" selects emulated machine (-machine ? for list)\n"
" property accel=accel1[:accel2[:...]] selects accelerator\n"
" supported accelerators are kvm, xen, tcg (default: tcg)\n"
- " kernel_irqchip=on|off controls accelerated irqchip support\n",
+ " kernel_irqchip=on|off controls accelerated irqchip support\n"
+ " kvm_shadow_mem=size of KVM shadow MMU\n",
QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
STEXI
@item -machine [type=]@var{name}[,prop=@var{value}[,...]]
to initialize.
@item kernel_irqchip=on|off
Enables in-kernel irqchip support for the chosen accelerator when available.
+@item kvm_shadow_mem=size
+Defines the size of the KVM shadow MMU.
@end table
ETEXI
DEFHEADING(File system options:)
DEF("fsdev", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_fsdev,
- "-fsdev fsdriver,id=id[,path=path,][security_model={mapped|passthrough|none}]\n"
+ "-fsdev fsdriver,id=id[,path=path,][security_model={mapped-xattr|mapped-file|passthrough|none}]\n"
" [,writeout=immediate][,readonly][,socket=socket|sock_fd=sock_fd]\n",
QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
this path will be available to the 9p client on the guest.
@item security_model=@var{security_model}
Specifies the security model to be used for this export path.
-Supported security models are "passthrough", "mapped" and "none".
+Supported security models are "passthrough", "mapped-xattr", "mapped-file" and "none".
In "passthrough" security model, files are stored using the same
credentials as they are created on the guest. This requires qemu
-to run as root. In "mapped" security model, some of the file
+to run as root. In "mapped-xattr" security model, some of the file
attributes like uid, gid, mode bits and link target are stored as
-file attributes. Directories exported by this security model cannot
+file attributes. For "mapped-file" these attributes are stored in the
+hidden .virtfs_metadata directory. Directories exported by this security model cannot
interact with other unix tools. "none" security model is same as
passthrough except the sever won't report failures if it fails to
set file attributes like ownership. Security model is mandatory
DEFHEADING(Virtual File system pass-through options:)
DEF("virtfs", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_virtfs,
- "-virtfs local,path=path,mount_tag=tag,security_model=[mapped|passthrough|none]\n"
+ "-virtfs local,path=path,mount_tag=tag,security_model=[mapped-xattr|mapped-file|passthrough|none]\n"
" [,writeout=immediate][,readonly][,socket=socket|sock_fd=sock_fd]\n",
QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
this path will be available to the 9p client on the guest.
@item security_model=@var{security_model}
Specifies the security model to be used for this export path.
-Supported security models are "passthrough", "mapped" and "none".
+Supported security models are "passthrough", "mapped-xattr", "mapped-file" and "none".
In "passthrough" security model, files are stored using the same
credentials as they are created on the guest. This requires qemu
-to run as root. In "mapped" security model, some of the file
+to run as root. In "mapped-xattr" security model, some of the file
attributes like uid, gid, mode bits and link target are stored as
-file attributes. Directories exported by this security model cannot
+file attributes. For "mapped-file" these attributes are stored in the
+hidden .virtfs_metadata directory. Directories exported by this security model cannot
interact with other unix tools. "none" security model is same as
passthrough except the sever won't report failures if it fails to
set file attributes like ownership. Security model is mandatory only
adaptive encodings allows to restore the original static behavior of encodings
like Tight.
+@item share=[allow-exclusive|force-shared|ignore]
+
+Set display sharing policy. 'allow-exclusive' allows clients to ask
+for exclusive access. As suggested by the rfb spec this is
+implemented by dropping other connections. Connecting multiple
+clients in parallel requires all clients asking for a shared session
+(vncviewer: -shared switch). This is the default. 'force-shared'
+disables exclusive client access. Useful for shared desktop sessions,
+where you don't want someone forgetting specify -shared disconnect
+everybody else. 'ignore' completely ignores the shared flag and
+allows everybody connect unconditionally. Doesn't conform to the rfb
+spec but is traditional qemu behavior.
+
@end table
ETEXI
Example (without authentication):
@example
-qemu -cdrom iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/2 \
---drive file=iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
+qemu -iscsi initiator-name=iqn.2001-04.com.example:my-initiator \
+-cdrom iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/2 \
+-drive file=iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
@end example
Example (CHAP username/password via URL):
@example
-qemu --drive file=iscsi://user%password@@192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
+qemu -drive file=iscsi://user%password@@192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
@end example
Example (CHAP username/password via environment variables):
@example
LIBISCSI_CHAP_USERNAME="user" \
LIBISCSI_CHAP_PASSWORD="password" \
-qemu --drive file=iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
+qemu -drive file=iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
@end example
iSCSI support is an optional feature of QEMU and only available when
compiled and linked against libiscsi.
+ETEXI
+DEF("iscsi", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_iscsi,
+ "-iscsi [user=user][,password=password]\n"
+ " [,header-digest=CRC32C|CR32C-NONE|NONE-CRC32C|NONE\n"
+ " [,initiator-name=iqn]\n"
+ " iSCSI session parameters\n", QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
+STEXI
@item NBD
QEMU supports NBD (Network Block Devices) both using TCP protocol as well
projects / qemu.git / blobdiff