* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2. See
* the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*/
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
+
#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <getopt.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <sys/fsuid.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <attr/xattr.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_LINUX_MAGIC_H
#include <linux/magic.h>
#endif
#include "qemu-common.h"
+#include "qemu/sockets.h"
+#include "qemu/xattr.h"
#include "virtio-9p-marshal.h"
#include "hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-proxy.h"
#include "fsdev/virtio-9p-marshal.h"
static bool is_daemon;
static bool get_version; /* IOC getversion IOCTL supported */
-static void do_log(int loglevel, const char *format, ...)
+static void GCC_FMT_ATTR(2, 3) do_log(int loglevel, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;
static int send_status(int sockfd, struct iovec *iovec, int status)
{
ProxyHeader header;
- int retval, msg_size;;
+ int retval, msg_size;
if (status < 0) {
header.type = T_ERROR;
/*
* from man 7 capabilities, section
* Effect of User ID Changes on Capabilities:
- * 4. If the file system user ID is changed from 0 to nonzero (see setfsuid(2))
- * then the following capabilities are cleared from the effective set:
- * CAP_CHOWN, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, CAP_FOWNER, CAP_FSETID,
- * CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE (since Linux 2.2.30), CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, and CAP_MKNOD
- * (since Linux 2.2.30). If the file system UID is changed from nonzero to 0,
- * then any of these capabilities that are enabled in the permitted set
- * are enabled in the effective set.
+ * If the effective user ID is changed from nonzero to 0, then the permitted
+ * set is copied to the effective set. If the effective user ID is changed
+ * from 0 to nonzero, then all capabilities are are cleared from the effective
+ * set.
+ *
+ * The setfsuid/setfsgid man pages warn that changing the effective user ID may
+ * expose the program to unwanted signals, but this is not true anymore: for an
+ * unprivileged (without CAP_KILL) program to send a signal, the real or
+ * effective user ID of the sending process must equal the real or saved user
+ * ID of the target process. Even when dropping privileges, it is enough to
+ * keep the saved UID to a "privileged" value and virtfs-proxy-helper won't
+ * be exposed to signals. So just use setresuid/setresgid.
*/
-static int setfsugid(int uid, int gid)
+static int setugid(int uid, int gid, int *suid, int *sgid)
{
+ int retval;
+
/*
- * We still need DAC_OVERRIDE because we don't change
+ * We still need DAC_OVERRIDE because we don't change
* supplementary group ids, and hence may be subjected DAC rules
*/
cap_value_t cap_list[] = {
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
};
- setfsgid(gid);
- setfsuid(uid);
+ *suid = geteuid();
+ *sgid = getegid();
+
+ if (setresgid(-1, gid, *sgid) == -1) {
+ retval = -errno;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ if (setresuid(-1, uid, *suid) == -1) {
+ retval = -errno;
+ goto err_sgid;
+ }
if (uid != 0 || gid != 0) {
- return do_cap_set(cap_list, ARRAY_SIZE(cap_list), 0);
+ if (do_cap_set(cap_list, ARRAY_SIZE(cap_list), 0) < 0) {
+ retval = -errno;
+ goto err_suid;
+ }
}
return 0;
+
+err_suid:
+ if (setresuid(-1, *suid, *suid) == -1) {
+ abort();
+ }
+err_sgid:
+ if (setresgid(-1, *sgid, *sgid) == -1) {
+ abort();
+ }
+err_out:
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is used to reset the ugid back with the saved values
+ * There is nothing much we can do checking error values here.
+ */
+static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
+{
+ if (setresgid(-1, sgid, sgid) == -1) {
+ abort();
+ }
+ if (setresuid(-1, suid, suid) == -1) {
+ abort();
+ }
}
/*
proxy_marshal(iovec, 0, "dd", header.type, header.size);
retval = socket_write(sock, iovec->iov_base, header.size + PROXY_HDR_SZ);
if (retval < 0) {
- return retval;;
+ return retval;
}
return 0;
}
v9fs_string_init(&path);
v9fs_string_init(&oldpath);
- cur_uid = geteuid();
- cur_gid = getegid();
retval = proxy_unmarshal(iovec, offset, "dd", &uid, &gid);
if (retval < 0) {
return retval;
}
offset += retval;
- retval = setfsugid(uid, gid);
+ retval = setugid(uid, gid, &cur_uid, &cur_gid);
if (retval < 0) {
- retval = -errno;
- goto err_out;
+ goto unmarshal_err_out;
}
switch (type) {
case T_MKNOD:
}
err_out:
+ resetugid(cur_uid, cur_gid);
+unmarshal_err_out:
v9fs_string_free(&path);
v9fs_string_free(&oldpath);
- setfsugid(cur_uid, cur_gid);
return retval;
}
if (ret < 0) {
goto unmarshal_err_out;
}
- cur_uid = geteuid();
- cur_gid = getegid();
- ret = setfsugid(uid, gid);
+ ret = setugid(uid, gid, &cur_uid, &cur_gid);
if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * On failure reset back to the
- * old uid/gid
- */
- ret = -errno;
- goto err_out;
+ goto unmarshal_err_out;
}
ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -errno;
}
-err_out:
- setfsugid(cur_uid, cur_gid);
+ resetugid(cur_uid, cur_gid);
unmarshal_err_out:
v9fs_string_free(&path);
return ret;
}
switch (c) {
case 'p':
- rpath = strdup(optarg);
+ rpath = g_strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'n':
is_daemon = false;
sock = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 's':
- sock_name = strdup(optarg);
+ sock_name = g_strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'u':
own_u = atoi(optarg);
return -1;
}
- if (*sock_name && (own_u == -1 || own_g == -1)) {
+ if (sock_name && sock != -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "both named socket and socket descriptor specified\n");
+ usage(argv[0]);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ if (sock_name && (own_u == -1 || own_g == -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "owner uid:gid not specified, ");
fprintf(stderr,
"owner uid:gid specifies who can access the socket file\n");
}
do_log(LOG_INFO, "Started\n");
- if (*sock_name) {
+ if (sock_name) {
sock = proxy_socket(sock_name, own_u, own_g);
if (sock < 0) {
goto error;
projects / qemu.git / blobdiff