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1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
8 *
9 * ima_policy.c
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
11 *
12 */
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/fs.h>
16 #include <linux/security.h>
17 #include <linux/magic.h>
18 #include <linux/parser.h>
19 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 #include <linux/rculist.h>
21 #include <linux/genhd.h>
22 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
23
24 #include "ima.h"
25
26 /* flags definitions */
27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
35 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100
36
37 #define UNKNOWN 0
38 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
39 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
40 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
41 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
42 #define AUDIT 0x0040
43
44 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
45 (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
46
47 int ima_policy_flag;
48 static int temp_ima_appraise;
49
50 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
51 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
52 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
53 };
54
55 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
56
57 struct ima_rule_entry {
58 struct list_head list;
59 int action;
60 unsigned int flags;
61 enum ima_hooks func;
62 int mask;
63 unsigned long fsmagic;
64 uuid_t fsuuid;
65 kuid_t uid;
66 kuid_t fowner;
67 bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
68 bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
69 int pcr;
70 struct {
71 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
72 void *args_p; /* audit value */
73 int type; /* audit type */
74 } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
75 };
76
77 /*
78 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
79 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
80 */
81
82 /*
83 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
84 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
85 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
86 * and running executables.
87 */
88 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
89 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
90 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
91 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
92 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
93 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
94 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
98 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
99 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC,
100 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
101 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
102 };
103
104 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
105 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
106 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
107 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
108 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
109 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
110 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
111 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
112 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
113 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
114 };
115
116 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
117 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
118 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
119 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
120 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
121 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
122 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
123 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
124 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
125 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
126 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
127 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
128 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
129 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
130 };
131
132 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
133 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
134 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
135 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
136 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
137 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
138 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
139 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
140 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
141 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
142 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
143 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
144 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
145 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
146 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
147 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
148 #endif
149 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
150 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
151 .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
152 #else
153 /* force signature */
154 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
155 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
156 #endif
157 };
158
159 static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
160 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
161 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
162 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
163 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
164 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
165 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
166 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
167 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
168 };
169
170 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
171 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
172 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
173 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
174
175 static int ima_policy __initdata;
176
177 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
178 {
179 if (ima_policy)
180 return 1;
181
182 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
183 return 1;
184 }
185 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
186
187 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
188 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
189 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
190 {
191 char *p;
192
193 while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) {
194 if (*p == ' ')
195 continue;
196 if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
197 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
198 else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
199 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
200 else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
201 ima_use_secure_boot = true;
202 }
203
204 return 1;
205 }
206 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
207
208 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
209 {
210 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
211 return 1;
212 }
213 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
214
215 /*
216 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
217 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
218 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
219 * they don't.
220 */
221 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
222 {
223 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
224 int result;
225 int i;
226
227 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
228 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
229 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
230 continue;
231 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
232 Audit_equal,
233 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
234 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
235 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
236 }
237 }
238 }
239
240 /**
241 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
242 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
243 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
244 * @func: LIM hook identifier
245 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
246 *
247 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
248 */
249 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
250 enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
251 {
252 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
253 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
254 int i;
255
256 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
257 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
258 return false;
259 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
260 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
261 return false;
262 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
263 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
264 return false;
265 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
266 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
267 return false;
268 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
269 !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
270 return false;
271 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
272 return false;
273 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
274 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
275 if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
276 && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
277 && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
278 return false;
279 } else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
280 return false;
281 }
282
283 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
284 !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
285 return false;
286 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
287 int rc = 0;
288 u32 osid, sid;
289 int retried = 0;
290
291 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
292 continue;
293 retry:
294 switch (i) {
295 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
296 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
297 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
298 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
299 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
300 rule->lsm[i].type,
301 Audit_equal,
302 rule->lsm[i].rule,
303 NULL);
304 break;
305 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
306 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
307 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
308 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
309 rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
310 rule->lsm[i].type,
311 Audit_equal,
312 rule->lsm[i].rule,
313 NULL);
314 default:
315 break;
316 }
317 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
318 retried = 1;
319 ima_lsm_update_rules();
320 goto retry;
321 }
322 if (!rc)
323 return false;
324 }
325 return true;
326 }
327
328 /*
329 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
330 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
331 */
332 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
333 {
334 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
335 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
336
337 switch (func) {
338 case MMAP_CHECK:
339 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
340 case BPRM_CHECK:
341 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
342 case FILE_CHECK:
343 case POST_SETATTR:
344 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
345 case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
346 default:
347 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
348 }
349 }
350
351 /**
352 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
353 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
354 * @func: IMA hook identifier
355 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
356 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
357 *
358 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
359 * conditions.
360 *
361 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
362 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
363 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
364 */
365 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
366 int flags, int *pcr)
367 {
368 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
369 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
370
371 rcu_read_lock();
372 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
373
374 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
375 continue;
376
377 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
378 continue;
379
380 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
381
382 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
383 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
384 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
385
386 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
387 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
388 else
389 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
390
391 if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
392 *pcr = entry->pcr;
393
394 if (!actmask)
395 break;
396 }
397 rcu_read_unlock();
398
399 return action;
400 }
401
402 /*
403 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
404 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
405 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
406 * can be made earlier.
407 */
408 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
409 {
410 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
411
412 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
413 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
414 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
415 }
416
417 ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise;
418 if (!ima_appraise)
419 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
420 }
421
422 /**
423 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
424 *
425 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
426 * the new ima_policy_rules.
427 */
428 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
429 {
430 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
431
432 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
433 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
434 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
435 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
436 secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
437 ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
438
439 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
440 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
441
442 switch (ima_policy) {
443 case ORIGINAL_TCB:
444 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
445 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
446 &ima_default_rules);
447 break;
448 case DEFAULT_TCB:
449 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
450 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
451 &ima_default_rules);
452 default:
453 break;
454 }
455
456 /*
457 * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
458 * any other appraise rules.
459 */
460 for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
461 list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
462 &ima_default_rules);
463
464 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
465 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
466 &ima_default_rules);
467 if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
468 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
469 }
470
471 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
472 ima_update_policy_flag();
473 }
474
475 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
476 int ima_check_policy(void)
477 {
478 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
479 return -EINVAL;
480 return 0;
481 }
482
483 /**
484 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
485 *
486 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
487 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
488 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
489 * RCU updater.
490 *
491 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
492 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
493 */
494 void ima_update_policy(void)
495 {
496 struct list_head *first, *last, *policy;
497
498 /* append current policy with the new rules */
499 first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next;
500 last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev;
501 policy = &ima_policy_rules;
502
503 synchronize_rcu();
504
505 last->next = policy;
506 rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first);
507 first->prev = policy->prev;
508 policy->prev = last;
509
510 /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */
511 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules);
512
513 if (ima_rules != policy) {
514 ima_policy_flag = 0;
515 ima_rules = policy;
516 }
517 ima_update_policy_flag();
518 }
519
520 enum {
521 Opt_err = -1,
522 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
523 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
524 Opt_audit,
525 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
526 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
527 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
528 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
529 Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
530 Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
531 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
532 Opt_pcr
533 };
534
535 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
536 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
537 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
538 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
539 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
540 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
541 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
542 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
543 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
544 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
545 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
546 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
547 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
548 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
549 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
550 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
551 {Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
552 {Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
553 {Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"},
554 {Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"},
555 {Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"},
556 {Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"},
557 {Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"},
558 {Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"},
559 {Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
560 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
561 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
562 {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
563 {Opt_err, NULL}
564 };
565
566 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
567 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
568 {
569 int result;
570
571 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
572 return -EINVAL;
573
574 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
575 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
576 return -ENOMEM;
577
578 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
579 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
580 Audit_equal,
581 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
582 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
583 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
584 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
585 return -EINVAL;
586 }
587
588 return result;
589 }
590
591 static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
592 bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
593 {
594 if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
595 audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
596 else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
597 audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
598 else
599 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
600 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
601 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
602 }
603 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
604 {
605 ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL);
606 }
607
608 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
609 {
610 struct audit_buffer *ab;
611 char *from;
612 char *p;
613 bool uid_token;
614 int result = 0;
615
616 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
617
618 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
619 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
620 entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
621 entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq;
622 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
623 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
624 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
625 int token;
626 unsigned long lnum;
627
628 if (result < 0)
629 break;
630 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
631 continue;
632 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
633 switch (token) {
634 case Opt_measure:
635 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
636
637 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
638 result = -EINVAL;
639
640 entry->action = MEASURE;
641 break;
642 case Opt_dont_measure:
643 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
644
645 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
646 result = -EINVAL;
647
648 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
649 break;
650 case Opt_appraise:
651 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
652
653 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
654 result = -EINVAL;
655
656 entry->action = APPRAISE;
657 break;
658 case Opt_dont_appraise:
659 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
660
661 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
662 result = -EINVAL;
663
664 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
665 break;
666 case Opt_audit:
667 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
668
669 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
670 result = -EINVAL;
671
672 entry->action = AUDIT;
673 break;
674 case Opt_func:
675 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
676
677 if (entry->func)
678 result = -EINVAL;
679
680 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
681 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
682 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
683 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
684 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
685 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
686 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
687 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
688 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
689 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
690 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
691 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
692 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
693 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
694 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
695 0)
696 entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
697 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
698 == 0)
699 entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
700 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
701 entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
702 else
703 result = -EINVAL;
704 if (!result)
705 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
706 break;
707 case Opt_mask:
708 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
709
710 if (entry->mask)
711 result = -EINVAL;
712
713 from = args[0].from;
714 if (*from == '^')
715 from++;
716
717 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
718 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
719 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
720 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
721 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
722 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
723 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
724 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
725 else
726 result = -EINVAL;
727 if (!result)
728 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
729 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
730 break;
731 case Opt_fsmagic:
732 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
733
734 if (entry->fsmagic) {
735 result = -EINVAL;
736 break;
737 }
738
739 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
740 if (!result)
741 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
742 break;
743 case Opt_fsuuid:
744 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
745
746 if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
747 result = -EINVAL;
748 break;
749 }
750
751 result = uuid_parse(args[0].from, &entry->fsuuid);
752 if (!result)
753 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
754 break;
755 case Opt_uid_gt:
756 case Opt_euid_gt:
757 entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
758 case Opt_uid_lt:
759 case Opt_euid_lt:
760 if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
761 entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
762 case Opt_uid_eq:
763 case Opt_euid_eq:
764 uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
765 (token == Opt_uid_gt) ||
766 (token == Opt_uid_lt);
767
768 ima_log_string_op(ab, uid_token ? "uid" : "euid",
769 args[0].from, entry->uid_op);
770
771 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
772 result = -EINVAL;
773 break;
774 }
775
776 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
777 if (!result) {
778 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
779 (uid_t) lnum);
780 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
781 (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
782 result = -EINVAL;
783 else
784 entry->flags |= uid_token
785 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
786 }
787 break;
788 case Opt_fowner_gt:
789 entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
790 case Opt_fowner_lt:
791 if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
792 entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
793 case Opt_fowner_eq:
794 ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
795 entry->fowner_op);
796
797 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
798 result = -EINVAL;
799 break;
800 }
801
802 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
803 if (!result) {
804 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
805 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
806 result = -EINVAL;
807 else
808 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
809 }
810 break;
811 case Opt_obj_user:
812 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
813 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
814 LSM_OBJ_USER,
815 AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
816 break;
817 case Opt_obj_role:
818 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
819 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
820 LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
821 AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
822 break;
823 case Opt_obj_type:
824 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
825 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
826 LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
827 AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
828 break;
829 case Opt_subj_user:
830 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
831 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
832 LSM_SUBJ_USER,
833 AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
834 break;
835 case Opt_subj_role:
836 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
837 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
838 LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
839 AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
840 break;
841 case Opt_subj_type:
842 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
843 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
844 LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
845 AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
846 break;
847 case Opt_appraise_type:
848 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
849 result = -EINVAL;
850 break;
851 }
852
853 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
854 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
855 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
856 else
857 result = -EINVAL;
858 break;
859 case Opt_permit_directio:
860 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
861 break;
862 case Opt_pcr:
863 if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
864 result = -EINVAL;
865 break;
866 }
867 ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
868
869 result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
870 if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
871 result = -EINVAL;
872 else
873 entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
874
875 break;
876 case Opt_err:
877 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
878 result = -EINVAL;
879 break;
880 }
881 }
882 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
883 result = -EINVAL;
884 else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
885 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
886 else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
887 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
888 else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
889 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
890 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
891 audit_log_end(ab);
892 return result;
893 }
894
895 /**
896 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
897 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
898 *
899 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
900 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
901 */
902 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
903 {
904 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
905 char *p;
906 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
907 ssize_t result, len;
908 int audit_info = 0;
909
910 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
911 len = strlen(p) + 1;
912 p += strspn(p, " \t");
913
914 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
915 return len;
916
917 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
918 if (!entry) {
919 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
920 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
921 return -ENOMEM;
922 }
923
924 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
925
926 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
927 if (result) {
928 kfree(entry);
929 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
930 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
931 audit_info);
932 return result;
933 }
934
935 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
936
937 return len;
938 }
939
940 /**
941 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
942 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
943 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
944 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
945 */
946 void ima_delete_rules(void)
947 {
948 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
949 int i;
950
951 temp_ima_appraise = 0;
952 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
953 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
954 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
955
956 list_del(&entry->list);
957 kfree(entry);
958 }
959 }
960
961 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
962 enum {
963 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
964 };
965
966 static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
967 "^MAY_EXEC",
968 "^MAY_WRITE",
969 "^MAY_READ",
970 "^MAY_APPEND"
971 };
972
973 #define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
974
975 static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
976 __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
977 };
978
979 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
980 {
981 loff_t l = *pos;
982 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
983
984 rcu_read_lock();
985 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
986 if (!l--) {
987 rcu_read_unlock();
988 return entry;
989 }
990 }
991 rcu_read_unlock();
992 return NULL;
993 }
994
995 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
996 {
997 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
998
999 rcu_read_lock();
1000 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
1001 rcu_read_unlock();
1002 (*pos)++;
1003
1004 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
1005 }
1006
1007 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
1008 {
1009 }
1010
1011 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
1012 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
1013
1014 /*
1015 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
1016 */
1017 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
1018 {
1019 if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
1020 seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
1021 else
1022 seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
1023 }
1024
1025 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
1026 {
1027 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
1028 int i;
1029 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
1030 int offset = 0;
1031
1032 rcu_read_lock();
1033
1034 if (entry->action & MEASURE)
1035 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
1036 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
1037 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
1038 if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
1039 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
1040 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
1041 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
1042 if (entry->action & AUDIT)
1043 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
1044
1045 seq_puts(m, " ");
1046
1047 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
1048 policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
1049
1050 if ((entry->flags & IMA_MASK) || (entry->flags & IMA_INMASK)) {
1051 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK)
1052 offset = 1;
1053 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
1054 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec) + offset);
1055 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
1056 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write) + offset);
1057 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
1058 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset);
1059 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
1060 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset);
1061 seq_puts(m, " ");
1062 }
1063
1064 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
1065 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
1066 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
1067 seq_puts(m, " ");
1068 }
1069
1070 if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
1071 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
1072 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
1073 seq_puts(m, " ");
1074 }
1075
1076 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
1077 seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry->fsuuid);
1078 seq_puts(m, " ");
1079 }
1080
1081 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
1082 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1083 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
1084 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf);
1085 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
1086 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf);
1087 else
1088 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf);
1089 seq_puts(m, " ");
1090 }
1091
1092 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
1093 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1094 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
1095 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf);
1096 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
1097 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf);
1098 else
1099 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf);
1100 seq_puts(m, " ");
1101 }
1102
1103 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
1104 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
1105 if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_gt)
1106 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf);
1107 else if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_lt)
1108 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf);
1109 else
1110 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf);
1111 seq_puts(m, " ");
1112 }
1113
1114 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
1115 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
1116 switch (i) {
1117 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
1118 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
1119 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1120 break;
1121 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
1122 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
1123 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1124 break;
1125 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
1126 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
1127 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1128 break;
1129 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
1130 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
1131 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1132 break;
1133 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
1134 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
1135 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1136 break;
1137 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
1138 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
1139 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1140 break;
1141 }
1142 }
1143 }
1144 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
1145 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1146 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
1147 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
1148 rcu_read_unlock();
1149 seq_puts(m, "\n");
1150 return 0;
1151 }
1152 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */