fscrypt: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1731951
commit d60b5b7854c3d135b869f74fb93eaf63cbb1991a upstream.

When an fscrypt-encrypted file is opened, we request the file's master
key from the keyrings service as a logon key, then access its payload.
However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for
this.  request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>

diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index 018c588c7ac3b7ac8fd78b4092332f771c6411c0..8e704d12a1cf2781087ec14d6ef6561ea9dd3236 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
                goto out;
        }
        ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
+       if (!ukp) {
+               /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+               res = -EKEYREVOKED;
+               goto out;
+       }
        if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
                res = -EINVAL;
                goto out;