IntelFsp2Pkg/GenCfgOpt.py: Support UPD offset auto assignment

[mirror_edk2.git] / MdeModulePkg / MdeModulePkg.dec

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
index 261da61c18a231249822e6982f1d1c348e5cebf8..6037504fa789d4ca96d45bf3a776dd77bc17a909 100644 (file)
--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
@@ -932,7 +932,8 @@
   #  If enabled, accessing NULL address in UEFI or SMM code can be caught.<BR><BR>\r
   #    BIT0    - Enable NULL pointer detection for UEFI.<BR>\r
   #    BIT1    - Enable NULL pointer detection for SMM.<BR>\r
-  #    BIT2..6 - Reserved for future uses.<BR>\r
+  #    BIT2..5 - Reserved for future uses.<BR>\r
+  #    BIT6    - Enable non-stop mode.<BR>\r
   #    BIT7    - Disable NULL pointer detection just after EndOfDxe. <BR>\r
   #              This is a workaround for those unsolvable NULL access issues in\r
   #              OptionROM, boot loader, etc. It can also help to avoid unnecessary\r
@@ -1014,6 +1015,7 @@
   #   BIT1 - Enable UEFI pool guard.<BR>\r
   #   BIT2 - Enable SMM page guard.<BR>\r
   #   BIT3 - Enable SMM pool guard.<BR>\r
+  #   BIT6 - Enable non-stop mode.<BR>\r
   #   BIT7 - The direction of Guard Page for Pool Guard.\r
   #          0 - The returned pool is near the tail guard page.<BR>\r
   #          1 - The returned pool is near the head guard page.<BR>\r
@@ -1286,17 +1288,23 @@
   ## Set image protection policy. The policy is bitwise.\r
   #  If a bit is set, the image will be protected by DxeCore if it is aligned.\r
   #   The code section becomes read-only, and the data section becomes non-executable.\r
-  #  If a bit is clear, the image will not be protected.<BR><BR>\r
+  #  If a bit is clear, nothing will be done to image code/data sections.<BR><BR>\r
   #    BIT0       - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r
   #    BIT1       - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r
+  #  <BR>\r
+  #  Note: If a bit is cleared, the data section could be still non-executable if\r
+  #  PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy is enabled for EfiLoaderData, EfiBootServicesData\r
+  #  and/or EfiRuntimeServicesData.<BR>\r
+  #  <BR>\r
   # @Prompt Set image protection policy.\r
   # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
   gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdImageProtectionPolicy|0x00000002|UINT32|0x00001047\r
 \r
   ## Set DXE memory protection policy. The policy is bitwise.\r
   #  If a bit is set, memory regions of the associated type will be mapped\r
-  #  non-executable.<BR><BR>\r
-  #\r
+  #  non-executable.<BR>\r
+  #  If a bit is cleared, nothing will be done to associated type of memory.<BR>\r
+  #  <BR>\r
   # Below is bit mask for this PCD: (Order is same as UEFI spec)<BR>\r
   #  EfiReservedMemoryType          0x0001<BR>\r
   #  EfiLoaderCode                  0x0002<BR>\r
@@ -1888,8 +1896,13 @@
   #  For the DxeIpl and the DxeCore are both X64, set NX for stack feature also require PcdDxeIplBuildPageTables be TRUE.<BR>\r
   #  For the DxeIpl and the DxeCore are both IA32 (PcdDxeIplSwitchToLongMode is FALSE), set NX for stack feature also require\r
   #  IA32 PAE is supported and Execute Disable Bit is available.<BR>\r
-  #   TRUE  - to set NX for stack.<BR>\r
-  #   FALSE - Not to set NX for stack.<BR>\r
+  #  <BR>\r
+  #   TRUE  - Set NX for stack.<BR>\r
+  #   FALSE - Do nothing for stack.<BR>\r
+  #  <BR>\r
+  #  Note: If this PCD is set to FALSE, NX could be still applied to stack due to PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy enabled for\r
+  #  EfiBootServicesData.<BR>\r
+  #  <BR>\r
   # @Prompt Set NX for stack.\r
   gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x0001006f\r
 \r