/** @file\r
HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
-This program and the accompanying materials \r
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at \r
-http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
-\r
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, \r
-WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+(C) Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>\r
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
\r
**/\r
\r
#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"\r
+#include <UefiSecureBoot.h>\r
+#include <Protocol/HiiPopup.h>\r
+#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>\r
+#include <Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h>\r
+#include <Library/SecureBootVariableProvisionLib.h>\r
\r
-CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r
+CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r
\r
-SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r
+SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE,\r
{\r
SecureBootExtractConfig,\r
}\r
};\r
\r
-HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {\r
+HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {\r
{\r
{\r
HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,\r
HW_VENDOR_DP,\r
{\r
- (UINT8) (sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),\r
- (UINT8) ((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)\r
+ (UINT8)(sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),\r
+ (UINT8)((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)\r
}\r
},\r
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID\r
{\r
END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,\r
END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,\r
- { \r
- (UINT8) (END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),\r
- (UINT8) ((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)\r
+ {\r
+ (UINT8)(END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),\r
+ (UINT8)((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)\r
}\r
}\r
};\r
\r
+BOOLEAN mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE;\r
+\r
+//\r
+// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r
+//\r
+UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r
+ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r
+};\r
+\r
+HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r
+ { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
+ { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final },\r
+ { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final },\r
+ { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final }\r
+};\r
+\r
+//\r
+// Variable Definitions\r
+//\r
+UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
+WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL;\r
+IMAGE_TYPE mImageType;\r
+UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r
+UINTN mImageSize = 0;\r
+UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r
+EFI_GUID mCertType;\r
+EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r
+EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r
+\r
+//\r
+// Possible DER-encoded certificate file suffixes, end with NULL pointer.\r
+//\r
+CHAR16 *mDerEncodedSuffix[] = {\r
+ L".cer",\r
+ L".der",\r
+ L".crt",\r
+ NULL\r
+};\r
+CHAR16 *mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";\r
+\r
+//\r
+// Prompt strings during certificate enrollment.\r
+//\r
+CHAR16 *mX509EnrollPromptTitle[] = {\r
+ L"",\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported certificate!",\r
+ NULL\r
+};\r
+CHAR16 *mX509EnrollPromptString[] = {\r
+ L"",\r
+ L"Only DER encoded certificate file (*.cer/der/crt) is supported.",\r
+ L"Public key length should be equal to or greater than 2048 bits.",\r
+ NULL\r
+};\r
+\r
+SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *gSecureBootPrivateData = NULL;\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This code cleans up enrolled file by closing file & free related resources attached to\r
+ enrolled file.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] FileContext FileContext cached in SecureBootConfig driver\r
+\r
+**/\r
+VOID\r
+CloseEnrolledFile (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ if (FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ CloseFile (FileContext->FHandle);\r
+ FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FileContext->FileName != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (FileContext->FileName);\r
+ FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FileContext->FileType = UNKNOWN_FILE_TYPE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] FileSuffix The suffix of the input certificate file\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE It's a DER-encoded certificate.\r
+ @retval FALSE It's NOT a DER-encoded certificate.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsDerEncodeCertificate (\r
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {\r
+ if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {\r
+ return TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This code checks if the file content complies with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format\r
+The function reads file content but won't open/close given FileHandle.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] FileHandle The FileHandle to be checked\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The content is EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format.\r
+ @retval FALSE The content is NOT a EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsAuthentication2Format (\r
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *Auth2;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsAuth2Format;\r
+\r
+ IsAuth2Format = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ FileHandle,\r
+ (VOID **)&mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Auth2 = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)mImageBase;\r
+ if (Auth2->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&gEfiCertPkcs7Guid, &Auth2->AuthInfo.CertType)) {\r
+ IsAuth2Format = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ //\r
+ // Do not close File. simply check file content\r
+ //\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsAuth2Format;\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
- Save Secure Boot option to variable space.\r
+ Set Secure Boot option into variable space.\r
\r
@param[in] VarValue The option of Secure Boot.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
SaveSecureBootVariable (\r
- IN UINT8 VarValue\r
+ IN UINT8 VarValue\r
)\r
{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- \r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, \r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, \r
- sizeof (UINT8), \r
- &VarValue\r
- );\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ &VarValue\r
+ );\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This code checks if the encode type and key strength of X.509\r
+ certificate is qualified.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] X509FileContext FileContext of X.509 certificate storing\r
+ file.\r
+ @param[out] Error Error type checked in the certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS The certificate checked successfully.\r
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Memory allocation failed.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+CheckX509Certificate (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *X509FileContext,\r
+ OUT ENROLL_KEY_ERROR *Error\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT16 *FilePostFix;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+ UINT8 *X509Data;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ void *X509PubKey;\r
+ UINTN PubKeyModSize;\r
+\r
+ if (X509FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r
+ *Error = Unsupported_Type;\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ X509PubKey = NULL;\r
+ PubKeyModSize = 0;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (X509FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Wrong X509 NameLength\n"));\r
+ *Error = Unsupported_Type;\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FilePostFix = X509FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.\n", mSupportX509Suffix));\r
+ *Error = Unsupported_Type;\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", X509FileContext->FileName));\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the certificate file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (X509FileContext->FHandle, (VOID **)&X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Error occured while reading the file.\n"));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the public key context.\r
+ //\r
+ if (RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (X509Data, X509DataSize, &X509PubKey) == FALSE) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Error occured while parsing the pubkey from certificate.\n"));\r
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ *Error = Unsupported_Type;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse Module size of public key using interface provided by CryptoPkg, which is\r
+ // actually the size of public key.\r
+ //\r
+ if (X509PubKey != NULL) {\r
+ RsaGetKey (X509PubKey, RsaKeyN, NULL, &PubKeyModSize);\r
+ if (PubKeyModSize < CER_PUBKEY_MIN_SIZE) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unqualified PK size, key size should be equal to or greater than 2048 bits.\n"));\r
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ *Error = Unqualified_Key;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RsaFree (X509PubKey);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)\r
+\r
+ @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r
+ @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources to form the signature list.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File,\r
+ OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *X509Data;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;\r
+\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ PkCertData = NULL;\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID **)&X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.\r
+ // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.\r
+ //\r
+ *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)AllocateZeroPool (\r
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + X509DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (*PkCert == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + X509DataSize);\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
+ PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINTN)(*PkCert)\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*PkCert != NULL)) {\r
+ FreePool (*PkCert);\r
+ *PkCert = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollPlatformKey (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;\r
+\r
+ PkCert = NULL;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
- gRT->ResetSystem (EfiResetCold, EFI_SUCCESS, 0, NULL);\r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Prase the selected PK file and generate PK certificate list.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &PkCert\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Set Platform Key variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8 **)&PkCert);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ PkCert\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ if (PkCert != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (PkCert);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one\r
- or more named elements from the target driver.\r
+ Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).\r
\r
- @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
- @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
- <ConfigRequest> format.\r
- @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request\r
- string. Points to the string's null terminator if\r
- request was successful. Points to the most recent\r
- '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or\r
- the beginning of the string if the failure is in\r
- the first name/value pair) if the request was not\r
- successful.\r
- @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
- <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled\r
- in for the names in the Request string. String to\r
- be allocated by the called function.\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.\r
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.\r
- @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
- driver.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
-EFIAPI\r
-SecureBootExtractConfig (\r
- IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
- IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,\r
- OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,\r
- OUT EFI_STRING *Results\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- UINTN BufferSize;\r
- SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;\r
- \r
- EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;\r
- UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
- \r
- if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+EnrollRsa2048ToKek (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r
+ UINTN KeyBlobSize;\r
+ UINT8 *KeyBlob;\r
+ CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
+ UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
+ UINT8 *KeyBuffer;\r
+ UINTN KeyLenInBytes;\r
+\r
+ Attr = 0;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ KeyBuffer = NULL;\r
+ KeyBlobSize = 0;\r
+ KeyBlob = NULL;\r
+ KeyInfo = NULL;\r
+ KEKSigData = NULL;\r
+ KekSigList = NULL;\r
+ KekSigListSize = 0;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
+ // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID **)&KeyBlob,\r
+ &KeyBlobSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);\r
+ KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *)KeyBlob;\r
+ if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r
+ //\r
+ KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r
+ KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r
+ if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Int2OctStr (\r
+ (UINTN *)(KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)),\r
+ KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN),\r
+ KeyBuffer,\r
+ KeyLenInBytes\r
+ );\r
+ CopyMem (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
+ //\r
+ KekSigListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
+\r
+ KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
+ if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
+ CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r
+\r
+ KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (\r
+ KEKSigData->SignatureData,\r
+ KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO),\r
+ WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if KEK entry has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new KEK to original variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8 **)&KekSigList);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ KekSigListSize,\r
+ KekSigList\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (KeyBlob != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KeyBlob);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KekSigList);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509ToKek (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ KekSigList = NULL;\r
+ KekSigListSize = 0;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ KEKSigData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ KekSigListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
+ KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
+ if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32)KekSigListSize;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
+\r
+ KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if KEK been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new kek to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8 **)&KekSigList);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ KekSigListSize,\r
+ KekSigList\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KekSigList);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT16 *FilePostFix;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate,\r
+ // and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r
+ } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk", 4) == 0) {\r
+ return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // File type is wrong, simply close it\r
+ //\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX or DBT) without\r
+ KEK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509toSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN SigDBSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ SigDBSize = 0;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ SigDBCert = NULL;\r
+ SigDBCertData = NULL;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ SigDBSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
+\r
+ Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32)SigDBSize;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
+\r
+ SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)(SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if signature database entry has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8 **)&Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ SigDBSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether signature is in specified database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r
+ @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r
+ @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN UINT8 *Signature,\r
+ IN UINTN SignatureSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read signature database variable.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if signature exists for executable.\r
+ //\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))) {\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find the signature in database.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (IsFound) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Calculate the hash of a certificate data with the specified hash algorithm.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] CertData The certificate data to be hashed.\r
+ @param[in] CertSize The certificate size in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg The specified hash algorithm.\r
+ @param[out] CertHash The output digest of the certificate\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE Successfully got the hash of the CertData.\r
+ @retval FALSE Failed to get the hash of CertData.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+CalculateCertHash (\r
+ IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
+ IN UINTN CertSize,\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg,\r
+ OUT UINT8 *CertHash\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN Status;\r
+ VOID *HashCtx;\r
+ UINTN CtxSize;\r
+ UINT8 *TBSCert;\r
+ UINTN TBSCertSize;\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = NULL;\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ if (HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Retrieve the TBSCertificate for Hash Calculation.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!X509GetTBSCert (CertData, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 1. Initialize context of hash.\r
+ //\r
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ();\r
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 2. Initialize a hash context.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 3. Calculate the hash.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 4. Get the hash result.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertHash);\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (HashCtx);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether the hash of an X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r
+ @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE Found the certificate hash in the forbidden database.\r
+ @return FALSE Certificate hash is Not found in the forbidden database.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsCertHashFoundInDbx (\r
+ IN UINT8 *Certificate,\r
+ IN UINTN CertSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;\r
+ UINTN CertHashCount;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINT32 HashAlg;\r
+ UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+ UINT8 *DbxCertHash;\r
+ UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read signature database variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check whether the certificate hash exists in the forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r
+ } else {\r
+ DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!CalculateCertHash (Certificate, CertSize, HashAlg, CertDigest)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r
+ CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
+ //\r
+ DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r
+ if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether the signature list exists in given variable data.\r
+\r
+ It searches the signature list for the certificate hash by CertType.\r
+ If the signature list is found, get the offset of Database for the\r
+ next hash of a certificate.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Database Variable data to save signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DatabaseSize Variable size.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureType The type of the signature.\r
+ @param[out] Offset The offset to save a new hash of certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE The signature list is found in the forbidden database.\r
+ @return FALSE The signature list is not found in the forbidden database.\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+GetSignaturelistOffset (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Database,\r
+ IN UINTN DatabaseSize,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *SignatureType,\r
+ OUT UINTN *Offset\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
+ UINTN SiglistSize;\r
+\r
+ if ((Database == NULL) || (DatabaseSize == 0)) {\r
+ *Offset = 0;\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SigList = Database;\r
+ SiglistSize = DatabaseSize;\r
+ while ((SiglistSize > 0) && (SiglistSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, SignatureType)) {\r
+ *Offset = DatabaseSize - SiglistSize;\r
+ return TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SiglistSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *Offset = 0;\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate hash into Signature Database (dbx) without\r
+ KEK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg The hash algorithm to enroll the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] RevocationDate The revocation date of the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] RevocationTime The revocation time of the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] AlwaysRevocation Indicate whether the certificate is always revoked.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509HashtoSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg,\r
+ IN EFI_HII_DATE *RevocationDate,\r
+ IN EFI_HII_TIME *RevocationTime,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN AlwaysRevocation\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *NewData;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN DbSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SignatureData;\r
+ UINTN SignatureSize;\r
+ EFI_GUID SignatureType;\r
+ UINTN Offset;\r
+ UINT8 CertHash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+ UINT16 *FilePostFix;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+ EFI_TIME *Time;\r
+\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ DbSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ SignatureData = NULL;\r
+ SignatureList = NULL;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ NewData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the certificate from file and calculate its hash.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ if (!CalculateCertHash (X509Data, X509DataSize, HashAlg, CertHash)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the variable for enrollment.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate memory for Signature and fill the Signature\r
+ //\r
+ SignatureSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength;\r
+ SignatureData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)AllocateZeroPool (SignatureSize);\r
+ if (SignatureData == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CopyGuid (&SignatureData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (SignatureData->SignatureData, CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill the time.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!AlwaysRevocation) {\r
+ Time = (EFI_TIME *)(&SignatureData->SignatureData + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+ Time->Year = RevocationDate->Year;\r
+ Time->Month = RevocationDate->Month;\r
+ Time->Day = RevocationDate->Day;\r
+ Time->Hour = RevocationTime->Hour;\r
+ Time->Minute = RevocationTime->Minute;\r
+ Time->Second = RevocationTime->Second;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Determine the GUID for certificate hash.\r
+ //\r
+ switch (HashAlg) {\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA256:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA384:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA512:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ default:\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Add signature into the new variable data buffer\r
+ //\r
+ if (GetSignaturelistOffset ((EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &SignatureType, &Offset)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Add the signature to the found signaturelist.\r
+ //\r
+ DbSize = DataSize + SignatureSize;\r
+ NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
+ if (NewData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
+ SignatureListSize = (UINTN)ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ CopyMem (NewData, Data, Offset + SignatureListSize);\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewData + Offset);\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32)(SignatureListSize + SignatureSize));\r
+\r
+ Offset += SignatureListSize;\r
+ CopyMem (NewData + Offset, SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
+ CopyMem (NewData + Offset + SignatureSize, Data + Offset, DataSize - Offset);\r
+\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ Data = NewData;\r
+ DataSize = DbSize;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Create a new signaturelist, and add the signature into the signaturelist.\r
+ //\r
+ DbSize = DataSize + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
+ NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
+ if (NewData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewData + DataSize);\r
+ SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32)SignatureListSize);\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureSize, (UINT32)SignatureSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &SignatureType);\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST), SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
+ if ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL)) {\r
+ CopyMem (NewData, Data, DataSize);\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = NewData;\r
+ DataSize = DbSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8 **)&Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SignatureData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SignatureData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether a certificate from a file exists in dbx.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The X509 certificate is found in dbx successfully.\r
+ @retval FALSE The X509 certificate is not found in dbx.\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsX509CertInDbx (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the certificate from file\r
+ //\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the raw certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the hash of certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsCertHashFoundInDbx (X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r
+\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
+ read is within the image buffer.\r
+\r
+ @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r
+ @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r
+ On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r
+ @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootConfigImageRead (\r
+ IN VOID *FileHandle,\r
+ IN UINTN FileOffset,\r
+ IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r
+ OUT VOID *Buffer\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINTN EndPosition;\r
+\r
+ if ((FileHandle == NULL) || (ReadSize == NULL) || (Buffer == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r
+ if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN)FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+LoadPeImage (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ NtHeader32 = NULL;\r
+ NtHeader64 = NULL;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *)mImageBase;\r
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE)SecureBootConfigImageRead;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get information about the image being loaded\r
+ //\r
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r
+ //\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SecureBootConfigDxe: PeImage invalid. \n"));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the Dos header\r
+ //\r
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)(mImageBase);\r
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // DOS image header is present,\r
+ // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r
+ //\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
+ } else {\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r
+ //\r
+ NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r
+ // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r
+ //\r
+ if ( (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_ARMTHUMB_MIXED))\r
+ {\r
+ //\r
+ // 32-bits Architecture\r
+ //\r
+ mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ } else if ( (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_AARCH64))\r
+ {\r
+ //\r
+ // 64-bits Architecture\r
+ //\r
+ mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r
+ NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)(mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
+ PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
+\r
+ Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in\r
+ the function LoadPeImage ().\r
+\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r
+ @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+HashPeImage (\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN Status;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
+ VOID *HashCtx;\r
+ UINTN CtxSize;\r
+ UINT8 *HashBase;\r
+ UINTN HashSize;\r
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN Pos;\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = NULL;\r
+ SectionHeader = NULL;\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ if (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize context of hash.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
+\r
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
+\r
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ();\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
+\r
+ // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r
+\r
+ // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
+ // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
+ //\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
+ // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase;\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN)HashBase;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN)HashBase;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
+ // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
+ //\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN)HashBase;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN)HashBase;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
+ //\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN)(&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN)mImageBase);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN)(&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN)mImageBase);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
+ //\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset\r
+ //\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r
+ // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r
+ // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
+ // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
+ //\r
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
+ ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r
+ //\r
+ // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r
+ // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r
+ // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r
+ // the section.\r
+ //\r
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *)(\r
+ mImageBase +\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r
+ sizeof (UINT32) +\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r
+ );\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
+ Pos = Index;\r
+ while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
+ Pos--;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
+ Section += 1;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r
+ // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r
+ // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r
+ // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r
+ // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r
+ //\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
+ Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r
+ if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r
+ // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r
+ // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r
+ // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r
+ //\r
+ if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
+ mImageSize -\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
+ mImageSize -\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (HashCtx);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SectionHeader);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of\r
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r
+ 8.0 Appendix A\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+HashPeImageByType (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 Index;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
+\r
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
+ // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ // version Version,\r
+ // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
+ // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
+ // .... }\r
+ // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r
+ // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r
+ // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
+ //\r
+ if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r
+ //\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!HashPeImage (Index)) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new signature of executable into Signature Database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
+ or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // DBT only support DER-X509 Cert Enrollment\r
+ //\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID **)&mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Directly set AUTHENTICATION_2 data to SetVariable\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ mImageSize,\r
+ mImageBase\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Enroll AUTH_2 data to Var:%s Status: %x\n", VariableName, Status));\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new signature of executable into Signature Database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
+ or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN SigDBSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *GuidCertData;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ GuidCertData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Form the SigDB certificate list.\r
+ // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
+ //\r
+ // We need to parse signature data of executable from specified signed executable file.\r
+ // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r
+ // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r
+ //\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID **)&mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
+\r
+ Status = LoadPeImage ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {\r
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the certificate data\r
+ //\r
+ mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
+\r
+ if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
+ GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *)mCertificate;\r
+ if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != 0) {\r
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
+ Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create a new SigDB entry.\r
+ //\r
+ SigDBSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + (UINT32)mImageDigestSize;\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32)SigDBSize;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32)mImageDigestSize;\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);\r
+\r
+ SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8 **)&Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enroll the variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ SigDBSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll signature into DB/DBX/DBT without KEK's authentication.\r
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval others Fail to enroll signature data.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT16 *FilePostFix;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
+ } else if (IsAuthentication2Format (Private->FileContext->FHandle)) {\r
+ return EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor (Private, VariableName);\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX/DBT)\r
+ by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
+ @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ UINTN GuidIndex;\r
+ VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r
+ CHAR16 *GuidStr;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID GuidID;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID Help;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ GuidStr = NULL;\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
+ //\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
+ //\r
+ StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartLabel->Number = LabelNumber;\r
+\r
+ EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);\r
+ if (GuidStr == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all KEK pub data.\r
+ //\r
+ ItemDataSize = (UINT32)DataSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ GuidIndex = 0;\r
+\r
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA384_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA512_GUID);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r
+ //\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize\r
+ + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ //\r
+ // Display GUID and help\r
+ //\r
+ GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r
+ GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r
+ HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ (EFI_QUESTION_ID)(QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ GuidID,\r
+ Help,\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ 0,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (GuidStr != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (GuidStr);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Delete a KEK entry from KEK database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *OldData;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ UINT32 Offset;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsKEKItemFound;\r
+ UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
+ UINTN DeleteKekIndex;\r
+ UINTN GuidIndex;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ OldData = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ Attr = 0;\r
+ DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get original KEK variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ OldData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (OldData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate space for new variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.\r
+ //\r
+ IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;\r
+ KekDataSize = (UINT32)DataSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)OldData;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ GuidIndex = 0;\r
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))\r
+ {\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
+ Offset += (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find it! Skip it!\r
+ //\r
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ IsKEKItemFound = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ GuidIndex++;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!IsKEKItemFound) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Doesn't find the Kek Item!\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.\r
+ //\r
+ KekDataSize = Offset;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
+ if (CertCount != 0) {\r
+ CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = Offset;\r
+ if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ OldData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (OldData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (OldData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ PrivateData,\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
+ FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Delete a signature entry from signature database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
+ @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete signature successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteSignature (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,\r
+ IN UINTN DeleteIndex\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *OldData;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ UINT32 Offset;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsItemFound;\r
+ UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r
+ UINTN GuidIndex;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ OldData = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ Attr = 0;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get original signature list data.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ OldData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (OldData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate space for new variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all signature data and erasing the target item.\r
+ //\r
+ IsItemFound = FALSE;\r
+ ItemDataSize = (UINT32)DataSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)OldData;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ GuidIndex = 0;\r
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)\r
+ )\r
+ {\r
+ //\r
+ // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
+ Offset += (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (GuidIndex == DeleteIndex) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find it! Skip it!\r
+ //\r
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ IsItemFound = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8 *)(Cert), CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ GuidIndex++;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This List doesn't match. Just copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8 *)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!IsItemFound) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Doesn't find the signature Item!\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header if there is no signature in the list.\r
+ //\r
+ ItemDataSize = Offset;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);\r
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
+ if (CertCount != 0) {\r
+ CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8 *)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = Offset;\r
+ if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ OldData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (OldData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (OldData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ PrivateData,\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ LabelNumber,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ QuestionIdBase\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function to delete signature list or data, according by DelType.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] DelType Indicate delete signature list or data.\r
+ @param[in] CheckedCount Indicate how many signature data have\r
+ been checked in current signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteSignatureEx (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN SIGNATURE_DELETE_TYPE DelType,\r
+ IN UINT32 CheckedCount\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListWalker;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataWalker;\r
+ CHAR16 VariableName[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ UINT32 VariableAttr;\r
+ UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
+ UINTN RemainingSize;\r
+ UINTN ListIndex;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN Offset;\r
+ UINT8 *VariableData;\r
+ UINT8 *NewVariableData;\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ VariableAttr = 0;\r
+ VariableDataSize = 0;\r
+ ListIndex = 0;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ VariableData = NULL;\r
+ NewVariableData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DB) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBX) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBT) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ } else {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ &VariableAttr,\r
+ &VariableDataSize,\r
+ VariableData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ VariableData = AllocateZeroPool (VariableDataSize);\r
+ if (VariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ &VariableAttr,\r
+ &VariableDataSize,\r
+ VariableData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ NewVariableData = AllocateZeroPool (VariableDataSize);\r
+ if (NewVariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize = VariableDataSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(VariableData);\r
+ if (DelType == Delete_Signature_List_All) {\r
+ VariableDataSize = 0;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Traverse to target EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST but others will be skipped.\r
+ //\r
+ while ((RemainingSize > 0) && (RemainingSize >= ListWalker->SignatureListSize) && ListIndex < PrivateData->ListIndex) {\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, ListWalker, ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ ListIndex++;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Handle the target EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
+ // If CheckedCount == SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker) or DelType == Delete_Signature_List_One\r
+ // it means delete the whole EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, So we just skip this EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
+ //\r
+ if ((CheckedCount < SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker)) && (DelType == Delete_Signature_Data)) {\r
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewVariableData + Offset);\r
+ //\r
+ // Copy header.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, ListWalker, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ Offset += sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
+\r
+ DataWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker); Index = Index + 1) {\r
+ if (PrivateData->CheckArray[Index]) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete checked signature data, and update the size of whole signature list.\r
+ //\r
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Remain the unchecked signature data.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, DataWalker, ListWalker->SignatureSize);\r
+ Offset += ListWalker->SignatureSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)DataWalker + ListWalker->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Copy remaining data, maybe 0.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, ListWalker, RemainingSize);\r
+ Offset += RemainingSize;\r
+\r
+ VariableDataSize = Offset;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((VariableAttr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&VariableDataSize, &NewVariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ VariableAttr,\r
+ VariableDataSize,\r
+ NewVariableData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (VariableData);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (NewVariableData);\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+\r
+ Update SecureBoot strings based on new Secure Boot Mode State. String includes STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT\r
+ and STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Update secure boot strings successfully.\r
+ @return other Fail to update secure boot strings.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdateSecureBootString (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
+\r
+ SecureBoot = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get current secure boot state.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
+ if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
+ HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);\r
+ } else {\r
+ HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function extracts configuration from variable.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Private Point to SecureBoot configuration driver private data.\r
+ @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+VOID\r
+SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
+ EFI_TIME CurrTime;\r
+\r
+ SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
+ SetupMode = NULL;\r
+ SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize the Date and Time using system time.\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ ConfigData->AlwaysRevocation = TRUE;\r
+ gRT->GetTime (&CurrTime, NULL);\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Year = CurrTime.Year;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Month = CurrTime.Month;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Day = CurrTime.Day;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Hour = CurrTime.Hour;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Minute = CurrTime.Minute;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Second = 0;\r
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ ConfigData->FileEnrollType = Private->FileContext->FileType;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->FileEnrollType = UNKNOWN_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.\r
+ //\r
+ if (UserPhysicalPresent ()) {\r
+ ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **)&SetupMode, NULL);\r
+ if ((SetupMode == NULL) || ((*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE)) {\r
+ ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistency.\r
+ // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
+ // Checkbox.\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fix Pk and SecureBootEnable inconsistency\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SetupMode != NULL) && ((*SetupMode) == USER_MODE)) {\r
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ if ((SecureBootEnable != NULL) && (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)) {\r
+ ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID **)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
+ if (SecureBootMode == NULL) {\r
+ ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SecureBootEnable != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SetupMode);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one\r
+ or more named elements from the target driver.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
+ @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
+ <ConfigRequest> format.\r
+ @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request\r
+ string. Points to the string's null terminator if\r
+ request was successful. Points to the most recent\r
+ '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or\r
+ the beginning of the string if the failure is in\r
+ the first name/value pair) if the request was not\r
+ successful.\r
+ @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
+ <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled\r
+ in for the names in the Request string. String to\r
+ be allocated by the called function.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
+ driver.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootExtractConfig (\r
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Results\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ UINTN Size;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;\r
+ EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;\r
+ EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
+ BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;\r
+\r
+ if ((Progress == NULL) || (Results == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ AllocatedRequest = FALSE;\r
+ ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
+ ConfigRequest = NULL;\r
+ Size = 0;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+ *Progress = Request;\r
+\r
+ if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get Configuration from Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, &Configuration);\r
+\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
+ ConfigRequest = Request;\r
+ if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Request is set to NULL or OFFSET is NULL, construct full request string.\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate and fill a buffer large enough to hold the <ConfigHdr> template\r
+ // followed by "&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW" followed by a Null-terminator\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigRequestHdr = HiiConstructConfigHdr (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, PrivateData->DriverHandle);\r
+ Size = (StrLen (ConfigRequestHdr) + 32 + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
+ ConfigRequest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);\r
+ ASSERT (ConfigRequest != NULL);\r
+ AllocatedRequest = TRUE;\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (ConfigRequest, Size, L"%s&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=%016LX", ConfigRequestHdr, (UINT64)BufferSize);\r
+ FreePool (ConfigRequestHdr);\r
+ ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (\r
+ gHiiConfigRouting,\r
+ ConfigRequest,\r
+ (UINT8 *)&Configuration,\r
+ BufferSize,\r
+ Results,\r
+ Progress\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Free the allocated config request string.\r
+ //\r
+ if (AllocatedRequest) {\r
+ FreePool (ConfigRequest);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Set Progress string to the original request string.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Request == NULL) {\r
+ *Progress = NULL;\r
+ } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {\r
+ *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
+ @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>\r
+ format.\r
+ @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of\r
+ the most recent '&' before the first failing\r
+ name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if\r
+ the failure is in the first name/value pair) or\r
+ the terminating NULL if all was successful.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
+ driver.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootRouteConfig (\r
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION IfrNvData;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ if ((Configuration == NULL) || (Progress == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *Progress = Configuration;\r
+ if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get Configuration from Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, &IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Map the Configuration to the configuration block.\r
+ //\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
+ Status = gHiiConfigRouting->ConfigToBlock (\r
+ gHiiConfigRouting,\r
+ Configuration,\r
+ (UINT8 *)&IfrNvData,\r
+ &BufferSize,\r
+ Progress\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Store Buffer Storage back to EFI variable if needed\r
+ //\r
+ if (!IfrNvData.HideSecureBoot) {\r
+ Status = SaveSecureBootVariable (IfrNvData.AttemptSecureBoot);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *Progress = Configuration + StrLen (Configuration);\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function to load signature list, the update the menu page.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] LabelId Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+LoadSignatureList (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelId,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID ListType;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatNameString;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatHelpString;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatTypeString;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListWalker;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartGoto;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndGoto;\r
+ EFI_FORM_ID DstFormId;\r
+ VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *StartGotoHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndGotoHandle;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN RemainingSize;\r
+ UINT16 Index;\r
+ UINT8 *VariableData;\r
+ CHAR16 VariableName[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 NameBuffer[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 HelpBuffer[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ FormatNameString = NULL;\r
+ FormatHelpString = NULL;\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ StartGotoHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndGotoHandle = NULL;\r
+ Index = 0;\r
+ VariableData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
+ //\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ StartGotoHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartGotoHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndGotoHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndGotoHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
+ //\r
+ StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartLabel->Number = LabelId;\r
+\r
+ EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ StartGoto = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ StartGotoHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartGoto->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartGoto->Number = LABEL_DELETE_ALL_LIST_BUTTON;\r
+\r
+ EndGoto = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ EndGotoHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndGoto->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndGoto->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DB) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ DstFormId = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_FORM;\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBX) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ DstFormId = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_FORM;\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBT) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ DstFormId = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION_FORM;\r
+ } else {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ HiiCreateGotoOpCode (\r
+ StartGotoHandle,\r
+ DstFormId,\r
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST),\r
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST),\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read Variable, the variable name save in the PrivateData->VariableName.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, VariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ VariableData = AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (VariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, VariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FormatNameString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_LIST_NAME_FORMAT), NULL);\r
+ FormatHelpString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_LIST_HELP_FORMAT), NULL);\r
+ if ((FormatNameString == NULL) || (FormatHelpString == NULL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize = DataSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)VariableData;\r
+ while ((RemainingSize > 0) && (RemainingSize >= ListWalker->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_SHA1);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_SHA256);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA256);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA384);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA512);\r
+ } else {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_UNKNOWN);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FormatTypeString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, ListType, NULL);\r
+ if (FormatTypeString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (NameBuffer, sizeof (NameBuffer));\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (NameBuffer, sizeof (NameBuffer), FormatNameString, Index + 1);\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (HelpBuffer, sizeof (HelpBuffer));\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ HelpBuffer,\r
+ sizeof (HelpBuffer),\r
+ FormatHelpString,\r
+ FormatTypeString,\r
+ SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker)\r
+ );\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatTypeString);\r
+ FormatTypeString = NULL;\r
+\r
+ HiiCreateGotoOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_DATA_FORM,\r
+ HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, NameBuffer, NULL),\r
+ HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, HelpBuffer, NULL),\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ QuestionIdBase + Index++\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartGotoHandle,\r
+ EndGotoHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (StartGotoHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (EndGotoHandle);\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (VariableData);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatNameString);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatHelpString);\r
+\r
+ PrivateData->ListCount = Index;\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Parse hash value from EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, and save in the CHAR16 type array.\r
+ The buffer is callee allocated and should be freed by the caller.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] ListEntry The pointer point to the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DataEntry The signature data we are processing.\r
+ @param[out] BufferToReturn Buffer to save the hash value.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid List or Data or Buffer.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation success.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+ParseHashValue (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListEntry,\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataEntry,\r
+ OUT CHAR16 **BufferToReturn\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN BufferIndex;\r
+ UINTN TotalSize;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN Line;\r
+ UINTN OneLineBytes;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Assume that, display 8 bytes in one line.\r
+ //\r
+ OneLineBytes = 8;\r
+\r
+ if ((ListEntry == NULL) || (DataEntry == NULL) || (BufferToReturn == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = ListEntry->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
+ Line = (DataSize + OneLineBytes - 1) / OneLineBytes;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Each byte will split two Hex-number, and each line need additional memory to save '\r\n'.\r
+ //\r
+ TotalSize = ((DataSize + Line) * 2 * sizeof (CHAR16));\r
+\r
+ *BufferToReturn = AllocateZeroPool (TotalSize);\r
+ if (*BufferToReturn == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0, BufferIndex = 0; Index < DataSize; Index = Index + 1) {\r
+ if ((Index > 0) && (Index % OneLineBytes == 0)) {\r
+ BufferIndex += UnicodeSPrint (&(*BufferToReturn)[BufferIndex], TotalSize - sizeof (CHAR16) * BufferIndex, L"\n");\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ BufferIndex += UnicodeSPrint (&(*BufferToReturn)[BufferIndex], TotalSize - sizeof (CHAR16) * BufferIndex, L"%02x", DataEntry->SignatureData[Index]);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ BufferIndex += UnicodeSPrint (&(*BufferToReturn)[BufferIndex], TotalSize - sizeof (CHAR16) * BufferIndex, L"\n");\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Function to get the common name from the X509 format certificate.\r
+ The buffer is callee allocated and should be freed by the caller.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] ListEntry The pointer point to the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DataEntry The signature data we are processing.\r
+ @param[out] BufferToReturn Buffer to save the CN of X509 certificate.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid List or Data or Buffer.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation success.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Not found CN field in the X509 certificate.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+GetCommonNameFromX509 (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListEntry,\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataEntry,\r
+ OUT CHAR16 **BufferToReturn\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ CHAR8 *CNBuffer;\r
+ UINTN CNBufferSize;\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ CNBuffer = NULL;\r
+\r
+ CNBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (256);\r
+ if (CNBuffer == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CNBufferSize = 256;\r
+ X509GetCommonName (\r
+ (UINT8 *)DataEntry + sizeof (EFI_GUID),\r
+ ListEntry->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID),\r
+ CNBuffer,\r
+ &CNBufferSize\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ *BufferToReturn = AllocateZeroPool (256 * sizeof (CHAR16));\r
+ if (*BufferToReturn == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ AsciiStrToUnicodeStrS (CNBuffer, *BufferToReturn, 256);\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (CNBuffer);\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Format the help info for the signature data, each help info contain 3 parts.\r
+ 1. Onwer Guid.\r
+ 2. Content, depends on the type of the signature list.\r
+ 3. Revocation time.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] ListEntry Point to the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DataEntry Point to the signature data we are processing.\r
+ @param[out] StringId Save the string id of help info.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation success.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+FormatHelpInfo (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListEntry,\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataEntry,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING_ID *StringId\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_TIME *Time;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID ListTypeId;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatHelpString;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatTypeString;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN HelpInfoIndex;\r
+ UINTN TotalSize;\r
+ CHAR16 GuidString[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 TimeString[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 *DataString;\r
+ CHAR16 *HelpInfoString;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsCert;\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ Time = NULL;\r
+ FormatTypeString = NULL;\r
+ HelpInfoIndex = 0;\r
+ DataString = NULL;\r
+ HelpInfoString = NULL;\r
+ IsCert = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256);\r
+ DataSize = ListEntry->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
+ IsCert = TRUE;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509);\r
+ DataSize = ListEntry->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
+ IsCert = TRUE;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_SHA1);\r
+ DataSize = 20;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_SHA256);\r
+ DataSize = 32;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA256);\r
+ DataSize = 32;\r
+ Time = (EFI_TIME *)(DataEntry->SignatureData + DataSize);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA384);\r
+ DataSize = 48;\r
+ Time = (EFI_TIME *)(DataEntry->SignatureData + DataSize);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListEntry->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ ListTypeId = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA512);\r
+ DataSize = 64;\r
+ Time = (EFI_TIME *)(DataEntry->SignatureData + DataSize);\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FormatTypeString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, ListTypeId, NULL);\r
+ if (FormatTypeString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ TotalSize = 1024;\r
+ HelpInfoString = AllocateZeroPool (TotalSize);\r
+ if (HelpInfoString == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Format GUID part.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (GuidString, sizeof (GuidString));\r
+ GuidToString (&DataEntry->SignatureOwner, GuidString, BUFFER_MAX_SIZE);\r
+ FormatHelpString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_DATA_HELP_FORMAT_GUID), NULL);\r
+ if (FormatHelpString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ HelpInfoIndex += UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ &HelpInfoString[HelpInfoIndex],\r
+ TotalSize - sizeof (CHAR16) * HelpInfoIndex,\r
+ FormatHelpString,\r
+ GuidString\r
+ );\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatHelpString);\r
+ FormatHelpString = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Format content part, it depends on the type of signature list, hash value or CN.\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsCert) {\r
+ GetCommonNameFromX509 (ListEntry, DataEntry, &DataString);\r
+ FormatHelpString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_DATA_HELP_FORMAT_CN), NULL);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Format hash value for each signature data entry.\r
+ //\r
+ ParseHashValue (ListEntry, DataEntry, &DataString);\r
+ FormatHelpString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_DATA_HELP_FORMAT_HASH), NULL);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FormatHelpString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ HelpInfoIndex += UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ &HelpInfoString[HelpInfoIndex],\r
+ TotalSize - sizeof (CHAR16) * HelpInfoIndex,\r
+ FormatHelpString,\r
+ FormatTypeString,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ DataString\r
+ );\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatHelpString);\r
+ FormatHelpString = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Format revocation time part.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Time != NULL) {\r
+ ZeroMem (TimeString, sizeof (TimeString));\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ TimeString,\r
+ sizeof (TimeString),\r
+ L"%d-%d-%d %d:%d:%d",\r
+ Time->Year,\r
+ Time->Month,\r
+ Time->Day,\r
+ Time->Hour,\r
+ Time->Minute,\r
+ Time->Second\r
+ );\r
+ FormatHelpString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_DATA_HELP_FORMAT_TIME), NULL);\r
+ if (FormatHelpString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ &HelpInfoString[HelpInfoIndex],\r
+ TotalSize - sizeof (CHAR16) * HelpInfoIndex,\r
+ FormatHelpString,\r
+ TimeString\r
+ );\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatHelpString);\r
+ FormatHelpString = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *StringId = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, HelpInfoString, NULL);\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (DataString);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (HelpInfoString);\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatTypeString);\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function to load signature data under the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] LabelId Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] ListIndex Indicate to load which signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+LoadSignatureData (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelId,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,\r
+ IN UINT16 ListIndex\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListWalker;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataWalker;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID HelpStringId;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatNameString;\r
+ VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN RemainingSize;\r
+ UINT16 Index;\r
+ UINT8 *VariableData;\r
+ CHAR16 VariableName[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 NameBuffer[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ FormatNameString = NULL;\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ Index = 0;\r
+ VariableData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
+ //\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
+ //\r
+ StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartLabel->Number = LabelId;\r
+\r
+ EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DB) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBX) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBT) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ } else {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read Variable, the variable name save in the PrivateData->VariableName.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, VariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ VariableData = AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (VariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
- *Progress = Request;\r
- if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, VariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
}\r
\r
+ RemainingSize = DataSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)VariableData;\r
+\r
//\r
- // Get the SecureBoot Variable\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = GetVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid); \r
- \r
- //\r
- // If the SecureBoot Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
- // Checkbox.\r
+ // Skip signature list.\r
//\r
- if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r
- Configuration.HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
- } else {\r
- Configuration.HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
- Configuration.SecureBootState = *SecureBootEnable;\r
+ while ((RemainingSize > 0) && (RemainingSize >= ListWalker->SignatureListSize) && ListIndex-- > 0) {\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FormatNameString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_DATA_NAME_FORMAT), NULL);\r
+ if (FormatNameString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker); Index = Index + 1) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Format name buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (NameBuffer, sizeof (NameBuffer));\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (NameBuffer, sizeof (NameBuffer), FormatNameString, Index + 1);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Format help info buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = FormatHelpInfo (PrivateData, ListWalker, DataWalker, &HelpStringId);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ (EFI_QUESTION_ID)(QuestionIdBase + Index),\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, NameBuffer, NULL),\r
+ HelpStringId,\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ 0,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (NameBuffer, 100);\r
+ DataWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)DataWalker + ListWalker->SignatureSize);\r
}\r
- \r
- BufferSize = sizeof (Configuration);\r
- ConfigRequest = Request;\r
\r
- Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (\r
- gHiiConfigRouting,\r
- ConfigRequest,\r
- (UINT8 *) &Configuration,\r
- BufferSize,\r
- Results,\r
- Progress\r
- );\r
- \r
//\r
- // Set Progress string to the original request string.\r
+ // Allocate a buffer to record which signature data will be checked.\r
+ // This memory buffer will be freed when exit from the SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_DATA_FORM form.\r
//\r
- if (Request == NULL) {\r
- *Progress = NULL;\r
- } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {\r
- *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);\r
- }\r
+ PrivateData->CheckArray = AllocateZeroPool (SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker) * sizeof (BOOLEAN));\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (VariableData);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatNameString);\r
\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r
-\r
- @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
- @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>\r
- format.\r
- @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of\r
- the most recent '&' before the first failing\r
- name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if\r
- the failure is in the first name/value pair) or\r
- the terminating NULL if all was successful.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.\r
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.\r
- @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
- driver.\r
+ This function reinitializes Secure Boot variables with default values.\r
\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval others Fail to delete or enroll signature data.\r
**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
+STATIC EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
-SecureBootRouteConfig (\r
- IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
- IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,\r
- OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r
+KeyEnrollReset (\r
+ VOID\r
)\r
{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- UINTN BufferSize;\r
- SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION SecureBootConfiguration;\r
- UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
- \r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 SetupMode;\r
\r
- if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- *Progress = Configuration;\r
- if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ // Clear all the keys and databases\r
+ Status = DeleteDb ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear DB: %r\n", Status));\r
+ return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- //\r
- // Convert <ConfigResp> to buffer data by helper function ConfigToBlock()\r
- //\r
- BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
- Status = gHiiConfigRouting->ConfigToBlock (\r
- gHiiConfigRouting,\r
- Configuration,\r
- (UINT8 *) &SecureBootConfiguration,\r
- &BufferSize,\r
- Progress\r
- );\r
+ Status = DeleteDbx ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear DBX: %r\n", Status));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = DeleteDbt ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear DBT: %r\n", Status));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = DeleteKEK ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear KEK: %r\n", Status));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = DeletePlatformKey ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear PK: %r\n", Status));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ // After PK clear, Setup Mode shall be enabled\r
+ Status = GetSetupMode (&SetupMode);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((\r
+ DEBUG_ERROR,\r
+ "Cannot get SetupMode variable: %r\n",\r
+ Status\r
+ ));\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- SecureBootEnable = GetVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid); \r
- if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r
+ if (SetupMode == USER_MODE) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Skipped - USER_MODE\n"));\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
- } \r
- \r
- if ((*SecureBootEnable) != SecureBootConfiguration.SecureBootState) {\r
- //\r
- // If the configure is changed, update the SecureBoot Variable.\r
- //\r
- SaveSecureBootVariable (SecureBootConfiguration.SecureBootState); \r
- } \r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((\r
+ DEBUG_ERROR,\r
+ "Cannot set CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE: %r\n",\r
+ Status\r
+ ));\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ // Enroll all the keys from default variables\r
+ Status = EnrollDbFromDefault ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll db: %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto error;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = EnrollDbxFromDefault ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll dbx: %r\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = EnrollDbtFromDefault ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll dbt: %r\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = EnrollKEKFromDefault ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll KEK: %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto cleardbs;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = EnrollPKFromDefault ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll PK: %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto clearKEK;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((\r
+ DEBUG_ERROR,\r
+ "Cannot set CustomMode to STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE\n"\r
+ "Please do it manually, otherwise system can be easily compromised\n"\r
+ ));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+\r
+clearKEK:\r
+ DeleteKEK ();\r
+\r
+cleardbs:\r
+ DeleteDbt ();\r
+ DeleteDbx ();\r
+ DeleteDb ();\r
+\r
+error:\r
+ if (SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) != EFI_SUCCESS) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot set mode to Secure: %r\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r
+ This function is called to provide results data to the driver.\r
\r
@param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
@param[in] Action Specifies the type of action taken by the browser.\r
EFI_STATUS\r
EFIAPI\r
SecureBootCallback (\r
- IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
- IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,\r
- IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,\r
- IN UINT8 Type,\r
- IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,\r
- OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest\r
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
+ IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,\r
+ IN UINT8 Type,\r
+ IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,\r
+ OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest\r
)\r
{\r
- BOOLEAN SecureBootEnable;\r
- \r
+ EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ RETURN_STATUS RStatus;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData;\r
+ UINT16 LabelId;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINT8 *Pk;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
+ CHAR16 PromptString[100];\r
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+ UINT16 *FilePostFix;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
+ BOOLEAN GetBrowserDataResult;\r
+ ENROLL_KEY_ERROR EnrollKeyErrorCode;\r
+ EFI_HII_POPUP_PROTOCOL *HiiPopup;\r
+ EFI_HII_POPUP_SELECTION UserSelection;\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
+ SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
+ SetupMode = NULL;\r
+ File = NULL;\r
+ EnrollKeyErrorCode = None_Error;\r
+\r
if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
- if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) || (QuestionId != KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)) {\r
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+\r
+ gSecureBootPrivateData = Private;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser\r
+ //\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
+ IfrNvData = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);\r
+ if (IfrNvData == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
}\r
- \r
- if (NULL == GetVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid)) {\r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ GetBrowserDataResult = HiiGetBrowserData (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, BufferSize, (UINT8 *)IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_OPEN) {\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Update secure boot strings when opening this form\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootString (Private);\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (Private, IfrNvData);\r
+ mIsEnterSecureBootForm = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // When entering SecureBoot OPTION Form\r
+ // always close opened file & free resource\r
+ //\r
+ if ((QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) ||\r
+ (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION))\r
+ {\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+ } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Update ListCount field in varstore\r
+ // Button "Delete All Signature List" is\r
+ // enable when ListCount is greater than 0.\r
+ //\r
+ IfrNvData->ListCount = Private->ListCount;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ goto EXIT;\r
}\r
- \r
- SecureBootEnable = Value->u8;\r
- SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8); \r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
\r
+ if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_RETRIEVE) {\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
+ if (mIsEnterSecureBootForm) {\r
+ Value->u8 = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ goto EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) &&\r
+ (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) &&\r
+ (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) &&\r
+ (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD))\r
+ {\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ goto EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) {\r
+ switch (QuestionId) {\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
+ if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r
+ FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8))) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Only Physical Presence User could disable secure boot!",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ } else {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Configuration changed, please reset the platform to take effect!",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION:\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+ //\r
+ // Clear Signature GUID.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, sizeof (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid));\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = (EFI_GUID *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Cleanup VFRData once leaving PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT enroll/delete page\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) {\r
+ LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;\r
+ } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) {\r
+ LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;\r
+ } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION) {\r
+ LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT;\r
+ } else {\r
+ LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Refresh selected file.\r
+ //\r
+ CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private);\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION:\r
+ LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM;\r
+ //\r
+ // Refresh selected file.\r
+ //\r
+ CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdatePKFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateKEKFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBXFromFile, &File);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ IfrNvData->FileEnrollType = X509_CERT_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ } else if (IsAuthentication2Format (Private->FileContext->FHandle)) {\r
+ IfrNvData->FileEnrollType = AUTHENTICATION_2_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ IfrNvData->FileEnrollType = PE_IMAGE_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Private->FileContext->FileType = IfrNvData->FileEnrollType;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Clean up Certificate Format if File type is not X509 DER\r
+ //\r
+ if (IfrNvData->FileEnrollType != X509_CERT_FILE_TYPE) {\r
+ IfrNvData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "IfrNvData->FileEnrollType %d\n", Private->FileContext->FileType));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT:\r
+ ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBTFromFile, &File);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r
+ if (Value->u8) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Are you sure you want to delete PK? Secure boot will be disabled!",\r
+ L"Press 'Y' to delete PK and exit, 'N' to discard change and return",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if ((Key.UnicodeChar == 'y') || (Key.UnicodeChar == 'Y')) {\r
+ Status = DeletePlatformKey ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Only Physical Presence User could delete PK in custom mode!",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_DELETE_KEK:\r
+ UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
+ FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB:\r
+ UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ LABEL_DB_DELETE,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // From DBX option to the level-1 form, display signature list.\r
+ //\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_FROM_DBX_TO_LIST_FORM:\r
+ Private->VariableName = Variable_DBX;\r
+ LoadSignatureList (\r
+ Private,\r
+ LABEL_SIGNATURE_LIST_START,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_LIST_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete all signature list and reload.\r
+ //\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST:\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Press 'Y' to delete signature list.",\r
+ L"Press other key to cancel and exit.",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if ((Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y') || (Key.UnicodeChar == L'y')) {\r
+ DeleteSignatureEx (Private, Delete_Signature_List_All, IfrNvData->CheckedDataCount);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ LoadSignatureList (\r
+ Private,\r
+ LABEL_SIGNATURE_LIST_START,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_LIST_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete one signature list and reload.\r
+ //\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_DATA:\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Press 'Y' to delete signature data.",\r
+ L"Press other key to cancel and exit.",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if ((Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y') || (Key.UnicodeChar == L'y')) {\r
+ DeleteSignatureEx (Private, Delete_Signature_List_One, IfrNvData->CheckedDataCount);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ LoadSignatureList (\r
+ Private,\r
+ LABEL_SIGNATURE_LIST_START,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_LIST_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete checked signature data and reload.\r
+ //\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_CHECK_DATA:\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Press 'Y' to delete signature data.",\r
+ L"Press other key to cancel and exit.",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if ((Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y') || (Key.UnicodeChar == L'y')) {\r
+ DeleteSignatureEx (Private, Delete_Signature_Data, IfrNvData->CheckedDataCount);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ LoadSignatureList (\r
+ Private,\r
+ LABEL_SIGNATURE_LIST_START,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_LIST_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT:\r
+ UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ LABEL_DBT_DELETE,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r
+ Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate and executable EFI image",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r
+ if (IsX509CertInDbx (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"Enrollment failed! Same certificate had already been in the dbx!",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Cert already exists in DBX. Close opened file before exit.\r
+ //\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((IfrNvData != NULL) && (IfrNvData->CertificateFormat < HASHALG_MAX)) {\r
+ Status = EnrollX509HashtoSigDB (\r
+ Private,\r
+ IfrNvData->CertificateFormat,\r
+ &IfrNvData->RevocationDate,\r
+ &IfrNvData->RevocationTime,\r
+ IfrNvData->AlwaysRevocation\r
+ );\r
+ IfrNvData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, AUTH_2 format data & executable EFI image",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT:\r
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
+ L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.",\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the suffix, encode type and the key strength of PK certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = CheckX509Certificate (Private->FileContext, &EnrollKeyErrorCode);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ if ((EnrollKeyErrorCode != None_Error) && (EnrollKeyErrorCode < Enroll_Error_Max)) {\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ mX509EnrollPromptTitle[EnrollKeyErrorCode],\r
+ mX509EnrollPromptString[EnrollKeyErrorCode],\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (\r
+ PromptString,\r
+ sizeof (PromptString),\r
+ L"Error status: %x.",\r
+ Status\r
+ );\r
+ CreatePopUp (\r
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
+ &Key,\r
+ L"ERROR: Enrollment failed!",\r
+ PromptString,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+ default:\r
+ if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE)))\r
+ {\r
+ DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId);\r
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE)))\r
+ {\r
+ DeleteSignature (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ LABEL_DB_DELETE,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID,\r
+ QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE)))\r
+ {\r
+ LoadSignatureData (\r
+ Private,\r
+ LABEL_SIGNATURE_DATA_START,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_DATA_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_SIGNATURE_DATA_QUESTION_ID,\r
+ QuestionId - OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ Private->ListIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_SIGNATURE_LIST_QUESTION_ID;\r
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_SIGNATURE_DATA_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_SIGNATURE_DATA_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE)))\r
+ {\r
+ if (Private->CheckArray[QuestionId - OPTION_SIGNATURE_DATA_QUESTION_ID]) {\r
+ IfrNvData->CheckedDataCount--;\r
+ Private->CheckArray[QuestionId - OPTION_SIGNATURE_DATA_QUESTION_ID] = FALSE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ IfrNvData->CheckedDataCount++;\r
+ Private->CheckArray[QuestionId - OPTION_SIGNATURE_DATA_QUESTION_ID] = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE)))\r
+ {\r
+ DeleteSignature (\r
+ Private,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ LABEL_DBT_DELETE,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID,\r
+ QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT:\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile (Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {\r
+ switch (QuestionId) {\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:\r
+ mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE;\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX:\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBT:\r
+ ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL);\r
+ RStatus = StrToGuid (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (RStatus) || (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid[GUID_STRING_LENGTH] != L'\0')) {\r
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **)&SetupMode, NULL);\r
+ if ((SetupMode == NULL) || ((*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE)) {\r
+ IfrNvData->DeletePk = TRUE;\r
+ IfrNvData->HasPk = FALSE;\r
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;\r
+ } else {\r
+ IfrNvData->DeletePk = FALSE;\r
+ IfrNvData->HasPk = TRUE;\r
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SetupMode);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_RESET_TO_DEFAULT:\r
+ {\r
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHiiPopupProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&HiiPopup);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = HiiPopup->CreatePopup (\r
+ HiiPopup,\r
+ EfiHiiPopupStyleInfo,\r
+ EfiHiiPopupTypeYesNo,\r
+ Private->HiiHandle,\r
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS_POPUP),\r
+ &UserSelection\r
+ );\r
+ if (UserSelection == EfiHiiPopupSelectionYes) {\r
+ Status = KeyEnrollReset ();\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update secure boot strings after key reset\r
+ //\r
+ if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS) {\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootString (Private);\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (Private, IfrNvData);\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ default:\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD) {\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_HIDE_SECURE_BOOT) {\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **)&Pk, NULL);\r
+ if (Pk == NULL) {\r
+ IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ FreePool (Pk);\r
+ IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Value->b = IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Force the platform back to Standard Mode once user leave the setup screen.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID **)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
+ if ((NULL != SecureBootMode) && (*SecureBootMode == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r
+ IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
+ SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_DATA) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Free memory when exit from the SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_DATA_FORM form.\r
+ //\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (Private->CheckArray);\r
+ IfrNvData->CheckedDataCount = 0;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+EXIT:\r
+\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && GetBrowserDataResult) {\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
+ HiiSetBrowserData (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, BufferSize, (UINT8 *)IfrNvData, NULL);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FreePool (IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ if (File != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (File);\r
+ File = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
\r
@param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed for this network device.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed successfully.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resource for HII Form installation.\r
@retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r
\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle;\r
EFI_HANDLE DriverHandle;\r
-\r
EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *ConfigAccess;\r
\r
DriverHandle = NULL;\r
ConfigAccess = &PrivateData->ConfigAccess;\r
- Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r
- &DriverHandle,\r
- &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r
- &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r
- &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r
- ConfigAccess,\r
- NULL\r
- );\r
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r
+ &DriverHandle,\r
+ &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r
+ &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r
+ &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r
+ ConfigAccess,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
&gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r
ConfigAccess,\r
NULL\r
- ); \r
-\r
+ );\r
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle;\r
- return EFI_SUCCESS; \r
+\r
+ PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT));\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL) {\r
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer\r
+ //\r
+ mStartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (mStartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ mEndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (mEndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the start opcode\r
+ //\r
+ mStartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ mStartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ mStartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the end opcode\r
+ //\r
+ mEndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ mEndOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
**/\r
VOID\r
UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r
- IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r
)\r
{\r
//\r
);\r
PrivateData->DriverHandle = NULL;\r
}\r
- \r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext);\r
+ }\r
+\r
FreePool (PrivateData);\r
+\r
+ if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mEndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mEndOpCodeHandle);\r
+ }\r
}\r