1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
81 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
82 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
83 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
84 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
86 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
87 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
88 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
91 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
93 /* number of audit rules */
96 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
99 struct audit_aux_data
{
100 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
107 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
109 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
110 struct audit_aux_data d
;
111 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
112 kuid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
113 kuid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
114 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
115 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
116 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
120 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
121 struct audit_aux_data d
;
122 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
123 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
124 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
125 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
128 struct audit_tree_refs
{
129 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
130 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
133 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
140 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
142 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
145 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
148 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
152 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
153 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
156 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
159 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
164 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
166 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
167 case 4: /* socketcall */
168 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
170 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
176 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
178 struct audit_names
*n
;
179 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
184 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
185 if ((n
->ino
!= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
) &&
186 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
194 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
195 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
196 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
197 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
198 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
199 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
200 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
203 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
204 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
208 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
212 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
214 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
215 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
217 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
218 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
227 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
233 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
235 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
236 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
242 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
244 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
245 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
250 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
251 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
253 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
254 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
257 /* we started with empty chain */
258 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
260 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
265 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
267 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
271 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
272 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
276 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
280 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
282 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
283 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
289 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
291 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
292 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
297 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
298 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
299 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
304 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
305 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
312 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid
,
313 struct audit_names
*name
,
314 struct audit_field
*f
,
315 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
317 struct audit_names
*n
;
321 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, name
->uid
);
327 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
328 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, n
->uid
);
336 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid
,
337 struct audit_names
*name
,
338 struct audit_field
*f
,
339 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
341 struct audit_names
*n
;
345 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, name
->gid
);
351 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
352 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, n
->gid
);
360 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
361 const struct cred
*cred
,
362 struct audit_field
*f
,
363 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
364 struct audit_names
*name
)
367 /* process to file object comparisons */
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
369 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->uid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
371 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->gid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->euid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->egid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
377 return audit_compare_uid(tsk
->loginuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
379 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->suid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
380 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
381 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->sgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
382 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
383 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->fsuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
385 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->fsgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
386 /* uid comparisons */
387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID
:
388 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, tsk
->loginuid
);
389 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID
:
390 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID
:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID
:
394 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
395 /* auid comparisons */
396 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID
:
397 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
398 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID
:
399 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
400 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID
:
401 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
402 /* euid comparisons */
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID
:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID
:
406 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
407 /* suid comparisons */
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID
:
409 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
410 /* gid comparisons */
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID
:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->egid
);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID
:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID
:
416 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
417 /* egid comparisons */
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID
:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID
:
421 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
422 /* sgid comparison */
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
:
424 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
426 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
432 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
433 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
436 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
437 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
438 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
440 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
441 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
442 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
443 struct audit_names
*name
,
444 enum audit_state
*state
,
447 const struct cred
*cred
;
450 unsigned int sessionid
;
452 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
454 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
455 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
456 struct audit_names
*n
;
462 pid
= task_tgid_nr(tsk
);
463 result
= audit_comparator(pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
468 ctx
->ppid
= task_ppid_nr(tsk
);
469 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
473 result
= audit_exe_compare(tsk
, rule
->exe
);
474 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
478 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
481 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
484 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
487 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
490 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
491 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
493 result
= in_group_p(f
->gid
);
494 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
496 result
= !in_group_p(f
->gid
);
500 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
501 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
503 result
= in_egroup_p(f
->gid
);
504 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
506 result
= !in_egroup_p(f
->gid
);
510 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
513 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
515 case AUDIT_SESSIONID
:
516 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
517 result
= audit_comparator(sessionid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
520 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
524 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
528 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
529 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
532 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
534 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
536 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
541 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
542 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
545 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
546 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
547 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
556 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
557 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
560 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
561 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
562 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
571 result
= audit_comparator(name
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
573 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
574 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
583 result
= audit_uid_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
585 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
586 if (audit_uid_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
)) {
595 result
= audit_gid_comparator(name
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
597 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
598 if (audit_gid_comparator(n
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
)) {
607 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
, name
->ino
, name
->dev
);
611 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
614 result
= audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
616 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET
:
617 result
= audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk
), f
->op
, f
->val
);
619 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
620 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
621 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
624 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
625 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
626 match for now to avoid losing information that
627 may be wanted. An error message will also be
631 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
634 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
643 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
644 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
645 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
648 /* Find files that match */
650 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
651 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
654 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
655 if (security_audit_rule_match(n
->osid
, f
->type
,
663 /* Find ipc objects that match */
664 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
666 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx
->ipc
.osid
,
677 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
679 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
680 /* ignore this field for filtering */
684 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
687 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
689 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
:
690 result
= audit_field_compare(tsk
, cred
, f
, ctx
, name
);
698 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
700 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
701 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
702 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
704 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
706 switch (rule
->action
) {
708 *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
;
711 *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
717 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
718 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
719 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
721 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
723 struct audit_entry
*e
;
724 enum audit_state state
;
727 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
728 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
730 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
731 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
737 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
740 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule
*rule
, unsigned long val
)
744 if (val
> 0xffffffff)
747 word
= AUDIT_WORD(val
);
748 if (word
>= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE
)
751 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(val
);
753 return rule
->mask
[word
] & bit
;
756 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
757 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
758 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
759 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
761 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
762 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
763 struct list_head
*list
)
765 struct audit_entry
*e
;
766 enum audit_state state
;
768 if (auditd_test_task(tsk
))
769 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
772 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
773 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
774 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
775 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
778 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
784 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
788 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
789 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
791 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
792 struct audit_names
*n
,
793 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
794 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
795 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
796 struct audit_entry
*e
;
797 enum audit_state state
;
799 if (list_empty(list
))
802 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
803 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
804 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
805 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
813 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
814 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
815 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
816 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
818 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
820 struct audit_names
*n
;
822 if (auditd_test_task(tsk
))
827 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
828 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
834 /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
835 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_take_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
839 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
843 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
846 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
847 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
850 * This is actually a test for:
851 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
852 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
854 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
856 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
857 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
858 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
859 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
861 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
863 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
) {
864 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
865 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
868 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
872 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context
*context
)
874 kfree(context
->proctitle
.value
);
875 context
->proctitle
.value
= NULL
;
876 context
->proctitle
.len
= 0;
879 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
881 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
883 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
890 context
->name_count
= 0;
891 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
892 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
893 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
896 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
898 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
900 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
901 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
904 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
905 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
910 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
912 struct audit_context
*context
;
914 context
= kzalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
);
917 context
->state
= state
;
918 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
919 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
920 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
925 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
928 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
929 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
930 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
933 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
935 struct audit_context
*context
;
936 enum audit_state state
;
939 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
940 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
942 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
943 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
) {
944 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
948 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
950 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
953 context
->filterkey
= key
;
955 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
956 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
960 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
962 audit_free_names(context
);
963 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
964 free_tree_refs(context
);
965 audit_free_aux(context
);
966 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
967 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
968 audit_proctitle_free(context
);
972 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
973 kuid_t auid
, kuid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
976 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
981 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
985 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
,
986 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
987 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
), sessionid
);
989 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
990 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
993 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
994 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
997 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
998 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1004 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1005 struct audit_buffer
**ab
)
1019 const char __user
*p
= (const char __user
*)current
->mm
->arg_start
;
1021 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1022 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1023 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1026 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1027 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1028 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1029 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1030 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
> 7500);
1031 len_max
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1033 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1034 buf_head
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1036 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1041 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", context
->execve
.argc
);
1046 require_data
= true;
1051 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1052 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1053 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1054 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1055 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1056 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1057 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1059 len_full
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1061 /* read more data from userspace */
1063 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1064 if (buf
!= buf_head
) {
1065 memmove(buf_head
, buf
, len_buf
);
1069 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1070 len_tmp
= strncpy_from_user(&buf_head
[len_buf
], p
,
1072 if (len_tmp
== -EFAULT
) {
1073 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1074 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1076 } else if (len_tmp
== (len_max
- len_buf
)) {
1077 /* buffer is not large enough */
1078 require_data
= true;
1079 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1080 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1081 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1082 * consistent record encoding */
1084 len_full
= len_full
* 2;
1087 require_data
= false;
1089 encode
= audit_string_contains_control(
1091 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1092 if (len_full
< len_max
)
1093 len_full
= (encode
?
1094 len_tmp
* 2 : len_tmp
);
1098 buf_head
[len_buf
] = '\0';
1100 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1101 len_abuf
= (encode
? len_buf
* 2 : len_buf
+ 2);
1104 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1106 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1107 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1108 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1110 if ((sizeof(abuf
) + 8) > len_rem
) {
1113 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
,
1114 GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1119 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1121 if (require_data
|| (iter
> 0) ||
1122 ((len_abuf
+ sizeof(abuf
)) > len_rem
)) {
1124 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1125 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1129 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1130 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1131 " a%d[%d]=", arg
, iter
++);
1133 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1134 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1136 WARN_ON(len_tmp
>= sizeof(abuf
));
1137 abuf
[sizeof(abuf
) - 1] = '\0';
1139 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1140 audit_log_format(*ab
, "%s", abuf
);
1144 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1145 len_tmp
= len_rem
/ 2; /* encoding */
1146 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1147 len_rem
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1148 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1150 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1151 len_tmp
= len_rem
- 2; /* quotes */
1152 audit_log_n_string(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1153 len_rem
-= len_tmp
+ 2;
1154 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1155 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1156 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
;
1162 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1163 if ((len_buf
== 0) && !require_data
) {
1167 require_data
= true;
1170 } while (arg
< context
->execve
.argc
);
1172 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1178 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1180 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1183 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1187 switch (context
->type
) {
1188 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1189 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1190 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1191 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1192 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1193 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1196 u32 osid
= context
->ipc
.osid
;
1198 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1199 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.uid
),
1200 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.gid
),
1205 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1206 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", osid
);
1209 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1210 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1213 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1215 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1216 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1219 audit_log_format(ab
,
1220 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1221 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1222 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1223 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1224 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1228 audit_log_format(ab
,
1229 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1230 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1231 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1232 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1233 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1234 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1235 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1237 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
:
1238 audit_log_format(ab
,
1239 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1240 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1241 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1242 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1243 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1244 (long long) context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1245 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1247 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
:
1248 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1249 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1250 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1252 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1253 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1254 audit_log_format(ab
,
1255 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1257 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1258 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1259 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1262 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1263 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1264 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1265 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1266 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pa", &context
->capset
.cap
.ambient
);
1269 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1270 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1273 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
);
1275 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
:
1276 audit_log_format(ab
, "name=");
1277 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, context
->module
.name
);
1278 kfree(context
->module
.name
);
1284 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle
, int len
)
1286 char *end
= proctitle
+ len
- 1;
1287 while (end
> proctitle
&& !isprint(*end
))
1290 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1291 len
= end
- proctitle
+ 1;
1292 len
-= isprint(proctitle
[len
-1]) == 0;
1296 static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1297 struct audit_context
*context
)
1301 char *msg
= "(null)";
1302 int len
= strlen(msg
);
1303 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1305 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PROCTITLE
);
1307 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1309 audit_log_format(ab
, "proctitle=");
1312 if (!context
->proctitle
.value
) {
1313 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1316 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1317 res
= get_cmdline(tsk
, buf
, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
);
1322 res
= audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf
, res
);
1327 context
->proctitle
.value
= buf
;
1328 context
->proctitle
.len
= res
;
1330 msg
= context
->proctitle
.value
;
1331 len
= context
->proctitle
.len
;
1333 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, msg
, len
);
1337 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1339 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1340 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1341 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1342 struct audit_names
*n
;
1344 /* tsk == current */
1345 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1347 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1349 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1350 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1351 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1352 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1353 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1354 if (context
->return_valid
)
1355 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1356 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1357 context
->return_code
);
1359 audit_log_format(ab
,
1360 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1365 context
->name_count
);
1367 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1368 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1371 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1373 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1375 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1377 switch (aux
->type
) {
1379 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1380 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1381 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1382 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1383 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1384 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1385 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1386 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1387 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1388 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pa", &axs
->old_pcap
.ambient
);
1389 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1390 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1391 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1392 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pa", &axs
->new_pcap
.ambient
);
1400 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1402 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1403 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1405 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1406 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1411 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1412 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1414 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1415 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1416 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1421 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1422 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1424 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1425 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1426 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1428 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1430 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1434 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1435 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1436 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1437 context
->target_sessionid
,
1438 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1441 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1442 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1444 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1450 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1453 audit_log_name(context
, n
, NULL
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1456 audit_log_proctitle(tsk
, context
);
1458 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1459 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1463 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1467 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1468 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1470 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1472 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1474 struct audit_context
*context
;
1476 context
= audit_take_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1480 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1481 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1482 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1483 * in the context of the idle thread */
1484 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1485 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1486 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1487 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1488 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1490 audit_free_context(context
);
1494 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1495 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1496 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1497 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1498 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1499 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1501 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1502 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1503 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1504 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1505 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1506 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1509 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major
, unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1510 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1512 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1513 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1514 enum audit_state state
;
1519 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1524 context
->arch
= syscall_get_arch();
1525 context
->major
= major
;
1526 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1527 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1528 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1529 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1531 state
= context
->state
;
1532 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1533 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1535 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1537 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1540 context
->serial
= 0;
1541 context
->ctime
= current_kernel_time64();
1542 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1543 context
->current_state
= state
;
1548 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1549 * @success: success value of the syscall
1550 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1552 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1553 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1554 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1555 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1556 * free the names stored from getname().
1558 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1560 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1561 struct audit_context
*context
;
1564 success
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1566 success
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1568 context
= audit_take_context(tsk
, success
, return_code
);
1572 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1573 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1575 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1576 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1578 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1579 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1581 audit_free_names(context
);
1582 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1583 audit_free_aux(context
);
1584 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1585 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1586 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1587 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1588 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1590 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1591 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1592 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1593 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1595 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1598 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1600 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1601 struct audit_context
*context
;
1602 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1603 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1605 if (likely(!inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))
1607 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1609 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1611 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1615 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1617 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1618 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1619 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1620 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1621 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1624 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1628 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1630 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1631 struct audit_context
*context
;
1632 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1633 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1634 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1638 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1640 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1645 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1647 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(d
);
1648 if (inode
&& unlikely(inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)) {
1649 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1650 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1652 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1658 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1663 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1666 /* just a race with rename */
1667 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1670 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1671 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1672 /* OK, got more space */
1673 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1677 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1678 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1679 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1686 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
,
1689 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1691 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1692 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1693 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1695 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1698 aname
->should_free
= true;
1701 aname
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
1703 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1705 context
->name_count
++;
1710 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1711 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1713 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1714 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1715 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1718 __audit_reusename(const __user
char *uptr
)
1720 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1721 struct audit_names
*n
;
1723 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1726 if (n
->name
->uptr
== uptr
) {
1735 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1736 * @name: name to add
1738 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1739 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1741 void __audit_getname(struct filename
*name
)
1743 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1744 struct audit_names
*n
;
1746 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1749 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
1754 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1758 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1759 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1763 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1764 * @name: name being audited
1765 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1766 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1768 void __audit_inode(struct filename
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1771 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1772 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1773 struct audit_names
*n
;
1774 bool parent
= flags
& AUDIT_INODE_PARENT
;
1776 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1783 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1784 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1789 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
1790 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1793 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1798 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1800 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1801 if (n
->ino
!= inode
->i_ino
||
1802 n
->dev
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
)
1804 } else if (n
->name
) {
1805 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
1806 if (strcmp(n
->name
->name
, name
->name
))
1809 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
1812 /* match the correct record type */
1814 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
1815 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1818 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1824 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
1825 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
1835 n
->name_len
= n
->name
? parent_len(n
->name
->name
) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1836 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
1837 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN
)
1840 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1841 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
;
1843 handle_path(dentry
);
1844 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
);
1847 void __audit_file(const struct file
*file
)
1849 __audit_inode(NULL
, file
->f_path
.dentry
, 0);
1853 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1854 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1855 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1856 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1858 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1859 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1860 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1861 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1862 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1863 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1864 * unsuccessful attempts.
1866 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode
*parent
,
1867 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1868 const unsigned char type
)
1870 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1871 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1872 const char *dname
= dentry
->d_name
.name
;
1873 struct audit_names
*n
, *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
1874 struct audit_entry
*e
;
1875 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_FS
];
1878 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1882 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
1883 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
1884 for (i
= 0; i
< e
->rule
.field_count
; i
++) {
1885 struct audit_field
*f
= &e
->rule
.fields
[i
];
1887 if (f
->type
== AUDIT_FSTYPE
) {
1888 if (audit_comparator(parent
->i_sb
->s_magic
,
1890 if (e
->rule
.action
== AUDIT_NEVER
) {
1904 /* look for a parent entry first */
1905 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1907 (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
&&
1908 n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
1911 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&& n
->dev
== parent
->i_sb
->s_dev
&&
1912 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
,
1913 n
->name
->name
, n
->name_len
)) {
1914 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1915 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
1921 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1922 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1923 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1925 (n
->type
!= type
&& n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
1928 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
->name
) ||
1929 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
->name
,
1931 found_parent
->name_len
:
1933 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1940 if (!found_parent
) {
1941 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1942 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
);
1945 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
);
1949 found_child
= audit_alloc_name(context
, type
);
1953 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1954 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1955 * audit_free_names() */
1957 found_child
->name
= found_parent
->name
;
1958 found_child
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1959 found_child
->name
->refcnt
++;
1964 audit_copy_inode(found_child
, dentry
, inode
);
1966 found_child
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
1968 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
1971 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1972 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1973 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
1974 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1976 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1978 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
1979 struct timespec64
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
1981 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
1984 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
1985 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
1986 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
1987 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
1990 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
1995 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1996 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1998 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid
)
2000 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
2001 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current
))
2003 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
2004 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
))
2006 /* it is set, you need permission */
2007 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
))
2009 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
2010 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID
) && uid_valid(loginuid
))
2015 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid
, kuid_t kloginuid
,
2016 unsigned int oldsessionid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
2019 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2020 uid_t uid
, oldloginuid
, loginuid
;
2021 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2026 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
2030 uid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, task_uid(current
));
2031 oldloginuid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, koldloginuid
);
2032 loginuid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, kloginuid
),
2033 tty
= audit_get_tty(current
);
2035 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current
), uid
);
2036 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2037 audit_log_format(ab
, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
2038 oldloginuid
, loginuid
, tty
? tty_name(tty
) : "(none)",
2039 oldsessionid
, sessionid
, !rc
);
2045 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2046 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2050 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2052 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid
)
2054 struct task_struct
*task
= current
;
2055 unsigned int oldsessionid
, sessionid
= (unsigned int)-1;
2059 oldloginuid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2060 oldsessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2062 rc
= audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid
);
2066 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2067 if (uid_valid(loginuid
)) {
2068 sessionid
= (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2069 if (unlikely(sessionid
== (unsigned int)-1))
2070 sessionid
= (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2073 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
2074 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
2076 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid
, loginuid
, oldsessionid
, sessionid
, rc
);
2081 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2084 * @attr: queue attributes
2087 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2089 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2092 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2094 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2096 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2097 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2099 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2103 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2104 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2105 * @msg_len: Message length
2106 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2107 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2110 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2111 const struct timespec64
*abs_timeout
)
2113 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2114 struct timespec64
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2117 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(*p
));
2119 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(*p
));
2121 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2122 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2123 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2125 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2129 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2130 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2131 * @notification: Notification event
2135 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2137 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2140 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2142 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2144 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2145 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2149 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2150 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2154 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2156 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2157 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2158 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2159 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2163 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2164 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2167 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2169 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2170 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2171 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2172 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2173 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2174 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.osid
);
2175 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2179 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2180 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2181 * @uid: msgq user id
2182 * @gid: msgq group id
2183 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2185 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2187 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2189 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2191 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2192 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2193 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2194 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2195 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2198 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2200 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2202 context
->type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2203 context
->execve
.argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2208 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2209 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2213 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2215 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2217 if (nargs
<= 0 || nargs
> AUDITSC_ARGS
|| !args
)
2219 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2220 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2221 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2226 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2227 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2228 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2231 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2233 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2234 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2235 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2239 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2240 * @len: data length in user space
2241 * @a: data address in kernel space
2243 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2245 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2247 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2249 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2250 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2253 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2256 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2257 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2261 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2263 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2265 context
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2266 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2267 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2268 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2269 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2270 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2274 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2275 * @sig: signal value
2276 * @t: task being signaled
2278 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2279 * and uid that is doing that.
2281 int audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2283 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2284 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2285 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2286 kuid_t uid
= current_uid(), t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2288 if (auditd_test_task(t
) &&
2289 (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
||
2290 sig
== SIGUSR1
|| sig
== SIGUSR2
)) {
2291 audit_sig_pid
= task_tgid_nr(tsk
);
2292 if (uid_valid(tsk
->loginuid
))
2293 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2295 audit_sig_uid
= uid
;
2296 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2299 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2302 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2303 * in audit_context */
2304 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2305 ctx
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2306 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2307 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2308 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2309 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2310 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2314 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2315 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2316 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2320 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2321 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2322 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2324 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2326 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = task_tgid_nr(t
);
2327 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2328 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2329 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2330 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2331 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2338 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2339 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2340 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2341 * @old: the old credentials
2343 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2344 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2348 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2349 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2351 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2352 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2353 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2355 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2359 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2360 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2361 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2363 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
, &vcaps
);
2365 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2366 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2367 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2368 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2370 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2371 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2372 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2373 ax
->old_pcap
.ambient
= old
->cap_ambient
;
2375 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2376 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2377 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2378 ax
->new_pcap
.ambient
= new->cap_ambient
;
2383 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2384 * @new: the new credentials
2385 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2387 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2388 * audit system if applicable
2390 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2392 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2393 context
->capset
.pid
= task_tgid_nr(current
);
2394 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2395 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2396 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2397 context
->capset
.cap
.ambient
= new->cap_ambient
;
2398 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2401 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2403 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2404 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2405 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2406 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2409 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name
)
2411 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2413 context
->module
.name
= kmalloc(strlen(name
) + 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
2414 strcpy(context
->module
.name
, name
);
2415 context
->type
= AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
;
2418 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response
)
2420 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
2421 AUDIT_FANOTIFY
, "resp=%u", response
);
2424 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
2428 unsigned int sessionid
;
2429 char comm
[sizeof(current
->comm
)];
2431 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2432 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2433 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2435 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2436 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
2437 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
),
2438 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, gid
),
2440 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2441 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current
));
2442 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, get_task_comm(comm
, current
));
2443 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab
, current
->mm
);
2447 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2448 * @signr: signal value
2450 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2451 * should record the event for investigation.
2453 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2455 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2460 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2463 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2467 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld res=1", signr
);
2471 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, int code
)
2473 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2475 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SECCOMP
);
2479 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2480 signr
, syscall_get_arch(), syscall
,
2481 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current
), code
);
2485 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2487 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
2488 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2490 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;