Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
service in UEFI2.2.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r
UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
-EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[SIGSUPPORT_NUM] = {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID};\r
+EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
//\r
// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
//\r
//\r
UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
\r
+//\r
+// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
+// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
+//\r
+EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
+//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
+ {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
+ {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
+ {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
+};\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
+ @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
+ \r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
+ || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
+ return TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ \r
+ return FALSE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
+ @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+InCustomMode (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
+\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
+ if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
+ return TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ \r
+ return FALSE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
/**\r
Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
required.\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
\r
- Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r
+ Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
UINTN CtxSize;\r
UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINT8 CustomMode;\r
\r
//\r
// Initialize hash context.\r
AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
&gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
\r
if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
}\r
\r
- FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
} else {\r
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
\r
if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
\r
if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
mSignatureSupport,\r
- SIGSUPPORT_NUM * sizeof(EFI_GUID),\r
+ sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
VarAttr,\r
0,\r
0,\r
// If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
//\r
SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
- FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
} else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
} else {\r
SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
}\r
- FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
Status = UpdateVariable (\r
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
\r
//\r
- // Detect whether a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key)\r
- // is configured by platform owner. This method is provided for users force to clear PK\r
- // in case incorrect enrollment mis-haps.\r
+ // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r
//\r
- if (ForceClearPK ()) {\r
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable PK/KEK/DB/DBX will be cleared in clear PK mode.\n"));\r
-\r
+ FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
+ if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
+ CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
+ } else {\r
//\r
- // 1. Clear PK.\r
+ // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
//\r
- Status = DeleteVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r
+ CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
+ Status = UpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
+ &CustomMode,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ &Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
-\r
- //\r
- // 2. Update "SetupMode" variable to SETUP_MODE.\r
- //\r
- UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
-\r
- //\r
- // 3. Clear KEK, DB and DBX.\r
- //\r
- DeleteVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r
- DeleteVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid);\r
- DeleteVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid);\r
}\r
+ \r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
\r
return Status;\r
}\r
AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
&gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
//\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256 type.\r
+ Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
\r
@param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
\r
//\r
// wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
- // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256.\r
+ // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
//\r
if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
- !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
+ !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
) {\r
//\r
// Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
//\r
// If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
&Variable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
\r
if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK variable.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
+ @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
+ \r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN VOID *Data,\r
+ IN UINTN DataSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
+ UINTN SigDataSize;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ UINT32 SigCount;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
+\r
+ if (DataSize == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
+ IsPk = TRUE;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {\r
+ IsPk = FALSE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SigCount = 0;\r
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
+ // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
+ //\r
+ while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
+ // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
+ //\r
+ if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
+ (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
+ SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Undefined signature type.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
+ \r
+ SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
- if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
\r
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
//\r
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&PkVariable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
\r
OldPkData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) OldPkList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + OldPkList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);\r
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ \r
Status = UpdateVariable (\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
}\r
} else {\r
//\r
- // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode.\r
+ // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode or Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
//\r
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
//\r
PayloadSize = DataSize;\r
}\r
\r
+ Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
Status = UpdateVariable (\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
Variable,\r
TimeStamp\r
);\r
- //\r
- // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
- //\r
- if ((DataSize != 0) && IsPk) {\r
- Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
- }\r
+\r
+ if (IsPk) {\r
+ if (PayloadSize != 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // If delete PK in custom mode, need change to setup mode.\r
+ //\r
+ UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
+ }\r
+ } \r
}\r
\r
return Status;\r
UINT8 *Payload;\r
UINTN PayloadSize;\r
UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
+ EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r
+\r
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
\r
- if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
- if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
+ if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) &&\r
+ ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0)){\r
//\r
- // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
+ // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS or\r
+ // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
//\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
- CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
- CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
- if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
//\r
- // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
+ // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
//\r
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
- }\r
- //\r
- // Get KEK database from variable.\r
- //\r
- Status = FindVariable (\r
- EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &KekVariable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
- );\r
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
+ return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, FALSE, NULL);\r
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Counter-based, verify against RSA2048 Cert KEK.\r
+ //\r
+ CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
+ CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
+ if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Get KEK database from variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = FindVariable (\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &KekVariable,\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
+ );\r
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
\r
- KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
- KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
+ KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
+ KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
\r
- //\r
- // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r
- // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r
- //\r
- IsFound = FALSE;\r
- while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
- if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
- KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
- KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r
- for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r
- if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
- IsFound = TRUE;\r
- break;\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r
+ // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
+ KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r
}\r
- KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r
}\r
+ KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r
}\r
- KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r
- KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r
- }\r
\r
- if (!IsFound) {\r
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
- }\r
+ if (!IsFound) {\r
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ }\r
\r
- Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- Status = UpdateVariable (\r
- VariableName,\r
- VendorGuid,\r
- (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
- DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
- Attributes,\r
- 0,\r
- CertData->MonotonicCount,\r
- Variable,\r
- NULL\r
- );\r
+ Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ Status = UpdateVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r
+ Attributes,\r
+ 0,\r
+ CertData->MonotonicCount,\r
+ Variable,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
}\r
} else {\r
//\r
- // If in setup mode, no authentication needed.\r
+ // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
//\r
- if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r
+ //\r
+ MonotonicCount = 0;\r
+ TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r
+ Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
//\r
// Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r
//\r
MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r
+ TimeStamp = NULL;\r
Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
} else {\r
// No Authentication descriptor.\r
//\r
MonotonicCount = 0;\r
+ TimeStamp = NULL;\r
Payload = Data;\r
PayloadSize = DataSize;\r
}\r
0,\r
MonotonicCount,\r
Variable,\r
- NULL\r
+ TimeStamp\r
);\r
}\r
\r
PubKey = NULL;\r
IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
\r
+ if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ }\r
+ \r
//\r
// Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
//\r
(CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
(CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
(CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
}\r
\r
if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&PkVariable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&KekVariable,\r
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
+ FALSE\r
);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
}\r
\r
+ Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
*VarDel = TRUE;\r
}\r