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1 | /** @file\r | |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r | |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r | |
4 | \r | |
5 | Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r | |
6 | This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r | |
7 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
8 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
9 | Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
10 | \r | |
11 | ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r | |
12 | variable authentication.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r | |
15 | They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r | |
16 | to verify the signature.\r | |
17 | \r | |
18 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r | |
19 | This program and the accompanying materials\r | |
20 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
21 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
22 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r | |
23 | \r | |
24 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r | |
25 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
26 | \r | |
27 | **/\r | |
28 | \r | |
29 | #include "Variable.h"\r | |
30 | #include "AuthService.h"\r | |
31 | \r | |
32 | ///\r | |
33 | /// Global database array for scratch\r | |
34 | ///\r | |
35 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r | |
36 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
37 | UINT8 mCertDbStore[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE];\r | |
38 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r | |
39 | UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r | |
40 | \r | |
41 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r | |
42 | //\r | |
43 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
44 | //\r | |
45 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
46 | //\r | |
47 | // Hash context pointer\r | |
48 | //\r | |
49 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r | |
50 | \r | |
51 | //\r | |
52 | // Pointer to runtime buffer.\r | |
53 | // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r | |
54 | // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r | |
55 | // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r | |
56 | //\r | |
57 | VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r | |
58 | \r | |
59 | //\r | |
60 | // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
61 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
62 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
63 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
64 | //\r | |
65 | UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r | |
66 | \r | |
67 | //\r | |
68 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
69 | // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
70 | //\r | |
71 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
72 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
73 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
74 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
75 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
76 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
77 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
78 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
79 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
80 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
81 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r | |
82 | };\r | |
83 | \r | |
84 | /**\r | |
85 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
86 | \r | |
87 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
88 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
89 | \r | |
90 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
91 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
92 | \r | |
93 | **/\r | |
94 | BOOLEAN\r | |
95 | NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r | |
96 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
97 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
98 | )\r | |
99 | {\r | |
100 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
101 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
102 | return TRUE;\r | |
103 | }\r | |
104 | \r | |
105 | return FALSE;\r | |
106 | }\r | |
107 | \r | |
108 | /**\r | |
109 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
110 | \r | |
111 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
112 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
113 | \r | |
114 | **/\r | |
115 | BOOLEAN\r | |
116 | InCustomMode (\r | |
117 | VOID\r | |
118 | )\r | |
119 | {\r | |
120 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
121 | \r | |
122 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
123 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r | |
124 | return TRUE;\r | |
125 | }\r | |
126 | \r | |
127 | return FALSE;\r | |
128 | }\r | |
129 | \r | |
130 | \r | |
131 | /**\r | |
132 | Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r | |
133 | required.\r | |
134 | \r | |
135 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
136 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
137 | \r | |
138 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r | |
139 | @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r | |
140 | \r | |
141 | **/\r | |
142 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
143 | DeleteVariable (\r | |
144 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
145 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
146 | )\r | |
147 | {\r | |
148 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
149 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
150 | \r | |
151 | Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
152 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
153 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
154 | }\r | |
155 | \r | |
156 | ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r | |
157 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
158 | }\r | |
159 | \r | |
160 | /**\r | |
161 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r | |
162 | \r | |
163 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r | |
164 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r | |
165 | \r | |
166 | **/\r | |
167 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
168 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r | |
169 | VOID\r | |
170 | )\r | |
171 | {\r | |
172 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
173 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
174 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
175 | UINT8 VarValue;\r | |
176 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
177 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
178 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
179 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
180 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
181 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
182 | UINT8 CustomMode;\r | |
183 | UINT32 ListSize;\r | |
184 | \r | |
185 | //\r | |
186 | // Initialize hash context.\r | |
187 | //\r | |
188 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r | |
189 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r | |
190 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
191 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
192 | }\r | |
193 | \r | |
194 | //\r | |
195 | // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r | |
196 | //\r | |
197 | mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (MAX (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize), PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize)));\r | |
198 | if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r | |
199 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
200 | }\r | |
201 | \r | |
202 | //\r | |
203 | // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r | |
204 | // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
205 | //\r | |
206 | mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
207 | if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
208 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
209 | }\r | |
210 | \r | |
211 | //\r | |
212 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r | |
213 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
214 | //\r | |
215 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
216 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
217 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
218 | &Variable,\r | |
219 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
220 | FALSE\r | |
221 | );\r | |
222 | \r | |
223 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
224 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
225 | VarValue = 0;\r | |
226 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
227 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
228 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
229 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
230 | &VarValue,\r | |
231 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
232 | VarAttr,\r | |
233 | 0,\r | |
234 | 0,\r | |
235 | &Variable,\r | |
236 | NULL\r | |
237 | );\r | |
238 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
239 | return Status;\r | |
240 | }\r | |
241 | } else {\r | |
242 | //\r | |
243 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r | |
244 | //\r | |
245 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
246 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
247 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
248 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
249 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
250 | }\r | |
251 | \r | |
252 | FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
253 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
254 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
255 | } else {\r | |
256 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
257 | }\r | |
258 | \r | |
259 | //\r | |
260 | // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r | |
261 | //\r | |
262 | FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
263 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
264 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r | |
265 | } else {\r | |
266 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r | |
267 | }\r | |
268 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
269 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
270 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
271 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
272 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
273 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r | |
274 | 0,\r | |
275 | 0,\r | |
276 | &Variable,\r | |
277 | NULL\r | |
278 | );\r | |
279 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
280 | return Status;\r | |
281 | }\r | |
282 | \r | |
283 | //\r | |
284 | // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r | |
285 | //\r | |
286 | FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
287 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
288 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r | |
289 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
290 | mSignatureSupport,\r | |
291 | sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r | |
292 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r | |
293 | 0,\r | |
294 | 0,\r | |
295 | &Variable,\r | |
296 | NULL\r | |
297 | );\r | |
298 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
299 | return Status;\r | |
300 | }\r | |
301 | \r | |
302 | //\r | |
303 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r | |
304 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r | |
305 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r | |
306 | //\r | |
307 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
308 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
309 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
310 | SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
311 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
312 | //\r | |
313 | // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r | |
314 | //\r | |
315 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
316 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
317 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
318 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
319 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
320 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
321 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
322 | 0,\r | |
323 | 0,\r | |
324 | &Variable,\r | |
325 | NULL\r | |
326 | );\r | |
327 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
328 | return Status;\r | |
329 | }\r | |
330 | }\r | |
331 | \r | |
332 | //\r | |
333 | // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r | |
334 | //\r | |
335 | if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
336 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
337 | } else {\r | |
338 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
339 | }\r | |
340 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
341 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
342 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
343 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
344 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
345 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
346 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
347 | 0,\r | |
348 | 0,\r | |
349 | &Variable,\r | |
350 | NULL\r | |
351 | );\r | |
352 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
353 | return Status;\r | |
354 | }\r | |
355 | \r | |
356 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r | |
357 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r | |
358 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r | |
359 | \r | |
360 | //\r | |
361 | // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r | |
362 | //\r | |
363 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
364 | CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r | |
365 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
366 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
367 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
368 | &CustomMode,\r | |
369 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
370 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
371 | 0,\r | |
372 | 0,\r | |
373 | &Variable,\r | |
374 | NULL\r | |
375 | );\r | |
376 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
377 | return Status;\r | |
378 | }\r | |
379 | \r | |
380 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r | |
381 | \r | |
382 | //\r | |
383 | // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r | |
384 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r | |
385 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
386 | //\r | |
387 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
388 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
389 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
390 | &Variable,\r | |
391 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
392 | FALSE\r | |
393 | );\r | |
394 | \r | |
395 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
396 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
397 | ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
398 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
399 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
400 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
401 | &ListSize,\r | |
402 | sizeof (UINT32),\r | |
403 | VarAttr,\r | |
404 | 0,\r | |
405 | 0,\r | |
406 | &Variable,\r | |
407 | NULL\r | |
408 | );\r | |
409 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
410 | return Status;\r | |
411 | }\r | |
412 | } \r | |
413 | \r | |
414 | //\r | |
415 | // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r | |
416 | //\r | |
417 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
418 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
419 | mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
420 | } else {\r | |
421 | //\r | |
422 | // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r | |
423 | //\r | |
424 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r | |
425 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
426 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
427 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
428 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
429 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
430 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
431 | 0,\r | |
432 | 0,\r | |
433 | &Variable,\r | |
434 | NULL\r | |
435 | );\r | |
436 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
437 | return Status;\r | |
438 | }\r | |
439 | }\r | |
440 | \r | |
441 | //\r | |
442 | // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r | |
443 | //\r | |
444 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
445 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
446 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
447 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
448 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
449 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
450 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
451 | 0,\r | |
452 | 0,\r | |
453 | &Variable,\r | |
454 | NULL\r | |
455 | );\r | |
456 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
457 | return Status;\r | |
458 | }\r | |
459 | \r | |
460 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r | |
461 | \r | |
462 | return Status;\r | |
463 | }\r | |
464 | \r | |
465 | /**\r | |
466 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
467 | \r | |
468 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r | |
469 | \r | |
470 | @return Index of new added item\r | |
471 | \r | |
472 | **/\r | |
473 | UINT32\r | |
474 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
475 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
476 | )\r | |
477 | {\r | |
478 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
479 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
480 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
481 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
482 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
483 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
484 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
485 | \r | |
486 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
487 | return 0;\r | |
488 | }\r | |
489 | \r | |
490 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
491 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
492 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
493 | &Variable,\r | |
494 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
495 | FALSE\r | |
496 | );\r | |
497 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
498 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
499 | return 0;\r | |
500 | }\r | |
501 | \r | |
502 | //\r | |
503 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
504 | //\r | |
505 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
506 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
507 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
508 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
509 | break;\r | |
510 | }\r | |
511 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
512 | }\r | |
513 | \r | |
514 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
515 | //\r | |
516 | // Add public key in database.\r | |
517 | //\r | |
518 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
519 | //\r | |
520 | // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r | |
521 | //\r | |
522 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r | |
523 | //\r | |
524 | // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r | |
525 | //\r | |
526 | return 0;\r | |
527 | }\r | |
528 | \r | |
529 | Status = Reclaim (\r | |
530 | mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r | |
531 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r | |
532 | FALSE,\r | |
533 | NULL,\r | |
534 | TRUE,\r | |
535 | TRUE\r | |
536 | );\r | |
537 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
538 | return 0;\r | |
539 | }\r | |
540 | \r | |
541 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
542 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
543 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
544 | &Variable,\r | |
545 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
546 | FALSE\r | |
547 | );\r | |
548 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
549 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
550 | return 0;\r | |
551 | }\r | |
552 | \r | |
553 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
554 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
555 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
556 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
557 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
558 | \r | |
559 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
560 | return 0;\r | |
561 | } \r | |
562 | }\r | |
563 | \r | |
564 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
565 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
566 | //\r | |
567 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
568 | //\r | |
569 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
570 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
571 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
572 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
573 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r | |
574 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
575 | 0,\r | |
576 | 0,\r | |
577 | &Variable,\r | |
578 | NULL\r | |
579 | );\r | |
580 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
581 | }\r | |
582 | \r | |
583 | return Index;\r | |
584 | }\r | |
585 | \r | |
586 | /**\r | |
587 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r | |
588 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r | |
589 | \r | |
590 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
591 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
592 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
593 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
594 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
595 | \r | |
596 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r | |
597 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
598 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
599 | \r | |
600 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
601 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r | |
602 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r | |
603 | \r | |
604 | **/\r | |
605 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
606 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
607 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
608 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
609 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
610 | )\r | |
611 | {\r | |
612 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
613 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
614 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
615 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
616 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
617 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
618 | \r | |
619 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
620 | Rsa = NULL;\r | |
621 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
622 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
623 | \r | |
624 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
625 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
626 | }\r | |
627 | \r | |
628 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
629 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
630 | \r | |
631 | //\r | |
632 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
633 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r | |
634 | //\r | |
635 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
636 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r | |
637 | ) {\r | |
638 | //\r | |
639 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
640 | //\r | |
641 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
642 | }\r | |
643 | //\r | |
644 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
645 | //\r | |
646 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
647 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
648 | if (!Status) {\r | |
649 | goto Done;\r | |
650 | }\r | |
651 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r | |
652 | if (!Status) {\r | |
653 | goto Done;\r | |
654 | }\r | |
655 | //\r | |
656 | // Hash Size.\r | |
657 | //\r | |
658 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r | |
659 | if (!Status) {\r | |
660 | goto Done;\r | |
661 | }\r | |
662 | //\r | |
663 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
664 | //\r | |
665 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
666 | if (!Status) {\r | |
667 | goto Done;\r | |
668 | }\r | |
669 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
670 | if (!Status) {\r | |
671 | goto Done;\r | |
672 | }\r | |
673 | //\r | |
674 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
675 | //\r | |
676 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
677 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
678 | //\r | |
679 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r | |
680 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
681 | //\r | |
682 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
683 | if (!Status) {\r | |
684 | goto Done;\r | |
685 | }\r | |
686 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
687 | if (!Status) {\r | |
688 | goto Done;\r | |
689 | }\r | |
690 | //\r | |
691 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
692 | //\r | |
693 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
694 | Rsa,\r | |
695 | Digest,\r | |
696 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
697 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
698 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r | |
699 | );\r | |
700 | \r | |
701 | Done:\r | |
702 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
703 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
704 | }\r | |
705 | if (Status) {\r | |
706 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
707 | } else {\r | |
708 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
709 | }\r | |
710 | }\r | |
711 | \r | |
712 | /**\r | |
713 | Update platform mode.\r | |
714 | \r | |
715 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
716 | \r | |
717 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
718 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
719 | \r | |
720 | **/\r | |
721 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
722 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
723 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
724 | )\r | |
725 | {\r | |
726 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
727 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
728 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
729 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
730 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
731 | \r | |
732 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
733 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
734 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
735 | &Variable,\r | |
736 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
737 | FALSE\r | |
738 | );\r | |
739 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
740 | return Status;\r | |
741 | }\r | |
742 | \r | |
743 | //\r | |
744 | // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r | |
745 | // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r | |
746 | //\r | |
747 | mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r | |
748 | CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r | |
749 | \r | |
750 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r | |
751 | //\r | |
752 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
753 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
754 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
755 | //\r | |
756 | return Status;\r | |
757 | }\r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | //\r | |
760 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
761 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
762 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
763 | //\r | |
764 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
765 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
766 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
767 | &Variable,\r | |
768 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
769 | FALSE\r | |
770 | );\r | |
771 | //\r | |
772 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
773 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
774 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
775 | //\r | |
776 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
777 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
778 | } else {\r | |
779 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
780 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
781 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
782 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
783 | } else {\r | |
784 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
785 | }\r | |
786 | }\r | |
787 | \r | |
788 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
789 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
790 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
791 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
792 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
793 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
794 | 0,\r | |
795 | 0,\r | |
796 | &Variable,\r | |
797 | NULL\r | |
798 | );\r | |
799 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
800 | return Status;\r | |
801 | }\r | |
802 | \r | |
803 | //\r | |
804 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
805 | //\r | |
806 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
807 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
808 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
809 | &Variable,\r | |
810 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
811 | FALSE\r | |
812 | );\r | |
813 | \r | |
814 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r | |
815 | //\r | |
816 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
817 | //\r | |
818 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
819 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
820 | } else {\r | |
821 | //\r | |
822 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r | |
823 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r | |
824 | //\r | |
825 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
826 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
827 | }\r | |
828 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
829 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
830 | }\r | |
831 | \r | |
832 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
833 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
834 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
835 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
836 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
837 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
838 | 0,\r | |
839 | 0,\r | |
840 | &Variable,\r | |
841 | NULL\r | |
842 | );\r | |
843 | return Status;\r | |
844 | }\r | |
845 | \r | |
846 | /**\r | |
847 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r | |
848 | \r | |
849 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
850 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
851 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
852 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
853 | \r | |
854 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
855 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
856 | \r | |
857 | **/\r | |
858 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
859 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
860 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
861 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
862 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
863 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
864 | )\r | |
865 | {\r | |
866 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
867 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
868 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
869 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
870 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
871 | VOID *RsaContext;\r | |
872 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
873 | UINTN CertLen;\r | |
874 | \r | |
875 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
876 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
877 | }\r | |
878 | \r | |
879 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
880 | \r | |
881 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
882 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
883 | } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r | |
884 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r | |
885 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r | |
886 | IsPk = FALSE;\r | |
887 | } else {\r | |
888 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
889 | }\r | |
890 | \r | |
891 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
892 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
893 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
894 | RsaContext = NULL;\r | |
895 | \r | |
896 | //\r | |
897 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
898 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
899 | //\r | |
900 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
901 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
902 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
903 | //\r | |
904 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r | |
905 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
906 | //\r | |
907 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r | |
908 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
909 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
910 | }\r | |
911 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r | |
912 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
913 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
914 | }\r | |
915 | break;\r | |
916 | }\r | |
917 | }\r | |
918 | \r | |
919 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
920 | //\r | |
921 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
922 | //\r | |
923 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
924 | }\r | |
925 | \r | |
926 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
927 | //\r | |
928 | // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r | |
929 | // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r | |
930 | //\r | |
931 | RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r | |
932 | if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r | |
933 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
934 | }\r | |
935 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
936 | CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
937 | if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r | |
938 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
939 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
940 | }\r | |
941 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
942 | }\r | |
943 | \r | |
944 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r | |
945 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
946 | }\r | |
947 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
948 | \r | |
949 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
950 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
951 | }\r | |
952 | \r | |
953 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
954 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
955 | }\r | |
956 | \r | |
957 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
958 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
959 | }\r | |
960 | \r | |
961 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
962 | }\r | |
963 | \r | |
964 | /**\r | |
965 | Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r | |
966 | \r | |
967 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r | |
968 | @return Others Failed to update variable.\r | |
969 | \r | |
970 | **/\r | |
971 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
972 | VendorKeyIsModified (\r | |
973 | VOID\r | |
974 | )\r | |
975 | {\r | |
976 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
977 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
978 | \r | |
979 | if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r | |
980 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
981 | }\r | |
982 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r | |
983 | \r | |
984 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
985 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
986 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
987 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
988 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
989 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
990 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
991 | 0,\r | |
992 | 0,\r | |
993 | &Variable,\r | |
994 | NULL\r | |
995 | );\r | |
996 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
997 | return Status;\r | |
998 | }\r | |
999 | \r | |
1000 | FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
1001 | return UpdateVariable (\r | |
1002 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
1003 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1004 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
1005 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
1006 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
1007 | 0,\r | |
1008 | 0,\r | |
1009 | &Variable,\r | |
1010 | NULL\r | |
1011 | );\r | |
1012 | }\r | |
1013 | \r | |
1014 | /**\r | |
1015 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
1016 | \r | |
1017 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1018 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1019 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1020 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1021 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1022 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1023 | \r | |
1024 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1025 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1026 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1027 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1028 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1029 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1030 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
1031 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
1032 | \r | |
1033 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1034 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r | |
1035 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1036 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r | |
1037 | \r | |
1038 | **/\r | |
1039 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1040 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
1041 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1042 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1043 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1044 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1045 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1046 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
1047 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
1048 | )\r | |
1049 | {\r | |
1050 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1051 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
1052 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
1053 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1054 | \r | |
1055 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r | |
1056 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1057 | //\r | |
1058 | // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
1059 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
1060 | //\r | |
1061 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1062 | }\r | |
1063 | \r | |
1064 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
1065 | if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r | |
1066 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1067 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1068 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
1069 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
1070 | }\r | |
1071 | \r | |
1072 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
1073 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1074 | return Status;\r | |
1075 | }\r | |
1076 | \r | |
1077 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1078 | VariableName,\r | |
1079 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1080 | Payload,\r | |
1081 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1082 | Attributes,\r | |
1083 | 0,\r | |
1084 | 0,\r | |
1085 | Variable,\r | |
1086 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r | |
1087 | );\r | |
1088 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
1089 | return Status;\r | |
1090 | }\r | |
1091 | \r | |
1092 | if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE || IsPk) {\r | |
1093 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r | |
1094 | }\r | |
1095 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
1096 | //\r | |
1097 | // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r | |
1098 | //\r | |
1099 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1100 | VariableName,\r | |
1101 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1102 | Data,\r | |
1103 | DataSize,\r | |
1104 | Variable,\r | |
1105 | Attributes,\r | |
1106 | AuthVarTypePk,\r | |
1107 | &Del\r | |
1108 | );\r | |
1109 | } else {\r | |
1110 | //\r | |
1111 | // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r | |
1112 | //\r | |
1113 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1114 | VariableName,\r | |
1115 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1116 | Data,\r | |
1117 | DataSize,\r | |
1118 | Variable,\r | |
1119 | Attributes,\r | |
1120 | AuthVarTypePayload,\r | |
1121 | &Del\r | |
1122 | );\r | |
1123 | }\r | |
1124 | \r | |
1125 | if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r | |
1126 | if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r | |
1127 | //\r | |
1128 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
1129 | //\r | |
1130 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
1131 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r | |
1132 | //\r | |
1133 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
1134 | //\r | |
1135 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
1136 | }\r | |
1137 | }\r | |
1138 | \r | |
1139 | return Status;\r | |
1140 | }\r | |
1141 | \r | |
1142 | /**\r | |
1143 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
1144 | \r | |
1145 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1146 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1147 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1148 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1149 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1150 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1151 | \r | |
1152 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1153 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1154 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1155 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1156 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1157 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1158 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1159 | \r | |
1160 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1161 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
1162 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1163 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1164 | \r | |
1165 | **/\r | |
1166 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1167 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
1168 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1169 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1170 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1171 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1172 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1173 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
1174 | )\r | |
1175 | {\r | |
1176 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1177 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
1178 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1179 | \r | |
1180 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r | |
1181 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1182 | //\r | |
1183 | // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
1184 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
1185 | //\r | |
1186 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1187 | }\r | |
1188 | \r | |
1189 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1190 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r | |
1191 | //\r | |
1192 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r | |
1193 | //\r | |
1194 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1195 | VariableName,\r | |
1196 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1197 | Data,\r | |
1198 | DataSize,\r | |
1199 | Variable,\r | |
1200 | Attributes,\r | |
1201 | AuthVarTypeKek,\r | |
1202 | NULL\r | |
1203 | );\r | |
1204 | } else {\r | |
1205 | //\r | |
1206 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r | |
1207 | //\r | |
1208 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1209 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1210 | \r | |
1211 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
1212 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1213 | return Status;\r | |
1214 | }\r | |
1215 | \r | |
1216 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1217 | VariableName,\r | |
1218 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1219 | Payload,\r | |
1220 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1221 | Attributes,\r | |
1222 | 0,\r | |
1223 | 0,\r | |
1224 | Variable,\r | |
1225 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r | |
1226 | );\r | |
1227 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1228 | return Status;\r | |
1229 | }\r | |
1230 | \r | |
1231 | if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
1232 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r | |
1233 | }\r | |
1234 | }\r | |
1235 | \r | |
1236 | return Status;\r | |
1237 | }\r | |
1238 | \r | |
1239 | /**\r | |
1240 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1241 | \r | |
1242 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1243 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1244 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1245 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1246 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1247 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1248 | \r | |
1249 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1250 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1251 | \r | |
1252 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1253 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1254 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1255 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1256 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1257 | \r | |
1258 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1259 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
1260 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1261 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r | |
1262 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
1263 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r | |
1264 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1265 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r | |
1266 | \r | |
1267 | **/\r | |
1268 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1269 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1270 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1271 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1272 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1273 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1274 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1275 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1276 | )\r | |
1277 | {\r | |
1278 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1279 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1280 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1281 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1282 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1283 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1284 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1285 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
1286 | \r | |
1287 | KeyIndex = 0;\r | |
1288 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1289 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1290 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1291 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1292 | \r | |
1293 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r | |
1294 | //\r | |
1295 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
1296 | //\r | |
1297 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1298 | }\r | |
1299 | \r | |
1300 | //\r | |
1301 | // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r | |
1302 | // can't be updated by each other.\r | |
1303 | // \r | |
1304 | if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r | |
1305 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r | |
1306 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
1307 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r | |
1308 | }\r | |
1309 | \r | |
1310 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r | |
1311 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
1312 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r | |
1313 | }\r | |
1314 | }\r | |
1315 | \r | |
1316 | //\r | |
1317 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1318 | //\r | |
1319 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1320 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1321 | VariableName,\r | |
1322 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1323 | Data,\r | |
1324 | DataSize,\r | |
1325 | Variable,\r | |
1326 | Attributes,\r | |
1327 | AuthVarTypePriv,\r | |
1328 | NULL\r | |
1329 | );\r | |
1330 | }\r | |
1331 | \r | |
1332 | //\r | |
1333 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1334 | //\r | |
1335 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1336 | //\r | |
1337 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1338 | //\r | |
1339 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1340 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1341 | }\r | |
1342 | //\r | |
1343 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1344 | //\r | |
1345 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
1346 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1347 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1348 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1349 | } else {\r | |
1350 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1351 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1352 | }\r | |
1353 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r | |
1354 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r | |
1355 | ) {\r | |
1356 | //\r | |
1357 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1358 | //\r | |
1359 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1360 | } else {\r | |
1361 | //\r | |
1362 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1363 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1364 | //\r | |
1365 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1366 | return Status;\r | |
1367 | }\r | |
1368 | \r | |
1369 | //\r | |
1370 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1371 | //\r | |
1372 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1373 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1374 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1375 | \r | |
1376 | //\r | |
1377 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1378 | //\r | |
1379 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1380 | \r | |
1381 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1382 | //\r | |
1383 | // Check input PubKey.\r | |
1384 | //\r | |
1385 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r | |
1386 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1387 | }\r | |
1388 | //\r | |
1389 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1390 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1391 | //\r | |
1392 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1393 | //\r | |
1394 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1395 | //\r | |
1396 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1397 | }\r | |
1398 | }\r | |
1399 | //\r | |
1400 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1401 | //\r | |
1402 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1403 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1404 | return Status;\r | |
1405 | }\r | |
1406 | \r | |
1407 | //\r | |
1408 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1409 | //\r | |
1410 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
1411 | //\r | |
1412 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1413 | //\r | |
1414 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r | |
1415 | if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r | |
1416 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1417 | }\r | |
1418 | }\r | |
1419 | \r | |
1420 | //\r | |
1421 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1422 | //\r | |
1423 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1424 | }\r | |
1425 | \r | |
1426 | /**\r | |
1427 | Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1428 | will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1429 | will be ignored.\r | |
1430 | \r | |
1431 | @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1432 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1433 | @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer \r | |
1434 | @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r | |
1435 | @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1436 | @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r | |
1437 | \r | |
1438 | @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r | |
1439 | \r | |
1440 | **/\r | |
1441 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1442 | AppendSignatureList (\r | |
1443 | IN OUT VOID *Data,\r | |
1444 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1445 | IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r | |
1446 | IN VOID *NewData,\r | |
1447 | IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r | |
1448 | OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r | |
1449 | )\r | |
1450 | {\r | |
1451 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1452 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1453 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1454 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1455 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1456 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1457 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1458 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1459 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1460 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1461 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1462 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1463 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1464 | \r | |
1465 | Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r | |
1466 | \r | |
1467 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1468 | while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1469 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1470 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1471 | \r | |
1472 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1473 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1474 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1475 | \r | |
1476 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1477 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1478 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1479 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1480 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1481 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1482 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1483 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1484 | //\r | |
1485 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1486 | //\r | |
1487 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1488 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1489 | break;\r | |
1490 | }\r | |
1491 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1492 | }\r | |
1493 | }\r | |
1494 | \r | |
1495 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1496 | break;\r | |
1497 | }\r | |
1498 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1499 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1500 | }\r | |
1501 | \r | |
1502 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1503 | //\r | |
1504 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r | |
1505 | //\r | |
1506 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1507 | if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r | |
1508 | return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r | |
1509 | }\r | |
1510 | \r | |
1511 | //\r | |
1512 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1513 | //\r | |
1514 | \r | |
1515 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1516 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1517 | FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1518 | }\r | |
1519 | \r | |
1520 | if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r | |
1521 | return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r | |
1522 | }\r | |
1523 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1524 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1525 | FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1526 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1527 | }\r | |
1528 | \r | |
1529 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1530 | }\r | |
1531 | \r | |
1532 | //\r | |
1533 | // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1534 | //\r | |
1535 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1536 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1537 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1538 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1539 | }\r | |
1540 | \r | |
1541 | NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1542 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1543 | }\r | |
1544 | \r | |
1545 | *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r | |
1546 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1547 | }\r | |
1548 | \r | |
1549 | /**\r | |
1550 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1551 | \r | |
1552 | \r | |
1553 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1554 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1555 | \r | |
1556 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1557 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1558 | \r | |
1559 | **/\r | |
1560 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1561 | CompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1562 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1563 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1564 | )\r | |
1565 | {\r | |
1566 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1567 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1568 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1569 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1570 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1571 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1572 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1573 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1574 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1575 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r | |
1576 | }\r | |
1577 | \r | |
1578 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1579 | }\r | |
1580 | \r | |
1581 | /**\r | |
1582 | Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1583 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1584 | \r | |
1585 | The data format of "certdb":\r | |
1586 | //\r | |
1587 | // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1588 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r | |
1589 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r | |
1590 | // /// ...\r | |
1591 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r | |
1592 | //\r | |
1593 | \r | |
1594 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1595 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1596 | @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r | |
1597 | @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r | |
1598 | @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r | |
1599 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1600 | @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r | |
1601 | starting of Data.\r | |
1602 | @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r | |
1603 | \r | |
1604 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1605 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r | |
1606 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r | |
1607 | \r | |
1608 | **/\r | |
1609 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1610 | FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1611 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1612 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1613 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
1614 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1615 | OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r | |
1616 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r | |
1617 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r | |
1618 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r | |
1619 | )\r | |
1620 | {\r | |
1621 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1622 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1623 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
1624 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1625 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1626 | UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1627 | \r | |
1628 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1629 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1630 | }\r | |
1631 | \r | |
1632 | //\r | |
1633 | // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r | |
1634 | //\r | |
1635 | if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1636 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1637 | }\r | |
1638 | \r | |
1639 | CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r | |
1640 | \r | |
1641 | if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1642 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1643 | }\r | |
1644 | \r | |
1645 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1646 | \r | |
1647 | //\r | |
1648 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1649 | //\r | |
1650 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1651 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
1652 | //\r | |
1653 | // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r | |
1654 | //\r | |
1655 | if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r | |
1656 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1657 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1658 | CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r | |
1659 | \r | |
1660 | if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r | |
1661 | sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r | |
1662 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1663 | }\r | |
1664 | \r | |
1665 | Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r | |
1666 | //\r | |
1667 | // Check whether VariableName matches.\r | |
1668 | //\r | |
1669 | if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r | |
1670 | (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r | |
1671 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1672 | \r | |
1673 | if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1674 | *CertOffset = Offset;\r | |
1675 | }\r | |
1676 | \r | |
1677 | if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r | |
1678 | *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r | |
1679 | }\r | |
1680 | \r | |
1681 | if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1682 | *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r | |
1683 | }\r | |
1684 | \r | |
1685 | if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r | |
1686 | *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r | |
1687 | }\r | |
1688 | \r | |
1689 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1690 | } else {\r | |
1691 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r | |
1692 | }\r | |
1693 | } else {\r | |
1694 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1695 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1696 | }\r | |
1697 | }\r | |
1698 | \r | |
1699 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r | |
1700 | }\r | |
1701 | \r | |
1702 | /**\r | |
1703 | Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1704 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1705 | \r | |
1706 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1707 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1708 | @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r | |
1709 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1710 | \r | |
1711 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1712 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r | |
1713 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r | |
1714 | \r | |
1715 | **/\r | |
1716 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1717 | GetCertsFromDb (\r | |
1718 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1719 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1720 | OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r | |
1721 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r | |
1722 | )\r | |
1723 | {\r | |
1724 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1725 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1726 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1727 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1728 | UINT32 CertOffset;\r | |
1729 | \r | |
1730 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r | |
1731 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1732 | }\r | |
1733 | \r | |
1734 | //\r | |
1735 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1736 | //\r | |
1737 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1738 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1739 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1740 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1741 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1742 | FALSE\r | |
1743 | ); \r | |
1744 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1745 | return Status;\r | |
1746 | }\r | |
1747 | \r | |
1748 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1749 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1750 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1751 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1752 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1753 | }\r | |
1754 | \r | |
1755 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1756 | VariableName,\r | |
1757 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1758 | Data,\r | |
1759 | DataSize,\r | |
1760 | &CertOffset,\r | |
1761 | CertDataSize,\r | |
1762 | NULL,\r | |
1763 | NULL\r | |
1764 | );\r | |
1765 | \r | |
1766 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1767 | return Status;\r | |
1768 | }\r | |
1769 | \r | |
1770 | *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r | |
1771 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1772 | }\r | |
1773 | \r | |
1774 | /**\r | |
1775 | Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r | |
1776 | variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1777 | \r | |
1778 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1779 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1780 | \r | |
1781 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1782 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r | |
1783 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1784 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
1785 | \r | |
1786 | **/\r | |
1787 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1788 | DeleteCertsFromDb (\r | |
1789 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1790 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
1791 | )\r | |
1792 | {\r | |
1793 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1794 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1795 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1796 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1797 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1798 | UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r | |
1799 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1800 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1801 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1802 | \r | |
1803 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r | |
1804 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1805 | }\r | |
1806 | \r | |
1807 | //\r | |
1808 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1809 | //\r | |
1810 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1811 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1812 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1813 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1814 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1815 | FALSE\r | |
1816 | ); \r | |
1817 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1818 | return Status;\r | |
1819 | }\r | |
1820 | \r | |
1821 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1822 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1823 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1824 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1825 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1826 | }\r | |
1827 | \r | |
1828 | if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1829 | //\r | |
1830 | // There is no certs in certdb.\r | |
1831 | //\r | |
1832 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1833 | }\r | |
1834 | \r | |
1835 | //\r | |
1836 | // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r | |
1837 | //\r | |
1838 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1839 | VariableName,\r | |
1840 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1841 | Data,\r | |
1842 | DataSize,\r | |
1843 | NULL,\r | |
1844 | NULL,\r | |
1845 | &CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1846 | &CertNodeSize\r | |
1847 | );\r | |
1848 | \r | |
1849 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1850 | return Status;\r | |
1851 | }\r | |
1852 | \r | |
1853 | if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1854 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1855 | }\r | |
1856 | \r | |
1857 | //\r | |
1858 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r | |
1859 | //\r | |
1860 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r | |
1861 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r | |
1862 | \r | |
1863 | //\r | |
1864 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1865 | //\r | |
1866 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r | |
1867 | //\r | |
1868 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1869 | //\r | |
1870 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1871 | //\r | |
1872 | // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r | |
1873 | //\r | |
1874 | if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1875 | CopyMem (\r | |
1876 | NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1877 | Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r | |
1878 | DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r | |
1879 | );\r | |
1880 | }\r | |
1881 | \r | |
1882 | //\r | |
1883 | // Set "certdb".\r | |
1884 | // \r | |
1885 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r | |
1886 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1887 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1888 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1889 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1890 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1891 | VarAttr,\r | |
1892 | 0,\r | |
1893 | 0,\r | |
1894 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1895 | NULL\r | |
1896 | );\r | |
1897 | \r | |
1898 | return Status;\r | |
1899 | }\r | |
1900 | \r | |
1901 | /**\r | |
1902 | Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r | |
1903 | and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r | |
1904 | \r | |
1905 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1906 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1907 | @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r | |
1908 | @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1909 | \r | |
1910 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1911 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r | |
1912 | and VendorGuid already exists.\r | |
1913 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1914 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r | |
1915 | \r | |
1916 | **/\r | |
1917 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1918 | InsertCertsToDb (\r | |
1919 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1920 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1921 | IN UINT8 *CertData,\r | |
1922 | IN UINTN CertDataSize\r | |
1923 | )\r | |
1924 | {\r | |
1925 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1926 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1927 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1928 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1929 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1930 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1931 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1932 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1933 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1934 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1935 | \r | |
1936 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r | |
1937 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1938 | }\r | |
1939 | \r | |
1940 | //\r | |
1941 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1942 | //\r | |
1943 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1944 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1945 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1946 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1947 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1948 | FALSE\r | |
1949 | ); \r | |
1950 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1951 | return Status;\r | |
1952 | }\r | |
1953 | \r | |
1954 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1955 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1956 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1957 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1958 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1959 | }\r | |
1960 | \r | |
1961 | //\r | |
1962 | // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r | |
1963 | // If yes return error.\r | |
1964 | //\r | |
1965 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1966 | VariableName,\r | |
1967 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1968 | Data,\r | |
1969 | DataSize,\r | |
1970 | NULL,\r | |
1971 | NULL,\r | |
1972 | NULL,\r | |
1973 | NULL\r | |
1974 | );\r | |
1975 | \r | |
1976 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1977 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1978 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1979 | }\r | |
1980 | \r | |
1981 | //\r | |
1982 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r | |
1983 | //\r | |
1984 | NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r | |
1985 | CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r | |
1986 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r | |
1987 | if (NewCertDbSize > MAX_CERTDB_SIZE) {\r | |
1988 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1989 | }\r | |
1990 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r | |
1991 | \r | |
1992 | //\r | |
1993 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1994 | //\r | |
1995 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r | |
1996 | //\r | |
1997 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1998 | //\r | |
1999 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2000 | //\r | |
2001 | // Construct new cert node.\r | |
2002 | //\r | |
2003 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r | |
2004 | CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r | |
2005 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2006 | CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2007 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
2008 | \r | |
2009 | CopyMem (\r | |
2010 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r | |
2011 | VariableName,\r | |
2012 | NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r | |
2013 | );\r | |
2014 | \r | |
2015 | CopyMem (\r | |
2016 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r | |
2017 | CertData,\r | |
2018 | CertDataSize\r | |
2019 | );\r | |
2020 | \r | |
2021 | //\r | |
2022 | // Set "certdb".\r | |
2023 | // \r | |
2024 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r | |
2025 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2026 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
2027 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
2028 | NewCertDb,\r | |
2029 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
2030 | VarAttr,\r | |
2031 | 0,\r | |
2032 | 0,\r | |
2033 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
2034 | NULL\r | |
2035 | );\r | |
2036 | \r | |
2037 | return Status;\r | |
2038 | }\r | |
2039 | \r | |
2040 | /**\r | |
2041 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
2042 | \r | |
2043 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
2044 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
2045 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
2046 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
2047 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
2048 | \r | |
2049 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
2050 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
2051 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
2052 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
2053 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
2054 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
2055 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
2056 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
2057 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
2058 | \r | |
2059 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2060 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
2061 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
2062 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
2063 | of resources.\r | |
2064 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
2065 | \r | |
2066 | **/\r | |
2067 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2068 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
2069 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
2070 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
2071 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
2072 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
2073 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
2074 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
2075 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
2076 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
2077 | )\r | |
2078 | {\r | |
2079 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
2080 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2081 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
2082 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
2083 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2084 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
2085 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
2086 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
2087 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
2088 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
2089 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
2090 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2091 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
2092 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
2093 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
2094 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
2095 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
2096 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
2097 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
2098 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r | |
2099 | UINTN Length;\r | |
2100 | UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r | |
2101 | UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r | |
2102 | UINTN CertStackSize;\r | |
2103 | UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r | |
2104 | UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r | |
2105 | \r | |
2106 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2107 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
2108 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
2109 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
2110 | WrapSigData = NULL;\r | |
2111 | SignerCerts = NULL;\r | |
2112 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
2113 | \r | |
2114 | //\r | |
2115 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r | |
2116 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r | |
2117 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r | |
2118 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
2119 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
2120 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r | |
2121 | //\r | |
2122 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2123 | \r | |
2124 | //\r | |
2125 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
2126 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
2127 | //\r | |
2128 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
2129 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
2130 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
2131 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
2132 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
2133 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2134 | }\r | |
2135 | \r | |
2136 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
2137 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r | |
2138 | //\r | |
2139 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
2140 | //\r | |
2141 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2142 | }\r | |
2143 | }\r | |
2144 | \r | |
2145 | //\r | |
2146 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
2147 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
2148 | //\r | |
2149 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2150 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r | |
2151 | //\r | |
2152 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
2153 | //\r | |
2154 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2155 | }\r | |
2156 | \r | |
2157 | //\r | |
2158 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
2159 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
2160 | //\r | |
2161 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r | |
2162 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
2163 | \r | |
2164 | //\r | |
2165 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
2166 | //\r | |
2167 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r | |
2168 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
2169 | \r | |
2170 | //\r | |
2171 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
2172 | //\r | |
2173 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
2174 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2175 | NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r | |
2176 | \r | |
2177 | Buffer = NewData;\r | |
2178 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2179 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
2180 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2181 | \r | |
2182 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
2183 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
2184 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2185 | \r | |
2186 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
2187 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
2188 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2189 | \r | |
2190 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r | |
2191 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
2192 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2193 | \r | |
2194 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
2195 | \r | |
2196 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r | |
2197 | //\r | |
2198 | // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r | |
2199 | // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2200 | //\r | |
2201 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2202 | SigData,\r | |
2203 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2204 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2205 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2206 | &RootCert,\r | |
2207 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2208 | );\r | |
2209 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2210 | goto Exit;\r | |
2211 | }\r | |
2212 | \r | |
2213 | //\r | |
2214 | // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2215 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2216 | //\r | |
2217 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2218 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2219 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2220 | &PkVariable,\r | |
2221 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
2222 | FALSE\r | |
2223 | );\r | |
2224 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2225 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2226 | goto Exit;\r | |
2227 | }\r | |
2228 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
2229 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2230 | if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r | |
2231 | (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r | |
2232 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2233 | goto Exit;\r | |
2234 | }\r | |
2235 | \r | |
2236 | //\r | |
2237 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2238 | //\r | |
2239 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2240 | SigData,\r | |
2241 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2242 | RootCert,\r | |
2243 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2244 | NewData,\r | |
2245 | NewDataSize\r | |
2246 | );\r | |
2247 | \r | |
2248 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r | |
2249 | \r | |
2250 | //\r | |
2251 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
2252 | //\r | |
2253 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2254 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2255 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2256 | &KekVariable,\r | |
2257 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
2258 | FALSE\r | |
2259 | );\r | |
2260 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2261 | return Status;\r | |
2262 | }\r | |
2263 | \r | |
2264 | //\r | |
2265 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2266 | //\r | |
2267 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r | |
2268 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
2269 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2270 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
2271 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2272 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2273 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
2274 | //\r | |
2275 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
2276 | //\r | |
2277 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
2278 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
2279 | \r | |
2280 | //\r | |
2281 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2282 | //\r | |
2283 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2284 | SigData,\r | |
2285 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2286 | RootCert,\r | |
2287 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2288 | NewData,\r | |
2289 | NewDataSize\r | |
2290 | );\r | |
2291 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2292 | goto Exit;\r | |
2293 | }\r | |
2294 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2295 | }\r | |
2296 | }\r | |
2297 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2298 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2299 | }\r | |
2300 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
2301 | \r | |
2302 | //\r | |
2303 | // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r | |
2304 | // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2305 | //\r | |
2306 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2307 | SigData,\r | |
2308 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2309 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2310 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2311 | &RootCert,\r | |
2312 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2313 | );\r | |
2314 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2315 | goto Exit;\r | |
2316 | }\r | |
2317 | \r | |
2318 | //\r | |
2319 | // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r | |
2320 | // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2321 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2322 | //\r | |
2323 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r | |
2324 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2325 | \r | |
2326 | Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r | |
2327 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2328 | goto Exit;\r | |
2329 | }\r | |
2330 | \r | |
2331 | if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r | |
2332 | (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r | |
2333 | goto Exit;\r | |
2334 | }\r | |
2335 | }\r | |
2336 | \r | |
2337 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2338 | SigData,\r | |
2339 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2340 | RootCert,\r | |
2341 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2342 | NewData,\r | |
2343 | NewDataSize\r | |
2344 | );\r | |
2345 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2346 | goto Exit;\r | |
2347 | }\r | |
2348 | \r | |
2349 | //\r | |
2350 | // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r | |
2351 | //\r | |
2352 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
2353 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r | |
2354 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2355 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2356 | goto Exit;\r | |
2357 | }\r | |
2358 | } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r | |
2359 | //\r | |
2360 | // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r | |
2361 | //\r | |
2362 | Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r | |
2363 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2364 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2365 | goto Exit;\r | |
2366 | }\r | |
2367 | }\r | |
2368 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r | |
2369 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r | |
2370 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2371 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
2372 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
2373 | \r | |
2374 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2375 | //\r | |
2376 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2377 | SigData,\r | |
2378 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2379 | RootCert,\r | |
2380 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2381 | NewData,\r | |
2382 | NewDataSize\r | |
2383 | );\r | |
2384 | } else {\r | |
2385 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2386 | }\r | |
2387 | \r | |
2388 | Exit:\r | |
2389 | \r | |
2390 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
2391 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r | |
2392 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r | |
2393 | }\r | |
2394 | \r | |
2395 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2396 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2397 | }\r | |
2398 | \r | |
2399 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
2400 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2401 | return Status;\r | |
2402 | }\r | |
2403 | \r | |
2404 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r | |
2405 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r | |
2406 | }\r | |
2407 | \r | |
2408 | //\r | |
2409 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
2410 | //\r | |
2411 | return UpdateVariable (\r | |
2412 | VariableName,\r | |
2413 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2414 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
2415 | PayloadSize,\r | |
2416 | Attributes,\r | |
2417 | 0,\r | |
2418 | 0,\r | |
2419 | Variable,\r | |
2420 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
2421 | );\r | |
2422 | }\r | |
2423 | \r |