/** @file\r
- The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot. \r
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
-This program and the accompanying materials \r
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at \r
-http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
+ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.\r
+ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition.\r
+ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
\r
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, \r
-WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
+ read is within the image buffer.\r
+\r
+ TcgMeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its\r
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.\r
+\r
+ TcgMeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse\r
+ partition data carefully.\r
+\r
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
\r
**/\r
\r
#include <PiDxe.h>\r
\r
#include <Protocol/TcgService.h>\r
-#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolume2.h>\r
#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>\r
#include <Protocol/DiskIo.h>\r
-#include <Protocol/DevicePathToText.h>\r
+#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolumeBlock.h>\r
+\r
+#include <Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h>\r
\r
#include <Library/BaseLib.h>\r
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>\r
#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>\r
#include <Library/PeCoffLib.h>\r
#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>\r
+#include <Library/HobLib.h>\r
\r
//\r
// Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.\r
//\r
BOOLEAN mMeasureGptTableFlag = FALSE;\r
-EFI_GUID mZeroGuid = {0, 0, 0, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}};\r
UINTN mMeasureGptCount = 0;\r
+VOID *mFileBuffer;\r
+UINTN mTpmImageSize;\r
+//\r
+// Measured FV handle cache\r
+//\r
+EFI_HANDLE mCacheMeasuredHandle = NULL;\r
+MEASURED_HOB_DATA *mMeasuredHobData = NULL;\r
\r
/**\r
Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r
\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
+ read is within the image buffer.\r
+\r
@param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r
@param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r
- @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation. \r
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r
On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r
@param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r
- \r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size \r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
-ImageRead (\r
+DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead (\r
IN VOID *FileHandle,\r
IN UINTN FileOffset,\r
IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r
OUT VOID *Buffer\r
)\r
{\r
+ UINTN EndPosition;\r
+\r
+ if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r
+ if (EndPosition > mTpmImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mTpmImageSize - FileOffset);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FileOffset >= mTpmImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r
+\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
Measure GPT table data into TPM log.\r
\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ The GPT partition table is external input, so this function should parse partition data carefully.\r
+\r
@param TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.\r
@param GptHandle Handle that GPT partition was installed.\r
\r
}\r
//\r
// Read the EFI Partition Table Header\r
- // \r
+ //\r
PrimaryHeader = (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *) AllocatePool (BlockIo->Media->BlockSize);\r
if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {\r
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk (\r
DiskIo,\r
BlockIo->Media->MediaId,\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n"));\r
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;\r
- } \r
+ }\r
//\r
// Read the partition entry.\r
//\r
FreePool (EntryPtr);\r
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Count the valid partition\r
//\r
PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)EntryPtr;\r
NumberOfPartition = 0;\r
for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {\r
- if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {\r
- NumberOfPartition++; \r
+ if (!IsZeroGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID)) {\r
+ NumberOfPartition++;\r
}\r
- PartitionEntry++;\r
+ PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)((UINT8 *)PartitionEntry + PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Parepare Data for Measurement\r
- // \r
- EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) \r
+ // Prepare Data for Measurement\r
+ //\r
+ EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions)\r
+ NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r
- TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));\r
+ TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));\r
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {\r
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);\r
FreePool (EntryPtr);\r
TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5;\r
TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT;\r
TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;\r
- GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *) TcgEvent->Event; \r
+ GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *) TcgEvent->Event;\r
\r
//\r
// Copy the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER and NumberOfPartition\r
- // \r
+ //\r
CopyMem ((UINT8 *)GptData, (UINT8*)PrimaryHeader, sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER));\r
GptData->NumberOfPartitions = NumberOfPartition;\r
//\r
PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY*)EntryPtr;\r
NumberOfPartition = 0;\r
for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {\r
- if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {\r
+ if (!IsZeroGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID)) {\r
CopyMem (\r
- (UINT8 *)&GptData->Partitions + NumberOfPartition * sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY),\r
+ (UINT8 *)&GptData->Partitions + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,\r
(UINT8 *)PartitionEntry,\r
- sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY)\r
+ PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry\r
);\r
NumberOfPartition++;\r
}\r
- PartitionEntry++;\r
+ PartitionEntry =(EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)((UINT8 *)PartitionEntry + PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);\r
}\r
\r
//\r
Measure PE image into TPM log based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A.\r
\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r
+ within this image buffer before use.\r
+\r
+ Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in\r
+ its caller function DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler().\r
+\r
@param[in] TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.\r
@param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer.\r
@param[in] ImageSize Image size\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure image.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format.\r
@retval other error value\r
+\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *FilePath\r
)\r
{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;\r
- UINT32 FilePathSize;\r
- VOID *Sha1Ctx;\r
- UINTN CtxSize;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
- UINT32 PeCoffHeaderOffset;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
- UINT8 *HashBase;\r
- UINTN HashSize;\r
- UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
- UINTN Index, Pos;\r
- UINT16 Magic;\r
- UINT32 EventSize;\r
- UINT32 EventNumber;\r
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;\r
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;\r
+ VOID *Sha1Ctx;\r
+ UINTN CtxSize;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
+ UINT32 PeCoffHeaderOffset;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
+ UINT8 *HashBase;\r
+ UINTN HashSize;\r
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN Pos;\r
+ UINT32 EventSize;\r
+ UINT32 EventNumber;\r
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r
EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION Hdr;\r
+ UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
+ BOOLEAN HashStatus;\r
+ UINT32 CertSize;\r
\r
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
ImageLoad = NULL;\r
SectionHeader = NULL;\r
Sha1Ctx = NULL;\r
"TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",\r
ImageType\r
));\r
- ASSERT (FALSE);\r
- TcgEvent->EventType = ImageType;\r
- Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
goto Finish;\r
}\r
\r
ImageLoad->ImageLengthInMemory = ImageSize;\r
ImageLoad->ImageLinkTimeAddress = LinkTimeBase;\r
ImageLoad->LengthOfDevicePath = FilePathSize;\r
- CopyMem (ImageLoad->DevicePath, FilePath, FilePathSize);\r
+ if ((FilePath != NULL) && (FilePathSize != 0)) {\r
+ CopyMem (ImageLoad->DevicePath, FilePath, FilePathSize);\r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
// Check PE/COFF image\r
if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r
PeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
}\r
- if (((EFI_TE_IMAGE_HEADER *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset))->Signature\r
- == EFI_TE_IMAGE_HEADER_SIGNATURE) {\r
+\r
+ Hdr.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r
goto Finish;\r
}\r
\r
goto Finish;\r
}\r
\r
- Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
// Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
// But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
//\r
- Hdr.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
- Magic = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
// 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
//\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress;\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset\r
//\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
} else {\r
//\r
// Use PE32+ offset\r
//\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
}\r
\r
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
// 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
- // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
- // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
//\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
//\r
- // Use PE32 offset\r
+ // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything\r
+ // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.\r
//\r
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (HashSize != 0) {\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
} else {\r
//\r
- // Use PE32+ offset\r
- // \r
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
- }\r
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ }\r
\r
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (HashSize != 0) {\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
\r
- //\r
- // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
- // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
- //\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
- //\r
- // Use PE32 offset\r
- //\r
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
- HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders -\r
- (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress);\r
- } else {\r
//\r
- // Use PE32+ offset\r
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
//\r
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
- HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders -\r
- (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress);\r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (HashSize != 0) {\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
}\r
- \r
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
\r
//\r
// 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header\r
//\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset\r
//\r
// header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
// IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
//\r
- SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
if (SectionHeader == NULL) {\r
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
goto Finish;\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
\r
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
\r
SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
}\r
//\r
if (ImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
- //\r
- // Use PE32 offset\r
- //\r
- HashSize = (UINTN)(ImageSize -\r
- Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
- SumOfBytesHashed);\r
+\r
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
+ CertSize = 0;\r
} else {\r
- //\r
- // Use PE32+ offset\r
- //\r
- HashSize = (UINTN)(ImageSize -\r
- Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
- SumOfBytesHashed); \r
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ CertSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ CertSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (ImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (ImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);\r
+\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if (ImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
//\r
// 17. Finalize the SHA hash.\r
//\r
- Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *)&TcgEvent->Digest);\r
+ HashStatus = Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *) &TcgEvent->Digest);\r
+ if (!HashStatus) {\r
+ goto Finish;\r
+ }\r
\r
//\r
// Log the PE data\r
&EventNumber,\r
&EventLogLastEntry\r
);\r
+ if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Out of resource here means the image is hashed and its result is extended to PCR.\r
+ // But the event log can't be saved since log area is full.\r
+ // Just return EFI_SUCCESS in order not to block the image load.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
\r
Finish:\r
FreePool (TcgEvent);\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- The security handler is used to abstract platform-specific policy \r
- from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a \r
- given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol. \r
+ The security handler is used to abstract platform-specific policy\r
+ from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a\r
+ given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol.\r
\r
- The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking \r
- flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers, \r
- and other exception operations. The File parameter allows for possible logging \r
+ The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking\r
+ flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers,\r
+ and other exception operations. The File parameter allows for possible logging\r
within the SAP of the driver.\r
\r
- If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.\r
+ If File is NULL, then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.\r
\r
- If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by \r
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by\r
AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.\r
\r
- If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by \r
- AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances, \r
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by\r
+ AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances,\r
then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.\r
\r
- If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by \r
- AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it \r
- might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is \r
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by\r
+ AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it\r
+ might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is\r
returned.\r
\r
- @param[in, out] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned\r
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned\r
from the securitymeasurement services for the\r
input file.\r
@param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r
@param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
@param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
+ @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.\r
\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the\r
- platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.\r
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.\r
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r
- the platform policy dictates that File should be placed\r
- in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from\r
- the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time\r
- with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.\r
- @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and\r
- the platform policy dictates that File should not be\r
- used for any purpose.\r
-\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL\r
+ FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates\r
+ that the DXE Foundation may use the file.\r
+ @retval other error value\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (\r
- IN OUT UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r
IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r
- IN VOID *FileBuffer OPTIONAL,\r
- IN UINTN FileSize OPTIONAL\r
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r
+ IN UINTN FileSize,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy\r
)\r
{\r
- EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol;\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- TCG_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;\r
- UINT32 TCGFeatureFlags;\r
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLocation;\r
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r
- EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;\r
- EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;\r
- EFI_HANDLE Handle;\r
- BOOLEAN ApplicationRequired;\r
- PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
-\r
+ EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ TCG_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;\r
+ UINT32 TCGFeatureFlags;\r
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLocation;\r
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;\r
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;\r
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;\r
+ EFI_HANDLE Handle;\r
+ EFI_HANDLE TempHandle;\r
+ BOOLEAN ApplicationRequired;\r
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
+ EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL *FvbProtocol;\r
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvAddress;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check for invalid parameters.\r
+ //\r
if (File == NULL) {\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
}\r
\r
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcgProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &TcgProtocol);\r
\r
ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8) sizeof (ProtocolCapability);\r
Status = TcgProtocol->StatusCheck (\r
- TcgProtocol, \r
+ TcgProtocol,\r
&ProtocolCapability,\r
&TCGFeatureFlags,\r
&EventLogLocation,\r
&EventLogLastEntry\r
);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || ProtocolCapability.TPMDeactivatedFlag) {\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || ProtocolCapability.TPMDeactivatedFlag || (!ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)) {\r
//\r
// TPM device doesn't work or activate.\r
//\r
// Copy File Device Path\r
//\r
OrigDevicePathNode = DuplicateDevicePath (File);\r
- ASSERT (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL);\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// 1. Check whether this device path support BlockIo protocol.\r
// Is so, this device path may be a GPT device path.\r
// Find the gpt partion on the given devicepath\r
//\r
DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r
+ ASSERT (DevicePathNode != NULL);\r
while (!IsDevicePathEnd (DevicePathNode)) {\r
//\r
// Find the Gpt partition\r
DevicePathSubType (DevicePathNode) == MEDIA_HARDDRIVE_DP) {\r
//\r
// Check whether it is a gpt partition or not\r
- // \r
- if (((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->MBRType == MBR_TYPE_EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER && \r
+ //\r
+ if (((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->MBRType == MBR_TYPE_EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER &&\r
((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->SignatureType == SIGNATURE_TYPE_GUID) {\r
\r
//\r
DevicePathNode = NextDevicePathNode (DevicePathNode);\r
}\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// 2. Measure PE image.\r
//\r
ApplicationRequired = FALSE;\r
\r
//\r
- // Check whether this device path support FV2 protocol.\r
+ // Check whether this device path support FVB protocol.\r
//\r
DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r
- Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);\r
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);\r
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
//\r
// Don't check FV image, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
//\r
- // The image from Firmware image will not be mearsured.\r
- // Current policy doesn't measure PeImage from Firmware if it is driver\r
- // If the got PeImage is application, it will be still be measured.\r
+ // The PE image from unmeasured Firmware volume need be measured\r
+ // The PE image from measured Firmware volume will be measured according to policy below.\r
+ // If it is driver, do not measure\r
+ // If it is application, still measure.\r
//\r
ApplicationRequired = TRUE;\r
+\r
+ if (mCacheMeasuredHandle != Handle && mMeasuredHobData != NULL) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Search for Root FV of this PE image\r
+ //\r
+ TempHandle = Handle;\r
+ do {\r
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol(\r
+ TempHandle,\r
+ &gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid,\r
+ (VOID**)&FvbProtocol\r
+ );\r
+ TempHandle = FvbProtocol->ParentHandle;\r
+ } while (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && FvbProtocol->ParentHandle != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Search in measured FV Hob\r
+ //\r
+ Status = FvbProtocol->GetPhysicalAddress(FvbProtocol, &FvAddress);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)){\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ApplicationRequired = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mMeasuredHobData->Num; Index++) {\r
+ if(mMeasuredHobData->MeasuredFvBuf[Index].BlobBase == FvAddress) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Cache measured FV for next measurement\r
+ //\r
+ mCacheMeasuredHandle = Handle;\r
+ ApplicationRequired = TRUE;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// File is not found.\r
//\r
goto Finish;\r
}\r
\r
+ mTpmImageSize = FileSize;\r
+ mFileBuffer = FileBuffer;\r
+\r
//\r
// Measure PE Image\r
//\r
DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;\r
ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r
- ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) ImageRead;\r
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead;\r
\r
//\r
// Get information about the image being loaded\r
//\r
goto Finish;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
//\r
// Measure only application if Application flag is set\r
// Measure drivers and applications if Application flag is not set\r
//\r
- if ((!ApplicationRequired) || \r
- (ApplicationRequired && ImageContext.ImageType == EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION)) { \r
+ if ((!ApplicationRequired) ||\r
+ (ApplicationRequired && ImageContext.ImageType == EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION)) {\r
//\r
// Print the image path to be measured.\r
- // \r
+ //\r
DEBUG_CODE_BEGIN ();\r
CHAR16 *ToText;\r
- EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TO_TEXT_PROTOCOL *DevPathToText;\r
- Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (\r
- &gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid,\r
- NULL,\r
- (VOID **) &DevPathToText\r
- );\r
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ToText = DevPathToText->ConvertDevicePathToText (\r
- DevicePathNode,\r
- FALSE,\r
- TRUE\r
- );\r
- if (ToText != NULL) {\r
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The measured image path is %s.\n", ToText));\r
- }\r
+ ToText = ConvertDevicePathToText (\r
+ DevicePathNode,\r
+ FALSE,\r
+ TRUE\r
+ );\r
+ if (ToText != NULL) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The measured image path is %s.\n", ToText));\r
+ FreePool (ToText);\r
}\r
DEBUG_CODE_END ();\r
\r
//\r
Status = TcgMeasurePeImage (\r
TcgProtocol,\r
- (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) FileBuffer, \r
- FileSize, \r
- (UINTN) ImageContext.ImageAddress, \r
- ImageContext.ImageType, \r
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) FileBuffer,\r
+ FileSize,\r
+ (UINTN) ImageContext.ImageAddress,\r
+ ImageContext.ImageType,\r
DevicePathNode\r
);\r
}\r
// Done, free the allocated resource.\r
//\r
Finish:\r
- FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);\r
+ if (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);\r
+ }\r
\r
return Status;\r
}\r
IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable\r
)\r
{\r
- return RegisterSecurityHandler (\r
+ EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE *GuidHob;\r
+\r
+ GuidHob = NULL;\r
+\r
+ GuidHob = GetFirstGuidHob (&gMeasuredFvHobGuid);\r
+\r
+ if (GuidHob != NULL) {\r
+ mMeasuredHobData = GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (GuidHob);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return RegisterSecurity2Handler (\r
DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler,\r
EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED\r
);\r