userfaultfd: shmem: allocate anonymous memory for MAP_PRIVATE shmem

Userfaultfd did not create private memory when UFFDIO_COPY was invoked
on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping.  Instead it wrote to the shmem file,
even when that had not been opened for writing.  Though, fortunately,
that could only happen where there was a hole in the file.

Fix the shmem-backed implementation of UFFDIO_COPY to create private
memory for MAP_PRIVATE mappings.  The hugetlbfs-backed implementation
was already correct.

This change is visible to userland, if userfaultfd has been used in
unintended ways: so it introduces a small risk of incompatibility, but
is necessary in order to respect file permissions.

An app that uses UFFDIO_COPY for anything like postcopy live migration
won't notice the difference, and in fact it'll run faster because there
will be no copy-on-write and memory waste in the tmpfs pagecache
anymore.

Userfaults on MAP_PRIVATE shmem keep triggering only on file holes like
before.

The real zeropage can also be built on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping
through UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE and that's safe because the zeropage pte is
never dirty, in turn even an mprotect upgrading the vma permission from
PROT_READ to PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE won't make the zeropage pte writable.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-3-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CVE-2018-18397

(cherry picked from commit 5b51072e97d587186c2f5390c8c9c1fb7e179505)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kleber Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>

diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c
index c63c0fc5ecfad888f4c10dcd1a6865dce1c407cd..cb82e50becf7a1e01f8ffec31ff4f451eb5e558b 100644 (file)
--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c
@@ -381,7 +381,17 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
 {
        ssize_t err;
 
-       if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma)) {
+       /*
+        * The normal page fault path for a shmem will invoke the
+        * fault, fill the hole in the file and COW it right away. The
+        * result generates plain anonymous memory. So when we are
+        * asked to fill an hole in a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping, we'll
+        * generate anonymous memory directly without actually filling
+        * the hole. For the MAP_PRIVATE case the robustness check
+        * only happens in the pagetable (to verify it's still none)
+        * and not in the radix tree.
+        */
+       if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
                if (!zeropage)
                        err = mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_vma,
                                               dst_addr, src_addr, page);
@@ -480,7 +490,8 @@ retry:
         * dst_vma.
         */
        err = -ENOMEM;
-       if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma)))
+       if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) &&
+           unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma)))
                goto out_unlock;
 
        while (src_addr < src_start + len) {