]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_edk2.git/commit
NetworkPkg/IScsiDxe: check IScsiHexToBin() return values
authorLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tue, 8 Jun 2021 12:12:59 +0000 (14:12 +0200)
committermergify[bot] <37929162+mergify[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Wed, 9 Jun 2021 17:25:03 +0000 (17:25 +0000)
commitb8649cf2a3e673a4a8cb6c255e394b354b771550
treeb13058c3f709f2e201760b5cf278401ccac7997f
parent54e90edaed0d7c15230902ac4d74f4304bad2ebd
NetworkPkg/IScsiDxe: check IScsiHexToBin() return values

IScsiDxe (that is, the initiator) receives two hex-encoded strings from
the iSCSI target:

- CHAP_C, where the target challenges the initiator,

- CHAP_R, where the target answers the challenge from the initiator (in
  case the initiator wants mutual authentication).

Accordingly, we have two IScsiHexToBin() call sites:

- At the CHAP_C decoding site, check whether the decoding succeeds. The
  decoded buffer ("AuthData->InChallenge") can accommodate 1024 bytes,
  which is a permissible restriction on the target, per
  <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7143#section-12.1.3>. Shorter challenges
  from the target are acceptable.

- At the CHAP_R decoding site, enforce that the decoding both succeed, and
  provide exactly ISCSI_CHAP_RSP_LEN bytes. CHAP_R contains the digest
  calculated by the target, therefore it must be of fixed size. We may
  only call IScsiCHAPAuthTarget() if "TargetRsp" has been fully populated.

Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3356
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210608121259.32451-11-lersek@redhat.com>
NetworkPkg/IScsiDxe/IScsiCHAP.c