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1. Set the secure boot state to Standard Mode when user leaving secure boot setup...
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / SecureBootConfigDxe / SecureBootConfigImpl.c
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beda2356 1/** @file\r
2 HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r
3\r
f71ed839 4Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
bc0c99b3 5This program and the accompanying materials\r
6are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
7which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
beda2356 8http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
9\r
bc0c99b3 10THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
beda2356 11WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
12\r
13**/\r
14\r
15#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"\r
16\r
ecc722ad 17CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r
beda2356 18\r
19SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r
ecc722ad 20 SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, \r
beda2356 21 {\r
22 SecureBootExtractConfig,\r
23 SecureBootRouteConfig,\r
24 SecureBootCallback\r
25 }\r
26};\r
27\r
28HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {\r
29 {\r
30 {\r
31 HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,\r
32 HW_VENDOR_DP,\r
33 {\r
34 (UINT8) (sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),\r
35 (UINT8) ((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)\r
36 }\r
37 },\r
38 SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID\r
39 },\r
40 {\r
41 END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,\r
42 END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,\r
bc0c99b3 43 {\r
beda2356 44 (UINT8) (END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),\r
45 (UINT8) ((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)\r
46 }\r
47 }\r
48};\r
49\r
ecc722ad 50\r
51//\r
52// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r
53//\r
54UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r
55 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r
56 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r
57 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r
58 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r
59 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r
60 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r
61 };\r
62\r
63HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r
64 { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r
65 { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
66 { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r
67 { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r
68 { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r
69};\r
70\r
e4d7370d 71//\r
72// Variable Definitions \r
73// \r
ecc722ad 74UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
75WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL;\r
76IMAGE_TYPE mImageType;\r
77UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r
78UINTN mImageSize = 0;\r
79UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
80UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r
81EFI_GUID mCertType;\r
82EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r
83EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r
84\r
e4d7370d 85//\r
86// Possible DER-encoded certificate file suffixes, end with NULL pointer.\r
87//\r
88CHAR16* mDerEncodedSuffix[] = {\r
89 L".cer",\r
90 L".der",\r
91 L".crt",\r
92 NULL\r
93};\r
94CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";\r
95\r
96/**\r
97 This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.\r
98\r
99 @param[in] FileSuffix The suffix of the input certificate file\r
100\r
101 @retval TRUE It's a DER-encoded certificate.\r
102 @retval FALSE It's NOT a DER-encoded certificate.\r
103\r
104**/\r
105BOOLEAN\r
106IsDerEncodeCertificate (\r
107 IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix\r
108)\r
109{\r
110 UINTN Index; \r
111 for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {\r
112 if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {\r
113 return TRUE;\r
114 }\r
115 }\r
116 return FALSE;\r
117}\r
ecc722ad 118\r
119/**\r
120 Set Secure Boot option into variable space.\r
121\r
122 @param[in] VarValue The option of Secure Boot.\r
123\r
124 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is finished successfully.\r
125 @retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r
126\r
127**/\r
128EFI_STATUS\r
129SaveSecureBootVariable (\r
130 IN UINT8 VarValue\r
131 )\r
132{\r
133 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
134\r
135 Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
136 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
137 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
138 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
139 sizeof (UINT8),\r
140 &VarValue\r
141 );\r
142 return Status;\r
143}\r
144\r
8c1babfd 145/**\r
146 Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2\r
147 descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function.\r
148 \r
149 @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes.\r
150 On output, the size of data returned in Data\r
151 buffer in bytes.\r
152 @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or \r
153 pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload.\r
154 On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool,\r
155 it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it. \r
156\r
157 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully.\r
158 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.\r
159 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
160 @retval Others Unexpected error happens.\r
161\r
162**/\r
163EFI_STATUS\r
164CreateTimeBasedPayload (\r
165 IN OUT UINTN *DataSize,\r
166 IN OUT UINT8 **Data\r
167 )\r
168{\r
169 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
170 UINT8 *NewData;\r
171 UINT8 *Payload;\r
172 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
173 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData;\r
174 UINTN DescriptorSize;\r
175 EFI_TIME Time;\r
176 \r
177 if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {\r
178 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
179 }\r
180 \r
181 //\r
182 // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the \r
183 // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated\r
184 // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate\r
185 // data in it.\r
186 //\r
187 Payload = *Data;\r
188 PayloadSize = *DataSize;\r
189 \r
190 DescriptorSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
191 NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize);\r
192 if (NewData == NULL) {\r
193 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
194 }\r
195\r
196 if ((Payload != NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r
197 CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
198 }\r
199\r
200 DescriptorData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData);\r
201\r
202 ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
203 Status = gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL);\r
204 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
205 FreePool(NewData);\r
206 return Status;\r
207 }\r
208 Time.Pad1 = 0;\r
209 Time.Nanosecond = 0;\r
210 Time.TimeZone = 0;\r
211 Time.Daylight = 0;\r
212 Time.Pad2 = 0;\r
213 CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
214 \r
215 DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
216 DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision = 0x0200;\r
217 DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;\r
218 CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);\r
219 \r
220 if (Payload != NULL) {\r
221 FreePool(Payload);\r
222 }\r
223 \r
224 *DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize;\r
225 *Data = NewData;\r
226 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
227}\r
228\r
ecc722ad 229/**\r
230 Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, NO authentication\r
231 required.\r
232\r
233 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
234 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
235\r
236 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
237 @retval Others The driver failed to start the device.\r
238\r
239**/\r
240EFI_STATUS\r
241DeleteVariable (\r
242 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
243 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
244 )\r
245{\r
246 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
247 VOID* Variable;\r
8c1babfd 248 UINT8 *Data;\r
249 UINTN DataSize;\r
250 UINT32 Attr;\r
ecc722ad 251\r
bf4a3dbd 252 GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL);\r
ecc722ad 253 if (Variable == NULL) {\r
254 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
255 }\r
f71ed839 256 FreePool (Variable);\r
ecc722ad 257\r
8c1babfd 258 Data = NULL;\r
259 DataSize = 0;\r
260 Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
261 | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
ecc722ad 262\r
8c1babfd 263 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data);\r
264 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
265 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
266 return Status;\r
ecc722ad 267 }\r
268\r
8c1babfd 269 Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
270 VariableName,\r
271 VendorGuid,\r
272 Attr,\r
273 DataSize,\r
274 Data\r
275 );\r
276 if (Data != NULL) {\r
277 FreePool (Data);\r
ecc722ad 278 }\r
ecc722ad 279 return Status;\r
280}\r
281\r
f71ed839 282/**\r
283\r
284 Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode.\r
285\r
286 @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or\r
287 CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
288 \r
289 @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the special mode successfully.\r
290 @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode.\r
291 \r
292**/\r
293EFI_STATUS\r
294SetSecureBootMode (\r
295 IN UINT8 SecureBootMode\r
296 )\r
297{\r
298 return gRT->SetVariable ( \r
299 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
300 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
301 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
302 sizeof (UINT8),\r
303 &SecureBootMode\r
304 );\r
305}\r
306\r
ecc722ad 307/**\r
308 Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)\r
309\r
310 @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r
311 @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r
312 \r
313 @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r
314 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r
315 \r
316**/\r
317EFI_STATUS\r
318CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
319 IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File, \r
320 OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert \r
321 )\r
322{\r
323 EFI_STATUS Status; \r
324 UINT8 *X509Data;\r
325 UINTN X509DataSize;\r
326 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;\r
327\r
328 X509Data = NULL;\r
329 PkCertData = NULL;\r
330 X509DataSize = 0; \r
331 \r
4adc12bf 332 Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r
ecc722ad 333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
334 goto ON_EXIT;\r
335 }\r
ba57d4fd 336 ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
ecc722ad 337\r
338 //\r
339 // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.\r
340 // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.\r
341 //\r
342 *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (\r
343 sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
344 + X509DataSize\r
345 );\r
346 if (*PkCert == NULL) {\r
347 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
348 goto ON_EXIT;\r
349 }\r
350\r
351 (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r
352 + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
353 + X509DataSize);\r
354 (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
355 (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
356 CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
357 PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert) \r
358 + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
359 + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
360 CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); \r
361 //\r
362 // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r
363 // \r
364 CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
365 \r
366ON_EXIT:\r
367 \r
368 if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
369 FreePool (X509Data);\r
370 }\r
371 \r
372 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {\r
373 FreePool (*PkCert);\r
374 *PkCert = NULL;\r
375 }\r
376 \r
377 return Status;\r
378}\r
379\r
380/**\r
381 Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.\r
382\r
383 The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.\r
384\r
385 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
386\r
387 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.\r
388 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
389 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
390 \r
391**/\r
392EFI_STATUS\r
393EnrollPlatformKey (\r
394 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private\r
395 ) \r
396{\r
397 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
398 UINT32 Attr;\r
399 UINTN DataSize;\r
400 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;\r
401 UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
402 \r
403 if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r
404 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
405 }\r
406\r
407 PkCert = NULL;\r
408\r
f71ed839 409 Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
410 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
411 return Status;\r
412 }\r
413\r
ecc722ad 414 //\r
e4d7370d 415 // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r
ecc722ad 416 //\r
417 FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r
e4d7370d 418 if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
419 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));\r
ecc722ad 420 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
421 }\r
422 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", Private->FileContext->FileName));\r
423 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r
424\r
425 //\r
426 // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r
427 //\r
8c1babfd 428 Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
429 Private->FileContext->FHandle, \r
430 &PkCert \r
431 );\r
432 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
433 goto ON_EXIT;\r
ecc722ad 434 }\r
ba57d4fd 435 ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r
ecc722ad 436 \r
437 //\r
438 // Set Platform Key variable.\r
439 // \r
440 Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
8c1babfd 441 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
ecc722ad 442 DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r
8c1babfd 443 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);\r
444 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
445 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
446 goto ON_EXIT;\r
447 }\r
448 \r
ecc722ad 449 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
450 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r
451 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
452 Attr, \r
453 DataSize, \r
454 PkCert\r
455 );\r
456 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
457 if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r
458 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));\r
459 }\r
460 goto ON_EXIT;\r
461 }\r
462 \r
463ON_EXIT:\r
464\r
465 if (PkCert != NULL) {\r
466 FreePool(PkCert);\r
467 }\r
468 \r
469 if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
470 CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
471 Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
472 }\r
473\r
474 return Status;\r
475}\r
476\r
477/**\r
478 Remove the PK variable.\r
479\r
480 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully.\r
481 @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK.\r
482 \r
483**/\r
484EFI_STATUS\r
485DeletePlatformKey (\r
486 VOID\r
487)\r
488{\r
489 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
490\r
f71ed839 491 Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
492 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
493 return Status;\r
494 }\r
495\r
8c1babfd 496 Status = DeleteVariable (\r
497 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
498 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid\r
499 );\r
ecc722ad 500 return Status;\r
501}\r
502\r
503/**\r
504 Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).\r
505\r
506 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
507\r
508 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successfully.\r
509 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
510 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
511 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
512\r
513**/\r
514EFI_STATUS\r
515EnrollRsa2048ToKek (\r
516 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
517 )\r
518{\r
519 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
520 UINT32 Attr;\r
521 UINTN DataSize;\r
522 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r
523 UINTN KeyBlobSize;\r
524 UINT8 *KeyBlob;\r
525 CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;\r
526 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
527 UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
528 UINT8 *KeyBuffer; \r
529 UINTN KeyLenInBytes;\r
530\r
531 Attr = 0;\r
532 DataSize = 0;\r
533 KeyBuffer = NULL;\r
534 KeyBlobSize = 0;\r
535 KeyBlob = NULL;\r
536 KeyInfo = NULL;\r
537 KEKSigData = NULL;\r
538 KekSigList = NULL;\r
539 KekSigListSize = 0;\r
540 \r
541 //\r
542 // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
543 // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r
544 // \r
545 Status = ReadFileContent (\r
546 Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
4adc12bf 547 (VOID**) &KeyBlob,\r
ecc722ad 548 &KeyBlobSize,\r
549 0\r
550 );\r
551 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
552 goto ON_EXIT;\r
553 }\r
ba57d4fd 554 ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);\r
ecc722ad 555 KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *) KeyBlob;\r
556 if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {\r
557 DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));\r
558 Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
559 goto ON_EXIT;\r
560 }\r
561 \r
562 //\r
563 // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r
564 // \r
565 KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r
566 KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r
567 if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r
568 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
569 goto ON_EXIT;\r
570 }\r
571 Int2OctStr (\r
572 (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)), \r
573 KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN), \r
574 KeyBuffer, \r
575 KeyLenInBytes\r
576 );\r
577 CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r
578 \r
579 //\r
580 // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
581 //\r
582 KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
583 + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
584 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
585\r
586 KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
587 if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
588 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
589 goto ON_EXIT;\r
590 }\r
591\r
592 KekSigList->SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
593 + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
594 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
595 KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
596 KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
597 CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r
598 \r
599 KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
600 CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
601 CopyMem (\r
602 KEKSigData->SignatureData,\r
603 KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),\r
604 WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r
605 );\r
606 \r
607 //\r
608 // Check if KEK entry has been already existed. \r
609 // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
610 // new KEK to original variable.\r
611 // \r
8c1babfd 612 Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
613 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
614 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
615 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
616 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
617 goto ON_EXIT;\r
618 }\r
619\r
ecc722ad 620 Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
621 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
622 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
623 NULL, \r
624 &DataSize, \r
625 NULL\r
626 );\r
627 if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
628 Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
629 } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
630 goto ON_EXIT;\r
631 }\r
632 \r
633 //\r
634 // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r
635 // \r
636 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
637 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
638 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
639 Attr, \r
640 KekSigListSize, \r
641 KekSigList\r
642 );\r
643 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
644 goto ON_EXIT;\r
645 }\r
646 \r
647ON_EXIT:\r
648\r
649 CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
650 Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
651 Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
652\r
653 if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
654 FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
655 Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
656 }\r
657\r
658 if (KeyBlob != NULL) {\r
659 FreePool (KeyBlob);\r
660 }\r
661 if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r
662 FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r
663 }\r
664 if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
665 FreePool (KekSigList);\r
666 }\r
667 \r
668 return Status;\r
669}\r
670\r
671/**\r
672 Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.\r
673\r
674 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
675\r
676 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
677 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
678 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
679 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
680\r
681**/\r
682EFI_STATUS\r
683EnrollX509ToKek (\r
684 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
685 ) \r
686{\r
687 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
688 UINTN X509DataSize;\r
689 VOID *X509Data;\r
690 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
691 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r
692 UINTN DataSize;\r
693 UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
694 UINT32 Attr;\r
695\r
696 X509Data = NULL;\r
697 X509DataSize = 0;\r
698 KekSigList = NULL;\r
699 KekSigListSize = 0;\r
700 DataSize = 0;\r
701 KEKSigData = NULL;\r
702\r
703 Status = ReadFileContent (\r
704 Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
705 &X509Data,\r
706 &X509DataSize,\r
707 0\r
708 );\r
709 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
710 goto ON_EXIT;\r
711 }\r
ba57d4fd 712 ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
ecc722ad 713\r
714 KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
715 KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
716 if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
717 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
718 goto ON_EXIT;\r
719 }\r
720\r
721 //\r
722 // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
723 // \r
724 KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;\r
725 KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
726 KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
727 CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
728\r
729 KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8*) KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
730 CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
731 CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
732\r
733 //\r
734 // Check if KEK been already existed. \r
735 // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
736 // new kek to original variable\r
737 // \r
738 Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
8c1babfd 739 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
740 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
741 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
742 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
743 goto ON_EXIT;\r
744 }\r
745 \r
ecc722ad 746 Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
747 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
748 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
749 NULL, \r
750 &DataSize, \r
751 NULL\r
752 );\r
753 if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
754 Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
755 } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
756 goto ON_EXIT;\r
757 } \r
758\r
759 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
760 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
761 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
762 Attr, \r
763 KekSigListSize,\r
764 KekSigList\r
765 );\r
766 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
767 goto ON_EXIT;\r
768 }\r
769\r
770ON_EXIT:\r
771\r
772 CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
773 Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
774 Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
775\r
776 if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
777 FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
778 Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
779 }\r
780\r
781 if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
782 FreePool (KekSigList);\r
783 }\r
784\r
785 return Status;\r
786}\r
787\r
788/**\r
789 Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r
790 The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
791 \r
792 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
793 \r
794 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.\r
795 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
796 @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.\r
797 \r
798**/\r
799EFI_STATUS\r
800EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r
801 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
802 ) \r
803{\r
804 UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
f71ed839 805 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
ecc722ad 806 \r
807 if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
808 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
809 }\r
810\r
f71ed839 811 Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
812 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
813 return Status;\r
814 }\r
815\r
ecc722ad 816 //\r
e4d7370d 817 // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, \r
ecc722ad 818 // and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r
819 //\r
820 FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r
e4d7370d 821 if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
ecc722ad 822 return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r
823 } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {\r
824 return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r
825 } else {\r
826 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
827 }\r
828}\r
829\r
830/**\r
831 Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX) without\r
832 KEK's authentication.\r
833\r
834 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
835 @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r
836 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
837 \r
838 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
839 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
840\r
841**/\r
842EFI_STATUS\r
843EnrollX509toSigDB (\r
844 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
845 IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
846 ) \r
847{\r
848 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
849 UINTN X509DataSize;\r
850 VOID *X509Data;\r
851 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r
852 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r
853 VOID *Data;\r
854 UINTN DataSize;\r
855 UINTN SigDBSize;\r
856 UINT32 Attr;\r
857\r
858 X509DataSize = 0;\r
859 SigDBSize = 0;\r
860 DataSize = 0;\r
861 X509Data = NULL;\r
862 SigDBCert = NULL;\r
863 SigDBCertData = NULL;\r
864 Data = NULL;\r
865\r
866 Status = ReadFileContent (\r
867 Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
868 &X509Data,\r
869 &X509DataSize,\r
870 0\r
871 );\r
872 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
873 goto ON_EXIT;\r
874 }\r
ba57d4fd 875 ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
ecc722ad 876\r
877 SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
878\r
879 Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
880 if (Data == NULL) {\r
881 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
882 goto ON_EXIT;\r
883 }\r
884\r
885 //\r
886 // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
887 // \r
888 SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
889 SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
890 SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
891 SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
892 CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
893\r
894 SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8* ) SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
895 CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
896 CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
897\r
898 //\r
899 // Check if signature database entry has been already existed. \r
900 // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
901 // new signature data to original variable\r
902 // \r
903 Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
8c1babfd 904 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
905 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
906 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
907 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
908 goto ON_EXIT;\r
909 }\r
ecc722ad 910\r
911 Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
912 VariableName, \r
913 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
914 NULL, \r
915 &DataSize, \r
916 NULL\r
917 );\r
918 if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
919 Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
920 } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
921 goto ON_EXIT;\r
922 } \r
923\r
924 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
925 VariableName, \r
926 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
927 Attr, \r
928 SigDBSize,\r
929 Data\r
930 );\r
931 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
932 goto ON_EXIT;\r
933 }\r
934\r
935ON_EXIT:\r
936\r
937 CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
938 Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
939 Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
940\r
941 if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
942 FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
943 Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
944 }\r
945\r
946 if (Data != NULL) {\r
947 FreePool (Data);\r
948 }\r
949\r
950 if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
951 FreePool (X509Data);\r
952 }\r
953\r
954 return Status;\r
955}\r
956\r
957/**\r
958 Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r
959\r
960 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r
961 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r
962 @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r
963\r
964**/\r
965EFI_STATUS\r
966LoadPeImage (\r
967 VOID \r
968 ) \r
969{\r
970 EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
971 EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r
972 EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r
973\r
974 NtHeader32 = NULL;\r
975 NtHeader64 = NULL;\r
976 //\r
977 // Read the Dos header\r
978 //\r
979 DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r
980 if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r
981 {\r
982 //\r
983 // DOS image header is present, \r
984 // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r
985 //\r
986 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
987 }\r
988 else\r
989 {\r
990 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
991 }\r
992\r
993 //\r
994 // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r
995 //\r
996 NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
997 if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r
998 {\r
999 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
1000 }\r
1001\r
1002 mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r
1003\r
1004 //\r
1005 // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r
1006 // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r
1007 //\r
1008 if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32) \r
1009 || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)) {\r
1010 //\r
1011 // IA-32 Architecture\r
1012 //\r
1013 mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r
1014 mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
1015 }\r
1016 else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r
1017 || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)) {\r
1018 //\r
1019 // 64-bits Architecture\r
1020 //\r
1021 mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r
1022 NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
1023 mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
1024 } else {\r
1025 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
1026 }\r
1027\r
1028 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1029}\r
1030\r
1031/**\r
1032 Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
1033 PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
1034\r
1035 @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
1036 \r
1037 @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r
1038 @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r
1039\r
1040**/\r
1041BOOLEAN \r
1042HashPeImage (\r
1043 IN UINT32 HashAlg\r
1044 )\r
1045{\r
1046 BOOLEAN Status;\r
1047 UINT16 Magic;\r
1048 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
1049 VOID *HashCtx;\r
1050 UINTN CtxSize;\r
1051 UINT8 *HashBase;\r
1052 UINTN HashSize;\r
1053 UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
1054 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
1055 UINTN Index;\r
1056 UINTN Pos;\r
1057\r
1058 HashCtx = NULL;\r
1059 SectionHeader = NULL;\r
1060 Status = FALSE;\r
1061\r
1062 if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
1063 return FALSE;\r
1064 }\r
1065 \r
1066 //\r
1067 // Initialize context of hash.\r
1068 //\r
1069 ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
1070\r
1071 if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r
1072 mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
1073 mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid; \r
1074 } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
1075 mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
1076 mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
1077 }\r
1078\r
1079 CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
1080 \r
1081 HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
1082 ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
1083\r
1084 // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r
1085\r
1086 // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
1087 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
1088 if (!Status) {\r
1089 goto Done;\r
1090 }\r
1091 //\r
1092 // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
1093 // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
1094 //\r
de2447dd 1095 if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1096 //\r
1097 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r
1098 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r
1099 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
1100 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
1101 //\r
1102 Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
1103 } else {\r
1104 //\r
1105 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
1106 //\r
1107 Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
1108 }\r
1109 \r
ecc722ad 1110 //\r
1111 // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
1112 // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
1113 //\r
1114 HashBase = mImageBase;\r
1115 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1116 //\r
1117 // Use PE32 offset.\r
1118 //\r
1119 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
1120 } else {\r
1121 //\r
1122 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
1123 //\r
1124 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r
1125 }\r
1126\r
1127 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
1128 if (!Status) {\r
1129 goto Done;\r
1130 }\r
1131 //\r
1132 // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
1133 // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
1134 // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
1135 //\r
1136 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1137 //\r
1138 // Use PE32 offset.\r
1139 //\r
1140 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
1141 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
1142 } else {\r
1143 //\r
1144 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
1145 // \r
1146 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
1147 HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r
1148 }\r
1149\r
1150 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
1151 if (!Status) {\r
1152 goto Done;\r
1153 }\r
1154 //\r
1155 // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
1156 // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
1157 //\r
1158 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1159 //\r
1160 // Use PE32 offset\r
1161 //\r
1162 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
1163 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r
1164 } else {\r
1165 //\r
1166 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
1167 //\r
1168 HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
1169 HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r
1170 }\r
1171\r
1172 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
1173 if (!Status) {\r
1174 goto Done;\r
1175 }\r
1176 //\r
1177 // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
1178 //\r
1179 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1180 //\r
1181 // Use PE32 offset.\r
1182 //\r
1183 SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
1184 } else {\r
1185 //\r
1186 // Use PE32+ offset\r
1187 //\r
1188 SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
1189 }\r
1190\r
1191 //\r
1192 // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r
1193 // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r
1194 // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
1195 // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
1196 //\r
1197 SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
1198 ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r
1199 //\r
1200 // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r
1201 // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r
1202 // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r
1203 // the section.\r
1204 //\r
1205 Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r
1206 mImageBase +\r
1207 mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r
1208 sizeof (UINT32) +\r
1209 sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r
1210 mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r
1211 );\r
1212 for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
1213 Pos = Index;\r
1214 while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r
1215 CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
1216 Pos--;\r
1217 }\r
1218 CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
1219 Section += 1;\r
1220 }\r
1221\r
1222 //\r
1223 // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r
1224 // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r
1225 // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r
1226 // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r
1227 // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r
1228 //\r
1229 for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
1230 Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r
1231 if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r
1232 continue;\r
1233 }\r
1234 HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
1235 HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
1236\r
1237 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
1238 if (!Status) {\r
1239 goto Done;\r
1240 }\r
1241\r
1242 SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
1243 }\r
1244\r
1245 //\r
1246 // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r
1247 // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r
1248 // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r
1249 // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r
1250 //\r
1251 if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
1252 HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
1253 if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
1254 //\r
1255 // Use PE32 offset.\r
1256 //\r
1257 HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
1258 mImageSize -\r
1259 mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
1260 SumOfBytesHashed);\r
1261 } else {\r
1262 //\r
1263 // Use PE32+ offset.\r
1264 //\r
1265 HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
1266 mImageSize -\r
1267 mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
1268 SumOfBytesHashed); \r
1269 }\r
1270\r
1271 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
1272 if (!Status) {\r
1273 goto Done;\r
1274 }\r
1275 }\r
1276\r
1277 Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r
1278\r
1279Done:\r
1280 if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
1281 FreePool (HashCtx);\r
1282 }\r
1283 if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r
1284 FreePool (SectionHeader);\r
1285 }\r
1286 return Status;\r
1287}\r
1288\r
1289/**\r
1290 Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of \r
1291 Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification \r
1292 8.0 Appendix A\r
1293\r
1294 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
1295 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r
1296\r
1297**/\r
1298EFI_STATUS \r
1299HashPeImageByType (\r
1300 VOID\r
1301 )\r
1302{\r
1303 UINT8 Index;\r
1304 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
1305\r
1306 PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
1307\r
1308 for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { \r
1309 //\r
1310 // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
1311 // According to PKCS#7 Definition: \r
1312 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
1313 // version Version,\r
1314 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
1315 // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
1316 // .... }\r
1317 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r
1318 // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r
1319 // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
1320 //\r
1321 if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r
1322 //\r
1323 // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r
1324 //\r
1325 continue;\r
1326 }\r
1327\r
1328 // \r
1329 if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
1330 break;\r
1331 }\r
1332 }\r
1333\r
1334 if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r
1335 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
1336 }\r
1337\r
1338 //\r
1339 // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
1340 //\r
1341 if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r
1342 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
1343 }\r
1344\r
1345 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1346}\r
1347\r
1348/**\r
1349 Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database. \r
1350\r
1351 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
1352 @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r
1353 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
1354\r
1355 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
1356 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
1357 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
1358 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
1359\r
1360**/\r
1361EFI_STATUS\r
1362EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (\r
1363 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
1364 IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
1365 )\r
1366{\r
1367 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1368 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r
1369 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r
1370 VOID *Data;\r
1371 UINTN DataSize;\r
1372 UINTN SigDBSize;\r
1373 UINT32 Attr;\r
1374 WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *GuidCertData;\r
1375\r
1376 Data = NULL;\r
1377 GuidCertData = NULL;\r
ecc722ad 1378\r
1379 //\r
1380 // Form the SigDB certificate list.\r
1381 // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
1382 //\r
1383 // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.\r
1384 // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r
1385 // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r
1386 //\r
1387\r
1388 //\r
1389 // Read the whole file content\r
1390 //\r
1391 Status = ReadFileContent(\r
1392 Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
1393 (VOID **) &mImageBase, \r
1394 &mImageSize, \r
1395 0\r
1396 );\r
1397 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1398 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1399 } \r
ba57d4fd 1400 ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
ecc722ad 1401\r
1402 Status = LoadPeImage ();\r
1403 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1404 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1405 }\r
1406\r
1407 if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {\r
1408 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
1409 Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1410 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1411 }\r
1412 } else {\r
1413 \r
1414 //\r
1415 // Read the certificate data\r
1416 //\r
1417 mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
1418\r
1419 if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
1420 GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID*) mCertificate;\r
1421 if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {\r
1422 Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
1423 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1424 }\r
1425\r
1426 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
1427 Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
1428 goto ON_EXIT;;\r
1429 }\r
1430 \r
1431 } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
1432\r
1433 Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r
1434 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1435 goto ON_EXIT;;\r
1436 }\r
1437 } else {\r
1438 Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
1439 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1440 }\r
1441 }\r
1442\r
1443 //\r
1444 // Create a new SigDB entry.\r
1445 //\r
1446 SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r
1447 + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
1448 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
1449\r
1450 Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
1451 if (Data == NULL) {\r
1452 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1453 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1454 }\r
1455 \r
1456 //\r
1457 // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r
1458 // \r
1459 SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
1460 SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
1461 SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
1462 SigDBCert->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
1463 CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);\r
1464\r
1465 SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)SigDBCert + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
1466 CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
1467 CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
1468\r
8c1babfd 1469 Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r
1470 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1471 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
1472 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1473 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
1474 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1475 }\r
1476 \r
ecc722ad 1477 //\r
1478 // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed. \r
1479 // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r
1480 // new signature data to original variable\r
1481 // \r
1482 DataSize = 0;\r
1483 Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
1484 VariableName, \r
1485 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
1486 NULL, \r
1487 &DataSize, \r
1488 NULL\r
1489 );\r
1490 if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
1491 Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
1492 } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
1493 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1494 } \r
1495\r
1496 //\r
1497 // Enroll the variable.\r
1498 //\r
1499 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
1500 VariableName, \r
1501 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r
1502 Attr, \r
1503 SigDBSize, \r
1504 Data\r
1505 );\r
1506 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1507 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1508 }\r
1509\r
1510ON_EXIT:\r
1511\r
1512 CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
1513 Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
1514 Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
1515\r
1516 if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
1517 FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
1518 Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
1519 }\r
1520\r
1521 if (Data != NULL) {\r
1522 FreePool (Data);\r
1523 }\r
1524\r
1525 if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
1526 FreePool (mImageBase);\r
1527 mImageBase = NULL;\r
1528 }\r
1529\r
1530 return Status;\r
1531}\r
1532\r
1533/**\r
1534 Enroll signature into DB/DBX without KEK's authentication.\r
1535 The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
1536 \r
1537 @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
1538 @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r
1539 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
1540 \r
1541 @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.\r
1542 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
1543 @retval others Fail to enroll signature data.\r
1544 \r
1545**/\r
1546EFI_STATUS\r
1547EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r
1548 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
1549 IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
1550 ) \r
1551{\r
1552 UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
f71ed839 1553 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
ecc722ad 1554\r
1555 if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
1556 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1557 }\r
1558\r
f71ed839 1559 Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
1560 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1561 return Status;\r
1562 }\r
1563 \r
ecc722ad 1564 //\r
1565 // Parse the file's postfix. \r
1566 //\r
1567 FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r
e4d7370d 1568 if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
ecc722ad 1569 //\r
e4d7370d 1570 // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
ecc722ad 1571 //\r
1572 return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
1573 }\r
1574\r
1575 return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
1576}\r
1577\r
1578/**\r
1579 List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX)\r
1580 by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r
1581\r
1582 @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
1583 @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
1584 @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
1585 @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r
1586 @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
1587 @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
1588\r
1589 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
1590 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
1591 \r
1592**/\r
1593EFI_STATUS\r
1594UpdateDeletePage (\r
1595 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
1596 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1597 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1598 IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r
1599 IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
1600 IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r
1601 )\r
1602{\r
1603 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1604 UINT32 Index;\r
1605 UINTN CertCount;\r
1606 UINTN GuidIndex;\r
1607 VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
1608 VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
1609 EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
1610 EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel; \r
1611 UINTN DataSize;\r
1612 UINT8 *Data;\r
1613 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1614 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1615 UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r
1616 CHAR16 *GuidStr;\r
1617 EFI_STRING_ID GuidID;\r
1618 EFI_STRING_ID Help;\r
1619\r
1620 Data = NULL;\r
1621 CertList = NULL;\r
1622 Cert = NULL;\r
1623 GuidStr = NULL;\r
1624 StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
1625 EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
1626 \r
1627 //\r
1628 // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
1629 //\r
1630 StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
1631 if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
1632 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1633 goto ON_EXIT; \r
1634 }\r
1635\r
1636 EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
1637 if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
1638 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1639 goto ON_EXIT; \r
1640 }\r
1641\r
1642 //\r
1643 // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
1644 //\r
1645 StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
1646 StartOpCodeHandle,\r
1647 &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
1648 NULL,\r
1649 sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
1650 );\r
1651 StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
1652 StartLabel->Number = LabelNumber;\r
1653\r
1654 EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
1655 EndOpCodeHandle,\r
1656 &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
1657 NULL,\r
1658 sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
1659 );\r
1660 EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
1661 EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
1662\r
1663 //\r
1664 // Read Variable.\r
1665 //\r
1666 DataSize = 0;\r
1667 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); \r
1668 if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
1669 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1670 }\r
1671\r
1672 Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
1673 if (Data == NULL) {\r
1674 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1675 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1676 }\r
1677\r
1678 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
1679 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1680 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1681 }\r
1682\r
1683 GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);\r
1684 if (GuidStr == NULL) {\r
1685 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1686 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1687 }\r
1688\r
1689 //\r
1690 // Enumerate all KEK pub data.\r
1691 //\r
1692 ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
1693 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1694 GuidIndex = 0;\r
1695\r
1696 while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1697\r
1698 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
1699 Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);\r
1700 } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
1701 Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);\r
1702 } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
1703 Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r
1704 } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
1705 Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r
1706 } else {\r
1707 //\r
1708 // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r
1709 //\r
1710 continue;\r
1711 }\r
1712\r
1713 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1714 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
1715 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList \r
1716 + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r
1717 + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize \r
1718 + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1719 //\r
1720 // Display GUID and help \r
1721 //\r
1722 GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r
1723 GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r
1724 HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r
1725 StartOpCodeHandle,\r
1726 (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r
1727 0, \r
1728 0, \r
1729 GuidID, \r
1730 Help,\r
1731 EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
1732 0,\r
1733 NULL\r
1734 ); \r
1735 }\r
1736\r
1737 ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1738 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1739 }\r
1740\r
1741ON_EXIT:\r
1742 HiiUpdateForm (\r
1743 PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
1744 &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
1745 FormId,\r
1746 StartOpCodeHandle,\r
1747 EndOpCodeHandle\r
1748 );\r
1749\r
1750 if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
1751 HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
1752 }\r
1753\r
1754 if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
1755 HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
1756 }\r
1757 \r
1758 if (Data != NULL) {\r
1759 FreePool (Data);\r
1760 }\r
1761\r
1762 if (GuidStr != NULL) {\r
1763 FreePool (GuidStr);\r
1764 }\r
1765\r
1766 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1767}\r
1768\r
beda2356 1769/**\r
ecc722ad 1770 Delete a KEK entry from KEK database. \r
beda2356 1771\r
ecc722ad 1772 @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
1773 @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r
beda2356 1774\r
ecc722ad 1775 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.\r
1776 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
1777 \r
1778**/\r
1779EFI_STATUS\r
1780DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r
1781 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
1782 IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId\r
1783 )\r
1784{\r
1785 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1786 UINTN DataSize;\r
1787 UINT8 *Data;\r
1788 UINT8 *OldData;\r
1789 UINT32 Attr;\r
1790 UINT32 Index;\r
1791 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1792 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1793 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1794 UINTN CertCount;\r
1795 UINT32 Offset;\r
1796 BOOLEAN IsKEKItemFound;\r
1797 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
1798 UINTN DeleteKekIndex;\r
1799 UINTN GuidIndex;\r
1800\r
1801 Data = NULL;\r
1802 OldData = NULL;\r
1803 CertList = NULL;\r
1804 Cert = NULL;\r
1805 Attr = 0; \r
1806 DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r
f71ed839 1807\r
1808 Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
1809 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1810 return Status;\r
1811 }\r
ecc722ad 1812 \r
1813 //\r
1814 // Get original KEK variable.\r
1815 // \r
1816 DataSize = 0; \r
1817 Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
1818 if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
1819 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1820 }\r
1821\r
1822 OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);\r
1823 if (OldData == NULL) {\r
1824 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r
1825 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1826 }\r
1827\r
1828 Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
1829 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1830 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1831 }\r
1832\r
1833 //\r
1834 // Allocate space for new variable. \r
1835 //\r
1836 Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
1837 if (Data == NULL) {\r
1838 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1839 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1840 }\r
1841\r
1842 //\r
1843 // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.\r
1844 //\r
1845 IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;\r
1846 KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
1847 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r
1848 Offset = 0;\r
1849 GuidIndex = 0;\r
1850 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1851 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
1852 CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
1853 CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
1854 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
1855 Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1856 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1857 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1858 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
1859 if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {\r
1860 //\r
1861 // Find it! Skip it!\r
1862 //\r
1863 NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1864 IsKEKItemFound = TRUE; \r
1865 } else {\r
1866 //\r
1867 // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
1868 //\r
1869 CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1870 Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1871 }\r
1872 GuidIndex++;\r
1873 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8*) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1874 }\r
1875 } else {\r
1876 //\r
1877 // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
1878 //\r
1879 CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1880 Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1881 }\r
1882 \r
1883 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1884 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1885 }\r
1886\r
1887 if (!IsKEKItemFound) {\r
1888 //\r
1889 // Doesn't find the Kek Item!\r
1890 //\r
1891 Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1892 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1893 }\r
1894\r
1895 //\r
1896 // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.\r
1897 //\r
1898 KekDataSize = Offset;\r
1899 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
1900 Offset = 0;\r
1901 ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r
1902 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1903 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1904 DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
1905 if (CertCount != 0) {\r
1906 CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1907 Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1908 } \r
1909 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1910 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1911 }\r
1912\r
ecc722ad 1913 DataSize = Offset;\r
8c1babfd 1914 if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1915 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
1916 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1917 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
1918 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1919 }\r
1920 }\r
ecc722ad 1921\r
1922 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
1923 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r
1924 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r
1925 Attr, \r
1926 DataSize, \r
1927 OldData\r
1928 );\r
1929 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1930 DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
1931 goto ON_EXIT;\r
1932 }\r
1933 \r
1934ON_EXIT:\r
1935 if (Data != NULL) {\r
1936 FreePool(Data);\r
1937 }\r
1938\r
1939 if (OldData != NULL) {\r
1940 FreePool(OldData);\r
1941 }\r
1942\r
1943 return UpdateDeletePage (\r
1944 PrivateData, \r
1945 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
1946 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1947 LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
1948 FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r
1949 OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r
1950 );\r
1951}\r
1952\r
1953/**\r
1954 Delete a signature entry from siganture database.\r
beda2356 1955\r
ecc722ad 1956 @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
1957 @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
1958 @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
1959 @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r
1960 @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
1961 @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
1962 @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.\r
1963 \r
1964 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete siganture successfully.\r
1965 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,\r
1966 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
beda2356 1967**/\r
1968EFI_STATUS\r
ecc722ad 1969DeleteSignature (\r
1970 IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
1971 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1972 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1973 IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r
1974 IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
1975 IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,\r
1976 IN UINTN DeleteIndex\r
beda2356 1977 )\r
1978{\r
ecc722ad 1979 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1980 UINTN DataSize;\r
1981 UINT8 *Data;\r
1982 UINT8 *OldData;\r
1983 UINT32 Attr;\r
1984 UINT32 Index;\r
1985 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1986 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1987 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1988 UINTN CertCount;\r
1989 UINT32 Offset;\r
1990 BOOLEAN IsItemFound;\r
1991 UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r
1992 UINTN GuidIndex;\r
bc0c99b3 1993\r
ecc722ad 1994 Data = NULL;\r
1995 OldData = NULL;\r
1996 CertList = NULL;\r
1997 Cert = NULL;\r
1998 Attr = 0; \r
1999\r
f71ed839 2000 Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
2001 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2002 return Status;\r
2003 }\r
2004\r
ecc722ad 2005 //\r
2006 // Get original signature list data.\r
2007 // \r
2008 DataSize = 0;\r
2009 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
2010 if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
2011 goto ON_EXIT;\r
2012 }\r
2013\r
2014 OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
2015 if (OldData == NULL) {\r
2016 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r
2017 goto ON_EXIT;\r
2018 }\r
2019\r
2020 Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
2021 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
2022 goto ON_EXIT;\r
2023 } \r
2024\r
2025 //\r
2026 // Allocate space for new variable. \r
2027 //\r
2028 Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
2029 if (Data == NULL) {\r
2030 Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2031 goto ON_EXIT;\r
2032 }\r
2033\r
2034 //\r
2035 // Enumerate all signature data and erasing the target item.\r
2036 //\r
2037 IsItemFound = FALSE;\r
2038 ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
2039 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r
2040 Offset = 0;\r
2041 GuidIndex = 0;\r
2042 while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2043 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
2044 CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||\r
2045 CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||\r
2046 CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)\r
2047 ) {\r
2048 //\r
2049 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.\r
2050 //\r
2051 CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
2052 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (Data + Offset);\r
2053 Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2054 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2055 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2056 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2057 if (GuidIndex == DeleteIndex) {\r
2058 //\r
2059 // Find it! Skip it!\r
2060 //\r
2061 NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2062 IsItemFound = TRUE; \r
2063 } else {\r
2064 //\r
2065 // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
2066 //\r
2067 CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(Cert), CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2068 Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2069 }\r
2070 GuidIndex++;\r
2071 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2072 }\r
2073 } else {\r
2074 //\r
2075 // This List doesn't match. Just copy it to the Data buffer.\r
2076 //\r
2077 CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2078 Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2079 }\r
2080 \r
2081 ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2082 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2083 }\r
2084\r
2085 if (!IsItemFound) {\r
2086 //\r
2087 // Doesn't find the signature Item!\r
2088 //\r
2089 Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2090 goto ON_EXIT;\r
2091 }\r
2092\r
2093 //\r
2094 // Delete the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header if there is no signature in the list.\r
2095 //\r
2096 ItemDataSize = Offset;\r
2097 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
2098 Offset = 0;\r
2099 ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);\r
2100 while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2101 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2102 DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
2103 if (CertCount != 0) {\r
2104 CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2105 Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2106 } \r
2107 ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2108 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2109 }\r
2110\r
ecc722ad 2111 DataSize = Offset;\r
8c1babfd 2112 if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
2113 Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
2114 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2115 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
2116 goto ON_EXIT;\r
2117 }\r
2118 }\r
ecc722ad 2119\r
2120 Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
2121 VariableName, \r
2122 VendorGuid, \r
2123 Attr, \r
2124 DataSize, \r
2125 OldData\r
2126 );\r
beda2356 2127 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
ecc722ad 2128 DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
2129 goto ON_EXIT;\r
beda2356 2130 }\r
ecc722ad 2131 \r
2132ON_EXIT:\r
2133 if (Data != NULL) {\r
2134 FreePool(Data);\r
2135 }\r
2136\r
2137 if (OldData != NULL) {\r
2138 FreePool(OldData);\r
2139 }\r
2140\r
2141 return UpdateDeletePage (\r
2142 PrivateData, \r
2143 VariableName,\r
2144 VendorGuid,\r
2145 LabelNumber,\r
2146 FormId,\r
2147 QuestionIdBase\r
2148 );\r
2149}\r
2150\r
2151/**\r
2152 This function extracts configuration from variable.\r
2153 \r
2154 @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
2155\r
2156**/\r
2157VOID\r
2158SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (\r
2159 IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData\r
2160 ) \r
2161{\r
2162 UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
2163 UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
2164 UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
2165\r
2166 SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
2167 SetupMode = NULL;\r
2168 SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
2169 \r
ecc722ad 2170 //\r
2171 // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
2172 // Checkbox.\r
2173 //\r
f71ed839 2174 ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
8f8ca22e 2175 GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
ecc722ad 2176 if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r
2177 ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
2178 } else {\r
2179 ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
f71ed839 2180 if ((*SecureBootEnable) == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) {\r
2181 ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
2182 }\r
ecc722ad 2183 }\r
8f8ca22e 2184 \r
ecc722ad 2185 //\r
2186 // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.\r
2187 //\r
2188 if (UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
2189 ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = TRUE;\r
2190 } else {\r
2191 ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;\r
2192 }\r
2193 \r
2194 //\r
2195 // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.\r
2196 //\r
f01b91ae 2197 GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r
8f8ca22e 2198 if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r
ecc722ad 2199 ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE;\r
2200 } else {\r
2201 ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;\r
2202 }\r
2203\r
2204 //\r
2205 // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.\r
2206 //\r
f01b91ae 2207 GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
ecc722ad 2208 if (SecureBootMode == NULL) {\r
2209 ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
2210 } else {\r
2211 ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);\r
2212 }\r
f71ed839 2213\r
2214 if (SecureBootEnable != NULL) {\r
2215 FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
2216 }\r
2217 if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r
2218 FreePool (SetupMode);\r
2219 }\r
2220 if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r
2221 FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
2222 }\r
beda2356 2223}\r
2224\r
2225/**\r
2226 This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one\r
2227 or more named elements from the target driver.\r
2228\r
2229 @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
2230 @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
2231 <ConfigRequest> format.\r
2232 @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request\r
2233 string. Points to the string's null terminator if\r
2234 request was successful. Points to the most recent\r
2235 '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or\r
2236 the beginning of the string if the failure is in\r
2237 the first name/value pair) if the request was not\r
2238 successful.\r
2239 @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
2240 <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled\r
2241 in for the names in the Request string. String to\r
2242 be allocated by the called function.\r
2243\r
2244 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.\r
2245 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.\r
2246 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.\r
2247 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
2248 driver.\r
2249\r
2250**/\r
2251EFI_STATUS\r
2252EFIAPI\r
2253SecureBootExtractConfig (\r
2254 IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
2255 IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,\r
2256 OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,\r
2257 OUT EFI_STRING *Results\r
2258 )\r
2259{\r
2260 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2261 UINTN BufferSize;\r
bc0c99b3 2262 UINTN Size;\r
beda2356 2263 SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;\r
beda2356 2264 EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;\r
bc0c99b3 2265 EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;\r
bc0c99b3 2266 SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
2267 BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;\r
f71ed839 2268 UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
bc0c99b3 2269\r
beda2356 2270 if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {\r
2271 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2272 }\r
ecc722ad 2273 \r
bc0c99b3 2274 AllocatedRequest = FALSE;\r
2275 ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
2276 ConfigRequest = NULL;\r
2277 Size = 0;\r
f71ed839 2278 SecureBoot = NULL;\r
bc0c99b3 2279 \r
ea71453f 2280 ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));\r
bc0c99b3 2281 PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
2282 *Progress = Request;\r
2283 \r
beda2356 2284 if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
2285 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2286 }\r
2287\r
beda2356 2288 //\r
ecc722ad 2289 // Get Configuration from Variable.\r
beda2356 2290 //\r
ecc722ad 2291 SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration);\r
f71ed839 2292\r
2293 //\r
2294 // Update current secure boot state.\r
2295 //\r
2296 GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
2297 if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
2298 HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);\r
2299 } else {\r
2300 HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);\r
2301 }\r
2302 if (SecureBoot != NULL) {\r
2303 FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
2304 }\r
beda2356 2305 \r
bc0c99b3 2306 BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
beda2356 2307 ConfigRequest = Request;\r
bc0c99b3 2308 if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {\r
2309 //\r
2310 // Request is set to NULL or OFFSET is NULL, construct full request string.\r
bc0c99b3 2311 //\r
2312 // Allocate and fill a buffer large enough to hold the <ConfigHdr> template\r
2313 // followed by "&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW" followed by a Null-terminator\r
2314 //\r
2315 ConfigRequestHdr = HiiConstructConfigHdr (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, PrivateData->DriverHandle);\r
2316 Size = (StrLen (ConfigRequestHdr) + 32 + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2317 ConfigRequest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);\r
2318 ASSERT (ConfigRequest != NULL);\r
2319 AllocatedRequest = TRUE;\r
2320 UnicodeSPrint (ConfigRequest, Size, L"%s&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=%016LX", ConfigRequestHdr, (UINT64)BufferSize);\r
2321 FreePool (ConfigRequestHdr);\r
2322 ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
2323 }\r
beda2356 2324\r
2325 Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (\r
2326 gHiiConfigRouting,\r
2327 ConfigRequest,\r
2328 (UINT8 *) &Configuration,\r
2329 BufferSize,\r
2330 Results,\r
2331 Progress\r
2332 );\r
bc0c99b3 2333\r
2334 //\r
2335 // Free the allocated config request string.\r
2336 //\r
2337 if (AllocatedRequest) {\r
2338 FreePool (ConfigRequest);\r
2339 }\r
2340\r
beda2356 2341 //\r
2342 // Set Progress string to the original request string.\r
2343 //\r
2344 if (Request == NULL) {\r
2345 *Progress = NULL;\r
2346 } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {\r
2347 *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);\r
2348 }\r
2349\r
2350 return Status;\r
2351}\r
2352\r
2353/**\r
2354 This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r
2355\r
2356 @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
2357 @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>\r
2358 format.\r
2359 @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of\r
2360 the most recent '&' before the first failing\r
2361 name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if\r
2362 the failure is in the first name/value pair) or\r
2363 the terminating NULL if all was successful.\r
2364\r
2365 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.\r
2366 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.\r
2367 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
2368 driver.\r
2369\r
2370**/\r
2371EFI_STATUS\r
2372EFIAPI\r
2373SecureBootRouteConfig (\r
2374 IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
2375 IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,\r
2376 OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r
2377 )\r
2378{\r
beda2356 2379 if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {\r
2380 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2381 }\r
2382\r
2383 *Progress = Configuration;\r
2384 if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
2385 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2386 }\r
2387\r
ecc722ad 2388 *Progress = Configuration + StrLen (Configuration);\r
beda2356 2389 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2390}\r
2391\r
2392/**\r
ecc722ad 2393 This function is called to provide results data to the driver.\r
beda2356 2394\r
2395 @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
2396 @param[in] Action Specifies the type of action taken by the browser.\r
2397 @param[in] QuestionId A unique value which is sent to the original\r
2398 exporting driver so that it can identify the type\r
2399 of data to expect.\r
2400 @param[in] Type The type of value for the question.\r
2401 @param[in] Value A pointer to the data being sent to the original\r
2402 exporting driver.\r
2403 @param[out] ActionRequest On return, points to the action requested by the\r
2404 callback function.\r
2405\r
2406 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The callback successfully handled the action.\r
2407 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the\r
2408 variable and its data.\r
2409 @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The variable could not be saved.\r
2410 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The specified Action is not supported by the\r
2411 callback.\r
2412\r
2413**/\r
2414EFI_STATUS\r
2415EFIAPI\r
2416SecureBootCallback (\r
2417 IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
2418 IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,\r
2419 IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,\r
2420 IN UINT8 Type,\r
2421 IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,\r
2422 OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest\r
2423 )\r
2424{\r
ecc722ad 2425 EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r
2426 EFI_STATUS Status; \r
2427 SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private;\r
2428 UINTN BufferSize;\r
2429 SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData;\r
2430 UINT16 LabelId;\r
bf4a3dbd 2431 UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
f71ed839 2432 UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
2433 UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
e4d7370d 2434 CHAR16 PromptString[100];\r
bf4a3dbd
ED		 2435\r
2436 SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
f71ed839 2437 SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
2438 SetupMode = NULL;\r
bc0c99b3 2439\r
beda2356 2440 if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {\r
2441 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2442 }\r
2443\r
f71ed839 2444 if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) &&\r
2445 (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) &&\r
2446 (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE)) {\r
beda2356 2447 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
2448 }\r
ecc722ad 2449 \r
2450 Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
bc0c99b3 2451\r
ecc722ad 2452 //\r
2453 // Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser\r
2454 //\r
2455 BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
2456 IfrNvData = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);\r
2457 if (IfrNvData == NULL) {\r
2458 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
beda2356 2459 }\r
bc0c99b3 2460\r
ecc722ad 2461 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2462\r
2463 HiiGetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData);\r
2464 \r
2465 if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) {\r
2466\r
2467 switch (QuestionId) {\r
2468 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r
f01b91ae 2469 GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r
bf4a3dbd 2470 if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r
f71ed839 2471 FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
ecc722ad 2472 if (EFI_ERROR (SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8))) {\r
2473 CreatePopUp (\r
2474 EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
2475 &Key,\r
2476 L"Only Physical Presence User could disable secure boot!",\r
2477 NULL\r
2478 );\r
2479 Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
0357efe3 2480 } else {\r
2481 CreatePopUp (\r
2482 EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
2483 &Key,\r
f71ed839 2484 L"Configuration changed, please reset the platform to take effect!",\r
0357efe3 2485 NULL\r
2486 );\r
ecc722ad 2487 }\r
ecc722ad 2488 }\r
2489 break;\r
2490\r
2491 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION:\r
2492 FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r
2493 FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r
2494 break;\r
2495\r
2496 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION:\r
2497 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION:\r
2498 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION:\r
2499 //\r
2500 // Clear Signature GUID.\r
2501 //\r
2502 ZeroMem (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, sizeof (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid));\r
2503 if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r
2504 Private->SignatureGUID = (EFI_GUID *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r
2505 if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r
2506 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2507 }\r
2508 }\r
beda2356 2509\r
ecc722ad 2510 if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) {\r
2511 LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;\r
2512 } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) {\r
2513 LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;\r
2514 } else {\r
2515 LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;\r
2516 }\r
2517\r
2518 //\r
2519 // Refresh selected file.\r
2520 //\r
2521 CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); \r
2522 break;\r
2523 \r
2524 case SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID:\r
2525 case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM:\r
2526 case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB:\r
2527 case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX:\r
2528 if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID) {\r
2529 Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile;\r
2530 } else if (QuestionId == FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM) {\r
2531 Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile;\r
2532 } else if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB) {\r
2533 Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb;\r
2534 } else {\r
2535 Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx;\r
2536 }\r
2537\r
2538 Private->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r
2539 CleanUpPage (FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID, Private);\r
2540 UpdateFileExplorer (Private, 0);\r
2541 break;\r
2542\r
2543 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: \r
f71ed839 2544 if (Value->u8) {\r
2545 CreatePopUp (\r
2546 EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
2547 &Key,\r
2548 L"Are you sure you want to delete PK? Secure boot will be disabled!",\r
2549 L"Press 'Y' to delete PK and exit, 'N' to discard change and return",\r
2550 NULL\r
2551 );\r
2552 if (Key.UnicodeChar == 'y' || Key.UnicodeChar == 'Y') {\r
ecc722ad 2553 Status = DeletePlatformKey ();\r
f71ed839 2554 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2555 CreatePopUp (\r
2556 EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
2557 &Key,\r
2558 L"Only Physical Presence User could delete PK in custom mode!",\r
2559 NULL\r
2560 );\r
2561 }\r
ecc722ad 2562 }\r
f71ed839 2563 }\r
ecc722ad 2564 break;\r
2565\r
2566 case KEY_DELETE_KEK:\r
2567 UpdateDeletePage (\r
2568 Private, \r
2569 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2570 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2571 LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
2572 FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r
2573 OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID \r
2574 );\r
2575 break;\r
2576\r
2577 case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB: \r
2578 UpdateDeletePage (\r
2579 Private,\r
2580 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
2581 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
2582 LABEL_DB_DELETE,\r
2583 SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r
2584 OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r
2585 );\r
2586 break;\r
2587\r
2588 case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX:\r
2589 UpdateDeletePage (\r
2590 Private,\r
2591 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
2592 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
2593 LABEL_DBX_DELETE,\r
2594 SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r
2595 OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r
2596 );\r
2597\r
2598 break;\r
2599\r
2600 case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r
2601 Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private);\r
2602 break;\r
2603\r
2604 case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r
2605 Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
2606 break;\r
2607\r
2608 case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r
2609 Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
2610 break;\r
2611\r
2612 default:\r
2613 if (QuestionId >= FILE_OPTION_OFFSET) {\r
2614 UpdateFileExplorer (Private, QuestionId);\r
2615 } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
2616 (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r
2617 DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId);\r
2618 } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
2619 (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r
2620 DeleteSignature (\r
2621 Private,\r
2622 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
2623 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
2624 LABEL_DB_DELETE, \r
2625 SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r
2626 OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID,\r
2627 QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r
2628 );\r
2629 } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID) &&\r
2630 (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r
2631 DeleteSignature (\r
2632 Private,\r
2633 EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
2634 &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
2635 LABEL_DBX_DELETE, \r
2636 SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r
2637 OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID,\r
2638 QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r
2639 );\r
2640 }\r
2641 break;\r
2642 }\r
2643 } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {\r
2644 switch (QuestionId) {\r
2645 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r
f71ed839 2646 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
ecc722ad 2647 break; \r
2648 case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
2649 Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);\r
e4d7370d 2650 UnicodeSPrint (\r
2651 PromptString,\r
2652 sizeof (PromptString),\r
2653 L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.",\r
2654 mSupportX509Suffix\r
2655 );\r
ecc722ad 2656 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2657 CreatePopUp (\r
2658 EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r
2659 &Key,\r
e4d7370d 2660 L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r
2661 PromptString,\r
ecc722ad 2662 NULL\r
2663 );\r
2664 } else {\r
0fb450fb 2665 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_RESET; \r
ecc722ad 2666 } \r
2667 break;\r
2668\r
2669 case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r
2670 case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r
2671 case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r
2672 case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r
2673 if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
2674 CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r
2675 Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r
2676 Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r
2677 }\r
2678 \r
2679 if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
2680 FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
2681 Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
2682 }\r
2683 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_EXIT;\r
2684 break;\r
2685 \r
2686 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:\r
f71ed839 2687 GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
2688 if (NULL != SecureBootMode) {\r
ecc722ad 2689 Status = gRT->SetVariable ( \r
2690 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
2691 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
2692 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
2693 sizeof (UINT8),\r
2694 &Value->u8\r
2695 );\r
2696 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
2697 IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8;\r
f71ed839 2698 FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
ecc722ad 2699 } \r
2700 break;\r
2701\r
2702 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID:\r
2703 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB:\r
2704 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX:\r
2705 ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL);\r
2706 Status = StringToGuid (\r
2707 IfrNvData->SignatureGuid,\r
2708 StrLen (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid),\r
2709 Private->SignatureGUID\r
2710 );\r
2711 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2712 break;\r
2713 }\r
2714\r
2715 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
2716 break;\r
2717\r
2718 case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r
f71ed839 2719 GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r
2720 if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r
2721 IfrNvData->DeletePk = TRUE;\r
2722 IfrNvData->HasPk = FALSE;\r
ecc722ad 2723 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;\r
f71ed839 2724 } else {\r
2725 IfrNvData->DeletePk = FALSE;\r
2726 IfrNvData->HasPk = TRUE;\r
2727 *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r
2728 }\r
2729 if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r
2730 FreePool (SetupMode);\r
ecc722ad 2731 }\r
2732 break; \r
2733 }\r
f71ed839 2734 } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) {\r
2735 //\r
2736 // Force the platform back to Standard Mode once user leave the setup screen.\r
2737 //\r
2738 GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
2739 if (NULL != SecureBootMode && *SecureBootMode == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
2740 IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
2741 SetSecureBootMode(STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
2742 }\r
2743 if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r
2744 FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
2745 }\r
ecc722ad 2746 }\r
2747 \r
2748 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2749 BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
2750 HiiSetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL);\r
2751 }\r
2752 FreePool (IfrNvData);\r
2753 \r
2754 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
beda2356 2755}\r
2756\r
2757/**\r
2758 This function publish the SecureBoot configuration Form.\r
2759\r
2760 @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
2761\r
ecc722ad 2762 @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed successfully.\r
beda2356 2763 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resource for HII Form installation.\r
2764 @retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r
2765\r
2766**/\r
2767EFI_STATUS\r
2768InstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r
2769 IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r
2770 )\r
2771{\r
2772 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2773 EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle;\r
2774 EFI_HANDLE DriverHandle;\r
beda2356 2775 EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *ConfigAccess;\r
2776\r
2777 DriverHandle = NULL;\r
2778 ConfigAccess = &PrivateData->ConfigAccess;\r
2779 Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r
2780 &DriverHandle,\r
2781 &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r
2782 &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r
2783 &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r
2784 ConfigAccess,\r
2785 NULL\r
2786 );\r
2787 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2788 return Status;\r
2789 }\r
2790\r
2791 PrivateData->DriverHandle = DriverHandle;\r
2792\r
2793 //\r
2794 // Publish the HII package list\r
2795 //\r
2796 HiiHandle = HiiAddPackages (\r
2797 &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
2798 DriverHandle,\r
2799 SecureBootConfigDxeStrings,\r
2800 SecureBootConfigBin,\r
2801 NULL\r
2802 );\r
2803 if (HiiHandle == NULL) {\r
2804 gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r
2805 DriverHandle,\r
2806 &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r
2807 &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r
2808 &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r
2809 ConfigAccess,\r
2810 NULL\r
bc0c99b3 2811 );\r
beda2356 2812 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2813 }\r
bc0c99b3 2814\r
beda2356 2815 PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle;\r
ecc722ad 2816\r
2817 PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT));\r
2818 PrivateData->MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY));\r
2819 \r
2820 if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL || PrivateData->MenuEntry == NULL) {\r
2821 UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
2822 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2823 }\r
2824 \r
2825 PrivateData->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateInActive;\r
2826 PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r
2827 \r
2828 InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head);\r
2829 InitializeListHead (&DirectoryMenu.Head);\r
2830\r
2831 //\r
2832 // Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer\r
2833 //\r
2834 mStartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
2835 if (mStartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
2836 UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
2837 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2838 }\r
2839\r
2840 mEndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
2841 if (mEndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
2842 UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r
2843 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2844 }\r
2845\r
2846 //\r
2847 // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the start opcode\r
2848 //\r
2849 mStartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
2850 mStartOpCodeHandle,\r
2851 &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
2852 NULL,\r
2853 sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
2854 );\r
2855 mStartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
2856\r
2857 //\r
2858 // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the end opcode\r
2859 //\r
2860 mEndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
2861 mEndOpCodeHandle,\r
2862 &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
2863 NULL,\r
2864 sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
2865 );\r
2866 mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
2867 mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
2868 \r
bc0c99b3 2869 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
beda2356 2870}\r
2871\r
2872/**\r
2873 This function removes SecureBoot configuration Form.\r
2874\r
2875 @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
2876\r
2877**/\r
2878VOID\r
2879UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r
2880 IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r
2881 )\r
2882{\r
2883 //\r
2884 // Uninstall HII package list\r
2885 //\r
2886 if (PrivateData->HiiHandle != NULL) {\r
2887 HiiRemovePackages (PrivateData->HiiHandle);\r
2888 PrivateData->HiiHandle = NULL;\r
2889 }\r
2890\r
2891 //\r
2892 // Uninstall HII Config Access Protocol\r
2893 //\r
2894 if (PrivateData->DriverHandle != NULL) {\r
2895 gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r
2896 PrivateData->DriverHandle,\r
2897 &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r
2898 &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r
2899 &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r
2900 &PrivateData->ConfigAccess,\r
2901 NULL\r
2902 );\r
2903 PrivateData->DriverHandle = NULL;\r
2904 }\r
bc0c99b3 2905\r
ecc722ad 2906 if (PrivateData->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
2907 FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID);\r
2908 }\r
2909\r
2910 if (PrivateData->MenuEntry != NULL) {\r
2911 FreePool (PrivateData->MenuEntry);\r
2912 }\r
2913\r
2914 if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) {\r
2915 FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext);\r
2916 }\r
2917\r
beda2356 2918 FreePool (PrivateData);\r
ecc722ad 2919\r
2920 FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r
2921 FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r
2922\r
2923 if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
2924 HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);\r
2925 }\r
2926\r
2927 if (mEndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
2928 HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mEndOpCodeHandle);\r
2929 }\r
beda2356 2930}\r
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