Eric Dumazet [Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:09:55 +0000 (06:09 -0700)]
tcp: refine memory limit test in tcp_fragment()
tcp_fragment() might be called for skbs in the write queue.
Memory limits might have been exceeded because tcp_sendmsg() only
checks limits at full skb (64KB) boundaries.
Therefore, we need to make sure tcp_fragment() wont punish applications
that might have setup very low SO_SNDBUF values.
Fixes: f070ef2ac667 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1831638
CVE-2019-11478
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Eric Dumazet [Sat, 8 Jun 2019 17:38:07 +0000 (10:38 -0700)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
CVE-2019-11479
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Eric Dumazet [Fri, 31 May 2019 20:59:30 +0000 (20:59 +0000)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits
Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.
TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.
A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> CC: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1831638
[tyhicks: Adjust context of SNMP enums] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Eric Dumazet [Fri, 31 May 2019 20:59:27 +0000 (20:59 +0000)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1831637 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tyler Hicks [Wed, 27 Mar 2019 17:45:13 +0000 (17:45 +0000)]
UBUNTU: [Config] Disable a.out support
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1818552
The a.out core dump handler is broken and will be removed in 5.1 with
upstream commit 08300f4402ab ("a.out: remove core dumping support").
Additionally, all a.out support will be deprecated in 5.1 with upstream
commit eac616557050 ("x86: Deprecate a.out support") and completely
removed in a future release.
Disable it in Ubuntu since it is risky to leave enabled and there are
likely no users that depend on it.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-By: You-Sheng Yang <vicamo.yang@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Julian Wiedmann [Thu, 9 May 2019 15:36:00 +0000 (17:36 +0200)]
s390/qdio: clear intparm during shutdown
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1828394
During shutdown, qdio returns its ccw device back to control by the
upper-layer driver. But there is a remote chance that by the time where the
IRQ handler gets switched back, the interrupt for the preceding
ccw_device_{clear,halt} hasn't been presented yet.
Upper-layer drivers would then need to handle this IRQ - and since the IO
is issued with an intparm, it could very well be confused with whatever
intparm mechanism the driver uses itself (eg intparm == request address).
So when switching over the IRQ handler, also clear the intparm and have
upper-layer drivers deal with any such delayed interrupt as if it was
unsolicited.
Suggested-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 89286320a236d245834075fa13adb0bdd827ecaa) Signed-off-by: Frank Heimes <frank.heimes@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
kprobes/x86: Fix instruction patching corruption when copying more than one RIP-relative instruction
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1826385
After copy_optimized_instructions() copies several instructions
to the working buffer it tries to fix up the real RIP address, but it
adjusts the RIP-relative instruction with an incorrect RIP address
for the 2nd and subsequent instructions due to a bug in the logic.
This will break the kernel pretty badly (with likely outcomes such as
a kernel freeze, a crash, or worse) because probed instructions can refer
to the wrong data.
For example putting kprobes on cpumask_next() typically hits this bug.
cpumask_next() is normally like below if CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y
(in this case nr_cpumask_bits is an alias of nr_cpu_ids):
This dump shows that the second MOV accesses *(nr_cpu_ids+3) instead of
the original *nr_cpu_ids. This leads to a kernel freeze because
cpumask_next() always returns 0 and for_each_cpu() never ends.
Fix this by adding 'len' correctly to the real RIP address while
copying.
[ mingo: Improved the changelog. ]
Reported-by: Michael Rodin <michael@rodin.online> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.15+ Fixes: 63fef14fc98a ("kprobes/x86: Make insn buffer always ROX and use text_poke()") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153504457253.22602.1314289671019919596.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 43a1b0cb4cd6dbfd3cd9c10da663368394d299d8) Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: [Config] Update config for AMD MP2 I2C driver
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1787775
The new MP2 driver can work as module instead of builtin.
Also this chip is part of Raven Ridge SoC, so it's only used on amd64.
MP2 controllers have two separate busses, so may accommodate up to two I2C
adapters. Those adapters are listed in the ACPI namespace with the
"AMDI0011" HID, and probed by a platform driver.
Communication with the MP2 takes place through MMIO registers, or through
DMA for more than 32 bytes transfers.
This is major rework of the patch submitted by Nehal-bakulchandra Shah from
AMD (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10597369/).
Most of the event handling of v3 was rewritten to make it work with more
than one bus (e.g on Ryzen-based Lenovo Yoga 530), and this version
contains many other improvements.
Make sure we report 'no buffer' for 0-length messages. This can only
happen if threshold is set to 0 which is kind of bogus but we should
still handle this situation. Update the docs and add a debug message
to educate callers of this function.
Reported-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Fixes: e94bc5d18be0 ("i2c: add helpers to ease DMA handling") Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Reviewed-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
(cherry picked from commit bf263c35b2ebe7f1674205f6b36487250299b5a7) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
I2C has no requirement that the buffer of a message needs to be DMA
safe. In case it is, it can now be flagged, so drivers wishing to
do DMA can use the buffer directly.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
(cherry picked from commit 521a72e1f2e8141d78e7699eaacda24e308ed428) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
One helper checks if DMA is suitable and optionally creates a bounce
buffer, if not. The other function returns the bounce buffer and makes
sure the data is properly copied back to the message.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
(cherry picked from commit e94bc5d18be03dac8e9d73d30c5523728edeff76) Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Acked-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
selftests/powerpc: Skip tm-unavailable if TM is not enabled
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1813129
Some processor revisions do not support transactional memory, and
additionally kernel support can be disabled. In either case the
tm-unavailable test should be skipped, otherwise it will fail with
a SIGILL.
That commit also sets this selftest to be called through the test
harness as it's done for other TM selftests.
Finally, it avoids using "ping" as a thread name since it's
ambiguous and can be confusing when shown, for instance,
in a kernel backtrace log.
Fixes: 77fad8bfb1d2 ("selftests/powerpc: Check FP/VEC on exception in TM") Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
(cherry picked from commit b395e55b49ecd56ea28dc629f4ca4c6239fc07c3) Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Michael Neuling [Thu, 25 Apr 2019 03:34:07 +0000 (11:34 +0800)]
selftests/powerpc: Remove redundant cp_abort test
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1813134
Paste on POWER9 only works on accelerators and no longer on real
memory. Hence this test is broken so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
(cherry picked from commit 00c946a06ec8414ad22f0e8dcd17187bdd127a72) Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: [Config] update configs after snapdragon removal
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827880
Running 'updateconfigs' after "UBUNTU: [Packaging] remove snapdragon
dead files" shuffles around some config options to accommodate the
removal of the snapdragon config files.
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827880
Remove all files and references that were previously used to build the
snapdragon binaries. They are not needed anymore since we have split it
to its own topic branch.
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Kailang Yang [Tue, 7 May 2019 03:58:31 +0000 (11:58 +0800)]
ALSA: hda/realtek - Fixed Dell AIO speaker noise
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827972
Fixed Dell AIO speaker noise.
spec->gen.auto_mute_via_amp = 1, this option was solved speaker white
noise at boot.
codec->power_save_node = 0, this option was solved speaker noise at
resume back.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1794232
When IPv6 is compiled but disabled at runtime, geneve_sock_add returns
-EAFNOSUPPORT. For metadata based tunnels, this causes failure of the whole
operation of bringing up the tunnel.
Ignore failure of IPv6 socket creation for metadata based tunnels caused by
IPv6 not being available.
This is the same fix as what commit d074bf960044 ("vxlan: correctly handle
ipv6.disable module parameter") is doing for vxlan.
Note there's also commit c0a47e44c098 ("geneve: should not call rt6_lookup()
when ipv6 was disabled") which fixes a similar issue but for regular
tunnels, while this patch is needed for metadata based tunnels.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit cf1c9ccba7308e48a68fa77f476287d9d614e4c7) Signed-off-by: Nivedita Singhvi <nivedita.singhvi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Hui Wang [Tue, 7 May 2019 02:57:00 +0000 (04:57 +0200)]
ALSA: hda/hdmi - Consider eld_valid when reporting jack event
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827967
On the machines with AMD GPU or Nvidia GPU, we often meet this issue:
after s3, there are 4 HDMI/DP audio devices in the gnome-sound-setting
even there is no any monitors plugged.
When this problem happens, we check the /proc/asound/cardX/eld#N.M, we
will find the monitor_present=1, eld_valid=0.
The root cause is BIOS or GPU driver makes the PRESENCE valid even no
monitor plugged, and of course the driver will not get the valid
eld_data subsequently.
In this situation, we should not report the jack_plugged event, to do
so, let us change the function hdmi_present_sense_via_verbs(). In this
function, it reads the pin_sense via snd_hda_pin_sense(), after
calling this function, the jack_dirty is 0, and before exiting
via_verbs(), we change the shadow pin_sense according to both
monitor_present and eld_valid, then in the snd_hda_jack_report_sync(),
since the jack_dirty is still 0, it will report jack event according
to this modified shadow pin_sense.
After this change, the driver will not report Jack_is_plugged event
through hdmi_present_sense_via_verbs() if monitor_present is 1 and
eld_valid is 0.
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit 7f641e26a6df9269cb25dd7a4b0a91d6586ed441
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound.git) Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Hui Wang [Tue, 7 May 2019 02:57:00 +0000 (04:57 +0200)]
ALSA: hda/hdmi - Read the pin sense from register when repolling
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827967
The driver will check the monitor presence when resuming from suspend,
starting poll or interrupt triggers. In these 3 situations, the
jack_dirty will be set to 1 first, then the hda_jack.c reads the
pin_sense from register, after reading the register, the jack_dirty
will be set to 0. But hdmi_repoll_work() is enabled in these 3
situations, It will read the pin_sense a couple of times subsequently,
since the jack_dirty is 0 now, It does not read the register anymore,
instead it uses the shadow pin_sense which is read at the first time.
It is meaningless to check the shadow pin_sense a couple of times,
we need to read the register to check the real plugging state, so
we set the jack_dirty to 1 in the hdmi_repoll_work().
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit 8c2e6728c2bf95765b724e07d0278ae97cd1ee0d
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound.git) Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Hui Wang [Tue, 7 May 2019 05:50:00 +0000 (07:50 +0200)]
ASoC: rt5645: Headphone Jack sense inverts on the LattePanda board
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824259
The LattePanda board has a sound card chtrt5645, when there is nothing
plugged in the headphone jack, the system thinks the headphone is
plugged in, while we plug a headphone in the jack, the system thinks
the headphone is unplugged.
If adding quirk=0x21 in the module parameter, the headphone jack can
work well. So let us fix it via platform_data.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/182459 Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
(backported from commit 406dcbc55a0a20fd155be889a4a0c4b812f7c18e
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound.git) Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Andrea Righi [Sat, 20 Apr 2019 07:41:00 +0000 (09:41 +0200)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: integrity: downgrade error to warning
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1766201
In 58441dc86d7b the error "Unable to open file: ..." has been downgraded
to warning in the integrity/ima subsystem. Do the same for a similar
error message in the generic integrity subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
driver core: Postpone DMA tear-down until after devres release
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1827437
When unbinding the (IOMMU-enabled) R-Car SATA device on Salvator-XS
(R-Car H3 ES2.0), in preparation of rebinding against vfio-platform for
device pass-through for virtualization:
While I've bisected this to commit e8e683ae9a736407 ("iommu/of: Fix
probe-deferral"), and reverting that commit on post-v5.0-rc4 kernels
does fix the problem, this turned out to be a red herring.
On arm64, arch_teardown_dma_ops() resets dev->dma_ops to NULL.
Hence if a driver has used a managed DMA allocation API, the allocated
DMA memory will be freed using the direct DMA ops, while it may have
been allocated using a custom DMA ops (iommu_dma_ops in this case).
Fix this by reversing the order of the calls to devres_release_all() and
arch_teardown_dma_ops().
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(backported from commit 376991db4b6464e906d699ef07681e2ffa8ab08c)
[dannf: Based on 4.19.29 backport, with trivial offset fix] Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
selftests/ftrace: Fix kprobe string testcase to not probe notrace function
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1825780
Fix kprobe string argument testcase to not probe notrace
function. Instead, it probes tracefs function which must
be available with ftrace.
Huazhong Tan [Mon, 29 Apr 2019 19:00:34 +0000 (13:00 -0600)]
net: hns: fix skb->truesize underestimation
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1826911
skb->truesize is not meant to be tracking amount of used bytes in a skb,
but amount of reserved/consumed bytes in memory.
For instance, if we use a single byte in last page fragment, we have to
account the full size of the fragment.
So skb_add_rx_frag needs to calculate the length of the entire buffer into
turesize.
Fixes: 9cbe9fd5214e ("net: hns: optimize XGE capability by reducing cpu usage") Signed-off-by: Huazhong tan <tanhuazhong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Salil Mehta <salil.mehta@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit b1ccd4c0ab6ef499f47dd84ed4920502a7147bba) Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Acked-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
selftests: net: run_netsocktests
========================================
--------------------
running socket test
--------------------
[FAIL]
ok 1..6 selftests: net: run_netsocktests [PASS]
This is because the test script itself has been successfully executed.
Fix this by exit 1 when the test failed.
Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 30c04d796b693e22405c38e9b78e9a364e4c77e6) Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Acked-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
CVE-2017-5715
CVE-2017-5753
CVE-2017-5754
CVE-2018-3639
(backported from commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- include <linux/cpu.h> from security.c] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
CVE-2017-5715
CVE-2017-5754
CVE-2018-3639
CVE-2018-3620
CVE-2018-3646
(cherry picked from commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
a) they want all mitigations off;
b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
it's vulnerable; or
c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:
- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
SMT if needed by a mitigation.
Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
CVE-2017-5715
CVE-2017-5754
CVE-2018-3639
CVE-2018-3620
CVE-2018-3646
(backported from commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- Minor context differences since boot_cpu_state_init() uses per_cpu_ptr()
instead of this_cpu_write()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS
mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions
have been made.
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 19 Feb 2019 10:10:49 +0000 (11:10 +0100)]
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 20 Feb 2019 08:40:40 +0000 (09:40 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.
Introduce an internal mitigation mode VWWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.
That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit 8a2979fc4e819a1bb77c782def72e45d9f5a3f0d) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Mon, 18 Feb 2019 21:51:43 +0000 (22:51 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
(backported from commit bd8651092f9656672e53feb1f8e793a0b960138d)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- Include asm/hypervisor.h from bugs.c for hypervisor_is_type()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Mon, 18 Feb 2019 21:04:08 +0000 (22:04 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.
This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:
mds=[full|off]
This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
(cherry picked from commit c5ee1ae05768716933d4e5d2015b59bdf6df04c5) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Mon, 18 Feb 2019 22:04:01 +0000 (23:04 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.
Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
Intel CPUs.
The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
the non idle sibling.
When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.
When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
then there is no action required either because before returning to user
space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
on the return to user path.
Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.
This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
two reasons:
- The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
to that new driver.
- The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
anymore, so there is no point in adding that.
(backported from commit e3f1fbbd5ffb7ca71bf13d447983c03cf4e27030)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.18:
- Adjust path of vmx.c which was changed in upstream commit a821bab2d1ee] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Mon, 18 Feb 2019 22:42:51 +0000 (23:42 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.
Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
Thomas Gleixner [Mon, 18 Feb 2019 22:13:06 +0000 (23:13 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
The Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) vulernabilities are mitigated by
clearing the affected CPU buffers. The mechanism for clearing the buffers
uses the unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a
microcode update which triggers a CPU buffer clear when VERW is executed.
Provide a inline function with the assembly magic. The argument of the VERW
instruction must be a memory operand as documented:
"MD_CLEAR enumerates that the memory-operand variant of VERW (for
example, VERW m16) has been extended to also overwrite buffers affected
by MDS. This buffer overwriting functionality is not guaranteed for the
register operand variant of VERW."
Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:
"The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
segment."
Add x86 specific documentation about MDS and the internal workings of the
mitigation.
Andi Kleen [Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:50:23 +0000 (16:50 -0800)]
x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
by invoking the VERW instruction.
Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.
This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
separately.
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 1 Mar 2019 19:21:08 +0000 (20:21 +0100)]
x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit ab12e2e20232e9b84e2b212346b9fe3956e91642) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Andi Kleen [Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:50:16 +0000 (16:50 -0800)]
x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks
on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
- Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
- Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
- Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
thread leakage is possible.
All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off),
so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue.
Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by
MDS.
(backported from commit 5edd28bac163689d3ab84c7545d9d0212504be86)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.18:
- X86_VENDOR_HYGON does not exist because commit c9661c1e80b6 is
missing] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
(backported from commit c01bba64427c723870372e97a82ae843ca14e876)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.18:
- X86_VENDOR_HYGON does not exist because commit c9661c1e80b6 is
missing] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 21 Feb 2019 11:36:50 +0000 (12:36 +0100)]
x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines
Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.
(backported from commit a4a931802e51223b3e0548fc31fb3f7dc8f6d032)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- The Makefiles do not contain override directives on the modified
lines] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
So that we reduce the difference of tools/include/linux/bitops.h to the
original kernel file, include/linux/bitops.h, trying to remove the need
to define BITS_PER_LONG, to avoid clashes with asm/bitsperlong.h.
And the things removed from tools/include/linux/bitops.h are really in
linux/bits.h, so that we can have a copy and then
tools/perf/check_headers.sh will tell us when new stuff gets added to
linux/bits.h so that we can check if it is useful and if any adjustment
needs to be done to the tools/{include,arch}/ copies.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-y1sqyydvfzo0bjjoj4zsl562@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit ba4aa02b417f08a0bee5e7b8ed70cac788a7c854) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Will Deacon [Tue, 19 Jun 2018 12:53:08 +0000 (13:53 +0100)]
locking/atomics, asm-generic: Move some macros from <linux/bitops.h> to a new <linux/bits.h> file
In preparation for implementing the asm-generic atomic bitops in terms
of atomic_long_*(), we need to prevent <asm/atomic.h> implementations from
pulling in <linux/bitops.h>. A common reason for this include is for the
BITS_PER_BYTE definition, so move this and some other BIT() and masking
macros into a new header file, <linux/bits.h>.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1529412794-17720-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit 8bd9cb51daac89337295b6f037b0486911e1b408) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Eduardo Habkost [Wed, 5 Dec 2018 19:19:56 +0000 (17:19 -0200)]
kvm: x86: Report STIBP on GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
Months ago, we have added code to allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
to the guest, which makes STIBP available to guests. This was implemented
by commits d28b387fb74d ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL") and b2ac58f90540 ("KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL").
However, we never updated GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to let userspace know that
STIBP can be enabled in CPUID. Fix that by updating
kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features and kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit d7b09c827a6cf291f66637a36f46928dd1423184) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
with additional information gleaned from other related pages; notably:
- Bonnell shrink was called Saltwell
- Moorefield is the Merriefield refresh which makes it Airmont
The general naming scheme is: FAM6_ATOM_UARCH_SOCTYPE
for i in `git grep -l FAM6_ATOM` ; do
sed -i -e 's/ATOM_PINEVIEW/ATOM_BONNELL/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_LINCROFT/ATOM_BONNELL_MID/' \
-e 's/ATOM_PENWELL/ATOM_SALTWELL_MID/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_CLOVERVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_CEDARVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT1/ATOM_SILVERMONT/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT2/ATOM_SILVERMONT_X/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_MERRIFIELD/ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_MOOREFIELD/ATOM_AIRMONT_MID/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_DENVERTON/ATOM_GOLDMONT_X/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE/ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS/g' ${i}
done
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: len.brown@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(backported from commit f2c4db1bd80720cd8cb2a5aa220d9bc9f374f04e)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c doesn't yet exist
- arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c doesn't use any FAM6_ATOM macros because it
is missing commit 397d3ad18dc4
- sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5651.c doesn't use any FAM6_ATOM
macros because it is missing commit fbea16dbc0a3
- The FAM6_ATOM items in the intel_pstate_cpu_ids[] array use bxt_funcs
due to missing commit dbd49b85eec7
- Context change in process_cpuid() because SKYLAKE_X and ATOM_DENVERTON
share a case block due to missing commit 733ef0f8e76e
- Manually ran the for loop documented in the commit message to ensure
that there were no additional uses of the old macros] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader [Fri, 26 Apr 2019 06:23:42 +0000 (08:23 +0200)]
UBUNTU: [Packaging] arm64: Drop snapdragon from kernel-versions
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820868
When dropping the snapdragon flavour from building, one also
must drop it from kernel-versions which controls the udeb
generation.
Fixes: 128e2a3e33d0 "UBUNTU: packaging: arm64: disable building
the snapdragon flavour" Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader [Thu, 25 Apr 2019 08:37:02 +0000 (10:37 +0200)]
UBUNTU: [Packaging] final-checks: Depend on makefile flavours
The available ABI files do not depend on the config flavours but
those actually built. So instead of looking at the config files,
parse the flavours variable of the <arch>.mk files.
This handles a special case which was found for the current
xenial/hwe tree. This is now based on bionic which builds a
snapdragon flavour for arm64. However that flavour is not done
in xenial because it is a separate tree there.
While the flavour gets removed from the .mk file, we rather would
like to preserve the snapdragon.flavour.config file because removing
it will cause re-arrangement of config options which would happen
everytime we update from the bionic master.
However the current final-checks would then fail because of course
there is no build and therefor no ABI files for that flavour.
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader [Thu, 25 Apr 2019 08:24:09 +0000 (10:24 +0200)]
UBUNTU: [Config] Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822870
This was introduced by: "powerpc/64: Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC"
without updating the config definitions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Paolo Pisati [Wed, 20 Mar 2019 08:31:00 +0000 (09:31 +0100)]
UBUNTU: packaging: arm64: disable building the snapdragon flavour
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820868 Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index
rmidi->streams.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Johannes Berg [Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:17:14 +0000 (13:17 +0200)]
cfg80211: prevent speculation on cfg80211_classify8021d() return
It's possible that the caller of cfg80211_classify8021d() uses the
value to index an array, like mac80211 in ieee80211_downgrade_queue().
Prevent speculation on the return value.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit 1fc9b7253382ce1a83d9a3e63e88d656eb63f263)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Breno Leitao [Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:46:00 +0000 (10:46 -0200)]
powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1
'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the
register number that would be read or written. This register number is
called 'regno' which is part of the 'addr' syscall parameter.
This 'regno' value is checked against the maximum pt_regs structure size,
and then used to dereference it, which matches the initial part of a
Spectre v1 (and Spectre v1.1) attack. The dereferenced value, then,
is returned to userspace in the GETREGS case.
This patch sanitizes 'regno' before using it to dereference pt_reg.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit ebb0e13ead2ddc186a80b1b0235deeefc5a1a667)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing IndexCard before using it to index apbs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing ipcnum before using it to index pDrvData->IPCs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls
and drm_ioctls.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix off-by-one bug in vgic_get_irq()
When using the nospec API, it should be taken into account that:
"...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
* array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
* size)."
The above is part of the header for macro array_index_nospec() in
linux/nospec.h
Now, in this particular case, if intid evaluates to exactly VGIC_MAX_SPI
or to exaclty VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE, the array_index_nospec() macro ends up
returning VGIC_MAX_SPI - 1 or VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE - 1 respectively, instead
of VGIC_MAX_SPI or VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE, which, based on the original logic:
/* SGIs and PPIs */
if (intid <= VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE)
return &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.private_irqs[intid];
Fix this by calling array_index_nospec() macro with VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE + 1
and VGIC_MAX_SPI + 1 as arguments for its parameter size.
Fixes: 41b87599c743 ("KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: fix possible spectre-v1 in vgic_get_irq()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
[dropped the SPI part which was fixed separately] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit c23b2e6fc4ca346018618266bcabd335c0a8a49e) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the
following checkpatch warning:
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103:
if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0)
Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].