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beda2356 | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.\r | |
3 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 4 | Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
bc0c99b3 | 5 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
6 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
7 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
beda2356 | 8 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
9 | \r | |
bc0c99b3 | 10 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
beda2356 | 11 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
12 | \r | |
13 | **/\r | |
14 | \r | |
15 | #include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"\r | |
16 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 17 | CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";\r |
beda2356 | 18 | \r |
19 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {\r | |
ecc722ad | 20 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, \r |
beda2356 | 21 | {\r |
22 | SecureBootExtractConfig,\r | |
23 | SecureBootRouteConfig,\r | |
24 | SecureBootCallback\r | |
25 | }\r | |
26 | };\r | |
27 | \r | |
28 | HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {\r | |
29 | {\r | |
30 | {\r | |
31 | HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,\r | |
32 | HW_VENDOR_DP,\r | |
33 | {\r | |
34 | (UINT8) (sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),\r | |
35 | (UINT8) ((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)\r | |
36 | }\r | |
37 | },\r | |
38 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID\r | |
39 | },\r | |
40 | {\r | |
41 | END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,\r | |
42 | END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 43 | {\r |
beda2356 | 44 | (UINT8) (END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),\r |
45 | (UINT8) ((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)\r | |
46 | }\r | |
47 | }\r | |
48 | };\r | |
49 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 50 | \r |
51 | //\r | |
52 | // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms\r | |
53 | //\r | |
54 | UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {\r | |
55 | 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5\r | |
56 | 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1\r | |
57 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224\r | |
58 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256\r | |
59 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384\r | |
60 | 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512\r | |
61 | };\r | |
62 | \r | |
63 | HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {\r | |
64 | { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },\r | |
65 | { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
66 | { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},\r | |
67 | { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },\r | |
68 | { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }\r | |
69 | };\r | |
70 | \r | |
e4d7370d | 71 | //\r |
72 | // Variable Definitions \r | |
73 | // \r | |
ecc722ad | 74 | UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r |
75 | WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL;\r | |
76 | IMAGE_TYPE mImageType;\r | |
77 | UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
78 | UINTN mImageSize = 0;\r | |
79 | UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
80 | UINTN mImageDigestSize;\r | |
81 | EFI_GUID mCertType;\r | |
82 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;\r | |
83 | EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;\r | |
84 | \r | |
e4d7370d | 85 | //\r |
86 | // Possible DER-encoded certificate file suffixes, end with NULL pointer.\r | |
87 | //\r | |
88 | CHAR16* mDerEncodedSuffix[] = {\r | |
89 | L".cer",\r | |
90 | L".der",\r | |
91 | L".crt",\r | |
92 | NULL\r | |
93 | };\r | |
94 | CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";\r | |
95 | \r | |
96 | /**\r | |
97 | This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.\r | |
98 | \r | |
99 | @param[in] FileSuffix The suffix of the input certificate file\r | |
100 | \r | |
101 | @retval TRUE It's a DER-encoded certificate.\r | |
102 | @retval FALSE It's NOT a DER-encoded certificate.\r | |
103 | \r | |
104 | **/\r | |
105 | BOOLEAN\r | |
106 | IsDerEncodeCertificate (\r | |
107 | IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix\r | |
108 | )\r | |
109 | {\r | |
110 | UINTN Index; \r | |
111 | for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {\r | |
112 | if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {\r | |
113 | return TRUE;\r | |
114 | }\r | |
115 | }\r | |
116 | return FALSE;\r | |
117 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 118 | \r |
119 | /**\r | |
120 | Set Secure Boot option into variable space.\r | |
121 | \r | |
122 | @param[in] VarValue The option of Secure Boot.\r | |
123 | \r | |
124 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is finished successfully.\r | |
125 | @retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r | |
126 | \r | |
127 | **/\r | |
128 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
129 | SaveSecureBootVariable (\r | |
130 | IN UINT8 VarValue\r | |
131 | )\r | |
132 | {\r | |
133 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
134 | \r | |
135 | Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r | |
136 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
137 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
138 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
139 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
140 | &VarValue\r | |
141 | );\r | |
142 | return Status;\r | |
143 | }\r | |
144 | \r | |
8c1babfd | 145 | /**\r |
146 | Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2\r | |
147 | descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function.\r | |
148 | \r | |
149 | @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes.\r | |
150 | On output, the size of data returned in Data\r | |
151 | buffer in bytes.\r | |
152 | @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or \r | |
153 | pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload.\r | |
154 | On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool,\r | |
155 | it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it. \r | |
156 | \r | |
157 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully.\r | |
158 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.\r | |
159 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
160 | @retval Others Unexpected error happens.\r | |
161 | \r | |
162 | **/\r | |
163 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
164 | CreateTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
165 | IN OUT UINTN *DataSize,\r | |
166 | IN OUT UINT8 **Data\r | |
167 | )\r | |
168 | {\r | |
169 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
170 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
171 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
172 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
173 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData;\r | |
174 | UINTN DescriptorSize;\r | |
175 | EFI_TIME Time;\r | |
176 | \r | |
177 | if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {\r | |
178 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
179 | }\r | |
180 | \r | |
181 | //\r | |
182 | // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the \r | |
183 | // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated\r | |
184 | // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate\r | |
185 | // data in it.\r | |
186 | //\r | |
187 | Payload = *Data;\r | |
188 | PayloadSize = *DataSize;\r | |
189 | \r | |
190 | DescriptorSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
191 | NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize);\r | |
192 | if (NewData == NULL) {\r | |
193 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
194 | }\r | |
195 | \r | |
196 | if ((Payload != NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r | |
197 | CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
198 | }\r | |
199 | \r | |
200 | DescriptorData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData);\r | |
201 | \r | |
202 | ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
203 | Status = gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL);\r | |
204 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
205 | FreePool(NewData);\r | |
206 | return Status;\r | |
207 | }\r | |
208 | Time.Pad1 = 0;\r | |
209 | Time.Nanosecond = 0;\r | |
210 | Time.TimeZone = 0;\r | |
211 | Time.Daylight = 0;\r | |
212 | Time.Pad2 = 0;\r | |
213 | CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
214 | \r | |
215 | DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r | |
216 | DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision = 0x0200;\r | |
217 | DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;\r | |
218 | CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);\r | |
219 | \r | |
220 | if (Payload != NULL) {\r | |
221 | FreePool(Payload);\r | |
222 | }\r | |
223 | \r | |
224 | *DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize;\r | |
225 | *Data = NewData;\r | |
226 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
227 | }\r | |
228 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 229 | /**\r |
230 | Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, NO authentication\r | |
231 | required.\r | |
232 | \r | |
233 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
234 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
235 | \r | |
236 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r | |
237 | @retval Others The driver failed to start the device.\r | |
238 | \r | |
239 | **/\r | |
240 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
241 | DeleteVariable (\r | |
242 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
243 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
244 | )\r | |
245 | {\r | |
246 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
247 | VOID* Variable;\r | |
8c1babfd | 248 | UINT8 *Data;\r |
249 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
250 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
ecc722ad | 251 | \r |
bf4a3dbd | 252 | GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 253 | if (Variable == NULL) {\r |
254 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
255 | }\r | |
f71ed839 | 256 | FreePool (Variable);\r |
ecc722ad | 257 | \r |
8c1babfd | 258 | Data = NULL;\r |
259 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
260 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
261 | | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
ecc722ad | 262 | \r |
8c1babfd | 263 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data);\r |
264 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
265 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
266 | return Status;\r | |
ecc722ad | 267 | }\r |
268 | \r | |
8c1babfd | 269 | Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r |
270 | VariableName,\r | |
271 | VendorGuid,\r | |
272 | Attr,\r | |
273 | DataSize,\r | |
274 | Data\r | |
275 | );\r | |
276 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
277 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
ecc722ad | 278 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 279 | return Status;\r |
280 | }\r | |
281 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 282 | /**\r |
283 | \r | |
284 | Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode.\r | |
285 | \r | |
286 | @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or\r | |
287 | CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r | |
288 | \r | |
289 | @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the special mode successfully.\r | |
290 | @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode.\r | |
291 | \r | |
292 | **/\r | |
293 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
294 | SetSecureBootMode (\r | |
295 | IN UINT8 SecureBootMode\r | |
296 | )\r | |
297 | {\r | |
298 | return gRT->SetVariable ( \r | |
299 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
300 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
301 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
302 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
303 | &SecureBootMode\r | |
304 | );\r | |
305 | }\r | |
306 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 307 | /**\r |
308 | Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)\r | |
309 | \r | |
310 | @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r | |
311 | @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r | |
312 | \r | |
313 | @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r | |
314 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r | |
315 | \r | |
316 | **/\r | |
317 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
318 | CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r | |
319 | IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File, \r | |
320 | OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert \r | |
321 | )\r | |
322 | {\r | |
323 | EFI_STATUS Status; \r | |
324 | UINT8 *X509Data;\r | |
325 | UINTN X509DataSize;\r | |
326 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;\r | |
327 | \r | |
328 | X509Data = NULL;\r | |
329 | PkCertData = NULL;\r | |
330 | X509DataSize = 0; \r | |
331 | \r | |
4adc12bf | 332 | Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r |
ecc722ad | 333 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
334 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
335 | }\r | |
ba57d4fd | 336 | ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 337 | \r |
338 | //\r | |
339 | // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.\r | |
340 | // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.\r | |
341 | //\r | |
342 | *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (\r | |
343 | sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
344 | + X509DataSize\r | |
345 | );\r | |
346 | if (*PkCert == NULL) {\r | |
347 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
348 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
349 | }\r | |
350 | \r | |
351 | (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r | |
352 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
353 | + X509DataSize);\r | |
354 | (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r | |
355 | (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
356 | CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r | |
357 | PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert) \r | |
358 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r | |
359 | + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
360 | CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); \r | |
361 | //\r | |
362 | // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r | |
363 | // \r | |
364 | CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r | |
365 | \r | |
366 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
367 | \r | |
368 | if (X509Data != NULL) {\r | |
369 | FreePool (X509Data);\r | |
370 | }\r | |
371 | \r | |
372 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {\r | |
373 | FreePool (*PkCert);\r | |
374 | *PkCert = NULL;\r | |
375 | }\r | |
376 | \r | |
377 | return Status;\r | |
378 | }\r | |
379 | \r | |
380 | /**\r | |
381 | Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.\r | |
382 | \r | |
383 | The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.\r | |
384 | \r | |
385 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
386 | \r | |
387 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.\r | |
388 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
389 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
390 | \r | |
391 | **/\r | |
392 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
393 | EnrollPlatformKey (\r | |
394 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private\r | |
395 | ) \r | |
396 | {\r | |
397 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
398 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
399 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
400 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;\r | |
401 | UINT16* FilePostFix;\r | |
402 | \r | |
403 | if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r | |
404 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
405 | }\r | |
406 | \r | |
407 | PkCert = NULL;\r | |
408 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 409 | Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r |
410 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
411 | return Status;\r | |
412 | }\r | |
413 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 414 | //\r |
e4d7370d | 415 | // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r |
ecc722ad | 416 | //\r |
417 | FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r | |
e4d7370d | 418 | if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r |
419 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));\r | |
ecc722ad | 420 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
421 | }\r | |
422 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", Private->FileContext->FileName));\r | |
423 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r | |
424 | \r | |
425 | //\r | |
426 | // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r | |
427 | //\r | |
8c1babfd | 428 | Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r |
429 | Private->FileContext->FHandle, \r | |
430 | &PkCert \r | |
431 | );\r | |
432 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
433 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
ecc722ad | 434 | }\r |
ba57d4fd | 435 | ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 436 | \r |
437 | //\r | |
438 | // Set Platform Key variable.\r | |
439 | // \r | |
440 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
8c1babfd | 441 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
ecc722ad | 442 | DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r |
8c1babfd | 443 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);\r |
444 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
445 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
446 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
447 | }\r | |
448 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 449 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r |
450 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, \r | |
451 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
452 | Attr, \r | |
453 | DataSize, \r | |
454 | PkCert\r | |
455 | );\r | |
456 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
457 | if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r | |
458 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));\r | |
459 | }\r | |
460 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
461 | }\r | |
462 | \r | |
463 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
464 | \r | |
465 | if (PkCert != NULL) {\r | |
466 | FreePool(PkCert);\r | |
467 | }\r | |
468 | \r | |
469 | if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r | |
470 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
471 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
472 | }\r | |
473 | \r | |
474 | return Status;\r | |
475 | }\r | |
476 | \r | |
477 | /**\r | |
478 | Remove the PK variable.\r | |
479 | \r | |
480 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully.\r | |
481 | @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK.\r | |
482 | \r | |
483 | **/\r | |
484 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
485 | DeletePlatformKey (\r | |
486 | VOID\r | |
487 | )\r | |
488 | {\r | |
489 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
490 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 491 | Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r |
492 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
493 | return Status;\r | |
494 | }\r | |
495 | \r | |
8c1babfd | 496 | Status = DeleteVariable (\r |
497 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r | |
498 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid\r | |
499 | );\r | |
ecc722ad | 500 | return Status;\r |
501 | }\r | |
502 | \r | |
503 | /**\r | |
504 | Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).\r | |
505 | \r | |
506 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
507 | \r | |
508 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successfully.\r | |
509 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
510 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r | |
511 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
512 | \r | |
513 | **/\r | |
514 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
515 | EnrollRsa2048ToKek (\r | |
516 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r | |
517 | )\r | |
518 | {\r | |
519 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
520 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
521 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
522 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r | |
523 | UINTN KeyBlobSize;\r | |
524 | UINT8 *KeyBlob;\r | |
525 | CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;\r | |
526 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r | |
527 | UINTN KekSigListSize;\r | |
528 | UINT8 *KeyBuffer; \r | |
529 | UINTN KeyLenInBytes;\r | |
530 | \r | |
531 | Attr = 0;\r | |
532 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
533 | KeyBuffer = NULL;\r | |
534 | KeyBlobSize = 0;\r | |
535 | KeyBlob = NULL;\r | |
536 | KeyInfo = NULL;\r | |
537 | KEKSigData = NULL;\r | |
538 | KekSigList = NULL;\r | |
539 | KekSigListSize = 0;\r | |
540 | \r | |
541 | //\r | |
542 | // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r | |
543 | // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r | |
544 | // \r | |
545 | Status = ReadFileContent (\r | |
546 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
4adc12bf | 547 | (VOID**) &KeyBlob,\r |
ecc722ad | 548 | &KeyBlobSize,\r |
549 | 0\r | |
550 | );\r | |
551 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
552 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
553 | }\r | |
ba57d4fd | 554 | ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 555 | KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *) KeyBlob;\r |
556 | if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {\r | |
557 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));\r | |
558 | Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
559 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
560 | }\r | |
561 | \r | |
562 | //\r | |
563 | // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r | |
564 | // \r | |
565 | KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r | |
566 | KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r | |
567 | if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
568 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
569 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
570 | }\r | |
571 | Int2OctStr (\r | |
572 | (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)), \r | |
573 | KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN), \r | |
574 | KeyBuffer, \r | |
575 | KeyLenInBytes\r | |
576 | );\r | |
577 | CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r | |
578 | \r | |
579 | //\r | |
580 | // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
581 | //\r | |
582 | KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r | |
583 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
584 | + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
585 | \r | |
586 | KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r | |
587 | if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r | |
588 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
589 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
590 | }\r | |
591 | \r | |
592 | KekSigList->SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r | |
593 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
594 | + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
595 | KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
596 | KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
597 | CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r | |
598 | \r | |
599 | KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
600 | CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
601 | CopyMem (\r | |
602 | KEKSigData->SignatureData,\r | |
603 | KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),\r | |
604 | WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r | |
605 | );\r | |
606 | \r | |
607 | //\r | |
608 | // Check if KEK entry has been already existed. \r | |
609 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
610 | // new KEK to original variable.\r | |
611 | // \r | |
8c1babfd | 612 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r |
613 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
614 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r | |
615 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
616 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
617 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
618 | }\r | |
619 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 620 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r |
621 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
622 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
623 | NULL, \r | |
624 | &DataSize, \r | |
625 | NULL\r | |
626 | );\r | |
627 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
628 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
629 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
630 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
631 | }\r | |
632 | \r | |
633 | //\r | |
634 | // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r | |
635 | // \r | |
636 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
637 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
638 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
639 | Attr, \r | |
640 | KekSigListSize, \r | |
641 | KekSigList\r | |
642 | );\r | |
643 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
644 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
645 | }\r | |
646 | \r | |
647 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
648 | \r | |
649 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
650 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
651 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
652 | \r | |
653 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
654 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
655 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
656 | }\r | |
657 | \r | |
658 | if (KeyBlob != NULL) {\r | |
659 | FreePool (KeyBlob);\r | |
660 | }\r | |
661 | if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r | |
662 | FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r | |
663 | }\r | |
664 | if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r | |
665 | FreePool (KekSigList);\r | |
666 | }\r | |
667 | \r | |
668 | return Status;\r | |
669 | }\r | |
670 | \r | |
671 | /**\r | |
672 | Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.\r | |
673 | \r | |
674 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
675 | \r | |
676 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r | |
677 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
678 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r | |
679 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
680 | \r | |
681 | **/\r | |
682 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
683 | EnrollX509ToKek (\r | |
684 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r | |
685 | ) \r | |
686 | {\r | |
687 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
688 | UINTN X509DataSize;\r | |
689 | VOID *X509Data;\r | |
690 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r | |
691 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r | |
692 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
693 | UINTN KekSigListSize;\r | |
694 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
695 | \r | |
696 | X509Data = NULL;\r | |
697 | X509DataSize = 0;\r | |
698 | KekSigList = NULL;\r | |
699 | KekSigListSize = 0;\r | |
700 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
701 | KEKSigData = NULL;\r | |
702 | \r | |
703 | Status = ReadFileContent (\r | |
704 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
705 | &X509Data,\r | |
706 | &X509DataSize,\r | |
707 | 0\r | |
708 | );\r | |
709 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
710 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
711 | }\r | |
ba57d4fd | 712 | ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 713 | \r |
714 | KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r | |
715 | KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r | |
716 | if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r | |
717 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
718 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
719 | }\r | |
720 | \r | |
721 | //\r | |
722 | // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r | |
723 | // \r | |
724 | KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;\r | |
725 | KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
726 | KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r | |
727 | CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r | |
728 | \r | |
729 | KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8*) KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
730 | CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
731 | CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r | |
732 | \r | |
733 | //\r | |
734 | // Check if KEK been already existed. \r | |
735 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
736 | // new kek to original variable\r | |
737 | // \r | |
738 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
8c1babfd | 739 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
740 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r | |
741 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
742 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
743 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
744 | }\r | |
745 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 746 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r |
747 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
748 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
749 | NULL, \r | |
750 | &DataSize, \r | |
751 | NULL\r | |
752 | );\r | |
753 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
754 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
755 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
756 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
757 | } \r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
760 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
761 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
762 | Attr, \r | |
763 | KekSigListSize,\r | |
764 | KekSigList\r | |
765 | );\r | |
766 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
767 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
768 | }\r | |
769 | \r | |
770 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
771 | \r | |
772 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
773 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
774 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
775 | \r | |
776 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
777 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
778 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
779 | }\r | |
780 | \r | |
781 | if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r | |
782 | FreePool (KekSigList);\r | |
783 | }\r | |
784 | \r | |
785 | return Status;\r | |
786 | }\r | |
787 | \r | |
788 | /**\r | |
789 | Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r | |
790 | The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r | |
791 | \r | |
792 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
793 | \r | |
794 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.\r | |
795 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
796 | @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.\r | |
797 | \r | |
798 | **/\r | |
799 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
800 | EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r | |
801 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r | |
802 | ) \r | |
803 | {\r | |
804 | UINT16* FilePostFix;\r | |
f71ed839 | 805 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
ecc722ad | 806 | \r |
807 | if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r | |
808 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
809 | }\r | |
810 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 811 | Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r |
812 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
813 | return Status;\r | |
814 | }\r | |
815 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 816 | //\r |
e4d7370d | 817 | // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, \r |
ecc722ad | 818 | // and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r |
819 | //\r | |
820 | FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r | |
e4d7370d | 821 | if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r |
ecc722ad | 822 | return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r |
823 | } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {\r | |
824 | return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r | |
825 | } else {\r | |
826 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
827 | }\r | |
828 | }\r | |
829 | \r | |
830 | /**\r | |
831 | Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX) without\r | |
832 | KEK's authentication.\r | |
833 | \r | |
834 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
835 | @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r | |
836 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r | |
837 | \r | |
838 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r | |
839 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
840 | \r | |
841 | **/\r | |
842 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
843 | EnrollX509toSigDB (\r | |
844 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r | |
845 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r | |
846 | ) \r | |
847 | {\r | |
848 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
849 | UINTN X509DataSize;\r | |
850 | VOID *X509Data;\r | |
851 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r | |
852 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r | |
853 | VOID *Data;\r | |
854 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
855 | UINTN SigDBSize;\r | |
856 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
857 | \r | |
858 | X509DataSize = 0;\r | |
859 | SigDBSize = 0;\r | |
860 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
861 | X509Data = NULL;\r | |
862 | SigDBCert = NULL;\r | |
863 | SigDBCertData = NULL;\r | |
864 | Data = NULL;\r | |
865 | \r | |
866 | Status = ReadFileContent (\r | |
867 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
868 | &X509Data,\r | |
869 | &X509DataSize,\r | |
870 | 0\r | |
871 | );\r | |
872 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
873 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
874 | }\r | |
ba57d4fd | 875 | ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 876 | \r |
877 | SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r | |
878 | \r | |
879 | Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r | |
880 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
881 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
882 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
883 | }\r | |
884 | \r | |
885 | //\r | |
886 | // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r | |
887 | // \r | |
888 | SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r | |
889 | SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r | |
890 | SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
891 | SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r | |
892 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r | |
893 | \r | |
894 | SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8* ) SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
895 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
896 | CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r | |
897 | \r | |
898 | //\r | |
899 | // Check if signature database entry has been already existed. \r | |
900 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
901 | // new signature data to original variable\r | |
902 | // \r | |
903 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r | |
8c1babfd | 904 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
905 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r | |
906 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
907 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
908 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
909 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 910 | \r |
911 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r | |
912 | VariableName, \r | |
913 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
914 | NULL, \r | |
915 | &DataSize, \r | |
916 | NULL\r | |
917 | );\r | |
918 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
919 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
920 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
921 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
922 | } \r | |
923 | \r | |
924 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
925 | VariableName, \r | |
926 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
927 | Attr, \r | |
928 | SigDBSize,\r | |
929 | Data\r | |
930 | );\r | |
931 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
932 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
933 | }\r | |
934 | \r | |
935 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
936 | \r | |
937 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
938 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
939 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
940 | \r | |
941 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
942 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
943 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
944 | }\r | |
945 | \r | |
946 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
947 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
948 | }\r | |
949 | \r | |
950 | if (X509Data != NULL) {\r | |
951 | FreePool (X509Data);\r | |
952 | }\r | |
953 | \r | |
954 | return Status;\r | |
955 | }\r | |
956 | \r | |
957 | /**\r | |
958 | Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r | |
959 | \r | |
960 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r | |
961 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r | |
962 | @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r | |
963 | \r | |
964 | **/\r | |
965 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
966 | LoadPeImage (\r | |
967 | VOID \r | |
968 | ) \r | |
969 | {\r | |
970 | EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r | |
971 | EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r | |
972 | EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r | |
973 | \r | |
974 | NtHeader32 = NULL;\r | |
975 | NtHeader64 = NULL;\r | |
976 | //\r | |
977 | // Read the Dos header\r | |
978 | //\r | |
979 | DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r | |
980 | if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r | |
981 | {\r | |
982 | //\r | |
983 | // DOS image header is present, \r | |
984 | // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r | |
985 | //\r | |
986 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r | |
987 | }\r | |
988 | else\r | |
989 | {\r | |
990 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r | |
991 | }\r | |
992 | \r | |
993 | //\r | |
994 | // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r | |
995 | //\r | |
996 | NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
997 | if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r | |
998 | {\r | |
999 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1000 | }\r | |
1001 | \r | |
1002 | mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r | |
1003 | \r | |
1004 | //\r | |
1005 | // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r | |
1006 | // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r | |
1007 | //\r | |
1008 | if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32) \r | |
1009 | || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)) {\r | |
1010 | //\r | |
1011 | // IA-32 Architecture\r | |
1012 | //\r | |
1013 | mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r | |
1014 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r | |
1015 | }\r | |
1016 | else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r | |
1017 | || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)) {\r | |
1018 | //\r | |
1019 | // 64-bits Architecture\r | |
1020 | //\r | |
1021 | mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r | |
1022 | NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r | |
1023 | mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r | |
1024 | } else {\r | |
1025 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1026 | }\r | |
1027 | \r | |
1028 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1029 | }\r | |
1030 | \r | |
1031 | /**\r | |
1032 | Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r | |
1033 | PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r | |
1034 | \r | |
1035 | @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r | |
1036 | \r | |
1037 | @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r | |
1038 | @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r | |
1039 | \r | |
1040 | **/\r | |
1041 | BOOLEAN \r | |
1042 | HashPeImage (\r | |
1043 | IN UINT32 HashAlg\r | |
1044 | )\r | |
1045 | {\r | |
1046 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
1047 | UINT16 Magic;\r | |
1048 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r | |
1049 | VOID *HashCtx;\r | |
1050 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
1051 | UINT8 *HashBase;\r | |
1052 | UINTN HashSize;\r | |
1053 | UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
1054 | EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r | |
1055 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1056 | UINTN Pos;\r | |
1057 | \r | |
1058 | HashCtx = NULL;\r | |
1059 | SectionHeader = NULL;\r | |
1060 | Status = FALSE;\r | |
1061 | \r | |
1062 | if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1063 | return FALSE;\r | |
1064 | }\r | |
1065 | \r | |
1066 | //\r | |
1067 | // Initialize context of hash.\r | |
1068 | //\r | |
1069 | ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
1070 | \r | |
1071 | if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {\r | |
1072 | mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
1073 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid; \r | |
1074 | } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {\r | |
1075 | mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r | |
1076 | mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r | |
1077 | }\r | |
1078 | \r | |
1079 | CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r | |
1080 | \r | |
1081 | HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r | |
1082 | ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r | |
1083 | \r | |
1084 | // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r | |
1085 | \r | |
1086 | // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r | |
1087 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r | |
1088 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1089 | goto Done;\r | |
1090 | }\r | |
1091 | //\r | |
1092 | // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r | |
1093 | // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r | |
1094 | //\r | |
de2447dd | 1095 | if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r |
1096 | //\r | |
1097 | // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value \r | |
1098 | // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the \r | |
1099 | // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r | |
1100 | // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r | |
1101 | //\r | |
1102 | Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r | |
1103 | } else {\r | |
1104 | //\r | |
1105 | // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r | |
1106 | //\r | |
1107 | Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r | |
1108 | }\r | |
1109 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1110 | //\r |
1111 | // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r | |
1112 | // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r | |
1113 | //\r | |
1114 | HashBase = mImageBase;\r | |
1115 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1116 | //\r | |
1117 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1118 | //\r | |
1119 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r | |
1120 | } else {\r | |
1121 | //\r | |
1122 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1123 | //\r | |
1124 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);\r | |
1125 | }\r | |
1126 | \r | |
1127 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1128 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1129 | goto Done;\r | |
1130 | }\r | |
1131 | //\r | |
1132 | // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r | |
1133 | // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r | |
1134 | // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r | |
1135 | //\r | |
1136 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1137 | //\r | |
1138 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1139 | //\r | |
1140 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1141 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
1142 | } else {\r | |
1143 | //\r | |
1144 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1145 | // \r | |
1146 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1147 | HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);\r | |
1148 | }\r | |
1149 | \r | |
1150 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1151 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1152 | goto Done;\r | |
1153 | }\r | |
1154 | //\r | |
1155 | // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r | |
1156 | // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r | |
1157 | //\r | |
1158 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1159 | //\r | |
1160 | // Use PE32 offset\r | |
1161 | //\r | |
1162 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
1163 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r | |
1164 | } else {\r | |
1165 | //\r | |
1166 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1167 | //\r | |
1168 | HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r | |
1169 | HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);\r | |
1170 | }\r | |
1171 | \r | |
1172 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1173 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1174 | goto Done;\r | |
1175 | }\r | |
1176 | //\r | |
1177 | // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r | |
1178 | //\r | |
1179 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1180 | //\r | |
1181 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1182 | //\r | |
1183 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
1184 | } else {\r | |
1185 | //\r | |
1186 | // Use PE32+ offset\r | |
1187 | //\r | |
1188 | SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r | |
1189 | }\r | |
1190 | \r | |
1191 | //\r | |
1192 | // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r | |
1193 | // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r | |
1194 | // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r | |
1195 | // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r | |
1196 | //\r | |
1197 | SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r | |
1198 | ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r | |
1199 | //\r | |
1200 | // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r | |
1201 | // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r | |
1202 | // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r | |
1203 | // the section.\r | |
1204 | //\r | |
1205 | Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r | |
1206 | mImageBase +\r | |
1207 | mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r | |
1208 | sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
1209 | sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r | |
1210 | mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r | |
1211 | );\r | |
1212 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
1213 | Pos = Index;\r | |
1214 | while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r | |
1215 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
1216 | Pos--;\r | |
1217 | }\r | |
1218 | CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r | |
1219 | Section += 1;\r | |
1220 | }\r | |
1221 | \r | |
1222 | //\r | |
1223 | // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r | |
1224 | // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r | |
1225 | // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r | |
1226 | // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r | |
1227 | // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r | |
1228 | //\r | |
1229 | for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r | |
1230 | Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r | |
1231 | if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r | |
1232 | continue;\r | |
1233 | }\r | |
1234 | HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r | |
1235 | HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r | |
1236 | \r | |
1237 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1238 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1239 | goto Done;\r | |
1240 | }\r | |
1241 | \r | |
1242 | SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r | |
1243 | }\r | |
1244 | \r | |
1245 | //\r | |
1246 | // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r | |
1247 | // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r | |
1248 | // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r | |
1249 | // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r | |
1250 | //\r | |
1251 | if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r | |
1252 | HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r | |
1253 | if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r | |
1254 | //\r | |
1255 | // Use PE32 offset.\r | |
1256 | //\r | |
1257 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r | |
1258 | mImageSize -\r | |
1259 | mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r | |
1260 | SumOfBytesHashed);\r | |
1261 | } else {\r | |
1262 | //\r | |
1263 | // Use PE32+ offset.\r | |
1264 | //\r | |
1265 | HashSize = (UINTN)(\r | |
1266 | mImageSize -\r | |
1267 | mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r | |
1268 | SumOfBytesHashed); \r | |
1269 | }\r | |
1270 | \r | |
1271 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r | |
1272 | if (!Status) {\r | |
1273 | goto Done;\r | |
1274 | }\r | |
1275 | }\r | |
1276 | \r | |
1277 | Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r | |
1278 | \r | |
1279 | Done:\r | |
1280 | if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r | |
1281 | FreePool (HashCtx);\r | |
1282 | }\r | |
1283 | if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r | |
1284 | FreePool (SectionHeader);\r | |
1285 | }\r | |
1286 | return Status;\r | |
1287 | }\r | |
1288 | \r | |
1289 | /**\r | |
1290 | Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of \r | |
1291 | Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification \r | |
1292 | 8.0 Appendix A\r | |
1293 | \r | |
1294 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r | |
1295 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r | |
1296 | \r | |
1297 | **/\r | |
1298 | EFI_STATUS \r | |
1299 | HashPeImageByType (\r | |
1300 | VOID\r | |
1301 | )\r | |
1302 | {\r | |
1303 | UINT8 Index;\r | |
1304 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r | |
1305 | \r | |
1306 | PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r | |
1307 | \r | |
1308 | for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { \r | |
1309 | //\r | |
1310 | // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
1311 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition: \r | |
1312 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r | |
1313 | // version Version,\r | |
1314 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
1315 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
1316 | // .... }\r | |
1317 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r | |
1318 | // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r | |
1319 | // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r | |
1320 | //\r | |
1321 | if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r | |
1322 | //\r | |
1323 | // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r | |
1324 | //\r | |
1325 | continue;\r | |
1326 | }\r | |
1327 | \r | |
1328 | // \r | |
1329 | if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r | |
1330 | break;\r | |
1331 | }\r | |
1332 | }\r | |
1333 | \r | |
1334 | if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r | |
1335 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1336 | }\r | |
1337 | \r | |
1338 | //\r | |
1339 | // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r | |
1340 | //\r | |
1341 | if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r | |
1342 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
1343 | }\r | |
1344 | \r | |
1345 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1346 | }\r | |
1347 | \r | |
1348 | /**\r | |
1349 | Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database. \r | |
1350 | \r | |
1351 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
1352 | @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r | |
1353 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r | |
1354 | \r | |
1355 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r | |
1356 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
1357 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r | |
1358 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
1359 | \r | |
1360 | **/\r | |
1361 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1362 | EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (\r | |
1363 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r | |
1364 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r | |
1365 | )\r | |
1366 | {\r | |
1367 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1368 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r | |
1369 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r | |
1370 | VOID *Data;\r | |
1371 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1372 | UINTN SigDBSize;\r | |
1373 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1374 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *GuidCertData;\r | |
1375 | \r | |
1376 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1377 | GuidCertData = NULL;\r | |
ecc722ad | 1378 | \r |
1379 | //\r | |
1380 | // Form the SigDB certificate list.\r | |
1381 | // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r | |
1382 | //\r | |
1383 | // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.\r | |
1384 | // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r | |
1385 | // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r | |
1386 | //\r | |
1387 | \r | |
1388 | //\r | |
1389 | // Read the whole file content\r | |
1390 | //\r | |
1391 | Status = ReadFileContent(\r | |
1392 | Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r | |
1393 | (VOID **) &mImageBase, \r | |
1394 | &mImageSize, \r | |
1395 | 0\r | |
1396 | );\r | |
1397 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1398 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1399 | } \r | |
ba57d4fd | 1400 | ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 1401 | \r |
1402 | Status = LoadPeImage ();\r | |
1403 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1404 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1405 | }\r | |
1406 | \r | |
1407 | if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {\r | |
1408 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1409 | Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1410 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1411 | }\r | |
1412 | } else {\r | |
1413 | \r | |
1414 | //\r | |
1415 | // Read the certificate data\r | |
1416 | //\r | |
1417 | mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r | |
1418 | \r | |
1419 | if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r | |
1420 | GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID*) mCertificate;\r | |
1421 | if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {\r | |
1422 | Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1423 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1424 | }\r | |
1425 | \r | |
1426 | if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r | |
1427 | Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1428 | goto ON_EXIT;;\r | |
1429 | }\r | |
1430 | \r | |
1431 | } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r | |
1432 | \r | |
1433 | Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r | |
1434 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1435 | goto ON_EXIT;;\r | |
1436 | }\r | |
1437 | } else {\r | |
1438 | Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1439 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1440 | }\r | |
1441 | }\r | |
1442 | \r | |
1443 | //\r | |
1444 | // Create a new SigDB entry.\r | |
1445 | //\r | |
1446 | SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r | |
1447 | + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r | |
1448 | + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1449 | \r | |
1450 | Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r | |
1451 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1452 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1453 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1454 | }\r | |
1455 | \r | |
1456 | //\r | |
1457 | // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r | |
1458 | // \r | |
1459 | SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r | |
1460 | SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r | |
1461 | SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r | |
1462 | SigDBCert->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r | |
1463 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);\r | |
1464 | \r | |
1465 | SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)SigDBCert + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r | |
1466 | CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
1467 | CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r | |
1468 | \r | |
8c1babfd | 1469 | Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS \r |
1470 | | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1471 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r | |
1472 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1473 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
1474 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1475 | }\r | |
1476 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1477 | //\r |
1478 | // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed. \r | |
1479 | // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the \r | |
1480 | // new signature data to original variable\r | |
1481 | // \r | |
1482 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1483 | Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r | |
1484 | VariableName, \r | |
1485 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
1486 | NULL, \r | |
1487 | &DataSize, \r | |
1488 | NULL\r | |
1489 | );\r | |
1490 | if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1491 | Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r | |
1492 | } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r | |
1493 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1494 | } \r | |
1495 | \r | |
1496 | //\r | |
1497 | // Enroll the variable.\r | |
1498 | //\r | |
1499 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
1500 | VariableName, \r | |
1501 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, \r | |
1502 | Attr, \r | |
1503 | SigDBSize, \r | |
1504 | Data\r | |
1505 | );\r | |
1506 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1507 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1508 | }\r | |
1509 | \r | |
1510 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
1511 | \r | |
1512 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
1513 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
1514 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
1515 | \r | |
1516 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
1517 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
1518 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
1519 | }\r | |
1520 | \r | |
1521 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1522 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1523 | }\r | |
1524 | \r | |
1525 | if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r | |
1526 | FreePool (mImageBase);\r | |
1527 | mImageBase = NULL;\r | |
1528 | }\r | |
1529 | \r | |
1530 | return Status;\r | |
1531 | }\r | |
1532 | \r | |
1533 | /**\r | |
1534 | Enroll signature into DB/DBX without KEK's authentication.\r | |
1535 | The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r | |
1536 | \r | |
1537 | @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r | |
1538 | @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be \r | |
1539 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r | |
1540 | \r | |
1541 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.\r | |
1542 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r | |
1543 | @retval others Fail to enroll signature data.\r | |
1544 | \r | |
1545 | **/\r | |
1546 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1547 | EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r | |
1548 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r | |
1549 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r | |
1550 | ) \r | |
1551 | {\r | |
1552 | UINT16* FilePostFix;\r | |
f71ed839 | 1553 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
ecc722ad | 1554 | \r |
1555 | if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r | |
1556 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1557 | }\r | |
1558 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 1559 | Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r |
1560 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1561 | return Status;\r | |
1562 | }\r | |
1563 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1564 | //\r |
1565 | // Parse the file's postfix. \r | |
1566 | //\r | |
1567 | FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;\r | |
e4d7370d | 1568 | if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r |
ecc722ad | 1569 | //\r |
e4d7370d | 1570 | // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r |
ecc722ad | 1571 | //\r |
1572 | return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r | |
1573 | }\r | |
1574 | \r | |
1575 | return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r | |
1576 | }\r | |
1577 | \r | |
1578 | /**\r | |
1579 | List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX)\r | |
1580 | by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r | |
1581 | \r | |
1582 | @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r | |
1583 | @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r | |
1584 | @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r | |
1585 | @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r | |
1586 | @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r | |
1587 | @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r | |
1588 | \r | |
1589 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r | |
1590 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r | |
1591 | \r | |
1592 | **/\r | |
1593 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1594 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
1595 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r | |
1596 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1597 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1598 | IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r | |
1599 | IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r | |
1600 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r | |
1601 | )\r | |
1602 | {\r | |
1603 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1604 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1605 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1606 | UINTN GuidIndex;\r | |
1607 | VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r | |
1608 | VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r | |
1609 | EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r | |
1610 | EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel; \r | |
1611 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1612 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1613 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1614 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1615 | UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r | |
1616 | CHAR16 *GuidStr;\r | |
1617 | EFI_STRING_ID GuidID;\r | |
1618 | EFI_STRING_ID Help;\r | |
1619 | \r | |
1620 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1621 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1622 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1623 | GuidStr = NULL;\r | |
1624 | StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r | |
1625 | EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r | |
1626 | \r | |
1627 | //\r | |
1628 | // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r | |
1629 | //\r | |
1630 | StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
1631 | if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
1632 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1633 | goto ON_EXIT; \r | |
1634 | }\r | |
1635 | \r | |
1636 | EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
1637 | if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
1638 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1639 | goto ON_EXIT; \r | |
1640 | }\r | |
1641 | \r | |
1642 | //\r | |
1643 | // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r | |
1644 | //\r | |
1645 | StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
1646 | StartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1647 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
1648 | NULL,\r | |
1649 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
1650 | );\r | |
1651 | StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
1652 | StartLabel->Number = LabelNumber;\r | |
1653 | \r | |
1654 | EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
1655 | EndOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1656 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
1657 | NULL,\r | |
1658 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
1659 | );\r | |
1660 | EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
1661 | EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r | |
1662 | \r | |
1663 | //\r | |
1664 | // Read Variable.\r | |
1665 | //\r | |
1666 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
1667 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); \r | |
1668 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1669 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1670 | }\r | |
1671 | \r | |
1672 | Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1673 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1674 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1675 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1676 | }\r | |
1677 | \r | |
1678 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r | |
1679 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1680 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1681 | }\r | |
1682 | \r | |
1683 | GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);\r | |
1684 | if (GuidStr == NULL) {\r | |
1685 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1686 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1687 | }\r | |
1688 | \r | |
1689 | //\r | |
1690 | // Enumerate all KEK pub data.\r | |
1691 | //\r | |
1692 | ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
1693 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1694 | GuidIndex = 0;\r | |
1695 | \r | |
1696 | while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1697 | \r | |
1698 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r | |
1699 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);\r | |
1700 | } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1701 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);\r | |
1702 | } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r | |
1703 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r | |
1704 | } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r | |
1705 | Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r | |
1706 | } else {\r | |
1707 | //\r | |
1708 | // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r | |
1709 | //\r | |
b7d269ea | 1710 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
1711 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
ecc722ad | 1712 | continue;\r |
1713 | }\r | |
1714 | \r | |
1715 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1716 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1717 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList \r | |
1718 | + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) \r | |
1719 | + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize \r | |
1720 | + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1721 | //\r | |
1722 | // Display GUID and help \r | |
1723 | //\r | |
1724 | GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r | |
1725 | GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r | |
1726 | HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r | |
1727 | StartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1728 | (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r | |
1729 | 0, \r | |
1730 | 0, \r | |
1731 | GuidID, \r | |
1732 | Help,\r | |
1733 | EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r | |
1734 | 0,\r | |
1735 | NULL\r | |
1736 | ); \r | |
1737 | }\r | |
1738 | \r | |
1739 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1740 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1741 | }\r | |
1742 | \r | |
1743 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
1744 | HiiUpdateForm (\r | |
1745 | PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r | |
1746 | &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r | |
1747 | FormId,\r | |
1748 | StartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
1749 | EndOpCodeHandle\r | |
1750 | );\r | |
1751 | \r | |
1752 | if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
1753 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);\r | |
1754 | }\r | |
1755 | \r | |
1756 | if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
1757 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r | |
1758 | }\r | |
1759 | \r | |
1760 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1761 | FreePool (Data);\r | |
1762 | }\r | |
1763 | \r | |
1764 | if (GuidStr != NULL) {\r | |
1765 | FreePool (GuidStr);\r | |
1766 | }\r | |
1767 | \r | |
1768 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1769 | }\r | |
1770 | \r | |
beda2356 | 1771 | /**\r |
ecc722ad | 1772 | Delete a KEK entry from KEK database. \r |
beda2356 | 1773 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1774 | @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r |
1775 | @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r | |
beda2356 | 1776 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1777 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.\r |
1778 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
1779 | \r | |
1780 | **/\r | |
1781 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1782 | DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r | |
1783 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r | |
1784 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId\r | |
1785 | )\r | |
1786 | {\r | |
1787 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1788 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1789 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1790 | UINT8 *OldData;\r | |
1791 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1792 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1793 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1794 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1795 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1796 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1797 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1798 | BOOLEAN IsKEKItemFound;\r | |
1799 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1800 | UINTN DeleteKekIndex;\r | |
1801 | UINTN GuidIndex;\r | |
1802 | \r | |
1803 | Data = NULL;\r | |
1804 | OldData = NULL;\r | |
1805 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1806 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
1807 | Attr = 0; \r | |
1808 | DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r | |
f71ed839 | 1809 | \r |
1810 | Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r | |
1811 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1812 | return Status;\r | |
1813 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 1814 | \r |
1815 | //\r | |
1816 | // Get original KEK variable.\r | |
1817 | // \r | |
1818 | DataSize = 0; \r | |
1819 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
1820 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
1821 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1822 | }\r | |
1823 | \r | |
1824 | OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);\r | |
1825 | if (OldData == NULL) {\r | |
1826 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r | |
1827 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1828 | }\r | |
1829 | \r | |
1830 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r | |
1831 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
1832 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1833 | }\r | |
1834 | \r | |
1835 | //\r | |
1836 | // Allocate space for new variable. \r | |
1837 | //\r | |
1838 | Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
1839 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
1840 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1841 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1842 | }\r | |
1843 | \r | |
1844 | //\r | |
1845 | // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.\r | |
1846 | //\r | |
1847 | IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;\r | |
1848 | KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
1849 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r | |
1850 | Offset = 0;\r | |
1851 | GuidIndex = 0;\r | |
1852 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1853 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r | |
1854 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1855 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r | |
1856 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r | |
1857 | Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1858 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1859 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1860 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1861 | if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {\r | |
1862 | //\r | |
1863 | // Find it! Skip it!\r | |
1864 | //\r | |
1865 | NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1866 | IsKEKItemFound = TRUE; \r | |
1867 | } else {\r | |
1868 | //\r | |
1869 | // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
1870 | //\r | |
1871 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1872 | Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1873 | }\r | |
1874 | GuidIndex++;\r | |
1875 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8*) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1876 | }\r | |
1877 | } else {\r | |
1878 | //\r | |
1879 | // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
1880 | //\r | |
1881 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1882 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1883 | }\r | |
1884 | \r | |
1885 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1886 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1887 | }\r | |
1888 | \r | |
1889 | if (!IsKEKItemFound) {\r | |
1890 | //\r | |
1891 | // Doesn't find the Kek Item!\r | |
1892 | //\r | |
1893 | Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1894 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1895 | }\r | |
1896 | \r | |
1897 | //\r | |
1898 | // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.\r | |
1899 | //\r | |
1900 | KekDataSize = Offset;\r | |
1901 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r | |
1902 | Offset = 0;\r | |
1903 | ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r | |
1904 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1905 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1906 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r | |
1907 | if (CertCount != 0) {\r | |
1908 | CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1909 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1910 | } \r | |
1911 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1912 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1913 | }\r | |
1914 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1915 | DataSize = Offset;\r |
8c1babfd | 1916 | if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
1917 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r | |
1918 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1919 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
1920 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1921 | }\r | |
1922 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 1923 | \r |
1924 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
1925 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, \r | |
1926 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, \r | |
1927 | Attr, \r | |
1928 | DataSize, \r | |
1929 | OldData\r | |
1930 | );\r | |
1931 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1932 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
1933 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
1934 | }\r | |
1935 | \r | |
1936 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
1937 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
1938 | FreePool(Data);\r | |
1939 | }\r | |
1940 | \r | |
1941 | if (OldData != NULL) {\r | |
1942 | FreePool(OldData);\r | |
1943 | }\r | |
1944 | \r | |
1945 | return UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
1946 | PrivateData, \r | |
1947 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
1948 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1949 | LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r | |
1950 | FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r | |
1951 | OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r | |
1952 | );\r | |
1953 | }\r | |
1954 | \r | |
1955 | /**\r | |
1956 | Delete a signature entry from siganture database.\r | |
beda2356 | 1957 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1958 | @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r |
1959 | @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r | |
1960 | @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r | |
1961 | @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r | |
1962 | @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r | |
1963 | @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r | |
1964 | @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.\r | |
1965 | \r | |
1966 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete siganture successfully.\r | |
1967 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,\r | |
1968 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r | |
beda2356 | 1969 | **/\r |
1970 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
ecc722ad | 1971 | DeleteSignature (\r |
1972 | IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r | |
1973 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1974 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1975 | IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r | |
1976 | IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r | |
1977 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,\r | |
1978 | IN UINTN DeleteIndex\r | |
beda2356 | 1979 | )\r |
1980 | {\r | |
ecc722ad | 1981 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1982 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1983 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1984 | UINT8 *OldData;\r | |
1985 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1986 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1987 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1988 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1989 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1990 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1991 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1992 | BOOLEAN IsItemFound;\r | |
1993 | UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r | |
1994 | UINTN GuidIndex;\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 1995 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1996 | Data = NULL;\r |
1997 | OldData = NULL;\r | |
1998 | CertList = NULL;\r | |
1999 | Cert = NULL;\r | |
2000 | Attr = 0; \r | |
2001 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 2002 | Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r |
2003 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2004 | return Status;\r | |
2005 | }\r | |
2006 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 2007 | //\r |
2008 | // Get original signature list data.\r | |
2009 | // \r | |
2010 | DataSize = 0;\r | |
2011 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r | |
2012 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r | |
2013 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2014 | }\r | |
2015 | \r | |
2016 | OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
2017 | if (OldData == NULL) {\r | |
2018 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; \r | |
2019 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2020 | }\r | |
2021 | \r | |
2022 | Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r | |
2023 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
2024 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2025 | } \r | |
2026 | \r | |
2027 | //\r | |
2028 | // Allocate space for new variable. \r | |
2029 | //\r | |
2030 | Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r | |
2031 | if (Data == NULL) {\r | |
2032 | Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2033 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2034 | }\r | |
2035 | \r | |
2036 | //\r | |
2037 | // Enumerate all signature data and erasing the target item.\r | |
2038 | //\r | |
2039 | IsItemFound = FALSE;\r | |
2040 | ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
2041 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r | |
2042 | Offset = 0;\r | |
2043 | GuidIndex = 0;\r | |
2044 | while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2045 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r | |
2046 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||\r | |
2047 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||\r | |
2048 | CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)\r | |
2049 | ) {\r | |
2050 | //\r | |
2051 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.\r | |
2052 | //\r | |
2053 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r | |
2054 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (Data + Offset);\r | |
2055 | Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2056 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2057 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2058 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
2059 | if (GuidIndex == DeleteIndex) {\r | |
2060 | //\r | |
2061 | // Find it! Skip it!\r | |
2062 | //\r | |
2063 | NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2064 | IsItemFound = TRUE; \r | |
2065 | } else {\r | |
2066 | //\r | |
2067 | // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
2068 | //\r | |
2069 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(Cert), CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2070 | Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2071 | }\r | |
2072 | GuidIndex++;\r | |
2073 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2074 | }\r | |
2075 | } else {\r | |
2076 | //\r | |
2077 | // This List doesn't match. Just copy it to the Data buffer.\r | |
2078 | //\r | |
2079 | CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2080 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2081 | }\r | |
2082 | \r | |
2083 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2084 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2085 | }\r | |
2086 | \r | |
2087 | if (!IsItemFound) {\r | |
2088 | //\r | |
2089 | // Doesn't find the signature Item!\r | |
2090 | //\r | |
2091 | Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2092 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2093 | }\r | |
2094 | \r | |
2095 | //\r | |
2096 | // Delete the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header if there is no signature in the list.\r | |
2097 | //\r | |
2098 | ItemDataSize = Offset;\r | |
2099 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
2100 | Offset = 0;\r | |
2101 | ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);\r | |
2102 | while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2103 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2104 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r | |
2105 | if (CertCount != 0) {\r | |
2106 | CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2107 | Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2108 | } \r | |
2109 | ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2110 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2111 | }\r | |
2112 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 2113 | DataSize = Offset;\r |
8c1babfd | 2114 | if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
2115 | Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r | |
2116 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2117 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r | |
2118 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
2119 | }\r | |
2120 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2121 | \r |
2122 | Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r | |
2123 | VariableName, \r | |
2124 | VendorGuid, \r | |
2125 | Attr, \r | |
2126 | DataSize, \r | |
2127 | OldData\r | |
2128 | );\r | |
beda2356 | 2129 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
ecc722ad | 2130 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r |
2131 | goto ON_EXIT;\r | |
beda2356 | 2132 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 2133 | \r |
2134 | ON_EXIT:\r | |
2135 | if (Data != NULL) {\r | |
2136 | FreePool(Data);\r | |
2137 | }\r | |
2138 | \r | |
2139 | if (OldData != NULL) {\r | |
2140 | FreePool(OldData);\r | |
2141 | }\r | |
2142 | \r | |
2143 | return UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2144 | PrivateData, \r | |
2145 | VariableName,\r | |
2146 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2147 | LabelNumber,\r | |
2148 | FormId,\r | |
2149 | QuestionIdBase\r | |
2150 | );\r | |
2151 | }\r | |
2152 | \r | |
2153 | /**\r | |
2154 | This function extracts configuration from variable.\r | |
2155 | \r | |
2156 | @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r | |
2157 | \r | |
2158 | **/\r | |
2159 | VOID\r | |
2160 | SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (\r | |
2161 | IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData\r | |
2162 | ) \r | |
2163 | {\r | |
2164 | UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r | |
2165 | UINT8 *SetupMode;\r | |
2166 | UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r | |
2167 | \r | |
2168 | SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r | |
2169 | SetupMode = NULL;\r | |
2170 | SecureBootMode = NULL;\r | |
2171 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 2172 | //\r |
2173 | // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r | |
2174 | // Checkbox.\r | |
2175 | //\r | |
f71ed839 | 2176 | ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r |
8f8ca22e | 2177 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 2178 | if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r |
2179 | ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r | |
2180 | } else {\r | |
2181 | ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r | |
f71ed839 | 2182 | if ((*SecureBootEnable) == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) {\r |
2183 | ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;\r | |
2184 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2185 | }\r |
8f8ca22e | 2186 | \r |
ecc722ad | 2187 | //\r |
2188 | // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.\r | |
2189 | //\r | |
2190 | if (UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r | |
2191 | ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = TRUE;\r | |
2192 | } else {\r | |
2193 | ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;\r | |
2194 | }\r | |
2195 | \r | |
2196 | //\r | |
2197 | // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.\r | |
2198 | //\r | |
f01b91ae | 2199 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r |
8f8ca22e | 2200 | if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r |
ecc722ad | 2201 | ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE;\r |
2202 | } else {\r | |
2203 | ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;\r | |
2204 | }\r | |
2205 | \r | |
2206 | //\r | |
2207 | // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.\r | |
2208 | //\r | |
f01b91ae | 2209 | GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r |
ecc722ad | 2210 | if (SecureBootMode == NULL) {\r |
2211 | ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r | |
2212 | } else {\r | |
2213 | ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);\r | |
2214 | }\r | |
f71ed839 | 2215 | \r |
2216 | if (SecureBootEnable != NULL) {\r | |
2217 | FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
2218 | }\r | |
2219 | if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r | |
2220 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r | |
2221 | }\r | |
2222 | if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r | |
2223 | FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r | |
2224 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 2225 | }\r |
2226 | \r | |
2227 | /**\r | |
2228 | This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one\r | |
2229 | or more named elements from the target driver.\r | |
2230 | \r | |
2231 | @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r | |
2232 | @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in\r | |
2233 | <ConfigRequest> format.\r | |
2234 | @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request\r | |
2235 | string. Points to the string's null terminator if\r | |
2236 | request was successful. Points to the most recent\r | |
2237 | '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or\r | |
2238 | the beginning of the string if the failure is in\r | |
2239 | the first name/value pair) if the request was not\r | |
2240 | successful.\r | |
2241 | @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in\r | |
2242 | <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled\r | |
2243 | in for the names in the Request string. String to\r | |
2244 | be allocated by the called function.\r | |
2245 | \r | |
2246 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.\r | |
2247 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.\r | |
2248 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.\r | |
2249 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r | |
2250 | driver.\r | |
2251 | \r | |
2252 | **/\r | |
2253 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2254 | EFIAPI\r | |
2255 | SecureBootExtractConfig (\r | |
2256 | IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r | |
2257 | IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,\r | |
2258 | OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,\r | |
2259 | OUT EFI_STRING *Results\r | |
2260 | )\r | |
2261 | {\r | |
2262 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2263 | UINTN BufferSize;\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2264 | UINTN Size;\r |
beda2356 | 2265 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;\r |
beda2356 | 2266 | EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2267 | EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2268 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r |
2269 | BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;\r | |
f71ed839 | 2270 | UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2271 | \r |
beda2356 | 2272 | if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {\r |
2273 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
2274 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2275 | \r |
bc0c99b3 | 2276 | AllocatedRequest = FALSE;\r |
2277 | ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r | |
2278 | ConfigRequest = NULL;\r | |
2279 | Size = 0;\r | |
f71ed839 | 2280 | SecureBoot = NULL;\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2281 | \r |
ea71453f | 2282 | ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2283 | PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r |
2284 | *Progress = Request;\r | |
2285 | \r | |
beda2356 | 2286 | if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r |
2287 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2288 | }\r | |
2289 | \r | |
beda2356 | 2290 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 2291 | // Get Configuration from Variable.\r |
beda2356 | 2292 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 2293 | SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration);\r |
f71ed839 | 2294 | \r |
2295 | //\r | |
2296 | // Update current secure boot state.\r | |
2297 | //\r | |
2298 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r | |
2299 | if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r | |
2300 | HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);\r | |
2301 | } else {\r | |
2302 | HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);\r | |
2303 | }\r | |
2304 | if (SecureBoot != NULL) {\r | |
2305 | FreePool (SecureBoot);\r | |
2306 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 2307 | \r |
bc0c99b3 | 2308 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r |
beda2356 | 2309 | ConfigRequest = Request;\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2310 | if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {\r |
2311 | //\r | |
2312 | // Request is set to NULL or OFFSET is NULL, construct full request string.\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2313 | //\r |
2314 | // Allocate and fill a buffer large enough to hold the <ConfigHdr> template\r | |
2315 | // followed by "&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW" followed by a Null-terminator\r | |
2316 | //\r | |
2317 | ConfigRequestHdr = HiiConstructConfigHdr (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, PrivateData->DriverHandle);\r | |
2318 | Size = (StrLen (ConfigRequestHdr) + 32 + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2319 | ConfigRequest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);\r | |
2320 | ASSERT (ConfigRequest != NULL);\r | |
2321 | AllocatedRequest = TRUE;\r | |
2322 | UnicodeSPrint (ConfigRequest, Size, L"%s&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=%016LX", ConfigRequestHdr, (UINT64)BufferSize);\r | |
2323 | FreePool (ConfigRequestHdr);\r | |
2324 | ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r | |
2325 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 2326 | \r |
2327 | Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (\r | |
2328 | gHiiConfigRouting,\r | |
2329 | ConfigRequest,\r | |
2330 | (UINT8 *) &Configuration,\r | |
2331 | BufferSize,\r | |
2332 | Results,\r | |
2333 | Progress\r | |
2334 | );\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2335 | \r |
2336 | //\r | |
2337 | // Free the allocated config request string.\r | |
2338 | //\r | |
2339 | if (AllocatedRequest) {\r | |
2340 | FreePool (ConfigRequest);\r | |
2341 | }\r | |
2342 | \r | |
beda2356 | 2343 | //\r |
2344 | // Set Progress string to the original request string.\r | |
2345 | //\r | |
2346 | if (Request == NULL) {\r | |
2347 | *Progress = NULL;\r | |
2348 | } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {\r | |
2349 | *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);\r | |
2350 | }\r | |
2351 | \r | |
2352 | return Status;\r | |
2353 | }\r | |
2354 | \r | |
2355 | /**\r | |
2356 | This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r | |
2357 | \r | |
2358 | @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r | |
2359 | @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>\r | |
2360 | format.\r | |
2361 | @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of\r | |
2362 | the most recent '&' before the first failing\r | |
2363 | name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if\r | |
2364 | the failure is in the first name/value pair) or\r | |
2365 | the terminating NULL if all was successful.\r | |
2366 | \r | |
2367 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.\r | |
2368 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.\r | |
2369 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r | |
2370 | driver.\r | |
2371 | \r | |
2372 | **/\r | |
2373 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2374 | EFIAPI\r | |
2375 | SecureBootRouteConfig (\r | |
2376 | IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r | |
2377 | IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,\r | |
2378 | OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r | |
2379 | )\r | |
2380 | {\r | |
a2f2c258 | 2381 | UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r |
2382 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION IfrNvData;\r | |
2383 | UINTN BufferSize;\r | |
2384 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2385 | \r | |
beda2356 | 2386 | if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {\r |
2387 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
2388 | }\r | |
2389 | \r | |
2390 | *Progress = Configuration;\r | |
2391 | if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r | |
2392 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2393 | }\r | |
2394 | \r | |
a2f2c258 | 2395 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r |
2396 | Status = gHiiConfigRouting->ConfigToBlock (\r | |
2397 | gHiiConfigRouting,\r | |
2398 | Configuration,\r | |
2399 | (UINT8 *)&IfrNvData,\r | |
2400 | &BufferSize,\r | |
2401 | Progress\r | |
2402 | );\r | |
2403 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2404 | return Status;\r | |
2405 | }\r | |
2406 | \r | |
2407 | //\r | |
2408 | // Store Buffer Storage back to EFI variable if needed\r | |
2409 | //\r | |
2410 | SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r | |
2411 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r | |
2412 | if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r | |
2413 | FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
2414 | Status = SaveSecureBootVariable (IfrNvData.AttemptSecureBoot);\r | |
2415 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2416 | return Status;\r | |
2417 | }\r | |
2418 | }\r | |
2419 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 2420 | *Progress = Configuration + StrLen (Configuration);\r |
beda2356 | 2421 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
2422 | }\r | |
2423 | \r | |
2424 | /**\r | |
ecc722ad | 2425 | This function is called to provide results data to the driver.\r |
beda2356 | 2426 | \r |
2427 | @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r | |
2428 | @param[in] Action Specifies the type of action taken by the browser.\r | |
2429 | @param[in] QuestionId A unique value which is sent to the original\r | |
2430 | exporting driver so that it can identify the type\r | |
2431 | of data to expect.\r | |
2432 | @param[in] Type The type of value for the question.\r | |
2433 | @param[in] Value A pointer to the data being sent to the original\r | |
2434 | exporting driver.\r | |
2435 | @param[out] ActionRequest On return, points to the action requested by the\r | |
2436 | callback function.\r | |
2437 | \r | |
2438 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The callback successfully handled the action.\r | |
2439 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the\r | |
2440 | variable and its data.\r | |
2441 | @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The variable could not be saved.\r | |
2442 | @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The specified Action is not supported by the\r | |
2443 | callback.\r | |
2444 | \r | |
2445 | **/\r | |
2446 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2447 | EFIAPI\r | |
2448 | SecureBootCallback (\r | |
2449 | IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r | |
2450 | IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,\r | |
2451 | IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,\r | |
2452 | IN UINT8 Type,\r | |
2453 | IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,\r | |
2454 | OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest\r | |
2455 | )\r | |
2456 | {\r | |
ecc722ad | 2457 | EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;\r |
2458 | EFI_STATUS Status; \r | |
2459 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private;\r | |
2460 | UINTN BufferSize;\r | |
2461 | SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData;\r | |
2462 | UINT16 LabelId;\r | |
bf4a3dbd | 2463 | UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r |
f71ed839 | 2464 | UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r |
2465 | UINT8 *SetupMode;\r | |
e4d7370d | 2466 | CHAR16 PromptString[100];\r |
bf4a3dbd ED |
2467 | \r |
2468 | SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r | |
f71ed839 | 2469 | SecureBootMode = NULL;\r |
2470 | SetupMode = NULL;\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2471 | \r |
beda2356 | 2472 | if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {\r |
2473 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
2474 | }\r | |
2475 | \r | |
f71ed839 | 2476 | if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) &&\r |
2477 | (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) &&\r | |
a2f2c258 | 2478 | (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) &&\r |
2479 | (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD)) {\r | |
beda2356 | 2480 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r |
2481 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2482 | \r |
2483 | Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2484 | \r |
ecc722ad | 2485 | //\r |
2486 | // Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser\r | |
2487 | //\r | |
2488 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r | |
2489 | IfrNvData = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);\r | |
2490 | if (IfrNvData == NULL) {\r | |
2491 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
beda2356 | 2492 | }\r |
bc0c99b3 | 2493 | \r |
ecc722ad | 2494 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
2495 | \r | |
2496 | HiiGetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData);\r | |
2497 | \r | |
2498 | if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) {\r | |
2499 | \r | |
2500 | switch (QuestionId) {\r | |
2501 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r | |
f01b91ae | 2502 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r |
bf4a3dbd | 2503 | if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {\r |
f71ed839 | 2504 | FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r |
ecc722ad | 2505 | if (EFI_ERROR (SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8))) {\r |
2506 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2507 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2508 | &Key,\r | |
2509 | L"Only Physical Presence User could disable secure boot!",\r | |
2510 | NULL\r | |
2511 | );\r | |
2512 | Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
0357efe3 | 2513 | } else {\r |
2514 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2515 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2516 | &Key,\r | |
f71ed839 | 2517 | L"Configuration changed, please reset the platform to take effect!",\r |
0357efe3 | 2518 | NULL\r |
2519 | );\r | |
ecc722ad | 2520 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 2521 | }\r |
2522 | break;\r | |
2523 | \r | |
2524 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION:\r | |
2525 | FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r | |
2526 | FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r | |
2527 | break;\r | |
2528 | \r | |
2529 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION:\r | |
2530 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION:\r | |
2531 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION:\r | |
2532 | //\r | |
2533 | // Clear Signature GUID.\r | |
2534 | //\r | |
2535 | ZeroMem (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, sizeof (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid));\r | |
2536 | if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r | |
2537 | Private->SignatureGUID = (EFI_GUID *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r | |
2538 | if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {\r | |
2539 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2540 | }\r | |
2541 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 2542 | \r |
ecc722ad | 2543 | if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) {\r |
2544 | LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;\r | |
2545 | } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) {\r | |
2546 | LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;\r | |
2547 | } else {\r | |
2548 | LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;\r | |
2549 | }\r | |
2550 | \r | |
2551 | //\r | |
2552 | // Refresh selected file.\r | |
2553 | //\r | |
2554 | CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); \r | |
2555 | break;\r | |
2556 | \r | |
2557 | case SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID:\r | |
2558 | case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM:\r | |
2559 | case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB:\r | |
2560 | case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX:\r | |
2561 | if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID) {\r | |
2562 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile;\r | |
2563 | } else if (QuestionId == FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM) {\r | |
2564 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile;\r | |
2565 | } else if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB) {\r | |
2566 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb;\r | |
2567 | } else {\r | |
2568 | Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx;\r | |
2569 | }\r | |
2570 | \r | |
2571 | Private->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r | |
2572 | CleanUpPage (FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID, Private);\r | |
2573 | UpdateFileExplorer (Private, 0);\r | |
2574 | break;\r | |
2575 | \r | |
2576 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: \r | |
f71ed839 | 2577 | if (Value->u8) {\r |
2578 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2579 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2580 | &Key,\r | |
2581 | L"Are you sure you want to delete PK? Secure boot will be disabled!",\r | |
2582 | L"Press 'Y' to delete PK and exit, 'N' to discard change and return",\r | |
2583 | NULL\r | |
2584 | );\r | |
2585 | if (Key.UnicodeChar == 'y' || Key.UnicodeChar == 'Y') {\r | |
ecc722ad | 2586 | Status = DeletePlatformKey ();\r |
f71ed839 | 2587 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2588 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2589 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2590 | &Key,\r | |
2591 | L"Only Physical Presence User could delete PK in custom mode!",\r | |
2592 | NULL\r | |
2593 | );\r | |
2594 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2595 | }\r |
f71ed839 | 2596 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 2597 | break;\r |
2598 | \r | |
2599 | case KEY_DELETE_KEK:\r | |
2600 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2601 | Private, \r | |
2602 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2603 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2604 | LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r | |
2605 | FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r | |
2606 | OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID \r | |
2607 | );\r | |
2608 | break;\r | |
2609 | \r | |
2610 | case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB: \r | |
2611 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2612 | Private,\r | |
2613 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r | |
2614 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2615 | LABEL_DB_DELETE,\r | |
2616 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r | |
2617 | OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2618 | );\r | |
2619 | break;\r | |
2620 | \r | |
2621 | case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX:\r | |
2622 | UpdateDeletePage (\r | |
2623 | Private,\r | |
2624 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r | |
2625 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2626 | LABEL_DBX_DELETE,\r | |
2627 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r | |
2628 | OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2629 | );\r | |
2630 | \r | |
2631 | break;\r | |
2632 | \r | |
2633 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r | |
2634 | Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private);\r | |
ee79ac8d | 2635 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2636 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2637 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2638 | &Key,\r | |
2639 | L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r | |
2640 | L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate",\r | |
2641 | NULL\r | |
2642 | );\r | |
2643 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2644 | break;\r |
2645 | \r | |
2646 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r | |
2647 | Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r | |
ee79ac8d | 2648 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2649 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2650 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2651 | &Key,\r | |
2652 | L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r | |
2653 | L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate and executable EFI image",\r | |
2654 | NULL\r | |
2655 | );\r | |
2656 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2657 | break;\r |
2658 | \r | |
2659 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r | |
2660 | Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r | |
ee79ac8d | 2661 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2662 | CreatePopUp (\r | |
2663 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2664 | &Key,\r | |
2665 | L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r | |
2666 | L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate and executable EFI image",\r | |
2667 | NULL\r | |
2668 | );\r | |
2669 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2670 | break;\r |
2671 | \r | |
2672 | default:\r | |
2673 | if (QuestionId >= FILE_OPTION_OFFSET) {\r | |
2674 | UpdateFileExplorer (Private, QuestionId);\r | |
2675 | } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&\r | |
2676 | (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r | |
2677 | DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId);\r | |
2678 | } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) &&\r | |
2679 | (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r | |
2680 | DeleteSignature (\r | |
2681 | Private,\r | |
2682 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r | |
2683 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2684 | LABEL_DB_DELETE, \r | |
2685 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,\r | |
2686 | OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID,\r | |
2687 | QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2688 | );\r | |
2689 | } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID) &&\r | |
2690 | (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {\r | |
2691 | DeleteSignature (\r | |
2692 | Private,\r | |
2693 | EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r | |
2694 | &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r | |
2695 | LABEL_DBX_DELETE, \r | |
2696 | SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,\r | |
2697 | OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID,\r | |
2698 | QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID\r | |
2699 | );\r | |
2700 | }\r | |
2701 | break;\r | |
2702 | }\r | |
2703 | } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {\r | |
2704 | switch (QuestionId) {\r | |
2705 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:\r | |
f71ed839 | 2706 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r |
ecc722ad | 2707 | break; \r |
2708 | case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r | |
2709 | Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);\r | |
2710 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
ee79ac8d | 2711 | UnicodeSPrint (\r |
2712 | PromptString,\r | |
2713 | sizeof (PromptString),\r | |
2714 | L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.",\r | |
2715 | mSupportX509Suffix\r | |
2716 | );\r | |
ecc722ad | 2717 | CreatePopUp (\r |
2718 | EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,\r | |
2719 | &Key,\r | |
e4d7370d | 2720 | L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",\r |
2721 | PromptString,\r | |
ecc722ad | 2722 | NULL\r |
2723 | );\r | |
2724 | } else {\r | |
0fb450fb | 2725 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_RESET; \r |
ecc722ad | 2726 | } \r |
2727 | break;\r | |
2728 | \r | |
2729 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:\r | |
2730 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:\r | |
2731 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:\r | |
2732 | case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:\r | |
2733 | if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2734 | CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);\r | |
2735 | Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;\r | |
2736 | Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;\r | |
2737 | }\r | |
2738 | \r | |
2739 | if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r | |
2740 | FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r | |
2741 | Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r | |
2742 | }\r | |
2743 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_EXIT;\r | |
2744 | break;\r | |
2745 | \r | |
2746 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:\r | |
f71ed839 | 2747 | GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r |
2748 | if (NULL != SecureBootMode) {\r | |
ecc722ad | 2749 | Status = gRT->SetVariable ( \r |
2750 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
2751 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
2752 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
2753 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
2754 | &Value->u8\r | |
2755 | );\r | |
2756 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r | |
2757 | IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8;\r | |
f71ed839 | 2758 | FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r |
ecc722ad | 2759 | } \r |
2760 | break;\r | |
2761 | \r | |
2762 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID:\r | |
2763 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB:\r | |
2764 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX:\r | |
2765 | ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL);\r | |
2766 | Status = StringToGuid (\r | |
2767 | IfrNvData->SignatureGuid,\r | |
2768 | StrLen (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid),\r | |
2769 | Private->SignatureGUID\r | |
2770 | );\r | |
2771 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2772 | break;\r | |
2773 | }\r | |
2774 | \r | |
2775 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r | |
2776 | break;\r | |
2777 | \r | |
2778 | case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:\r | |
f71ed839 | 2779 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r |
2780 | if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
2781 | IfrNvData->DeletePk = TRUE;\r | |
2782 | IfrNvData->HasPk = FALSE;\r | |
ecc722ad | 2783 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;\r |
f71ed839 | 2784 | } else {\r |
2785 | IfrNvData->DeletePk = FALSE;\r | |
2786 | IfrNvData->HasPk = TRUE;\r | |
2787 | *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;\r | |
2788 | }\r | |
2789 | if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r | |
2790 | FreePool (SetupMode);\r | |
ecc722ad | 2791 | }\r |
2792 | break; \r | |
2793 | }\r | |
a2f2c258 | 2794 | } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD) {\r |
2795 | if (QuestionId == KEY_HIDE_SECURE_BOOT) {\r | |
2796 | GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);\r | |
2797 | if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {\r | |
2798 | IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r | |
2799 | } else {\r | |
2800 | FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
2801 | IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r | |
2802 | }\r | |
2803 | Value->b = IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot;\r | |
2804 | }\r | |
f71ed839 | 2805 | } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) {\r |
2806 | //\r | |
2807 | // Force the platform back to Standard Mode once user leave the setup screen.\r | |
2808 | //\r | |
2809 | GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r | |
2810 | if (NULL != SecureBootMode && *SecureBootMode == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r | |
2811 | IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r | |
2812 | SetSecureBootMode(STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r | |
2813 | }\r | |
2814 | if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r | |
2815 | FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r | |
2816 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 2817 | }\r |
2818 | \r | |
2819 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2820 | BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r | |
2821 | HiiSetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL);\r | |
2822 | }\r | |
2823 | FreePool (IfrNvData);\r | |
2824 | \r | |
2825 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
beda2356 | 2826 | }\r |
2827 | \r | |
2828 | /**\r | |
2829 | This function publish the SecureBoot configuration Form.\r | |
2830 | \r | |
2831 | @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r | |
2832 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 2833 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed successfully.\r |
beda2356 | 2834 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resource for HII Form installation.\r |
2835 | @retval Others Other errors as indicated.\r | |
2836 | \r | |
2837 | **/\r | |
2838 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2839 | InstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r | |
2840 | IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r | |
2841 | )\r | |
2842 | {\r | |
2843 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2844 | EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle;\r | |
2845 | EFI_HANDLE DriverHandle;\r | |
beda2356 | 2846 | EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *ConfigAccess;\r |
2847 | \r | |
2848 | DriverHandle = NULL;\r | |
2849 | ConfigAccess = &PrivateData->ConfigAccess;\r | |
2850 | Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r | |
2851 | &DriverHandle,\r | |
2852 | &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r | |
2853 | &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r | |
2854 | &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r | |
2855 | ConfigAccess,\r | |
2856 | NULL\r | |
2857 | );\r | |
2858 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2859 | return Status;\r | |
2860 | }\r | |
2861 | \r | |
2862 | PrivateData->DriverHandle = DriverHandle;\r | |
2863 | \r | |
2864 | //\r | |
2865 | // Publish the HII package list\r | |
2866 | //\r | |
2867 | HiiHandle = HiiAddPackages (\r | |
2868 | &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r | |
2869 | DriverHandle,\r | |
2870 | SecureBootConfigDxeStrings,\r | |
2871 | SecureBootConfigBin,\r | |
2872 | NULL\r | |
2873 | );\r | |
2874 | if (HiiHandle == NULL) {\r | |
2875 | gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r | |
2876 | DriverHandle,\r | |
2877 | &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r | |
2878 | &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r | |
2879 | &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r | |
2880 | ConfigAccess,\r | |
2881 | NULL\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2882 | );\r |
beda2356 | 2883 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r |
2884 | }\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2885 | \r |
beda2356 | 2886 | PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle;\r |
ecc722ad | 2887 | \r |
2888 | PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT));\r | |
2889 | PrivateData->MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY));\r | |
2890 | \r | |
2891 | if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL || PrivateData->MenuEntry == NULL) {\r | |
2892 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r | |
2893 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2894 | }\r | |
2895 | \r | |
2896 | PrivateData->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateInActive;\r | |
2897 | PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;\r | |
2898 | \r | |
2899 | InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head);\r | |
2900 | InitializeListHead (&DirectoryMenu.Head);\r | |
2901 | \r | |
2902 | //\r | |
2903 | // Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer\r | |
2904 | //\r | |
2905 | mStartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
2906 | if (mStartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
2907 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r | |
2908 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2909 | }\r | |
2910 | \r | |
2911 | mEndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r | |
2912 | if (mEndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r | |
2913 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);\r | |
2914 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2915 | }\r | |
2916 | \r | |
2917 | //\r | |
2918 | // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the start opcode\r | |
2919 | //\r | |
2920 | mStartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
2921 | mStartOpCodeHandle,\r | |
2922 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
2923 | NULL,\r | |
2924 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
2925 | );\r | |
2926 | mStartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
2927 | \r | |
2928 | //\r | |
2929 | // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the end opcode\r | |
2930 | //\r | |
2931 | mEndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r | |
2932 | mEndOpCodeHandle,\r | |
2933 | &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r | |
2934 | NULL,\r | |
2935 | sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r | |
2936 | );\r | |
2937 | mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r | |
2938 | mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r | |
2939 | \r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2940 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
beda2356 | 2941 | }\r |
2942 | \r | |
2943 | /**\r | |
2944 | This function removes SecureBoot configuration Form.\r | |
2945 | \r | |
2946 | @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r | |
2947 | \r | |
2948 | **/\r | |
2949 | VOID\r | |
2950 | UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (\r | |
2951 | IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData\r | |
2952 | )\r | |
2953 | {\r | |
2954 | //\r | |
2955 | // Uninstall HII package list\r | |
2956 | //\r | |
2957 | if (PrivateData->HiiHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2958 | HiiRemovePackages (PrivateData->HiiHandle);\r | |
2959 | PrivateData->HiiHandle = NULL;\r | |
2960 | }\r | |
2961 | \r | |
2962 | //\r | |
2963 | // Uninstall HII Config Access Protocol\r | |
2964 | //\r | |
2965 | if (PrivateData->DriverHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2966 | gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (\r | |
2967 | PrivateData->DriverHandle,\r | |
2968 | &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,\r | |
2969 | &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,\r | |
2970 | &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,\r | |
2971 | &PrivateData->ConfigAccess,\r | |
2972 | NULL\r | |
2973 | );\r | |
2974 | PrivateData->DriverHandle = NULL;\r | |
2975 | }\r | |
bc0c99b3 | 2976 | \r |
ecc722ad | 2977 | if (PrivateData->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r |
2978 | FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID);\r | |
2979 | }\r | |
2980 | \r | |
2981 | if (PrivateData->MenuEntry != NULL) {\r | |
2982 | FreePool (PrivateData->MenuEntry);\r | |
2983 | }\r | |
2984 | \r | |
2985 | if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) {\r | |
2986 | FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext);\r | |
2987 | }\r | |
2988 | \r | |
beda2356 | 2989 | FreePool (PrivateData);\r |
ecc722ad | 2990 | \r |
2991 | FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);\r | |
2992 | FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);\r | |
2993 | \r | |
2994 | if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2995 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);\r | |
2996 | }\r | |
2997 | \r | |
2998 | if (mEndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r | |
2999 | HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mEndOpCodeHandle);\r | |
3000 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 3001 | }\r |