vsprintf: Replace memory barrier with static_key for random_ptr_key update

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1782846
commit 85f4f12d51397f1648e1f4350f77e24039b82d61 upstream.

Reviewing Tobin's patches for getting pointers out early before
entropy has been established, I noticed that there's a lone smp_mb() in
the code. As with most lone memory barriers, this one appears to be
incorrectly used.

We currently basically have this:

	get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
	/*
	 * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
	 * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
	 * after get_random_bytes() returns.
	 */
	smp_mb();
	WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);

And later we have:

	if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key))
		return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec);

/* Missing memory barrier here. */

	hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);

As the CPU can perform speculative loads, we could have a situation
with the following:

	CPU0				CPU1
	----				----
				   load ptr_key = 0
   store ptr_key = random
   smp_mb()
   store have_filled_random_ptr_key

				   load have_filled_random_ptr_key = true

				    BAD BAD BAD! (you're so bad!)

Because nothing prevents CPU1 from loading ptr_key before loading
have_filled_random_ptr_key.

But this race is very unlikely, but we can't keep an incorrect smp_mb() in
place. Instead, replace the have_filled_random_ptr_key with a static_branch
not_filled_random_ptr_key, that is initialized to true and changed to false
when we get enough entropy. If the update happens in early boot, the
static_key is updated immediately, otherwise it will have to wait till
entropy is filled and this happens in an interrupt handler which can't
enable a static_key, as that requires a preemptible context. In that case, a
work_queue is used to enable it, as entropy already took too long to
establish in the first place waiting a little more shouldn't hurt anything.

The benefit of using the static key is that the unlikely branch in
vsprintf() now becomes a nop.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515100558.21df515e@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ad67b74d2469d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 3dfa16c4581b01f0065208cb4179e7002047c8d2..0f21d58f4e66e3320ed84ec03bfa0a494f5d09dc 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1660,19 +1660,22 @@ char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
        return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec);
 }
 
-static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
 static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
 
-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
 {
        get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
-       /*
-        * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
-        * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
-        * after get_random_bytes() returns.
-        */
-       smp_mb();
-       WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
+       /* Needs to run from preemptible context */
+       static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
+}
+
+static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
+
+static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+       /* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
+       queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
 }
 
 static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
@@ -1686,7 +1689,8 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
        if (!ret) {
                return 0;
        } else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
-               fill_random_ptr_key(&random_ready);
+               /* This is in preemptible context */
+               enable_ptr_key_workfn(&enable_ptr_key_work);
                return 0;
        }
 
@@ -1700,7 +1704,7 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
        unsigned long hashval;
        const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
 
-       if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
+       if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
                spec.field_width = default_width;
                /* string length must be less than default_width */
                return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec);