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1## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r
2# Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards\r
3#\r
4# The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.\r
5# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)\r
6# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.\r
7#\r
8# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
9# (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP <BR>\r
10# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>\r
11# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
12#\r
13##\r
14\r
15[Defines]\r
16 DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r
17 PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
18 PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni\r
19 PACKAGE_GUID = 4EFC4F66-6219-4427-B780-FB99F470767F\r
20 PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.98\r
21\r
22[Includes]\r
23 Include\r
24\r
25[LibraryClasses]\r
26 ## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.\r
27 #\r
28 HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h\r
29\r
30 ## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.\r
31 #\r
32 PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h\r
33\r
34 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.\r
35 #\r
36 TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
37\r
38 ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
39 #\r
40 TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
41\r
42 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r
43 #\r
44 Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
45\r
46 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.\r
47 #\r
48 Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r
49\r
50 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.\r
51 #\r
52 Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h\r
53\r
54 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.\r
55 #\r
56 Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h\r
57\r
58 ## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r
59 #\r
60 TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
61\r
62 ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification\r
63 # >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
64 #\r
65 Tcg2PpVendorLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h\r
66\r
67 ## @libraryclass Handle TPM 2.0 physical presence request from OS.\r
68 #\r
69 Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
70\r
71 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about TCG storage generic command.\r
72 #\r
73 TcgStorageCoreLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageCoreLib.h\r
74\r
75 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about TCG storage Opal generic command.\r
76 #\r
77 TcgStorageOpalLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageOpalLib.h\r
78\r
79 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to access RPMC device.\r
80 #\r
81 RpmcLib|Include/Library/RpmcLib.h\r
82\r
83 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to access variable root key.\r
84 #\r
85 VariableKeyLib|Include/Library/VariableKeyLib.h\r
86\r
87[Guids]\r
88 ## Security package token space guid.\r
89 # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
90 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
91\r
92 ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.\r
93 # This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.\r
94 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
95 gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }\r
96\r
97 ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".\r
98 # Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.\r
99 # Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:\r
100 # Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.\r
101 # Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.\r
102 # Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.\r
103 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
104 gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
105\r
106 ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r
107 # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a\r
108 # mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r
109 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
110 gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
111\r
112 ## GUID used to "certdb"/"certdbv" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
113 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
114 gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r
115\r
116 ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.\r
117 # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
118 gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r
119\r
120 ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT_2 from a TPM2 PEIM to a TPM2 DXE Driver.\r
121 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
122 gTcgEvent2EntryHobGuid = { 0xd26c221e, 0x2430, 0x4c8a, { 0x91, 0x70, 0x3f, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x0, 0x41, 0x3f }}\r
123\r
124 ## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.\r
125 # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
126 gTpmErrorHobGuid = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}\r
127\r
128 ## HOB GUID used to record TPM2 startup locality\r
129 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
130 gTpm2StartupLocalityHobGuid = { 0x397b0c9, 0x22e8, 0x459e, { 0xa4, 0xff, 0x99, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x27, 0x9, 0x29 }}\r
131\r
132 ## HOB GUID used to record TCG 800-155 PlatformId Event\r
133 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
134 gTcg800155PlatformIdEventHobGuid = { 0xe2c3bc69, 0x615c, 0x4b5b, { 0x8e, 0x5c, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xa9, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0xd6 }}\r
135\r
136 ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.\r
137 # Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r
138 gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r
139\r
140 ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.\r
141 # Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
142 gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
143\r
144 ## GUID used to "Tcg2PhysicalPresence" variable and "Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
145 # Include/Guid/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
146 gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xaeb9c5c1, 0x94f1, 0x4d02, { 0xbf, 0xd9, 0x46, 0x2, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x54 }}\r
147\r
148 ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.\r
149 # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h\r
150 gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}\r
151\r
152 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
153 # Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
154 gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
155\r
156 ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
157 # Include/Guid/Tcg2ConfigHii.h\r
158 gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid = {0x6339d487, 0x26ba, 0x424b, { 0x9a, 0x5d, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x40, 0xbc }}\r
159\r
160 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
161 # Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
162 gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
163\r
164 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.\r
165 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
166 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r
167\r
168 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.\r
169 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
170 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r
171\r
172 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.\r
173 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
174 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r
175\r
176 ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.\r
177 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
178 gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r
179\r
180 ## Include/OpalPasswordExtraInfoVariable.h\r
181 gOpalExtraInfoVariableGuid = {0x44a2ad5d, 0x612c, 0x47b3, {0xb0, 0x6e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d}}\r
182\r
183\r
184[Ppis]\r
185 ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.\r
186 # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
187 gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
188\r
189 ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.\r
190 # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
191 gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
192\r
193 ## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.\r
194 # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
195 gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}\r
196\r
197 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r
198 gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r
199\r
200 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFV.h\r
201 gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid = { 0x3ce1e631, 0x7008, 0x477c, { 0xad, 0xa7, 0x5d, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x4b } }\r
202\r
203 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h\r
204 gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid = {0x7f5e4e31, 0x81b1, 0x47e5, { 0x9e, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x4b, 0x5b, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x1d } }\r
205\r
206#\r
207# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]\r
208# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.\r
209# 0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.\r
210# 0x80000003 | Incorrect progress or error code provided.\r
211#\r
212\r
213[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
214 ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
215 # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
216 # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
217 # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
218 # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
219 # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
220 # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
221 # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
222 # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
223 # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.\r
224 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
225 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r
226\r
227 ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.\r
228 # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
229 # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
230 # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
231 # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
232 # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
233 # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
234 # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
235 # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
236 # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.\r
237 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
238 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
239\r
240 ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.\r
241 # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or\r
242 # the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>\r
243 # BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r
244 # BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r
245 # BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.<BR>\r
246 # BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>\r
247 # BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>\r
248 # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.\r
249 # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
250 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
251\r
252 ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.\r
253 # The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
254 # @Prompt File name to save credential.\r
255 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
256\r
257 ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
258 # Note: This PCD is not been used.\r
259 # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.\r
260 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005\r
261\r
262 ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>\r
263 # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>\r
264 # If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>\r
265 # @Prompt Select platform type.\r
266 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
267 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
268\r
269 ## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>\r
270 # EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>\r
271 # @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions\r
272 # @ValidList 0x80000003 | 0x010D0000\r
273 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007\r
274\r
275 ## Defines the IO port used to trigger a software System Management Interrupt (SMI).<BR><BR>\r
276 # Used as the SMI Command IO port by security functionality that triggers a software SMI such\r
277 # as Physical Presence Interface (PPI).<BR>\r
278 # @Prompt SMI Command IO port.\r
279 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmiCommandIoPort|0xB2|UINT16|0x00000009\r
280\r
281 ## Progress Code for FV verification result.<BR><BR>\r
282 # (EFI_SOFTWARE_PEI_MODULE | EFI_SUBCLASS_SPECIFIC | XXX)\r
283 # @Prompt Status Code for FV verification result\r
284 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass|0x0303100A|UINT32|0x00010030\r
285 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail|0x0303100B|UINT32|0x00010031\r
286\r
287[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
288 ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
289 # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
290 # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
291 # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
292 # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
293 # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
294 # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
295 # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
296 # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r
297 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
298 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
299\r
300 ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.\r
301 # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands\r
302 # that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>\r
303 # TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>\r
304 # FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>\r
305 # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.\r
306 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
307\r
308[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
309 ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.\r
310 # Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>\r
311 # TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
312 # FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
313 # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.\r
314 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r
315\r
316[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
317 ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
318 # TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
319 # FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
320 # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.\r
321 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r
322\r
323[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
324 ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
325 # TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
326 # FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
327 # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.\r
328 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r
329\r
330[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
331 ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>\r
332 # TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>\r
333 # FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>\r
334 # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.\r
335 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r
336\r
337 ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
338 # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
339 # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
340 # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>\r
341 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
342 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
343\r
344 ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
345 # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
346 # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
347 # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.\r
348 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
349 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
350\r
351 ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>\r
352 # if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>\r
353 # if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>\r
354 # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.\r
355 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
356 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
357\r
358 ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
359 # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
360 # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
361 # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.\r
362 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
363 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
364\r
365 ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
366 # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
367 # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
368 # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device\r
369 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
370 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
371\r
372 ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>\r
373 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>\r
374 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>\r
375 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>\r
376 # Other GUID value means other TPM 2.0 device.<BR>\r
377 # @Prompt TPM device type identifier\r
378 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r
379\r
380 ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>\r
381 # FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>\r
382 # TRUE - Auto detection.<BR>\r
383 # @Prompt TPM type detection.\r
384 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r
385\r
386 ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>\r
387 # @Prompt TPM device address.\r
388 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r
389\r
390 ## This PCR means the OEM configured number of PCR banks.\r
391 # 0 means dynamic get from supported HASH algorithm\r
392 # @Prompt OEM configured number of PCR banks.\r
393 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks|0x0|UINT32|0x00010015\r
394\r
395 ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
396 # WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
397 # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
398 #\r
399 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013\r
400\r
401 ## Provides one PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
402 # WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
403 # @Prompt One PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
404 #\r
405 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPkcs7CertBuffer|{0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xec, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x91, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0x66, 0xc0, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x82, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x54, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x31, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x45, 0x44, 0x4b, 0x49, 0x49, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x52, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x65, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x69, 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0x2d, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0xb1, 0x30, 0x80, 0xbd, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x3e, 0xdd, 0xc4, 0xc7, 0x55, 0x65, 0xcf, 0x28, 0x17, 0xf4, 0xee, 0xda, 0xbe, 0x77, 0x70, 0xd5, 0x52, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x7a, 0xfb, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0xd5, 0x45, 0x90, 0x5a, 0xe6, 0x31, 0x42, 0xd7, 0x84, 0xb3, 0x49, 0x56, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x47, 0xf3, 0xbf, 0x68, 0x60, 0x8b, 0x0f, 0xe2, 0xaf, 0xf4, 0xe3, 0xec, 0x12, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x11, 0x4e, 0x4d, 0x73, 0x79, 0xaf, 0x47, 0x85, 0x4c, 0x76, 0x26, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x32, 0xc0, 0x8e, 0xc2, 0xdc, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xac, 0x93, 0x9e, 0xa1, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0x34, 0x45, 0xe0, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0x9d, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xd7, 0x37, 0x72, 0x97, 0xf8, 0x58, 0xf9, 0xb6, 0x35, 0x48, 0xf1, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0x72, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0xe9, 0xcc, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x52, 0x53, 0xde, 0x51, 0x01, 0x53, 0x35, 0xbc, 0x90, 0xcd, 0x8c, 0x8a, 0xcc, 0x43, 0x20, 0xa7, 0x45, 0xff, 0x2b, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x55, 0x15, 0x4b, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x94, 0x4b, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x62, 0xea, 0x22, 0xab, 0x62, 0x68, 0xdd, 0x53, 0xc6, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xdd, 0x9a, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x9c, 0xe4, 0x66, 0x80, 0x8c, 0x1d}|VOID*|0x00010014\r
406\r
407 ## This PCD defines minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).\r
408 # For PC Client Implementation spec up to and including 1.2 the minimum log size is 64KB.\r
409 # @Prompt Minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).\r
410 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgLogAreaMinLen|0x10000|UINT32|0x00010017\r
411\r
412 ## This PCD defines length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.\r
413 # @Prompt Length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.\r
414 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2FinalLogAreaLen|0x8000|UINT32|0x00010018\r
415\r
416 ## Null-terminated string of the Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.<BR><BR>\r
417 # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.<BR>\r
418 # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.PpiVersion to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.<BR>\r
419 # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x0|"1.3"|NV,BS<BR>\r
420 # @Prompt Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.\r
421 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|"1.3"|VOID*|0x00000008\r
422\r
423 ## Indicate whether a physical presence user exist.\r
424 # When it is configured to Dynamic or DynamicEx, it can be set through detection using\r
425 # a platform-specific method (e.g. Button pressed) in a actual platform in early boot phase.<BR><BR>\r
426 # @Prompt A physical presence user status\r
427 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUserPhysicalPresence|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010019\r
428\r
429 ## Indicate the TPM2 ACPI table revision. Rev 4 has been defined since TCG ACPI Specification Rev 00.37.<BR><BR>\r
430 # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.<BR>\r
431 # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.Tpm2AcpiTableRev to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.<BR>\r
432 # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x8|3|NV,BS<BR>\r
433 # @Prompt Revision of TPM2 ACPI table.\r
434 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|3|UINT8|0x0001001A\r
435\r
436 ## This PCD defines initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
437 # PCD can be configured for different settings in different scenarios\r
438 # This PCD follows UEFI TCG2 library definition bit of the BIOS TPM/Storage Management Flags<BR>\r
439 # BIT0 - Reserved <BR>\r
440 # BIT1 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CLEAR <BR>\r
441 # BIT2 - Reserved <BR>\r
442 # BIT3 - TCG2_LIB_PP_FLAG_RESET_TRACK <BR>\r
443 # BIT4 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_TURN_ON <BR>\r
444 # BIT5 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_TURN_OFF <BR>\r
445 # BIT6 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CHANGE_EPS <BR>\r
446 # BIT7 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CHANGE_PCRS <BR>\r
447 # BIT16 - TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_ENABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
448 # BIT17 - TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_DISABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
449 # BIT18 - TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_ENABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
450 # @Prompt Initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
451 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags|0x700E2|UINT32|0x0001001B\r
452\r
453 ## Indicate current TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _CRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
454 # TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled If the pcd is set to 0.<BR>\r
455 # @Prompt Current TPM2 Interrupt Number\r
456 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum|0x00|UINT32|0x0001001C\r
457\r
458 ## Indicate platform possible TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _PRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
459 # Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number Buffer will not be reported if TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled.<BR>\r
460 # @Prompt Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number buffer\r
461 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}|VOID*|0x0001001D\r
462\r
463 ## Indicates if Opal DXE driver skip password prompt.<BR><BR>\r
464 # TRUE - Skip password prompt.<BR>\r
465 # FALSE - Does not skip password prompt.<BR>\r
466 # @Prompt Skip Opal DXE driver password prompt.\r
467 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipOpalPasswordPrompt|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010020\r
468\r
469 ## Indicates if Hdd Password driver skip password prompt.<BR><BR>\r
470 # TRUE - Skip password prompt.<BR>\r
471 # FALSE - Does not skip password prompt.<BR>\r
472 # @Prompt Skip Hdd Password prompt.\r
473 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipHddPasswordPrompt|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010021\r
474\r
475[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
476\r
477 ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0. Bit definition strictly follows TCG Algorithm Registry.<BR><BR>\r
478 # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
479 # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
480 # If all the bits are clear, that means hash algorithm is determined by current Active PCR Banks.<BR>\r
481 # BIT0 - SHA1.<BR>\r
482 # BIT1 - SHA256.<BR>\r
483 # BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>\r
484 # BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>\r
485 # BIT4 - SM3_256.<BR>\r
486 # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0\r
487 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
488 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x00010010\r
489\r
490 ## This PCD indicated final BIOS supported Hash mask.\r
491 # Bios may choose to register a subset of PcdTpm2HashMask.\r
492 # So this PCD is final value of how many hash algo is extended to PCR.\r
493 # If software HashLib(HashLibBaseCryptoRouter) solution is chosen, this PCD\r
494 # has no need to be configured in platform dsc and will be set to correct\r
495 # value by the HashLib instance according to the HashInstanceLib instances\r
496 # linked, and the value of this PCD should be got in module entrypoint.\r
497 # @Prompt Hash Algorithm bitmap.\r
498 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010016\r
499\r
500 ## This PCD indicates current active TPM interface type.\r
501 # According to TCG PTP spec 1.3, there are 3 types defined in TPM2_PTP_INTERFACE_TYPE.<BR>\r
502 # 0x00 - FIFO interface as defined in TIS 1.3 is active.<BR>\r
503 # 0x01 - FIFO interface as defined in PTP for TPM 2.0 is active.<BR>\r
504 # 0x02 - CRB interface is active.<BR>\r
505 # 0xFF - Contains no current active TPM interface type.<BR>\r
506 #\r
507 # @Prompt current active TPM interface type.\r
508 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001E\r
509\r
510 ## This PCD records IdleBypass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
511 # According to TCG PTP spec 1.3, TPM with CRB interface can skip idle state and\r
512 # directly move to CmdReady state. <BR>\r
513 # 0x00 - Do not support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
514 # 0x01 - Support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
515 # 0xFF - IdleByPass State is not synced with TPM hardware.<BR>\r
516 #\r
517 # @Prompt IdleBypass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
518 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCRBIdleByPass|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001F\r
519\r
520 ## This PCD records LAML field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
521 # @Prompt Tpm2AcpiTableLaml LAML field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
522 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableLaml|0|UINT32|0x00010022\r
523\r
524 ## This PCD records LASA field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
525 # @Prompt Tpm2AcpiTableLasa LASA field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
526 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableLasa|0|UINT64|0x00010023\r
527\r
528[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]\r
529 SecurityPkgExtra.uni\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE