystemTable
1944 // Register the event to publish the image execution table.
1946 EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (
1953 return RegisterSecurity2Handler (
1954 DxeImageVerificationHandler
,
1955 EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE
| EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED