]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_edk2.git/blame_incremental - SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blame_incremental
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blob | blame (non-incremental) | history | HEAD
SecurityPkg Variable: Support the new introduced PcdMaxAuthVariableSize.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
... / ...
CommitLineData
1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
10 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r
11 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r
12 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r
13 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r
14\r
15 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
16 variable authentication.\r
17\r
18 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
19 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
20 to verify the signature.\r
21\r
22Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
23This program and the accompanying materials\r
24are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
25which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
26http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
27\r
28THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
29WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
30\r
31**/\r
32\r
33#include "Variable.h"\r
34#include "AuthService.h"\r
35\r
36///\r
37/// Global database array for scratch\r
38///\r
39UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;\r
40UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
41UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;\r
42UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;\r
43UINT8 *mCertDbStore;\r
44UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;\r
45UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
46UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r
47\r
48EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
49//\r
50// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
51//\r
52CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
53//\r
54// Hash context pointer\r
55//\r
56VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
57\r
58//\r
59// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
60// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
61//\r
62EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
63//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
64 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
65 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
66 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
67 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
68 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
69 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
70 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
72 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
74 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
76};\r
77\r
78/**\r
79 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
80\r
81 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
82 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
83\r
84 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
85 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
86\r
87**/\r
88BOOLEAN\r
89NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
90 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
91 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
92 )\r
93{\r
94 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
95 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
96 return TRUE;\r
97 }\r
98\r
99 return FALSE;\r
100}\r
101\r
102/**\r
103 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
104\r
105 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
106 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
107\r
108**/\r
109BOOLEAN\r
110InCustomMode (\r
111 VOID\r
112 )\r
113{\r
114 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
115\r
116 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
117 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
118 return TRUE;\r
119 }\r
120\r
121 return FALSE;\r
122}\r
123\r
124/**\r
125 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
126\r
127 @param[in] MaxAuthVariableSize Reflect the overhead associated with the saving\r
128 of a single EFI authenticated variable with the exception\r
129 of the overhead associated with the length\r
130 of the string name of the EFI variable.\r
131\r
132 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
133 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
134\r
135**/\r
136EFI_STATUS\r
137AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
138 IN UINTN MaxAuthVariableSize\r
139 )\r
140{\r
141 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
142 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
143 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
144 UINT8 VarValue;\r
145 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
146 UINT8 *Data;\r
147 UINTN DataSize;\r
148 UINTN CtxSize;\r
149 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
150 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
151 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
152 UINT32 ListSize;\r
153\r
154 //\r
155 // Initialize hash context.\r
156 //\r
157 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
158 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
159 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
160 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
161 }\r
162\r
163 //\r
164 // Reserve runtime buffer for public key database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
165 //\r
166 mMaxKeyDbSize = (UINT32) (MaxAuthVariableSize - sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME));\r
167 mMaxKeyNumber = mMaxKeyDbSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
168 mPubKeyStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxKeyDbSize);\r
169 if (mPubKeyStore == NULL) {\r
170 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
171 }\r
172\r
173 //\r
174 // Reserve runtime buffer for certificate database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
175 //\r
176 mMaxCertDbSize = (UINT32) (MaxAuthVariableSize - sizeof (EFI_CERT_DB_NAME));\r
177 mCertDbStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxCertDbSize);\r
178 if (mCertDbStore == NULL) {\r
179 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
180 }\r
181\r
182 //\r
183 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
184 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
185 //\r
186 Status = FindVariable (\r
187 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
188 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
189 &Variable,\r
190 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
191 FALSE\r
192 );\r
193\r
194 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
195 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
196 VarValue = 0;\r
197 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
198 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
199 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
200 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
201 &VarValue,\r
202 sizeof(UINT8),\r
203 VarAttr,\r
204 0,\r
205 0,\r
206 &Variable,\r
207 NULL\r
208 );\r
209 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
210 return Status;\r
211 }\r
212 } else {\r
213 //\r
214 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
215 //\r
216 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
217 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
218 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
219 //\r
220 // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)\r
221 // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.\r
222 //\r
223 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
224 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
225 }\r
226\r
227 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
228 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
229 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
230 } else {\r
231 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
232 }\r
233\r
234 //\r
235 // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
236 //\r
237 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
238 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
239 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
240 } else {\r
241 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
242 }\r
243 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
244 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
245 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
246 &mPlatformMode,\r
247 sizeof(UINT8),\r
248 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
249 0,\r
250 0,\r
251 &Variable,\r
252 NULL\r
253 );\r
254 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
255 return Status;\r
256 }\r
257\r
258 //\r
259 // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
260 //\r
261 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
262 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
263 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
264 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
265 mSignatureSupport,\r
266 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
267 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
268 0,\r
269 0,\r
270 &Variable,\r
271 NULL\r
272 );\r
273 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
274 return Status;\r
275 }\r
276\r
277 //\r
278 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
279 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
280 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
281 //\r
282 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
283 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
284 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
285 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE){\r
286 //\r
287 // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot \r
288 // Delete "SecureBootMode" in SetupMode\r
289 //\r
290 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
291 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
292 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
293 &SecureBootEnable,\r
294 0,\r
295 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
296 0,\r
297 0,\r
298 &Variable,\r
299 NULL\r
300 );\r
301 } else {\r
302 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
303 }\r
304 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
305 //\r
306 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
307 //\r
308 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
309 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
310 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
311 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
312 &SecureBootEnable,\r
313 sizeof (UINT8),\r
314 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
315 0,\r
316 0,\r
317 &Variable,\r
318 NULL\r
319 );\r
320 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
321 return Status;\r
322 }\r
323 }\r
324\r
325 //\r
326 // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
327 //\r
328 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
329 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
330 } else {\r
331 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
332 }\r
333 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
334 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
335 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
336 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
337 &SecureBootMode,\r
338 sizeof (UINT8),\r
339 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
340 0,\r
341 0,\r
342 &Variable,\r
343 NULL\r
344 );\r
345 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
346 return Status;\r
347 }\r
348\r
349 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
350 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
351 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
352\r
353 //\r
354 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r
355 //\r
356 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
357 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
358 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
359 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
360 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
361 &CustomMode,\r
362 sizeof (UINT8),\r
363 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
364 0,\r
365 0,\r
366 &Variable,\r
367 NULL\r
368 );\r
369 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
370 return Status;\r
371 }\r
372\r
373 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
374\r
375 //\r
376 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
377 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with\r
378 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
379 //\r
380 Status = FindVariable (\r
381 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
382 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
383 &Variable,\r
384 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
385 FALSE\r
386 );\r
387\r
388 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
389 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
390 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
391 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
392 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
393 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
394 &ListSize,\r
395 sizeof (UINT32),\r
396 VarAttr,\r
397 0,\r
398 0,\r
399 &Variable,\r
400 NULL\r
401 );\r
402 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
403 return Status;\r
404 }\r
405 }\r
406\r
407 //\r
408 // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r
409 //\r
410 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
411 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
412 mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
413 } else {\r
414 //\r
415 // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r
416 //\r
417 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r
418 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
419 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
420 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
421 &mVendorKeyState,\r
422 sizeof (UINT8),\r
423 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
424 0,\r
425 0,\r
426 &Variable,\r
427 NULL\r
428 );\r
429 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
430 return Status;\r
431 }\r
432 }\r
433\r
434 //\r
435 // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
436 //\r
437 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
438 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
439 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
440 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
441 &mVendorKeyState,\r
442 sizeof (UINT8),\r
443 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
444 0,\r
445 0,\r
446 &Variable,\r
447 NULL\r
448 );\r
449 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
450 return Status;\r
451 }\r
452\r
453 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r
454\r
455 return Status;\r
456}\r
457\r
458/**\r
459 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
460\r
461 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
462 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry\r
463\r
464 @return Index of new added item\r
465\r
466**/\r
467UINT32\r
468AddPubKeyInStore (\r
469 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
470 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
471 )\r
472{\r
473 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
474 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
475 UINT32 Index;\r
476 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
477 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
478 UINT8 *Data;\r
479 UINTN DataSize;\r
480 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
481 UINT32 Attributes;\r
482\r
483 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
484 return 0;\r
485 }\r
486\r
487 Status = FindVariable (\r
488 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
489 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
490 &Variable,\r
491 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
492 FALSE\r
493 );\r
494 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
495 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
496 return 0;\r
497 }\r
498\r
499 //\r
500 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
501 //\r
502 IsFound = FALSE;\r
503 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
504 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
505 IsFound = TRUE;\r
506 break;\r
507 }\r
508 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
509 }\r
510\r
511 if (!IsFound) {\r
512 //\r
513 // Add public key in database.\r
514 //\r
515 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
516 //\r
517 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r
518 //\r
519 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
520 //\r
521 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r
522 //\r
523 return 0;\r
524 }\r
525\r
526 Status = Reclaim (\r
527 mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r
528 &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r
529 FALSE,\r
530 NULL,\r
531 NULL,\r
532 0,\r
533 TRUE\r
534 );\r
535 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
536 return 0;\r
537 }\r
538\r
539 Status = FindVariable (\r
540 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
541 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
542 &Variable,\r
543 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
544 FALSE\r
545 );\r
546 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
547 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
548 return 0;\r
549 }\r
550\r
551 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
552 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
553 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
554 //\r
555 // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal used variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)\r
556 // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.\r
557 //\r
558 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
559 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
560\r
561 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
562 return 0;\r
563 }\r
564 }\r
565\r
566 //\r
567 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
568 //\r
569 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
570 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
571 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
572 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
573\r
574 if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
575 //\r
576 // No enough variable space.\r
577 //\r
578 return 0;\r
579 }\r
580\r
581 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
582 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
583 //\r
584 // Update public key database variable.\r
585 //\r
586 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
587 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
588 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
589 mPubKeyStore,\r
590 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
591 Attributes,\r
592 0,\r
593 0,\r
594 &Variable,\r
595 NULL\r
596 );\r
597 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
598 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
599 return 0;\r
600 }\r
601 }\r
602\r
603 return Index;\r
604}\r
605\r
606/**\r
607 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
608 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
609\r
610 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
611 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
612 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
613 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
614 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
615\r
616 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
617 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
618 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
619\r
620 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
621 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
622 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
623\r
624**/\r
625EFI_STATUS\r
626VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
627 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
628 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
629 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
630 )\r
631{\r
632 BOOLEAN Status;\r
633 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
634 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
635 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
636 VOID *Rsa;\r
637 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
638\r
639 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
640 Rsa = NULL;\r
641 CertData = NULL;\r
642 CertBlock = NULL;\r
643\r
644 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
645 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
646 }\r
647\r
648 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
649 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
650\r
651 //\r
652 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
653 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
654 //\r
655 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
656 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
657 ) {\r
658 //\r
659 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
660 //\r
661 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
662 }\r
663 //\r
664 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
665 //\r
666 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
667 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
668 if (!Status) {\r
669 goto Done;\r
670 }\r
671 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
672 if (!Status) {\r
673 goto Done;\r
674 }\r
675 //\r
676 // Hash Size.\r
677 //\r
678 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
679 if (!Status) {\r
680 goto Done;\r
681 }\r
682 //\r
683 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
684 //\r
685 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
686 if (!Status) {\r
687 goto Done;\r
688 }\r
689 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
690 if (!Status) {\r
691 goto Done;\r
692 }\r
693 //\r
694 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
695 //\r
696 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
697 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
698 //\r
699 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
700 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
701 //\r
702 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
703 if (!Status) {\r
704 goto Done;\r
705 }\r
706 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
707 if (!Status) {\r
708 goto Done;\r
709 }\r
710 //\r
711 // Verify the signature.\r
712 //\r
713 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
714 Rsa,\r
715 Digest,\r
716 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
717 CertBlock->Signature,\r
718 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
719 );\r
720\r
721Done:\r
722 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
723 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
724 }\r
725 if (Status) {\r
726 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
727 } else {\r
728 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
729 }\r
730}\r
731\r
732/**\r
733 Update platform mode.\r
734\r
735 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
736\r
737 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
738 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
739\r
740**/\r
741EFI_STATUS\r
742UpdatePlatformMode (\r
743 IN UINT32 Mode\r
744 )\r
745{\r
746 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
747 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
748 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
749 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
750 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
751\r
752 Status = FindVariable (\r
753 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
754 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
755 &Variable,\r
756 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
757 FALSE\r
758 );\r
759 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
760 return Status;\r
761 }\r
762\r
763 //\r
764 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
765 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
766 //\r
767 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
768 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
769\r
770 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
771 //\r
772 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
773 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
774 // Variable in runtime.\r
775 //\r
776 return Status;\r
777 }\r
778\r
779 //\r
780 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
781 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
782 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
783 //\r
784 Status = FindVariable (\r
785 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
786 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
787 &Variable,\r
788 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
789 FALSE\r
790 );\r
791 //\r
792 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
793 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
794 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
795 //\r
796 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
797 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
798 } else {\r
799 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
800 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
801 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
802 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
803 } else {\r
804 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
805 }\r
806 }\r
807\r
808 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
809 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
810 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
811 &SecureBootMode,\r
812 sizeof(UINT8),\r
813 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
814 0,\r
815 0,\r
816 &Variable,\r
817 NULL\r
818 );\r
819 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
820 return Status;\r
821 }\r
822\r
823 //\r
824 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
825 //\r
826 Status = FindVariable (\r
827 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
828 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
829 &Variable,\r
830 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
831 FALSE\r
832 );\r
833\r
834 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
835 //\r
836 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
837 //\r
838 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
839 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
840 } else {\r
841 //\r
842 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
843 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
844 //\r
845 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
846 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
847 }\r
848 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
849 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
850 }\r
851\r
852 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
853 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
854 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
855 &SecureBootEnable,\r
856 VariableDataSize,\r
857 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
858 0,\r
859 0,\r
860 &Variable,\r
861 NULL\r
862 );\r
863 return Status;\r
864}\r
865\r
866/**\r
867 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
868\r
869 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
870 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
871 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
872 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
873\r
874 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
875 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
876\r
877**/\r
878EFI_STATUS\r
879CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
880 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
881 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
882 IN VOID *Data,\r
883 IN UINTN DataSize\r
884 )\r
885{\r
886 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
887 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
888 UINT32 Index;\r
889 UINT32 SigCount;\r
890 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
891 VOID *RsaContext;\r
892 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
893 UINTN CertLen;\r
894\r
895 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
896 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
897 }\r
898\r
899 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
900\r
901 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
902 IsPk = TRUE;\r
903 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r
904 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
905 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
906 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r
907 IsPk = FALSE;\r
908 } else {\r
909 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
910 }\r
911\r
912 SigCount = 0;\r
913 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
914 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
915 RsaContext = NULL;\r
916\r
917 //\r
918 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
919 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
920 //\r
921 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
922 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
923 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
924 //\r
925 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r
926 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
927 //\r
928 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r
929 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
930 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
931 }\r
932 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
933 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
934 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
935 }\r
936 break;\r
937 }\r
938 }\r
939\r
940 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
941 //\r
942 // Undefined signature type.\r
943 //\r
944 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
945 }\r
946\r
947 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
948 //\r
949 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
950 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
951 //\r
952 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
953 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
954 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
955 }\r
956 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
957 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
958 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
959 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
960 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
961 }\r
962 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
963 }\r
964\r
965 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
966 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
967 }\r
968 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
969\r
970 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
971 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
972 }\r
973\r
974 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
975 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
976 }\r
977\r
978 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
979 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
980 }\r
981\r
982 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
983}\r
984\r
985/**\r
986 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
987\r
988 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
989 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
990\r
991**/\r
992EFI_STATUS\r
993VendorKeyIsModified (\r
994 VOID\r
995 )\r
996{\r
997 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
998 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
999\r
1000 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
1001 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1002 }\r
1003 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
1004\r
1005 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1006 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1007 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1008 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
1009 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1010 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1011 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
1012 0,\r
1013 0,\r
1014 &Variable,\r
1015 NULL\r
1016 );\r
1017 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1018 return Status;\r
1019 }\r
1020\r
1021 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1022 return UpdateVariable (\r
1023 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1024 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1025 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1026 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1027 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
1028 0,\r
1029 0,\r
1030 &Variable,\r
1031 NULL\r
1032 );\r
1033}\r
1034\r
1035/**\r
1036 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
1037\r
1038 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1039 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1040 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1041 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1042 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1043 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1044\r
1045 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1046 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1047 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1048 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1049 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1050 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1051 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
1052 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
1053\r
1054 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1055 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
1056 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1057 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
1058\r
1059**/\r
1060EFI_STATUS\r
1061ProcessVarWithPk (\r
1062 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1063 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1064 IN VOID *Data,\r
1065 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1066 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1067 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
1068 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
1069 )\r
1070{\r
1071 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1072 BOOLEAN Del;\r
1073 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1074 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1075\r
1076 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1077 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1078 //\r
1079 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1080 // authenticated variable.\r
1081 //\r
1082 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1083 }\r
1084\r
1085 Del = FALSE;\r
1086 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
1087 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1088 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1089 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1090 Del = TRUE;\r
1091 }\r
1092\r
1093 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1094 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1095 return Status;\r
1096 }\r
1097\r
1098 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1099 VariableName,\r
1100 VendorGuid,\r
1101 Payload,\r
1102 PayloadSize,\r
1103 Attributes,\r
1104 0,\r
1105 0,\r
1106 Variable,\r
1107 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1108 );\r
1109 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1110 return Status;\r
1111 }\r
1112\r
1113 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
1114 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1115 }\r
1116 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
1117 //\r
1118 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
1119 //\r
1120 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1121 VariableName,\r
1122 VendorGuid,\r
1123 Data,\r
1124 DataSize,\r
1125 Variable,\r
1126 Attributes,\r
1127 AuthVarTypePk,\r
1128 &Del\r
1129 );\r
1130 } else {\r
1131 //\r
1132 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
1133 //\r
1134 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1135 VariableName,\r
1136 VendorGuid,\r
1137 Data,\r
1138 DataSize,\r
1139 Variable,\r
1140 Attributes,\r
1141 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
1142 &Del\r
1143 );\r
1144 }\r
1145\r
1146 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
1147 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
1148 //\r
1149 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
1150 //\r
1151 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
1152 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
1153 //\r
1154 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1155 //\r
1156 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
1157 }\r
1158 }\r
1159\r
1160 return Status;\r
1161}\r
1162\r
1163/**\r
1164 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1165\r
1166 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1167 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1168 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1169 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1170 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1171 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1172\r
1173 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1174 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1175 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1176 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1177 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1178 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1179 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1180\r
1181 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1182 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1183 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1184 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1185\r
1186**/\r
1187EFI_STATUS\r
1188ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1189 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1190 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1191 IN VOID *Data,\r
1192 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1193 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1194 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1195 )\r
1196{\r
1197 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1198 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1199 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1200\r
1201 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1202 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1203 //\r
1204 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1205 // authenticated variable.\r
1206 //\r
1207 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1208 }\r
1209\r
1210 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1211 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
1212 //\r
1213 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1214 //\r
1215 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1216 VariableName,\r
1217 VendorGuid,\r
1218 Data,\r
1219 DataSize,\r
1220 Variable,\r
1221 Attributes,\r
1222 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1223 NULL\r
1224 );\r
1225 } else {\r
1226 //\r
1227 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
1228 //\r
1229 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1230 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1231\r
1232 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1233 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1234 return Status;\r
1235 }\r
1236\r
1237 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1238 VariableName,\r
1239 VendorGuid,\r
1240 Payload,\r
1241 PayloadSize,\r
1242 Attributes,\r
1243 0,\r
1244 0,\r
1245 Variable,\r
1246 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
1247 );\r
1248 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1249 return Status;\r
1250 }\r
1251\r
1252 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
1253 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1254 }\r
1255 }\r
1256\r
1257 return Status;\r
1258}\r
1259\r
1260/**\r
1261 Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r
1262\r
1263 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1264 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1265 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1266 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1267\r
1268 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r
1269 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r
1270\r
1271**/\r
1272BOOLEAN\r
1273IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r
1274 IN VOID *Data,\r
1275 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1276 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1277 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1278 )\r
1279{\r
1280 BOOLEAN Del;\r
1281 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1282\r
1283 Del = FALSE;\r
1284\r
1285 //\r
1286 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1287 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r
1288 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r
1289 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r
1290 //\r
1291 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r
1292 (Attributes == Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes) &&\r
1293 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r
1294 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1295 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1296 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1297 Del = TRUE;\r
1298 }\r
1299 } else {\r
1300 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1301 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1302 Del = TRUE;\r
1303 }\r
1304 }\r
1305 }\r
1306\r
1307 return Del;\r
1308}\r
1309\r
1310/**\r
1311 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1312\r
1313 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1314 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1315 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1316 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1317 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1318 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1319\r
1320 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1321 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1322\r
1323 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1324 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
1325 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1326 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1327\r
1328 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1329 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1330 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1331 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
1332 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1333 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1334 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1335 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1336\r
1337**/\r
1338EFI_STATUS\r
1339ProcessVariable (\r
1340 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1341 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1342 IN VOID *Data,\r
1343 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1344 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1345 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1346 )\r
1347{\r
1348 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1349 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1350 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1351 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1352 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1353 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1354 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1355 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1356 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
1357\r
1358 KeyIndex = 0;\r
1359 CertData = NULL;\r
1360 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1361 PubKey = NULL;\r
1362 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1363 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1364\r
1365 if (IsDeleteAuthVariable (Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1366 //\r
1367 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.\r
1368 //\r
1369 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1370 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
1371 }\r
1372 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1373 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1374 VariableName,\r
1375 VendorGuid,\r
1376 NULL,\r
1377 0,\r
1378 0,\r
1379 0,\r
1380 0,\r
1381 Variable,\r
1382 NULL\r
1383 );\r
1384 }\r
1385 return Status;\r
1386 }\r
1387\r
1388 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1389 //\r
1390 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1391 //\r
1392 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1393 }\r
1394\r
1395 //\r
1396 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1397 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1398 //\r
1399 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
1400 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1401 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1402 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1403 }\r
1404\r
1405 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1406 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1407 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1408 }\r
1409 }\r
1410\r
1411 //\r
1412 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1413 //\r
1414 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1415 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1416 VariableName,\r
1417 VendorGuid,\r
1418 Data,\r
1419 DataSize,\r
1420 Variable,\r
1421 Attributes,\r
1422 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1423 NULL\r
1424 );\r
1425 }\r
1426\r
1427 //\r
1428 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1429 //\r
1430 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1431 //\r
1432 // Determine current operation type.\r
1433 //\r
1434 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1435 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1436 }\r
1437 //\r
1438 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1439 //\r
1440 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1441 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1442 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1443 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1444 } else {\r
1445 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1446 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1447 }\r
1448 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r
1449 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1450 ) {\r
1451 //\r
1452 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1453 //\r
1454 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1455 } else {\r
1456 //\r
1457 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1458 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1459 //\r
1460 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1461 return Status;\r
1462 }\r
1463\r
1464 //\r
1465 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1466 //\r
1467 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1468 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1469 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1470\r
1471 //\r
1472 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1473 //\r
1474 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1475\r
1476 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1477 //\r
1478 // 2 cases need to check here\r
1479 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0\r
1480 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r
1481 //\r
1482 if (KeyIndex == 0 || CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1483 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1484 }\r
1485 //\r
1486 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1487 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1488 //\r
1489 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1490 //\r
1491 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1492 //\r
1493 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1494 }\r
1495 }\r
1496 //\r
1497 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1498 //\r
1499 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1500 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1501 return Status;\r
1502 }\r
1503\r
1504 //\r
1505 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1506 //\r
1507 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1508 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1509 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
1510 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
1511\r
1512 //\r
1513 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1514 //\r
1515 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
1516 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1517 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1518 }\r
1519 }\r
1520\r
1521 //\r
1522 // Verification pass.\r
1523 //\r
1524 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1525}\r
1526\r
1527/**\r
1528 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1529 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1530 will be ignored.\r
1531\r
1532 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1533 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1534 @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer\r
1535 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1536 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1537 @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r
1538\r
1539 @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r
1540\r
1541**/\r
1542EFI_STATUS\r
1543AppendSignatureList (\r
1544 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1545 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1546 IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r
1547 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1548 IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r
1549 OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r
1550 )\r
1551{\r
1552 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1553 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1554 UINTN CertCount;\r
1555 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1556 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1557 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1558 UINTN Index;\r
1559 UINTN Index2;\r
1560 UINTN Size;\r
1561 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1562 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1563 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1564 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1565\r
1566 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1567\r
1568 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1569 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1570 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1571 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1572\r
1573 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1574 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1575 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1576\r
1577 Size = DataSize;\r
1578 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1579 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1580 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1581 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1582 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1583 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1584 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1585 //\r
1586 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1587 //\r
1588 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1589 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1590 break;\r
1591 }\r
1592 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1593 }\r
1594 }\r
1595\r
1596 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1597 break;\r
1598 }\r
1599 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1600 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1601 }\r
1602\r
1603 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1604 //\r
1605 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1606 //\r
1607 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1608 if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r
1609 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1610 }\r
1611\r
1612 //\r
1613 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1614 //\r
1615\r
1616 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1617 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1618 FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1619 }\r
1620\r
1621 if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r
1622 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1623 }\r
1624 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1625 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1626 FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1627 CopiedCount++;\r
1628 }\r
1629\r
1630 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1631 }\r
1632\r
1633 //\r
1634 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1635 //\r
1636 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1637 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1638 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1639 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1640 }\r
1641\r
1642 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1643 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1644 }\r
1645\r
1646 *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1647 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1648}\r
1649\r
1650/**\r
1651 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1652\r
1653\r
1654 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1655 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1656\r
1657 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1658 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1659\r
1660**/\r
1661BOOLEAN\r
1662CompareTimeStamp (\r
1663 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1664 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1665 )\r
1666{\r
1667 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1668 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1669 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1670 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1671 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1672 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1673 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1674 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1675 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1676 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
1677 }\r
1678\r
1679 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1680}\r
1681\r
1682/**\r
1683 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1684 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1685\r
1686 The data format of "certdb":\r
1687 //\r
1688 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1689 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1690 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1691 // /// ...\r
1692 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1693 //\r
1694\r
1695 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1696 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1697 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1698 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1699 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1700 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1701 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1702 starting of Data.\r
1703 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1704\r
1705 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1706 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1707 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1708\r
1709**/\r
1710EFI_STATUS\r
1711FindCertsFromDb (\r
1712 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1713 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1714 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1715 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1716 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1717 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1718 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1719 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1720 )\r
1721{\r
1722 UINT32 Offset;\r
1723 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1724 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1725 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1726 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1727 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1728\r
1729 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1730 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1731 }\r
1732\r
1733 //\r
1734 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1735 //\r
1736 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1737 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1738 }\r
1739\r
1740 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1741\r
1742 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1743 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1744 }\r
1745\r
1746 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1747\r
1748 //\r
1749 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1750 //\r
1751 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1752 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1753 //\r
1754 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1755 //\r
1756 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1757 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1758 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1759 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1760\r
1761 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1762 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1763 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1764 }\r
1765\r
1766 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1767 //\r
1768 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1769 //\r
1770 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r
1771 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1772 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1773\r
1774 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1775 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1776 }\r
1777\r
1778 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1779 *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r
1780 }\r
1781\r
1782 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1783 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1784 }\r
1785\r
1786 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1787 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1788 }\r
1789\r
1790 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1791 } else {\r
1792 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1793 }\r
1794 } else {\r
1795 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1796 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1797 }\r
1798 }\r
1799\r
1800 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1801}\r
1802\r
1803/**\r
1804 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1805 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1806\r
1807 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1808 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1809 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1810 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1811\r
1812 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1813 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1814 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1815\r
1816**/\r
1817EFI_STATUS\r
1818GetCertsFromDb (\r
1819 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1820 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1821 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1822 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1823 )\r
1824{\r
1825 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1826 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1827 UINT8 *Data;\r
1828 UINTN DataSize;\r
1829 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1830\r
1831 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1832 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1833 }\r
1834\r
1835 //\r
1836 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1837 //\r
1838 Status = FindVariable (\r
1839 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1840 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1841 &CertDbVariable,\r
1842 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1843 FALSE\r
1844 );\r
1845 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1846 return Status;\r
1847 }\r
1848\r
1849 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1850 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1851 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1852 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1853 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1854 }\r
1855\r
1856 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1857 VariableName,\r
1858 VendorGuid,\r
1859 Data,\r
1860 DataSize,\r
1861 &CertOffset,\r
1862 CertDataSize,\r
1863 NULL,\r
1864 NULL\r
1865 );\r
1866\r
1867 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1868 return Status;\r
1869 }\r
1870\r
1871 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1872 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1873}\r
1874\r
1875/**\r
1876 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1877 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1878\r
1879 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1880 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1881\r
1882 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1883 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1884 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1885 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1886\r
1887**/\r
1888EFI_STATUS\r
1889DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1890 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1891 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1892 )\r
1893{\r
1894 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1895 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1896 UINT8 *Data;\r
1897 UINTN DataSize;\r
1898 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1899 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1900 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1901 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1902 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1903\r
1904 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1905 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1906 }\r
1907\r
1908 //\r
1909 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1910 //\r
1911 Status = FindVariable (\r
1912 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1913 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1914 &CertDbVariable,\r
1915 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1916 FALSE\r
1917 );\r
1918 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1919 return Status;\r
1920 }\r
1921\r
1922 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1923 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1924 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1925 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1926 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1927 }\r
1928\r
1929 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1930 //\r
1931 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1932 //\r
1933 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1934 }\r
1935\r
1936 //\r
1937 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1938 //\r
1939 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1940 VariableName,\r
1941 VendorGuid,\r
1942 Data,\r
1943 DataSize,\r
1944 NULL,\r
1945 NULL,\r
1946 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1947 &CertNodeSize\r
1948 );\r
1949\r
1950 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1951 return Status;\r
1952 }\r
1953\r
1954 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1955 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1956 }\r
1957\r
1958 //\r
1959 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1960 //\r
1961 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1962 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
1963\r
1964 //\r
1965 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1966 //\r
1967 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1968 //\r
1969 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1970 //\r
1971 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1972 //\r
1973 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1974 //\r
1975 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1976 CopyMem (\r
1977 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1978 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1979 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1980 );\r
1981 }\r
1982\r
1983 //\r
1984 // Set "certdb".\r
1985 //\r
1986 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
1987 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1988 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1989 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1990 NewCertDb,\r
1991 NewCertDbSize,\r
1992 VarAttr,\r
1993 0,\r
1994 0,\r
1995 &CertDbVariable,\r
1996 NULL\r
1997 );\r
1998\r
1999 return Status;\r
2000}\r
2001\r
2002/**\r
2003 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
2004 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
2005\r
2006 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
2007 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
2008 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
2009 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
2010\r
2011 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
2012 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
2013 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
2014 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
2015 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
2016\r
2017**/\r
2018EFI_STATUS\r
2019InsertCertsToDb (\r
2020 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2021 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2022 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
2023 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
2024 )\r
2025{\r
2026 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
2027 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2028 UINT8 *Data;\r
2029 UINTN DataSize;\r
2030 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
2031 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
2032 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
2033 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
2034 UINT32 NameSize;\r
2035 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
2036\r
2037 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
2038 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
2039 }\r
2040\r
2041 //\r
2042 // Get variable "certdb".\r
2043 //\r
2044 Status = FindVariable (\r
2045 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2046 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2047 &CertDbVariable,\r
2048 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2049 FALSE\r
2050 );\r
2051 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2052 return Status;\r
2053 }\r
2054\r
2055 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2056 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2057 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
2058 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2059 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
2060 }\r
2061\r
2062 //\r
2063 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
2064 // If yes return error.\r
2065 //\r
2066 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2067 VariableName,\r
2068 VendorGuid,\r
2069 Data,\r
2070 DataSize,\r
2071 NULL,\r
2072 NULL,\r
2073 NULL,\r
2074 NULL\r
2075 );\r
2076\r
2077 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2078 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2079 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
2080 }\r
2081\r
2082 //\r
2083 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
2084 //\r
2085 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
2086 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2087 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
2088 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
2089 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2090 }\r
2091 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
2092\r
2093 //\r
2094 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
2095 //\r
2096 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
2097 //\r
2098 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
2099 //\r
2100 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2101 //\r
2102 // Construct new cert node.\r
2103 //\r
2104 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
2105 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
2106 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2107 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2108 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2109\r
2110 CopyMem (\r
2111 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
2112 VariableName,\r
2113 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
2114 );\r
2115\r
2116 CopyMem (\r
2117 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
2118 CertData,\r
2119 CertDataSize\r
2120 );\r
2121\r
2122 //\r
2123 // Set "certdb".\r
2124 //\r
2125 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
2126 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2127 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2128 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2129 NewCertDb,\r
2130 NewCertDbSize,\r
2131 VarAttr,\r
2132 0,\r
2133 0,\r
2134 &CertDbVariable,\r
2135 NULL\r
2136 );\r
2137\r
2138 return Status;\r
2139}\r
2140\r
2141/**\r
2142 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2143\r
2144 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2145 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2146 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2147 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2148 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2149\r
2150 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2151 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2152 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2153 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2154 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2155 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
2156 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2157 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
2158 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2159\r
2160 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2161 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2162 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2163 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2164 of resources.\r
2165 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2166\r
2167**/\r
2168EFI_STATUS\r
2169VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2170 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2171 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2172 IN VOID *Data,\r
2173 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2174 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
2175 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2176 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2177 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2178 )\r
2179{\r
2180 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2181 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2182 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2183 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2184 UINTN Index;\r
2185 UINTN CertCount;\r
2186 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2187 UINT32 Attr;\r
2188 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2189 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
2190 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2191 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2192 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2193 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2194 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
2195 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2196 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2197 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2198 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2199 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2200 UINTN Length;\r
2201 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
2202 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2203 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2204 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
2205\r
2206 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2207 CertData = NULL;\r
2208 NewData = NULL;\r
2209 Attr = Attributes;\r
2210 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2211 RootCert = NULL;\r
2212 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
2213\r
2214 //\r
2215 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
2216 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2217 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2218 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2219 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
2220 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2221 //\r
2222 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2223\r
2224 //\r
2225 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2226 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2227 //\r
2228 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2229 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2230 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2231 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2232 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2233 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2234 }\r
2235\r
2236 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2237 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
2238 //\r
2239 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2240 //\r
2241 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2242 }\r
2243 }\r
2244\r
2245 //\r
2246 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2247 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2248 //\r
2249 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2250 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
2251 //\r
2252 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2253 //\r
2254 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2255 }\r
2256\r
2257 //\r
2258 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2259 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2260 //\r
2261 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2262 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
2263\r
2264 //\r
2265 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2266 //\r
2267 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2268 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
2269\r
2270 //\r
2271 // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
2272 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
2273 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
2274 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
2275 //\r
2276 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2277 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2278 //\r
2279 // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r
2280 // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r
2281 // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r
2282 // because it will be used at here to do verification only first\r
2283 // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r
2284 //\r
2285 NewData = (UINT8 *) GetEndPointer ((VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *) ((UINTN) mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.VolatileVariableBase));\r
2286\r
2287 Buffer = NewData;\r
2288 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2289 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2290 Buffer += Length;\r
2291\r
2292 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2293 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2294 Buffer += Length;\r
2295\r
2296 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2297 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2298 Buffer += Length;\r
2299\r
2300 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2301 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2302 Buffer += Length;\r
2303\r
2304 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2305\r
2306 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
2307 //\r
2308 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
2309 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2310 //\r
2311 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2312 SigData,\r
2313 SigDataSize,\r
2314 &SignerCerts,\r
2315 &CertStackSize,\r
2316 &RootCert,\r
2317 &RootCertSize\r
2318 );\r
2319 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2320 goto Exit;\r
2321 }\r
2322\r
2323 //\r
2324 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
2325 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2326 //\r
2327 Status = FindVariable (\r
2328 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2329 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2330 &PkVariable,\r
2331 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2332 FALSE\r
2333 );\r
2334 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2335 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2336 goto Exit;\r
2337 }\r
2338 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2339 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2340 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
2341 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
2342 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2343 goto Exit;\r
2344 }\r
2345\r
2346 //\r
2347 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2348 //\r
2349 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2350 SigData,\r
2351 SigDataSize,\r
2352 RootCert,\r
2353 RootCertSize,\r
2354 NewData,\r
2355 NewDataSize\r
2356 );\r
2357\r
2358 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2359\r
2360 //\r
2361 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2362 //\r
2363 Status = FindVariable (\r
2364 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2365 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2366 &KekVariable,\r
2367 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2368 FALSE\r
2369 );\r
2370 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2371 return Status;\r
2372 }\r
2373\r
2374 //\r
2375 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2376 //\r
2377 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2378 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2379 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2380 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2381 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2382 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2383 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2384 //\r
2385 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2386 //\r
2387 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2388 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2389\r
2390 //\r
2391 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2392 //\r
2393 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2394 SigData,\r
2395 SigDataSize,\r
2396 RootCert,\r
2397 RootCertSize,\r
2398 NewData,\r
2399 NewDataSize\r
2400 );\r
2401 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2402 goto Exit;\r
2403 }\r
2404 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2405 }\r
2406 }\r
2407 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2408 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2409 }\r
2410 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2411\r
2412 //\r
2413 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r
2414 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2415 //\r
2416 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2417 SigData,\r
2418 SigDataSize,\r
2419 &SignerCerts,\r
2420 &CertStackSize,\r
2421 &RootCert,\r
2422 &RootCertSize\r
2423 );\r
2424 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2425 goto Exit;\r
2426 }\r
2427\r
2428 //\r
2429 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2430 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2431 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2432 //\r
2433 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2434 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2435\r
2436 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2437 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2438 goto Exit;\r
2439 }\r
2440\r
2441 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2442 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2443 goto Exit;\r
2444 }\r
2445 }\r
2446\r
2447 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2448 SigData,\r
2449 SigDataSize,\r
2450 RootCert,\r
2451 RootCertSize,\r
2452 NewData,\r
2453 NewDataSize\r
2454 );\r
2455 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2456 goto Exit;\r
2457 }\r
2458\r
2459 //\r
2460 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2461 //\r
2462 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2463 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2464 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2465 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2466 goto Exit;\r
2467 }\r
2468 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r
2469 //\r
2470 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2471 //\r
2472 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2473 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2474 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2475 goto Exit;\r
2476 }\r
2477 }\r
2478 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2479 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2480 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2481 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2482 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2483\r
2484 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2485 //\r
2486 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2487 SigData,\r
2488 SigDataSize,\r
2489 RootCert,\r
2490 RootCertSize,\r
2491 NewData,\r
2492 NewDataSize\r
2493 );\r
2494 } else {\r
2495 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2496 }\r
2497\r
2498Exit:\r
2499\r
2500 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2501 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2502 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2503 }\r
2504\r
2505 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2506 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2507 }\r
2508\r
2509 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2510 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2511 return Status;\r
2512 }\r
2513\r
2514 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
2515 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2516 }\r
2517\r
2518 //\r
2519 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2520 //\r
2521 return UpdateVariable (\r
2522 VariableName,\r
2523 VendorGuid,\r
2524 PayloadPtr,\r
2525 PayloadSize,\r
2526 Attributes,\r
2527 0,\r
2528 0,\r
2529 Variable,\r
2530 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2531 );\r
2532}\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE