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1## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r
2# This package includes the security drivers, defintions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs \r
3# and library classes) and libraries instances.\r
4#\r
5# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
6# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under\r
7# the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.\r
8# The full text of the license may be found at\r
9# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
10#\r
11# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
12# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
13#\r
14##\r
15\r
16[Defines]\r
17 DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r
18 PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
19 PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD\r
20 PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.93\r
21\r
22[Includes]\r
23 Include\r
24\r
25[LibraryClasses]\r
26 ## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.\r
27 # \r
28 HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h\r
29 \r
30 ## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.\r
31 #\r
32 PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h\r
33 \r
34 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.\r
35 #\r
36 TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
37 \r
38 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r
39 #\r
40 Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
41 \r
42 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.\r
43 #\r
44 Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r
45 \r
46 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.\r
47 #\r
48 Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h\r
49 \r
50 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.\r
51 #\r
52 Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h\r
53 \r
54 ## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r
55 #\r
56 TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
57 \r
58 ## @libraryclass Provides common interfaces about TPM measurement for other modules.\r
59 #\r
60 TpmMeasurementLib|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h\r
61 \r
62 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 2.0 request.\r
63 #\r
64 TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
65\r
66[Guids]\r
67 ## Security package token space guid\r
68 # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
69 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
70 \r
71 ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.\r
72 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
73 gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }\r
74\r
75 ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.\r
76 # This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.\r
77 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
78 gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }\r
79\r
80 ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".\r
81 # Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.\r
82 # Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:\r
83 # Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.\r
84 # Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.\r
85 # Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.\r
86 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
87 gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
88\r
89 ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r
90 # This variable is a read-only NV varaible that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a \r
91 # mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r
92 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
93 gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
94\r
95 ## GUID used to "certdb" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
96 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
97 gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r
98 \r
99 ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.\r
100 # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
101 gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r
102\r
103 ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.\r
104 # Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r
105 gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r
106\r
107 ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.\r
108 # Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
109 gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
110 \r
111 ## GUID used for form browser, password credential and provider identifier.\r
112 # Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h\r
113 gPwdCredentialProviderGuid = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}\r
114\r
115 ## GUID used for form browser, USB credential and provider identifier.\r
116 # Include/Guid/UsbCredentialProviderHii.h\r
117 gUsbCredentialProviderGuid = { 0xd0849ed1, 0xa88c, 0x4ba6, { 0xb1, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb7, 0xa9 }}\r
118\r
119 ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.\r
120 # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h\r
121 gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}\r
122\r
123 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
124 # Include/Guid/UserProfileManagerHii.h\r
125 gUserProfileManagerGuid = { 0xc35f272c, 0x97c2, 0x465a, { 0xa2, 0x16, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0xfe }}\r
126\r
127 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
128 # Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
129 gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
130 \r
131 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
132 # Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
133 gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
134\r
135 ## GUID used to "TrEEPhysicalPresence" variable and "TrEEPhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
136 # Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h\r
137 gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}\r
138\r
139 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.\r
140 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
141 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r
142 \r
143 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.\r
144 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
145 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r
146 \r
147 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.\r
148 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
149 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r
150 \r
151 ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.\r
152 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
153 gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r
154\r
155 ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
156 # Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h\r
157 gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}\r
158\r
159[Ppis]\r
160 ## Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
161 gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
162\r
163 ## Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
164 gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
165\r
166 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r
167 gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r
168\r
169[PcdsFixedAtBuild]\r
170 ## Pcd for OptionRom.\r
171 # Image verification policy settings:\r
172 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
173 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
174 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
175 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
176 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
177 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
178 # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since\r
179 # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
180 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
181 \r
182 ## Pcd for removable media.\r
183 # Removable media include CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
184 # Image verification policy settings:\r
185 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
186 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
187 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
188 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
189 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
190 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005\r
191 # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since\r
192 # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
193 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r
194 \r
195 ## Pcd for fixed media.\r
196 # Fixed media include hard disk.\r
197 # Image verification policy settings:\r
198 # ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000\r
199 # NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001\r
200 # ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002\r
201 # DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003\r
202 # DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004\r
203 # QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005 \r
204 # NOTE: Do NOT use QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION since\r
205 # it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.\r
206 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
207 \r
208 ## Defer Image Load policy settings.\r
209 # The policy is bitwise. \r
210 # If bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trust when loading.\r
211 #\r
212 # IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001\r
213 # IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002\r
214 # IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004\r
215 # IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008\r
216 # IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010\r
217 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
218 \r
219 ## The token file name used to save credential in USB credential provider driver.\r
220 # The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
221 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
222\r
223 ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
224 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005 \r
225\r
226 ## This PCD specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip. \r
227 # This PCD is only avaiable when PcdTpmPhysicalPresence is TRUE.\r
228 # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.\r
229 # If 1, TCG platform type is server.\r
230 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
231\r
232[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
233 ## This PCD indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator.\r
234 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
235\r
236[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
237 ## This PCD indicates whether to set TPM physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
238 # Once this bit is set, it can not be cleared (It is locked for TPM life time).\r
239 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r
240 \r
241[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
242 ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
243 # If PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceCMDEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.\r
244 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r
245 \r
246[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
247 ## This PCD is used to specify the default value for physicalPresenceHWEnable bit when setting physicalPresenceLifetimeLock bit.\r
248 # If PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable is set to TRUE, physicalPresenceHWEnable bit will be set, else this bit will be cleared.\r
249 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r
250\r
251[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
252 ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists.\r
253 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r
254\r
255 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 initialization policy.\r
256 # 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.\r
257 # 1: Initialization needed.\r
258 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
259\r
260 ## This PCD indicates the TPM initialization policy.\r
261 # 0: No initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.\r
262 # 1: Initialization needed.\r
263 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
264\r
265 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SelfTest policy.\r
266 # 0: No SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.\r
267 # 1: SelfTest needed.\r
268 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
269\r
270 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 SCRTM policy.\r
271 # 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.\r
272 # 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.\r
273 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
274\r
275 ## This PCD indicates the TPM SCRTM policy.\r
276 # 0: No SCRTM needed - In this case, it is already done.\r
277 # 1: SCRTM done by BIOS.\r
278 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
279\r
280 ## Guid name to identify TPM instance\r
281 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable\r
282 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM1.2 DTPM\r
283 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM2 DTPM\r
284 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r
285\r
286 ## This PCD indicates the TPM2 Hash mask.\r
287 # BIT0: SHA1\r
288 # BIT1: SHA256\r
289 # BIT2: SHA384\r
290 # BIT3: SHA512\r
291 # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.\r
292 # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.\r
293 # 0xFFFFFFFF means extend all.\r
294 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010010\r
295\r
296 ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.\r
297 # 0: No auto detection.\r
298 # 1: Auto detection.\r
299 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r
300\r
301 ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.\r
302 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r
303\r
304 ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
305 #\r
306 # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
307 #\r
308 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013\r
309
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE