gEfiLegacyDevOrderVariableGuid = {0xa56074db, 0x65fe, 0x45f7, {0xbd, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0x96, 0x52}}\r
gLinuxEfiInitrdMediaGuid = {0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, {0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68}}\r
gQemuKernelLoaderFsMediaGuid = {0x1428f772, 0xb64a, 0x441e, {0xb8, 0xc3, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0xd7, 0xf8, 0x93, 0xc7}}\r
+ gGrubFileGuid = {0xb5ae312c, 0xbc8a, 0x43b1, {0x9c, 0x62, 0xeb, 0xb8, 0x26, 0xdd, 0x5d, 0x07}}\r
+ gConfidentialComputingSecretGuid = {0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, {0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47}}\r
\r
[Ppis]\r
# PPI whose presence in the PPI database signals that the TPM base address\r
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase|0|UINT32|0x40\r
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize|0|UINT32|0x41\r
\r
+ ## The base address and size of the SEV Launch Secret Area provisioned\r
+ # after remote attestation. If this is set in the .fdf, the platform\r
+ # is responsible for protecting the area from DXE phase overwrites.\r
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|0x0|UINT32|0x42\r
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize|0x0|UINT32|0x43\r
+\r
[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2\r
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10\r