/** @file\r
HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
(C) Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>\r
-This program and the accompanying materials\r
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
-http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
-\r
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
-WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
\r
**/\r
\r
it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it.\r
\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources to create time based payload.\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
@retval Others Unexpected error happens.\r
\r
@param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r
\r
@return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r
- @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources to form the signature list.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r
\r
//\r
- // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r
+ // Prase the selected PK file and generate PK certificate list.\r
//\r
Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r
+ // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if signature exists for executable.\r
//\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
/**\r
Check whether the signature list exists in given variable data.\r
\r
- It searches the signature list for the ceritificate hash by CertType.\r
+ It searches the signature list for the certificate hash by CertType.\r
If the signature list is found, get the offset of Database for the\r
next hash of a certificate.\r
\r
Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
\r
- Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in \r
+ Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in\r
the function LoadPeImage ().\r
\r
@param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
)\r
{\r
BOOLEAN Status;\r
- UINT16 Magic;\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
VOID *HashCtx;\r
UINTN CtxSize;\r
// Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
// But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
//\r
- if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
- //\r
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r
- // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
- // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
- //\r
- Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
- //\r
- Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
- }\r
\r
//\r
// 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
// 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
//\r
HashBase = mImageBase;\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset.\r
//\r
// 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
// 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
//\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset.\r
//\r
// 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
// 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
//\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset\r
//\r
//\r
// 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
//\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset.\r
//\r
//\r
if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
//\r
// Use PE32 offset.\r
//\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
+ Enroll a new signature of executable into Signature Database.\r
\r
@param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
@param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Diretly set AUTHENTICATION_2 data to SetVariable\r
+ // Directly set AUTHENTICATION_2 data to SetVariable\r
//\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
VariableName,\r
\r
\r
/**\r
- Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
+ Enroll a new signature of executable into Signature Database.\r
\r
@param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
@param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
// Form the SigDB certificate list.\r
// Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
//\r
- // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.\r
+ // We need to parse signature data of executable from specified signed executable file.\r
// In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r
// In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r
//\r
SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
\r
//\r
- // Initilize the Date and Time using system time.\r
+ // Initialize the Date and Time using system time.\r
//\r
ConfigData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
ConfigData->AlwaysRevocation = TRUE;\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistence. \r
+ // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistency.\r
// If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
// Checkbox.\r
//\r
ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
- GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); \r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
\r
//\r
- // Fix Pk, SecureBootEnable inconsistence\r
+ // Fix Pk and SecureBootEnable inconsistency\r
//\r
if ((SetupMode != NULL) && (*SetupMode) == USER_MODE) {\r
ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
Value->u8 = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD;\r
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
- } \r
+ }\r
goto EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff