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Fix always reboot issue for an invalid physical presence operation request.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
5Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
6This program and the accompanying materials\r
7are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
8which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
9http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
10\r
11THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
12WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
13\r
14**/\r
15\r
16#include "Variable.h"\r
17#include "AuthService.h"\r
18\r
19///\r
20/// Global database array for scratch\r
21///\r
22UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r
23UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
24UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
25EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
26//\r
27// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
28//\r
29CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
30//\r
31// Hash context pointer\r
32//\r
33VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
34\r
35//\r
36// Pointer to runtime buffer.\r
37// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r
38// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r
39// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r
40//\r
41VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r
42\r
43//\r
44// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
45// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
46// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
47// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
48//\r
49UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
50\r
51//\r
52// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
53// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
54//\r
55EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
56//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
57 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
58 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
59 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
60 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
61 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
62 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
63 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
64 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
65 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
66};\r
67\r
68/**\r
69 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
70\r
71 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
72 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
73\r
74 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
75 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
76 \r
77**/\r
78BOOLEAN\r
79NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
80 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
81 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
82 )\r
83{\r
84 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
85 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
86 return TRUE;\r
87 }\r
88 \r
89 return FALSE;\r
90}\r
91\r
92/**\r
93 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
94\r
95 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
96 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
97\r
98**/\r
99BOOLEAN\r
100InCustomMode (\r
101 VOID\r
102 )\r
103{\r
104 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
105\r
106 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
107 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
108 return TRUE;\r
109 }\r
110 \r
111 return FALSE;\r
112}\r
113\r
114\r
115/**\r
116 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
117 required.\r
118\r
119 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
120 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
121\r
122 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
123 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
124\r
125**/\r
126EFI_STATUS\r
127DeleteVariable (\r
128 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
129 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
130 )\r
131{\r
132 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
133 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
134\r
135 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
136 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
137 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
138 }\r
139\r
140 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
141 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
142}\r
143\r
144/**\r
145 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
146\r
147 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
148 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
149\r
150**/\r
151EFI_STATUS\r
152AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
153 VOID\r
154 )\r
155{\r
156 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
157 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
158 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
159 UINT8 VarValue;\r
160 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
161 UINT8 *Data;\r
162 UINTN DataSize;\r
163 UINTN CtxSize;\r
164 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
165 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
166 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
167 UINT32 ListSize;\r
168\r
169 //\r
170 // Initialize hash context.\r
171 //\r
172 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
173 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
174 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
175 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
176 }\r
177\r
178 //\r
179 // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r
180 //\r
181 mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r
182 if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r
183 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
184 }\r
185\r
186 //\r
187 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
188 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
189 //\r
190 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
191 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
192 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
193 }\r
194\r
195 //\r
196 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
197 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
198 //\r
199 Status = FindVariable (\r
200 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
201 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
202 &Variable,\r
203 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
204 FALSE\r
205 );\r
206\r
207 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
208 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
209 VarValue = 0;\r
210 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
211 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
212 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
213 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
214 &VarValue,\r
215 sizeof(UINT8),\r
216 VarAttr,\r
217 0,\r
218 0,\r
219 &Variable,\r
220 NULL\r
221 );\r
222 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
223 return Status;\r
224 }\r
225 } else {\r
226 //\r
227 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
228 //\r
229 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
230 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
231 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
232 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
233 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
234 }\r
235\r
236 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
237 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
238 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
239 } else {\r
240 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
241 }\r
242 \r
243 //\r
244 // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.\r
245 // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.\r
246 // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
247 //\r
248 Status = FindVariable (\r
249 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
250 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
251 &Variable,\r
252 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
253 FALSE\r
254 );\r
255\r
256 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
257 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
258 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
259 } else {\r
260 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
261 }\r
262\r
263 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
264 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
265 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
266 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
267 &mPlatformMode,\r
268 sizeof(UINT8),\r
269 VarAttr,\r
270 0,\r
271 0,\r
272 &Variable,\r
273 NULL\r
274 );\r
275 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
276 return Status;\r
277 }\r
278 } else {\r
279 mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
280 }\r
281 //\r
282 // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.\r
283 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
284 //\r
285 Status = FindVariable (\r
286 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
287 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
288 &Variable,\r
289 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
290 FALSE\r
291 );\r
292\r
293 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
294 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
295 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
296 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
297 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
298 mSignatureSupport,\r
299 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
300 VarAttr,\r
301 0,\r
302 0,\r
303 &Variable,\r
304 NULL\r
305 );\r
306 }\r
307\r
308 //\r
309 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
310 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
311 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
312 //\r
313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
314 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
315 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
316 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
317 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
318 //\r
319 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
320 //\r
321 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
322 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
323 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
324 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
325 &SecureBootEnable,\r
326 sizeof (UINT8),\r
327 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
328 0,\r
329 0,\r
330 &Variable,\r
331 NULL\r
332 );\r
333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
334 return Status;\r
335 }\r
336 }\r
337\r
338 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
339 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
340 } else {\r
341 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
342 }\r
343 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
344 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
345 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
346 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
347 &SecureBootMode,\r
348 sizeof (UINT8),\r
349 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
350 0,\r
351 0,\r
352 &Variable,\r
353 NULL\r
354 );\r
355 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
356 return Status;\r
357 }\r
358\r
359 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
360 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
361 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
362\r
363 //\r
364 // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r
365 //\r
366 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
367 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
368 CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
369 } else {\r
370 //\r
371 // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
372 //\r
373 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
374 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
375 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
376 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
377 &CustomMode,\r
378 sizeof (UINT8),\r
379 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
380 0,\r
381 0,\r
382 &Variable,\r
383 NULL\r
384 );\r
385 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
386 return Status;\r
387 }\r
388 }\r
389 \r
390 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
391\r
392 //\r
393 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
394 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
395 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
396 //\r
397 Status = FindVariable (\r
398 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
399 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
400 &Variable,\r
401 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
402 FALSE\r
403 );\r
404\r
405 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
406 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
407 ListSize = 0;\r
408 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
409 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
410 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
411 &ListSize,\r
412 sizeof (UINT32),\r
413 VarAttr,\r
414 0,\r
415 0,\r
416 &Variable,\r
417 NULL\r
418 );\r
419\r
420 } \r
421\r
422 return Status;\r
423}\r
424\r
425/**\r
426 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
427\r
428 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
429\r
430 @return Index of new added item\r
431\r
432**/\r
433UINT32\r
434AddPubKeyInStore (\r
435 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
436 )\r
437{\r
438 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
439 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
440 UINT32 Index;\r
441 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
442 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
443\r
444 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
445 return 0;\r
446 }\r
447\r
448 Status = FindVariable (\r
449 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
450 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
451 &Variable,\r
452 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
453 FALSE\r
454 );\r
455 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
456 //\r
457 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
458 //\r
459 IsFound = FALSE;\r
460 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
461 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
462 IsFound = TRUE;\r
463 break;\r
464 }\r
465 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
466 }\r
467\r
468 if (!IsFound) {\r
469 //\r
470 // Add public key in database.\r
471 //\r
472 if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
473 //\r
474 // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r
475 //\r
476 return 0;\r
477 }\r
478\r
479 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
480 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
481 //\r
482 // Update public key database variable.\r
483 //\r
484 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
485 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
486 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
487 mPubKeyStore,\r
488 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
489 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
490 0,\r
491 0,\r
492 &Variable,\r
493 NULL\r
494 );\r
495 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
496 }\r
497\r
498 return Index;\r
499}\r
500\r
501/**\r
502 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
503 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
504\r
505 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
506 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
507 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
508\r
509 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
510 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
511 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
512\r
513**/\r
514EFI_STATUS\r
515VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
516 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
517 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
518 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
519 )\r
520{\r
521 BOOLEAN Status;\r
522 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
523 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
524 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
525 VOID *Rsa;\r
526\r
527 Rsa = NULL;\r
528 CertData = NULL;\r
529 CertBlock = NULL;\r
530\r
531 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
532 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
533 }\r
534\r
535 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
536 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
537\r
538 //\r
539 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
540 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
541 //\r
542 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
543 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
544 ) {\r
545 //\r
546 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
547 //\r
548 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
549 }\r
550 //\r
551 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
552 //\r
553 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
554 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
555 if (!Status) {\r
556 goto Done;\r
557 }\r
558 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r
559 if (!Status) {\r
560 goto Done;\r
561 }\r
562 //\r
563 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
564 //\r
565 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
566 if (!Status) {\r
567 goto Done;\r
568 }\r
569 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
570 if (!Status) {\r
571 goto Done;\r
572 }\r
573 //\r
574 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
575 //\r
576 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
577 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
578 //\r
579 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
580 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
581 //\r
582 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
583 if (!Status) {\r
584 goto Done;\r
585 }\r
586 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
587 if (!Status) {\r
588 goto Done;\r
589 }\r
590 //\r
591 // Verify the signature.\r
592 //\r
593 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
594 Rsa,\r
595 Digest,\r
596 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
597 CertBlock->Signature,\r
598 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
599 );\r
600\r
601Done:\r
602 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
603 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
604 }\r
605 if (Status) {\r
606 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
607 } else {\r
608 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
609 }\r
610}\r
611\r
612/**\r
613 Update platform mode.\r
614\r
615 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
616\r
617 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
618 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
619\r
620**/\r
621EFI_STATUS\r
622UpdatePlatformMode (\r
623 IN UINT32 Mode\r
624 )\r
625{\r
626 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
627 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
628 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
629 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
630 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
631 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
632\r
633 Status = FindVariable (\r
634 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
635 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
636 &Variable,\r
637 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
638 FALSE\r
639 );\r
640 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
641 return Status;\r
642 }\r
643\r
644 mPlatformMode = Mode;\r
645 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
646 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
647 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
648 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
649 &mPlatformMode,\r
650 sizeof(UINT8),\r
651 VarAttr,\r
652 0,\r
653 0,\r
654 &Variable,\r
655 NULL\r
656 );\r
657 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
658 return Status;\r
659 }\r
660\r
661 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
662 //\r
663 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
664 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
665 // Variable in runtime.\r
666 //\r
667 return Status;\r
668 }\r
669\r
670 //\r
671 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
672 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
673 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
674 //\r
675 Status = FindVariable (\r
676 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
677 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
678 &Variable,\r
679 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
680 FALSE\r
681 );\r
682 //\r
683 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
684 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
685 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
686 //\r
687 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
688 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
689 } else {\r
690 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
691 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
692 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
693 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
694 } else {\r
695 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
696 }\r
697 }\r
698\r
699 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
700 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
701 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
702 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
703 &SecureBootMode,\r
704 sizeof(UINT8),\r
705 VarAttr,\r
706 0,\r
707 0,\r
708 &Variable,\r
709 NULL\r
710 );\r
711 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
712 return Status;\r
713 }\r
714\r
715 //\r
716 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
717 //\r
718 Status = FindVariable (\r
719 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
720 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
721 &Variable,\r
722 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
723 FALSE\r
724 );\r
725\r
726 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
727 //\r
728 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
729 //\r
730 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
731 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
732 } else {\r
733 //\r
734 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
735 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
736 //\r
737 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
738 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
739 }\r
740 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
741 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
742 }\r
743\r
744 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
745 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
746 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
747 &SecureBootEnable,\r
748 VariableDataSize,\r
749 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
750 0,\r
751 0,\r
752 &Variable,\r
753 NULL\r
754 );\r
755 return Status;\r
756}\r
757\r
758/**\r
759 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK variable.\r
760\r
761 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
762 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
763 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
764 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
765\r
766 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
767 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
768 \r
769**/\r
770EFI_STATUS\r
771CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
772 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
773 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
774 IN VOID *Data,\r
775 IN UINTN DataSize\r
776 )\r
777{\r
778 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
779 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
780 UINT32 Index;\r
781 UINT32 SigCount;\r
782 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
783\r
784 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
785 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
786 }\r
787\r
788 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
789\r
790 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
791 IsPk = TRUE;\r
792 } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {\r
793 IsPk = FALSE;\r
794 } else {\r
795 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
796 }\r
797\r
798 SigCount = 0;\r
799 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
800 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
801\r
802 //\r
803 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
804 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
805 //\r
806 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
807 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
808 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
809 //\r
810 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
811 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
812 //\r
813 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
814 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
815 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
816 }\r
817 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
818 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
819 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
820 }\r
821 break;\r
822 }\r
823 }\r
824\r
825 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
826 //\r
827 // Undefined signature type.\r
828 //\r
829 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
830 }\r
831\r
832 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
833 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
834 }\r
835 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
836 \r
837 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
838 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
839 }\r
840\r
841 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
842 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
843 }\r
844\r
845 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
846 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
847 }\r
848\r
849 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
850}\r
851\r
852/**\r
853 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
854\r
855 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
856 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
857 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
858 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
859 data, this value contains the required size.\r
860 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
861 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
862 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
863\r
864 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
865 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
866 check carried out by the firmware.\r
867 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
868\r
869**/\r
870EFI_STATUS\r
871ProcessVarWithPk (\r
872 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
873 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
874 IN VOID *Data,\r
875 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
876 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
877 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
878 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
879 )\r
880{\r
881 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
882 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
883 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *OldPkList;\r
884 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *OldPkData;\r
885 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
886 BOOLEAN TimeBase;\r
887 BOOLEAN Del;\r
888 UINT8 *Payload;\r
889 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
890 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
891 EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r
892\r
893 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r
894 //\r
895 // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r
896 //\r
897 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
898 }\r
899\r
900 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
901\r
902 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
903 //\r
904 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means time-based X509 Cert PK.\r
905 //\r
906 TimeBase = TRUE;\r
907 } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
908 //\r
909 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means counter-based RSA-2048 Cert PK.\r
910 //\r
911 TimeBase = FALSE;\r
912 } else {\r
913 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
914 }\r
915\r
916 if (TimeBase) {\r
917 //\r
918 // Verify against X509 Cert PK.\r
919 //\r
920 Del = FALSE;\r
921 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
922 VariableName,\r
923 VendorGuid,\r
924 Data,\r
925 DataSize,\r
926 Variable,\r
927 Attributes,\r
928 AuthVarTypePk,\r
929 &Del\r
930 );\r
931 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
932 //\r
933 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
934 //\r
935 if (Del && IsPk) {\r
936 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
937 }\r
938 }\r
939 return Status;\r
940 } else {\r
941 //\r
942 // Verify against RSA2048 Cert PK.\r
943 //\r
944 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
945 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r
946 //\r
947 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
948 //\r
949 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
950 }\r
951 //\r
952 // Get platform key from variable.\r
953 //\r
954 Status = FindVariable (\r
955 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
956 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
957 &PkVariable,\r
958 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
959 FALSE\r
960 );\r
961 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
962\r
963 OldPkList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
964 OldPkData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) OldPkList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + OldPkList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
965 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);\r
966 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
967 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
968 VariableName,\r
969 VendorGuid,\r
970 (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
971 DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE);\r
972 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
973 return Status;\r
974 }\r
975 \r
976 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
977 VariableName,\r
978 VendorGuid,\r
979 (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
980 DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
981 Attributes,\r
982 0,\r
983 CertData->MonotonicCount,\r
984 Variable,\r
985 NULL\r
986 );\r
987\r
988 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
989 //\r
990 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
991 //\r
992 if ((DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) && IsPk) {\r
993 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
994 }\r
995 }\r
996 }\r
997 }\r
998 } else {\r
999 //\r
1000 // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode or Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
1001 //\r
1002 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1003 //\r
1004 // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r
1005 //\r
1006 MonotonicCount = 0;\r
1007 TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r
1008 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1009 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1010 } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1011 //\r
1012 // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r
1013 //\r
1014 MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r
1015 TimeStamp = NULL;\r
1016 Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1017 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1018 } else {\r
1019 //\r
1020 // No Authentication descriptor.\r
1021 //\r
1022 MonotonicCount = 0;\r
1023 TimeStamp = NULL;\r
1024 Payload = Data;\r
1025 PayloadSize = DataSize;\r
1026 }\r
1027\r
1028 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1029 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1030 return Status;\r
1031 }\r
1032\r
1033 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1034 VariableName,\r
1035 VendorGuid,\r
1036 Payload,\r
1037 PayloadSize,\r
1038 Attributes,\r
1039 0,\r
1040 MonotonicCount,\r
1041 Variable,\r
1042 TimeStamp\r
1043 );\r
1044\r
1045 if (IsPk) {\r
1046 if (PayloadSize != 0) {\r
1047 //\r
1048 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
1049 //\r
1050 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
1051 } else {\r
1052 //\r
1053 // If delete PK in custom mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1054 //\r
1055 UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
1056 }\r
1057 } \r
1058 }\r
1059\r
1060 return Status;\r
1061}\r
1062\r
1063/**\r
1064 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1065\r
1066 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1067 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1068 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1069 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1070 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1071 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1072 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1073\r
1074 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1075 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1076 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1077 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1078\r
1079**/\r
1080EFI_STATUS\r
1081ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1082 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1083 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1084 IN VOID *Data,\r
1085 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1086 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1087 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1088 )\r
1089{\r
1090 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1091 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
1092 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r
1093 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r
1094 UINT32 KekCount;\r
1095 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1096 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1097 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
1098 UINT32 Index;\r
1099 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
1100 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1101 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
1102 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1103 EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r
1104\r
1105 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r
1106 //\r
1107 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r
1108 //\r
1109 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1110 }\r
1111\r
1112 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1113 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
1114 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) &&\r
1115 ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0)){\r
1116 //\r
1117 // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS or\r
1118 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
1119 //\r
1120 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1121 }\r
1122\r
1123 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1124 //\r
1125 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1126 //\r
1127 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1128 VariableName,\r
1129 VendorGuid,\r
1130 Data,\r
1131 DataSize,\r
1132 Variable,\r
1133 Attributes,\r
1134 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1135 NULL\r
1136 );\r
1137 } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1138 //\r
1139 // Counter-based, verify against RSA2048 Cert KEK.\r
1140 //\r
1141 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1142 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1143 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r
1144 //\r
1145 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1146 //\r
1147 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1148 }\r
1149 //\r
1150 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
1151 //\r
1152 Status = FindVariable (\r
1153 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
1154 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1155 &KekVariable,\r
1156 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1157 FALSE\r
1158 );\r
1159 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
1160\r
1161 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
1162 KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1163\r
1164 //\r
1165 // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r
1166 // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r
1167 //\r
1168 IsFound = FALSE;\r
1169 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1170 if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
1171 KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1172 KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r
1173 for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r
1174 if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
1175 IsFound = TRUE;\r
1176 break;\r
1177 }\r
1178 KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r
1179 }\r
1180 }\r
1181 KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r
1182 KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r
1183 }\r
1184\r
1185 if (!IsFound) {\r
1186 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1187 }\r
1188\r
1189 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r
1190 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1191 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1192 VariableName,\r
1193 VendorGuid,\r
1194 (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
1195 DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
1196 Attributes,\r
1197 0,\r
1198 CertData->MonotonicCount,\r
1199 Variable,\r
1200 NULL\r
1201 );\r
1202 }\r
1203 }\r
1204 } else {\r
1205 //\r
1206 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
1207 //\r
1208 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1209 //\r
1210 // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r
1211 //\r
1212 MonotonicCount = 0;\r
1213 TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r
1214 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1215 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1216 } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1217 //\r
1218 // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r
1219 //\r
1220 MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r
1221 TimeStamp = NULL;\r
1222 Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1223 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1224 } else {\r
1225 //\r
1226 // No Authentication descriptor.\r
1227 //\r
1228 MonotonicCount = 0;\r
1229 TimeStamp = NULL;\r
1230 Payload = Data;\r
1231 PayloadSize = DataSize;\r
1232 }\r
1233\r
1234 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1235 VariableName,\r
1236 VendorGuid,\r
1237 Payload,\r
1238 PayloadSize,\r
1239 Attributes,\r
1240 0,\r
1241 MonotonicCount,\r
1242 Variable,\r
1243 TimeStamp\r
1244 );\r
1245 }\r
1246\r
1247 return Status;\r
1248}\r
1249\r
1250/**\r
1251 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1252\r
1253 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1254 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1255\r
1256 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1257 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1258 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1259 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1260 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1261\r
1262 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1263 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1264 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1265 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
1266 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1267 check carried out by the firmware.\r
1268 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1269\r
1270**/\r
1271EFI_STATUS\r
1272ProcessVariable (\r
1273 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1274 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1275 IN VOID *Data,\r
1276 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1277 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1278 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1279 )\r
1280{\r
1281 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1282 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1283 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1284 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1285 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1286 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1287 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1288 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1289\r
1290 KeyIndex = 0;\r
1291 CertData = NULL;\r
1292 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1293 PubKey = NULL;\r
1294 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1295\r
1296 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1297 //\r
1298 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1299 //\r
1300 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1301 }\r
1302 \r
1303 //\r
1304 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1305 //\r
1306 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1307 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1308 VariableName,\r
1309 VendorGuid,\r
1310 Data,\r
1311 DataSize,\r
1312 Variable,\r
1313 Attributes,\r
1314 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1315 NULL\r
1316 );\r
1317 }\r
1318\r
1319 //\r
1320 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1321 //\r
1322 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1323 //\r
1324 // Determine current operation type.\r
1325 //\r
1326 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1327 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1328 }\r
1329 //\r
1330 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1331 //\r
1332 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1333 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1334 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1335 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1336 } else {\r
1337 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1338 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1339 }\r
1340 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1341 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1342 ) {\r
1343 //\r
1344 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1345 //\r
1346 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1347 } else {\r
1348 //\r
1349 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1350 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1351 //\r
1352 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1353 return Status;\r
1354 }\r
1355\r
1356 //\r
1357 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1358 //\r
1359 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1360 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1361 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1362\r
1363 //\r
1364 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1365 //\r
1366 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1367\r
1368 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1369 //\r
1370 // Check input PubKey.\r
1371 //\r
1372 if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1373 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1374 }\r
1375 //\r
1376 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1377 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1378 //\r
1379 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1380 //\r
1381 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1382 //\r
1383 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1384 }\r
1385 }\r
1386 //\r
1387 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1388 //\r
1389 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1390 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1391 return Status;\r
1392 }\r
1393\r
1394 //\r
1395 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1396 //\r
1397 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1398 //\r
1399 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1400 //\r
1401 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r
1402 }\r
1403\r
1404 //\r
1405 // Verification pass.\r
1406 //\r
1407 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1408}\r
1409\r
1410/**\r
1411 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1412 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1413 will be ignored.\r
1414\r
1415 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1416 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1417 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1418 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1419\r
1420 @return Size of the merged buffer.\r
1421\r
1422**/\r
1423UINTN\r
1424AppendSignatureList (\r
1425 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1426 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1427 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1428 IN UINTN NewDataSize\r
1429 )\r
1430{\r
1431 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1432 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1433 UINTN CertCount;\r
1434 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1435 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1436 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1437 UINTN Index;\r
1438 UINTN Index2;\r
1439 UINTN Size;\r
1440 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1441 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1442 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1443 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1444\r
1445 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1446\r
1447 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1448 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1449 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1450 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1451\r
1452 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1453 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1454 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1455\r
1456 Size = DataSize;\r
1457 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1458 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1459 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1460 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1461 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1462 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1463 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1464 //\r
1465 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1466 //\r
1467 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1468 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1469 break;\r
1470 }\r
1471 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1472 }\r
1473 }\r
1474\r
1475 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1476 break;\r
1477 }\r
1478 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1479 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1480 }\r
1481\r
1482 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1483 //\r
1484 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1485 //\r
1486 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1487 //\r
1488 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1489 //\r
1490 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1491 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1492 }\r
1493\r
1494 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1495 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1496 CopiedCount++;\r
1497 }\r
1498\r
1499 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1500 }\r
1501\r
1502 //\r
1503 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1504 //\r
1505 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1506 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1507 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1508 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1509 }\r
1510\r
1511 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1512 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1513 }\r
1514\r
1515 return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1516}\r
1517\r
1518/**\r
1519 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1520\r
1521\r
1522 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1523 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1524\r
1525 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1526 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1527\r
1528**/\r
1529BOOLEAN\r
1530CompareTimeStamp (\r
1531 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1532 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1533 )\r
1534{\r
1535 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1536 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1537 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1538 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1539 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1540 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1541 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1542 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1543 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
1544 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r
1545 }\r
1546\r
1547 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1548}\r
1549\r
1550/**\r
1551 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1552 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1553\r
1554 The data format of "certdb":\r
1555 //\r
1556 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1557 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1558 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1559 // /// ...\r
1560 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1561 //\r
1562\r
1563 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1564 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1565 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1566 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1567 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1568 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1569 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1570 starting of Data.\r
1571 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1572\r
1573 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1574 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1575 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1576\r
1577**/\r
1578EFI_STATUS\r
1579FindCertsFromDb (\r
1580 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1581 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1582 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1583 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1584 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1585 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1586 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1587 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1588 )\r
1589{\r
1590 UINT32 Offset;\r
1591 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1592 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1593 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1594 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1595 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1596\r
1597 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1598 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1599 }\r
1600\r
1601 //\r
1602 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1603 //\r
1604 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1605 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1606 }\r
1607\r
1608 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1609\r
1610 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1611 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1612 }\r
1613\r
1614 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1615\r
1616 //\r
1617 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1618 //\r
1619 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1620 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1621 //\r
1622 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1623 //\r
1624 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1625 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1626 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1627 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1628\r
1629 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1630 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1631 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1632 }\r
1633\r
1634 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1635 //\r
1636 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1637 //\r
1638 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1639 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1640 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1641\r
1642 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1643 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1644 }\r
1645\r
1646 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1647 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1648 }\r
1649\r
1650 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1651 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1652 }\r
1653\r
1654 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1655 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1656 }\r
1657\r
1658 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1659 } else {\r
1660 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1661 }\r
1662 } else {\r
1663 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1664 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1665 }\r
1666 }\r
1667\r
1668 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1669}\r
1670\r
1671/**\r
1672 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1673 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1674\r
1675 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1676 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1677 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1678 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1679\r
1680 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1681 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1682 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1683\r
1684**/\r
1685EFI_STATUS\r
1686GetCertsFromDb (\r
1687 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1688 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1689 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1690 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1691 )\r
1692{\r
1693 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1694 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1695 UINT8 *Data;\r
1696 UINTN DataSize;\r
1697 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1698\r
1699 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1700 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1701 }\r
1702 \r
1703 //\r
1704 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1705 //\r
1706 Status = FindVariable (\r
1707 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1708 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1709 &CertDbVariable,\r
1710 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1711 FALSE\r
1712 ); \r
1713 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1714 return Status;\r
1715 }\r
1716\r
1717 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1718 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1719 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1720 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1721 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1722 }\r
1723\r
1724 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1725 VariableName,\r
1726 VendorGuid,\r
1727 Data,\r
1728 DataSize,\r
1729 &CertOffset,\r
1730 CertDataSize,\r
1731 NULL,\r
1732 NULL\r
1733 );\r
1734\r
1735 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1736 return Status;\r
1737 }\r
1738\r
1739 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1740 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1741}\r
1742\r
1743/**\r
1744 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1745 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1746\r
1747 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1748 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1749\r
1750 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1751 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1752 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1753 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1754\r
1755**/\r
1756EFI_STATUS\r
1757DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1758 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1759 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1760 )\r
1761{\r
1762 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1763 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1764 UINT8 *Data;\r
1765 UINTN DataSize;\r
1766 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1767 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1768 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1769 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1770 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1771\r
1772 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1773 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1774 }\r
1775 \r
1776 //\r
1777 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1778 //\r
1779 Status = FindVariable (\r
1780 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1781 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1782 &CertDbVariable,\r
1783 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1784 FALSE\r
1785 ); \r
1786 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1787 return Status;\r
1788 }\r
1789\r
1790 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1791 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1792 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1793 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1794 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1795 }\r
1796\r
1797 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1798 //\r
1799 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1800 //\r
1801 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1802 }\r
1803\r
1804 //\r
1805 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1806 //\r
1807 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1808 VariableName,\r
1809 VendorGuid,\r
1810 Data,\r
1811 DataSize,\r
1812 NULL,\r
1813 NULL,\r
1814 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1815 &CertNodeSize\r
1816 );\r
1817\r
1818 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1819 return Status;\r
1820 }\r
1821\r
1822 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1823 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1824 }\r
1825\r
1826 //\r
1827 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1828 //\r
1829 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
1830 NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);\r
1831 if (NewCertDb == NULL) {\r
1832 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1833 }\r
1834\r
1835 //\r
1836 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1837 //\r
1838 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1839 //\r
1840 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1841 //\r
1842 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1843 //\r
1844 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1845 //\r
1846 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1847 CopyMem (\r
1848 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1849 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1850 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1851 );\r
1852 }\r
1853\r
1854 //\r
1855 // Set "certdb".\r
1856 // \r
1857 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1858 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1859 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1860 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1861 NewCertDb,\r
1862 NewCertDbSize,\r
1863 VarAttr,\r
1864 0,\r
1865 0,\r
1866 &CertDbVariable,\r
1867 NULL\r
1868 );\r
1869\r
1870 FreePool (NewCertDb);\r
1871 return Status;\r
1872}\r
1873\r
1874/**\r
1875 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1876 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1877\r
1878 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1879 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1880 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1881 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1882\r
1883 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1884 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1885 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1886 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1887 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1888\r
1889**/\r
1890EFI_STATUS\r
1891InsertCertsToDb (\r
1892 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1893 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1894 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1895 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1896 )\r
1897{\r
1898 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1899 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1900 UINT8 *Data;\r
1901 UINTN DataSize;\r
1902 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1903 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1904 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1905 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1906 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1907 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1908\r
1909 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1910 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1911 }\r
1912 \r
1913 //\r
1914 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1915 //\r
1916 Status = FindVariable (\r
1917 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1918 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1919 &CertDbVariable,\r
1920 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1921 FALSE\r
1922 ); \r
1923 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1924 return Status;\r
1925 }\r
1926\r
1927 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1928 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1929 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1930 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1931 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1932 }\r
1933\r
1934 //\r
1935 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1936 // If yes return error.\r
1937 //\r
1938 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1939 VariableName,\r
1940 VendorGuid,\r
1941 Data,\r
1942 DataSize,\r
1943 NULL,\r
1944 NULL,\r
1945 NULL,\r
1946 NULL\r
1947 );\r
1948\r
1949 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1950 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1951 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1952 }\r
1953\r
1954 //\r
1955 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1956 //\r
1957 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1958 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
1959 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize; \r
1960 NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);\r
1961 if (NewCertDb == NULL) {\r
1962 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1963 }\r
1964\r
1965 //\r
1966 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1967 //\r
1968 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1969 //\r
1970 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1971 //\r
1972 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1973 //\r
1974 // Construct new cert node.\r
1975 //\r
1976 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1977 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1978 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1979 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1980 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1981 \r
1982 CopyMem (\r
1983 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1984 VariableName,\r
1985 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1986 );\r
1987\r
1988 CopyMem (\r
1989 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
1990 CertData,\r
1991 CertDataSize\r
1992 );\r
1993 \r
1994 //\r
1995 // Set "certdb".\r
1996 // \r
1997 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1998 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1999 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2000 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2001 NewCertDb,\r
2002 NewCertDbSize,\r
2003 VarAttr,\r
2004 0,\r
2005 0,\r
2006 &CertDbVariable,\r
2007 NULL\r
2008 );\r
2009\r
2010 FreePool (NewCertDb);\r
2011 return Status;\r
2012}\r
2013\r
2014/**\r
2015 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2016\r
2017 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2018 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2019 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2020 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2021 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2022 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
2023 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
2024 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK or KEK database or private database.\r
2025 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2026\r
2027 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2028 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2029 check carried out by the firmware.\r
2030 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2031 of resources.\r
2032 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2033\r
2034**/\r
2035EFI_STATUS\r
2036VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2037 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2038 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2039 IN VOID *Data,\r
2040 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2041 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
2042 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
2043 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
2044 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2045 )\r
2046{\r
2047 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2048 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2049 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
2050 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2051 UINTN Index;\r
2052 UINTN CertCount;\r
2053 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
2054 UINT32 Attr;\r
2055 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2056 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
2057 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2058 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2059 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2060 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2061 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
2062 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2063 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2064 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2065 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2066 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2067 UINTN Length;\r
2068 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
2069 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
2070 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2071 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2072 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
2073\r
2074 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2075 CertData = NULL;\r
2076 NewData = NULL;\r
2077 Attr = Attributes;\r
2078 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
2079 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2080 RootCert = NULL;\r
2081\r
2082 //\r
2083 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
2084 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2085 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2086 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2087 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
2088 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2089 //\r
2090 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2091\r
2092 //\r
2093 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2094 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2095 //\r
2096 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2097 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2098 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2099 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2100 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2101 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2102 }\r
2103\r
2104 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2105 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
2106 //\r
2107 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2108 //\r
2109 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2110 }\r
2111 }\r
2112\r
2113 //\r
2114 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2115 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2116 //\r
2117 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2118 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
2119 //\r
2120 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2121 //\r
2122 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2123 }\r
2124\r
2125 //\r
2126 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2127 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2128 //\r
2129 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2130 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
2131\r
2132 //\r
2133 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2134 //\r
2135 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2136 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
2137\r
2138 //\r
2139 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
2140 //\r
2141 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2142 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2143 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
2144\r
2145 Buffer = NewData;\r
2146 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2147 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2148 Buffer += Length;\r
2149\r
2150 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2151 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2152 Buffer += Length;\r
2153\r
2154 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2155 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2156 Buffer += Length;\r
2157\r
2158 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2159 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2160 Buffer += Length;\r
2161\r
2162 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2163\r
2164 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
2165 //\r
2166 // Get platform key from variable.\r
2167 //\r
2168 Status = FindVariable (\r
2169 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2170 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2171 &PkVariable,\r
2172 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2173 FALSE\r
2174 );\r
2175 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2176 return Status;\r
2177 }\r
2178\r
2179 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2180 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2181 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2182 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2183\r
2184\r
2185 //\r
2186 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2187 //\r
2188 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2189 SigData,\r
2190 SigDataSize,\r
2191 RootCert,\r
2192 RootCertSize,\r
2193 NewData,\r
2194 NewDataSize\r
2195 );\r
2196\r
2197 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2198\r
2199 //\r
2200 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2201 //\r
2202 Status = FindVariable (\r
2203 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2204 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2205 &KekVariable,\r
2206 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2207 FALSE\r
2208 );\r
2209 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2210 return Status;\r
2211 }\r
2212\r
2213 //\r
2214 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2215 //\r
2216 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2217 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2218 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2219 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2220 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2221 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2222 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2223 //\r
2224 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2225 //\r
2226 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2227 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2228\r
2229 //\r
2230 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2231 //\r
2232 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2233 SigData,\r
2234 SigDataSize,\r
2235 RootCert,\r
2236 RootCertSize,\r
2237 NewData,\r
2238 NewDataSize\r
2239 );\r
2240 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2241 goto Exit;\r
2242 }\r
2243 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2244 }\r
2245 }\r
2246 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2247 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2248 }\r
2249 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2250\r
2251 //\r
2252 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2253 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2254 //\r
2255 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2256 SigData,\r
2257 SigDataSize,\r
2258 &SignerCerts,\r
2259 &CertStackSize,\r
2260 &RootCert,\r
2261 &RootCertSize\r
2262 );\r
2263 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2264 goto Exit;\r
2265 }\r
2266\r
2267 //\r
2268 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2269 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2270 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2271 //\r
2272 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2273 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2274\r
2275 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2276 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2277 goto Exit;\r
2278 }\r
2279 \r
2280 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2281 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2282 goto Exit;\r
2283 }\r
2284 }\r
2285\r
2286 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2287 SigData,\r
2288 SigDataSize,\r
2289 RootCert,\r
2290 RootCertSize,\r
2291 NewData,\r
2292 NewDataSize\r
2293 );\r
2294 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2295 goto Exit;\r
2296 }\r
2297\r
2298 //\r
2299 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2300 //\r
2301 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2302 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2303 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2304 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2305 goto Exit;\r
2306 }\r
2307 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
2308 //\r
2309 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2310 //\r
2311 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2312 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2313 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2314 goto Exit;\r
2315 }\r
2316 }\r
2317 } else {\r
2318 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2319 }\r
2320\r
2321Exit:\r
2322\r
2323 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2324 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2325 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2326 }\r
2327\r
2328 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2329 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2330 }\r
2331\r
2332 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2334 return Status;\r
2335 }\r
2336\r
2337 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
2338 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2339 }\r
2340\r
2341 //\r
2342 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2343 //\r
2344 return UpdateVariable (\r
2345 VariableName,\r
2346 VendorGuid,\r
2347 PayloadPtr,\r
2348 PayloadSize,\r
2349 Attributes,\r
2350 0,\r
2351 0,\r
2352 Variable,\r
2353 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2354 );\r
2355}\r
2356\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE