tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching a child socket

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1859249
[ Upstream commit cb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8 ]

When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated.
Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be
in the future.

That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report
that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies
has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31.

Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie
verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification
should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the
packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie.

Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow
only if jiffies is within the
[last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This
way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and
'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of
time_after32().

However, if jiffies wraps and enters the
[last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with
'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an
overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification
to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate
between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp.

In practice, using last_overflow as lower bound is problematic.
If the synflood timestamp is concurrently updated between the time
we read jiffies and the moment we store the timestamp in
'last_overflow', then 'now' becomes smaller than 'last_overflow' and
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() returns true, potentially dropping a
valid syncookie.

Reading jiffies after loading the timestamp could fix the problem,
but that'd require a memory barrier. Let's just accommodate for
potential timestamp growth instead and extend the interval using
'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound.

Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>

diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index e0d76f5d1feeb8e05f6b9d3def560981f100f417..093c1f7c25bedd351d006487d51c467c74a2411d 100644 (file)
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -482,7 +482,15 @@ static inline bool tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(const struct sock *sk)
 {
        unsigned long last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp;
 
-       return time_after(jiffies, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
+       /* If last_overflow <= jiffies <= last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID,
+        * then we're under synflood. However, we have to use
+        * 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. That's because a concurrent
+        * tcp_synq_overflow() could update .ts_recent_stamp after we read
+        * jiffies but before we store .ts_recent_stamp into last_overflow,
+        * which could lead to rejecting a valid syncookie.
+        */
+       return !time_between32(jiffies, last_overflow - HZ,
+                              last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
 }
 
 static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void)