They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
to verify the signature.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
{EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
};\r
\r
-//\r
-// Secure Boot Mode state machine\r
-//\r
-SECURE_BOOT_MODE mSecureBootState[SecureBootModeTypeMax] = {\r
- // USER MODE\r
- {\r
- AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode\r
- FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW\r
- DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
- FALSE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RW\r
- SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode\r
- // SetupMode is always RO\r
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot\r
- },\r
- // SETUP MODE\r
- {\r
- AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode\r
- FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW\r
- DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
- TRUE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RO\r
- SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode\r
- // SetupMode is always RO\r
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot\r
- },\r
- // AUDIT MODE\r
- {\r
- AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE, // AuditMode\r
- TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO, AuditMode is RO\r
- DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
- TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO\r
- SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode\r
- // SetupMode is always RO\r
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot\r
- },\r
- // DEPLOYED MODE\r
- {\r
- AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode, AuditMode is RO\r
- TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO\r
- DEPLOYED_MODE_ENABLE, // DeployedMode\r
- TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO\r
- SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode\r
- // SetupMode is always RO\r
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot\r
- }\r
-};\r
-\r
-SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE mSecureBootMode;\r
-\r
/**\r
Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
\r
AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
\r
FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- VariableName,\r
- VendorGuid,\r
- &OrgData,\r
- &OrgDataSize\r
- );\r
-\r
- //\r
- // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
- //\r
- if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
- if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
- ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
- (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
- (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
- //\r
- // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
- // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
- //\r
- FilterSignatureList (\r
- OrgData,\r
- OrgDataSize,\r
- Data,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
- AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
- return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
- &AuthVariableInfo\r
- );\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- Initialize Secure Boot variables.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-InitSecureBootVariables (\r
- VOID\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- UINT8 *Data;\r
- UINTN DataSize;\r
- UINT32 SecureBoot;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
- SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE SecureBootMode;\r
- BOOLEAN IsPkPresent;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Find "PK" variable\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- IsPkPresent = FALSE;\r
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
- } else {\r
- IsPkPresent = TRUE;\r
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Init "SecureBootMode" variable.\r
- // Initial case\r
- // SecureBootMode doesn't exist. Init it with PK state\r
- // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync\r
- // 1.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
- // 1.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
- // 1.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- //\r
- // Variable driver Initial Case\r
- //\r
- if (IsPkPresent) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;\r
- } else {\r
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;\r
- }\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync\r
- //\r
- SecureBootMode = (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data;\r
- ASSERT(SecureBootMode < SecureBootModeTypeMax);\r
-\r
- if (IsPkPresent) {\r
- //\r
- // 3.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
- //\r
- if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;\r
- } else if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode;\r
- }\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // 3.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
- // 3.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var. Reinit to be SetupMode\r
- //\r
- if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;\r
- }\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (SecureBootMode != (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data)) {\r
- //\r
- // Update SecureBootMode Var\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,\r
- &SecureBootMode,\r
- sizeof (UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Init "AuditMode"\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].AuditMode,\r
- sizeof(UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Init "DeployedMode"\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].DeployedMode,\r
- sizeof(UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Init "SetupMode"\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].SetupMode,\r
- sizeof(UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in User Mode or Deployed Mode, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);\r
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- if (!IsPkPresent) {\r
- //\r
- // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot\r
- // Delete "SecureBootMode"\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- 0,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- } else {\r
- SecureBootEnable = *Data;\r
- }\r
- } else if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
- //\r
- // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in User Mode or Deployed Mode.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- sizeof (UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
- //\r
- if ((SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) \r
- && ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))) {\r
- SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
- } else {\r
- SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
- }\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SecureBoot,\r
- sizeof (UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
-\r
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode is %x\n", SecureBootMode));\r
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBoot));\r
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Save SecureBootMode in global space\r
- //\r
- mSecureBootMode = SecureBootMode;\r
-\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- Update SecureBootMode variable.\r
-\r
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-UpdateSecureBootMode(\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update "SecureBootMode" variable to new Secure Boot Mode\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,\r
- &NewMode,\r
- sizeof (UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
- );\r
-\r
- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode Update to %x\n", NewMode));\r
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
- } else {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootMode Update failure %x\n", Status));\r
- }\r
-\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- Current secure boot mode is AuditMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
- to a new mode.\r
-\r
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-TransitionFromAuditMode(\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- VOID *AuditVarData;\r
- VOID *DeployedVarData;\r
- VOID *SetupVarData;\r
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
- UINTN DataSize;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &AuditVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &DeployedVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SetupVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
- // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.\r
- //\r
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
- }\r
-\r
- if (NewMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
- //\r
- // Since PK is enrolled, can't rollback, always update SecureBootMode in memory\r
- //\r
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // AuditMode ----> DeployedMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // AuditMode =: 0 / DeployedMode := 1 / SetupMode := 0\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
- //\r
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
- // Variable in runtime.\r
- //\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Create "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- sizeof (SecureBootEnable),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- } else {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode, NewMode));\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- Current secure boot mode is DeployedMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
- to a new mode.\r
-\r
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-TransitionFromDeployedMode(\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- VOID *DeployedVarData;\r
- VOID *SetupVarData;\r
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
- UINTN DataSize;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &DeployedVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SetupVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
- // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.\r
- //\r
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
- }\r
-\r
- switch(NewMode) {\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
- //\r
- // DeployedMode ----> UserMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // DeployedMode := 0\r
- //\r
- // Platform Specific DeployedMode clear. UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
- //\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- break;\r
-\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
- //\r
- // Since PK is processed before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
- //\r
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // DeployedMode ----> SetupMode\r
- //\r
- // Platform Specific PKpub clear or Delete Pkpub\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // DeployedMode := 0 / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
- //\r
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
- // Variable in runtime.\r
- //\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- 0,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- break;\r
-\r
- default:\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode, NewMode));\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- Current secure boot mode is UserMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
- to a new mode.\r
-\r
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-TransitionFromUserMode(\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- VOID *AuditVarData;\r
- VOID *DeployedVarData;\r
- VOID *SetupVarData;\r
- VOID *PkVarData;\r
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
- UINTN DataSize;\r
- VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &AuditVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &DeployedVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SetupVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow. \r
- // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.\r
- //\r
- if (NewMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
- }\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // UserMode -----> AuditMode. Check RemainingSpace for SecureBootMode var first.\r
- // Will update SecureBootMode after DeletePK logic\r
- //\r
- VariableEntry.VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);\r
- VariableEntry.Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;\r
- VariableEntry.Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;\r
- if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry, NULL)) {\r
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- switch(NewMode) {\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:\r
- //\r
- // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
- //\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // UserMode ----> DeployedMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // DeployedMode := 1\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
- break;\r
-\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
- //\r
- // UserMode ----> AuditMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // Delete PKpub / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0\r
- //\r
- // Delete PKpub without verification. Should always succeed.\r
- //\r
- PkVarData = NULL;\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- PkVarData,\r
- 0,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "UserMode -> AuditMode. Delete PK fail %x\n", Status));\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable\r
- //\r
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- //\r
- // Since PK is deleted successfully, Doesn't break, continue to update other variable.\r
- //\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
- }\r
- CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Fall into SetupMode logic\r
- //\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
- //\r
- // Since PK is deleted before , can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
- //\r
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // UserMode ----> SetupMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // DeployedMode :=0 / SetupMode :=1 / SecureBoot :=0\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
- //\r
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
- // Variable in runtime.\r
- //\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- 0,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
-\r
- break;\r
-\r
- default:\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeUserMode, NewMode));\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- Current secure boot mode is SetupMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
- to a new mode.\r
-\r
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-TransitionFromSetupMode(\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- VOID *AuditVarData;\r
- VOID *SetupVarData;\r
- VOID *SecureBootVarData;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
- UINTN DataSize;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &AuditVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SetupVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootVarData,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
- // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
- // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.\r
- //\r
- Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
- }\r
-\r
- switch(NewMode) {\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
- //\r
- // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
- //\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // SetupMode ----> AuditMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // AuditMode := 1\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
- break;\r
-\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
- //\r
- // Since PK is enrolled before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
- //\r
- mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // SetupMode ----> UserMode\r
- // Side Effects\r
- // SetupMode := 0 / SecureBoot := 1\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
- //\r
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
- // Variable in runtime.\r
- //\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
- AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- sizeof (SecureBootEnable),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- break;\r
-\r
- default:\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode, NewMode));\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
-\r
-/**\r
- This function performs main secure boot mode transition logic.\r
-\r
- @param[in] CurMode Current Secure Boot Mode.\r
- @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
-\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The Current Secure Boot Mode is wrong.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-SecureBootModeTransition(\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE CurMode,\r
- IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // SecureBootMode transition\r
- //\r
- switch (CurMode) {\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
- Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode);\r
- break;\r
-\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
- Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode);\r
- break;\r
-\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
- Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode);\r
- break;\r
-\r
- case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:\r
- Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode);\r
- break;\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ &OrgData,\r
+ &OrgDataSize\r
+ );\r
\r
- default:\r
- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ //\r
+ // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
+ //\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
+ if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
+ ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
+ (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
+ (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
+ //\r
+ // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
+ // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
+ //\r
+ FilterSignatureList (\r
+ OrgData,\r
+ OrgDataSize,\r
+ Data,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
- return Status;\r
-\r
+ ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
+ return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
+ &AuthVariableInfo\r
+ );\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
}\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Update platform mode.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdatePlatformMode (\r
+ IN UINT32 Mode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &Data,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
+ CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
+ // Variable in runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
+ // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
+ // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &Data,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ //\r
+ // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
+ // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
+ // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
+ //\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootMode,\r
+ sizeof(UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &Data,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
+ VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
+ // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
+ //\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
+ VariableDataSize = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ VariableDataSize,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
\r
/**\r
Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
);\r
}\r
\r
-/**\r
- Process Secure Boot Mode variable.\r
-\r
- Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
- This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
- This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
- This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
- buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
- This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
-\r
- @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
- @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
- @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
- data, this value contains the required size.\r
- @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
-\r
- @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter\r
- @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
- check carried out by the firmware.\r
- @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.\r
- @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-ProcessSecureBootModeVar (\r
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
- IN VOID *Data,\r
- IN UINTN DataSize,\r
- IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- VOID *VarData;\r
- UINTN VarDataSize;\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Check "AuditMode", "DeployedMode" Variable ReadWrite Attributes\r
- // if in Runtime, Always RO\r
- // if in Boottime, Depends on current Secure Boot Mode\r
- //\r
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime()) {\r
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Delete not OK\r
- //\r
- if ((DataSize != sizeof(UINT8)) || (Attributes == 0)) {\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
- }\r
-\r
- if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
- if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsAuditModeRO) {\r
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
- }\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // Platform specific deployedMode clear. Set DeployedMode = RW\r
- //\r
- if (!InCustomMode() || !UserPhysicalPresent() || mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
- if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsDeployedModeRO) {\r
- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
- }\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- if (*(UINT8 *)Data != 0 && *(UINT8 *)Data != 1) {\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
- // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- VariableName,\r
- VendorGuid,\r
- &VarData,\r
- &VarDataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- ASSERT(FALSE);\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // If AuditMode/DeployedMode is assigned same value. Simply return EFI_SUCCESS\r
- //\r
- if (*(UINT8 *)VarData == *(UINT8 *)Data) {\r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Perform SecureBootMode transition\r
- //\r
- if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode));\r
- return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode);\r
- } else if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
- if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
- //\r
- // Platform specific DeployedMode clear. InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent() is checked before\r
- //\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode));\r
- return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);\r
- } else {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode));\r
- return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
-}\r
-\r
/**\r
Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
\r
BOOLEAN Del;\r
UINT8 *Payload;\r
UINTN PayloadSize;\r
- VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry[2];\r
\r
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
// Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r
//\r
Del = FALSE;\r
- Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
- PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
- if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
- Del = TRUE;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Check the variable space for both PKpub and SecureBootMode variable.\r
- //\r
- VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = PayloadSize;\r
- VariableEntry[0].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;\r
- VariableEntry[0].Name = EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME;\r
-\r
- VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);\r
- VariableEntry[1].Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;\r
- VariableEntry[1].Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;\r
-\r
- if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || \r
- (((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) && !IsPk)) {\r
+ if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
+ Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
+ if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
+ Del = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
\r
Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- //\r
- // If delete PKpub, only check for "SecureBootMode" only\r
- // if update / add PKpub, check both NewPKpub & "SecureBootMode"\r
- //\r
- if (IsPk) {\r
- //\r
- // Delete PKpub\r
- //\r
- if (Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) \r
- && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){\r
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- //\r
- // Add PKpub\r
- //\r
- } else if (!Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode))\r
- && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {\r
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- if (((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) || IsPk) {\r
+ if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
}\r
- } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
- //\r
- // If delete PKpub, check "SecureBootMode" only\r
- //\r
- if (IsPk && Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){\r
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- }\r
-\r
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
//\r
// Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
//\r
);\r
} else {\r
//\r
- // SetupMode or AuditMode to add PK\r
// Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
//\r
- //\r
- // Check PKpub & SecureBootMode variable space consistency\r
- //\r
- if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {\r
- //\r
- // No enough variable space to set PK successfully.\r
- //\r
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
- }\r
-\r
Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
}\r
\r
if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
- //\r
- // Delete or Enroll PK causes SecureBootMode change\r
- //\r
- if (!Del) {\r
- if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {\r
- //\r
- // If enroll PK in setup mode, change to user mode.\r
- //\r
- Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);\r
- } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
- //\r
- // If enroll PK in Audit mode, change to Deployed mode.\r
- //\r
- Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);\r
- } else {\r
- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "PK is updated in %x mode. No SecureBootMode change.\n", mSecureBootMode));\r
- }\r
- } else {\r
- if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
- //\r
- // If delete PK in User Mode or DeployedMode, change to Setup Mode.\r
- //\r
- Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode);\r
- }\r
+ if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
+ //\r
+ // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
+ } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
+ //\r
+ // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
}\r
}\r
\r
}\r
\r
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
- if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)\r
- && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
//\r
// Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
//\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- if ((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) {\r
+ if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
}\r
}\r
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
IN VOID *Data,\r
IN UINTN DataSize,\r
- IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
+ IN UINT32 Attributes\r
)\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0\r
);\r
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
- Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
+ Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r
}\r
\r
return Status;\r
\r
/**\r
Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
- by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
+ by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
\r
- The data format of "certdb":\r
+ The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":\r
//\r
// UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
// /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
\r
@param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
@param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
- @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
- @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
+ @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
@param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
@param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
@param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
\r
/**\r
Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
- by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
+ by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"\r
+ or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r
\r
@param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
@param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
+ @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
@param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
@param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
- @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
\r
**/\r
GetCertsFromDb (\r
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
)\r
UINT8 *Data;\r
UINTN DataSize;\r
UINT32 CertOffset;\r
+ CHAR16 *DbName;\r
\r
if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
+ \r
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get variable "certdb".\r
+ //\r
+ DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get variable "certdbv".\r
+ //\r
+ DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
- // Get variable "certdb".\r
+ // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
+ DbName,\r
&gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
(VOID **) &Data,\r
&DataSize\r
\r
/**\r
Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
- variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
+ variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or \r
+ "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r
\r
@param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
@param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
+ @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
\r
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
- @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
\r
EFI_STATUS\r
DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT32 Attributes\r
)\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
+ CHAR16 *DbName;\r
\r
if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
- //\r
- // Get variable "certdb".\r
- //\r
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get variable "certdb".\r
+ //\r
+ DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
+ VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get variable "certdbv".\r
+ //\r
+ DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
+ VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
+ DbName,\r
&gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
(VOID **) &Data,\r
&DataSize\r
);\r
+\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
//\r
- // There is no certs in certdb.\r
+ // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
+ // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
VariableName,\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
+ // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Set "certdb".\r
+ // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
+ DbName,\r
&gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
NewCertDb,\r
NewCertDbSize,\r
\r
/**\r
Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
- and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
+ and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to\r
+ time based authenticated variable attributes.\r
\r
@param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
@param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
+ @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r
@param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
@param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
\r
@retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
and VendorGuid already exists.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
InsertCertsToDb (\r
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
)\r
UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
UINT32 NameSize;\r
AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
+ CHAR16 *DbName;\r
\r
if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get variable "certdb".\r
+ //\r
+ DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r
+ VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get variable "certdbv".\r
+ //\r
+ DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r
+ VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
- // Get variable "certdb".\r
+ // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
+ DbName,\r
&gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
(VOID **) &Data,\r
&DataSize\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
+ // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
// If yes return error.\r
//\r
Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
+ // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
);\r
\r
//\r
- // Set "certdb".\r
+ // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r
//\r
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
+ DbName,\r
&gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
NewCertDb,\r
NewCertDbSize,\r
BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r
UINT8 *Data;\r
UINTN DataSize;\r
- UINT8 *AuthVarData;\r
- UINTN AuthVarDataSize;\r
EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r
+ AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
\r
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
\r
//\r
// Find corresponding time auth variable\r
//\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- VariableName,\r
- &AuthVarGuid,\r
- (VOID **) &AuthVarData,\r
- &AuthVarDataSize\r
- );\r
-\r
- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
- Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(VariableName, &AuthVarGuid);\r
+ ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
+ Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &AuthVarGuid,\r
+ &AuthVariableInfo\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
+ Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &AuthVarGuid,\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.Attributes\r
+ );\r
CertCleaned = TRUE;\r
DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r
FreePool(VariableName);\r
}\r
\r
//\r
- // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
+ // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing\r
// variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
// in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
//\r
if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r
VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
\r
- Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
+ Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
goto Exit;\r
}\r
//\r
// Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
//\r
- Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
+ Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
goto Exit;\r
// Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
//\r
if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r
- Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
+ Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r
}\r
\r
if (VarDel != NULL) {\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / blobdiff