x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation

Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.

Invocations:
 Check indirect branch speculation status with
 - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);

 Enable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);

 Disable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);

 Force disable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);

See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
CVE-2017-5715

(cherry picked from commit 9137bb27e60e554dab694eafa4cca241fa3a694f)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 32f3d55c54b75e1c6642a3d328a1dc404dfd4dc9..c4dbe6f7cdae8c8c76e706d773322af79cc26b78 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -92,3 +92,12 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes
+                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 2de273c475217cd1f2eca6a3d532ab71ec6c0580..35ef92c5cc6634191c7ba8600a4531783f339aad 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
+       SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
 };
 
 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index f30f168aa9cb34135395d16346742026ad442ca1..e45a16347a4d546a942c67b6827cd1530500746d 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -563,6 +563,8 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
                update_stibp_strict();
                break;
+       case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+               break;
        }
 
        mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
@@ -749,12 +751,50 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
        return 0;
 }
 
+static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+       switch (ctrl) {
+       case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+               if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+                       return 0;
+               /*
+                * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
+                * mode.
+                */
+               if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT)
+                       return -EPERM;
+               task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
+               task_update_spec_tif(task);
+               break;
+       case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+       case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+               /*
+                * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
+                * mitigation is force disabled.
+                */
+               if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+                       return -EPERM;
+               if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT)
+                       return 0;
+               task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
+               if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
+                       task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
+               task_update_spec_tif(task);
+               break;
+       default:
+               return -ERANGE;
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
                             unsigned long ctrl)
 {
        switch (which) {
        case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
                return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+       case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+               return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
        default:
                return -ENODEV;
        }
@@ -787,11 +827,34 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
        }
 }
 
+static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+               return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+
+       switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+       case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+               return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+       case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+               if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+                       return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+               if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
+                       return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+               return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+       case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+               return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+       default:
+               return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+       }
+}
+
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 {
        switch (which) {
        case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
                return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+       case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+               return ib_prctl_get(task);
        default:
                return -ENODEV;
        }
@@ -968,6 +1031,8 @@ static char *stibp_state(void)
                return ", STIBP: disabled";
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
                return ", STIBP: forced";
+       case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+               return "";
        }
        return "";
 }
@@ -980,6 +1045,8 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
                        return ", IBPB: disabled";
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
                        return ", IBPB: always-on";
+               case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+                       return "";
                }
        }
        return "";

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 533337a845b86c5ff785c1de233aba3b79d5fc53..f3783eaa50555bfab300a9684f5a8df6e86a55fb 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -453,6 +453,11 @@ static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
                        set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD);
                else
                        clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD);
+
+               if (task_spec_ib_disable(tsk))
+                       set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_IB);
+               else
+                       clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_IB);
        }
        /* Return the updated threadinfo flags*/
        return task_thread_info(tsk)->flags;

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 5a786e288aa6e214a5319a234c5342317c1f86aa..41b6daa66ec1198a167e45364c5552c982a924fb 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1395,6 +1395,8 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void)
 #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB                        2       /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
 #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE           3       /* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
 #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE     4       /* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
+#define PFA_SPEC_IB_DISABLE            5       /* Indirect branch speculation restricted */
+#define PFA_SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE      6       /* Indirect branch speculation permanently restricted */
 
 #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func)                                      \
        static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p)           \
@@ -1426,6 +1428,13 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
 TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
 TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
 
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
+
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
+
 static inline void
 current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags)
 {

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a00a4499676c26ce3b3db4e64d796a34428bda98..aeabb547702c43f18fb0741e5b18a074c35ced44 100644 (file)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL                53
 /* Speculation control variants */
 # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS          0
+# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH       1
 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
 # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED          0
 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL                 (1UL << 0)

diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index db9f15f5db047e643780ce23a0d33f9cc599ddf4..abf3f64adf8d07517686e6a9167e8d48f3e10ad4 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL                53
 /* Speculation control variants */
 # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS          0
+# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH       1
 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
 # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED          0
 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL                 (1UL << 0)