We don't support partial csumed packet since its metadata will be lost
or incorrect during XDP processing. So fail the XDP set if guest_csum
feature is negotiated.
Fixes: f600b6905015 ("virtio_net: Add XDP support") Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
We don't disable VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM if XDP was set. This means we
can receive partial csumed packets with metadata kept in the
vnet_hdr. This may have several side effects:
- It could be overridden by header adjustment, thus is might be not
correct after XDP processing.
- There's no way to pass such metadata information through
XDP_REDIRECT to another driver.
- XDP does not support checksum offload right now.
So simply disable guest csum if possible in this the case of XDP.
Fixes: 3f93522ffab2d ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set") Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Set xdp_prog pointer to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails since that routine
reports the error code instead of NULL in case of failure and xdp_prog
pointer value is used in the driver to verify if XDP is currently
enabled.
Moreover report the error code to userspace if nicvf_xdp_setup fails
Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
When a packet is trapped and the corresponding SKB marked as
already-forwarded, it retains this marking even after it is forwarded
across veth links into another bridge. There, since it ingresses the
bridge over veth, which doesn't have offload_fwd_mark, it triggers a
warning in nbp_switchdev_frame_mark().
Then nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress() decides not to allow egress from
this bridge through another veth, because the SKB is already marked, and
the mark (of 0) of course matches. Thus the packet is incorrectly
blocked.
Solve by resetting offload_fwd_mark() in skb_scrub_packet(). That
function is called from tunnels and also from veth, and thus catches the
cases where traffic is forwarded between bridges and transformed in a
way that invalidates the marking.
Fixes: 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices") Fixes: abf4bb6b63d0 ("skbuff: Add the offload_mr_fwd_mark field") Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com> Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
After fuzzing, cp_pack_start_sum could be corrupted, so current log's
summary info should be wrong due to loading incorrect summary block.
Then, if segment's type in current log is exceeded NR_CURSEG_TYPE, it
can lead accessing invalid dirty_i->dirty_segmap bitmap finally.
Add sanity check for cp_pack_start_sum to fix this issue.
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L775
if (test_and_clear_bit(segno, dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t]))
dirty_i->nr_dirty[t]--;
Here dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t] can be NULL which leads to crash in test_and_clear_bit()
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: The function is called sanity_check_ckpt()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
If inode.i_extra_isize was fuzzed to an abnormal value, when
calculating inline data size, the result will overflow, result
in accessing invalid memory area when operating inline data.
Let's do sanity check with i_extra_isize during inode loading
for fixing.
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel message
Umount the image will leave the following message
[ 2910.995489] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 2918.416465] ==================================================================
[ 2918.416807] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417009] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88018efc2068 by task a.out/1229
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/inline.c#L78
memset(addr + from, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode) - from);
Here the length can be negative.
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- Error label is different in validate_checkpoint() due to the earlier
backport of "f2fs: fix invalid memory access"
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
If secs_per_zone is corrupted due to fuzzing test, it will cause divide
zero operation when using GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG macro, so we should do more
sanity check with secs_per_zone during mount to avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address
with valid range to detect bug earlier.
In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run
fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: I skipped an earlier renaming of
is_valid_meta_blkaddr() to f2fs_is_valid_meta_blkaddr()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
In order to avoid the below overflow issue, we should have checked the
boundaries in superblock before reaching out to allocation. As Linus suggested,
the right place should be sanity_check_raw_super().
Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect reported:
There are integer overflows with using the cp_payload superblock field in the
f2fs filesystem potentially leading to memory corruption.
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
struct f2fs_super_block {
...
__le32 cp_payload;
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
typedef u32 block_t; /*
* should not change u32, since it is the on-disk block
* address format, __le32.
*/
...
Although we have tree level check at tree read runtime, it's completely
based on its parent level.
We still need to do accurate level check to avoid invalid tree blocks
sneak into kernel space.
The check itself is simple, for leaf its level should always be 0.
For nodes its level should be in range [1, BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1].
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
A crafted btrfs image with incorrect chunk<->block group mapping will
trigger a lot of unexpected things as the mapping is essential.
Although the problem can be caught by block group item checker
added in "btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item", it's still not
sufficient. A sufficiently valid block group item can pass the check
added by the mentioned patch but could fail to match the existing chunk.
This patch will add extra block group -> chunk mapping check, to ensure
we have a completely matching (start, len, flags) chunk for each block
group at mount time.
Here we reuse the original helper find_first_block_group(), which is
already doing the basic bg -> chunk checks, adding further checks of the
start/len and type flags.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199837 Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
A crafted image with invalid block group items could make free space cache
code to cause panic.
We could detect such invalid block group item by checking:
1) Item size
Known fixed value.
2) Block group size (key.offset)
We have an upper limit on block group item (10G)
3) Chunk objectid
Known fixed value.
4) Type
Only 4 valid type values, DATA, METADATA, SYSTEM and DATA|METADATA.
No more than 1 bit set for profile type.
5) Used space
No more than the block group size.
This should allow btrfs to detect and refuse to mount the crafted image.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199849 Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- In check_leaf_item(), pass root->fs_info to check_block_group_item()
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
I've noticed that the updated item checker stack consumption increased
dramatically in 542f5385e20cf97447 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker
for dir item")
tree-checker.c:check_leaf +552 (176 -> 728)
The array is 255 bytes long, dynamic allocation would slow down the
sanity checks so it's more reasonable to keep it on-stack. Moving the
variable to the scope of use reduces the stack usage again
tree-checker.c:check_leaf -264 (728 -> 464)
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The return value of sizeof() is of type size_t, so we must print it
using the %z format modifier rather than %l to avoid this warning
on some architectures:
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c: In function 'check_dir_item':
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c:273:50: error: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'u32' {aka 'unsigned int'} [-Werror=format=]
Fixes: 005887f2e3e0 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Add checker for dir item, for key types DIR_ITEM, DIR_INDEX and
XATTR_ITEM.
This checker does comprehensive checks for:
1) dir_item header and its data size
Against item boundary and maximum name/xattr length.
This part is mostly the same as old verify_dir_item().
2) dir_type
Against maximum file types, and against key type.
Since XATTR key should only have FT_XATTR dir item, and normal dir
item type should not have XATTR key.
The check between key->type and dir_type is newly introduced by this
patch.
3) name hash
For XATTR and DIR_ITEM key, key->offset is name hash (crc32c).
Check the hash of the name against the key to ensure it's correct.
The name hash check is only found in btrfs-progs before this patch.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
In tls_sw_sendmsg() and tls_sw_sendpage(), the variable 'ret' has
been set to return value of tls_complete_pending_work(). This allows
return of proper error code if tls_complete_pending_work() fails.
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support") Signed-off-by: Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks)
instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out
data_crc entirely.
This addresses CVE-2018-1129.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with
a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds
with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the
client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect
against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse
the same authorizer to authenticate themselves.
Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random
challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond
with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the
service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this
specific connection instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit.
This addresses CVE-2018-1128.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
We already copy authorizer_reply_buf and authorizer_reply_buf_len into
ceph_connection. Factoring out __prepare_write_connect() requires two
more: authorizer_buf and authorizer_buf_len. Store the pointer to the
handshake in con->auth rather than piling on.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Fix bug by moving the i2c_unregister_device calls after deregistration
of dvb frontend.
The new style i2c drivers already destroys the frontend object at
i2c_unregister_device time.
When the dvb frontend is unregistered afterwards it leads to this oops:
collapse_shmem()'s VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTransCompound) was unsafe: before
it holds page lock of the first page, racing truncation then extension
might conceivably have inserted a hugepage there already. Fail with the
SCAN_PAGE_COMPOUND result, instead of crashing (CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y) or
otherwise mishandling the unexpected hugepage - though later we might
code up a more constructive way of handling it, with SCAN_SUCCESS.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261529310.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
khugepaged's collapse_shmem() does almost all of its work, to assemble
the huge new_page from 512 scattered old pages, with the new_page's
refcount frozen to 0 (and refcounts of all old pages so far also frozen
to 0). Including shmem_getpage() to read in any which were out on swap,
memory reclaim if necessary to allocate their intermediate pages, and
copying over all the data from old to new.
Imagine the frozen refcount as a spinlock held, but without any lock
debugging to highlight the abuse: it's not good, and under serious load
heads into lockups - speculative getters of the page are not expecting
to spin while khugepaged is rescheduled.
One can get a little further under load by hacking around elsewhere; but
fortunately, freezing the new_page turns out to have been entirely
unnecessary, with no hacks needed elsewhere.
The huge new_page lock is already held throughout, and guards all its
subpages as they are brought one by one into the page cache tree; and
anything reading the data in that page, without the lock, before it has
been marked PageUptodate, would already be in the wrong. So simply
eliminate the freezing of the new_page.
Each of the old pages remains frozen with refcount 0 after it has been
replaced by a new_page subpage in the page cache tree, until they are
all unfrozen on success or failure: just as before. They could be
unfrozen sooner, but cause no problem once no longer visible to
find_get_entry(), filemap_map_pages() and other speculative lookups.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261527570.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Several cleanups in collapse_shmem(): most of which probably do not
really matter, beyond doing things in a more familiar and reassuring
order. Simplify the failure gotos in the main loop, and on success
update stats while interrupts still disabled from the last iteration.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261526400.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Huge tmpfs testing reminds us that there is no __GFP_ZERO in the gfp
flags khugepaged uses to allocate a huge page - in all common cases it
would just be a waste of effort - so collapse_shmem() must remember to
clear out any holes that it instantiates.
The obvious place to do so, where they are put into the page cache tree,
is not a good choice: because interrupts are disabled there. Leave it
until further down, once success is assured, where the other pages are
copied (before setting PageUptodate).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261525080.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Huge tmpfs testing on a shortish file mapped into a pmd-rounded extent
hit shmem_evict_inode()'s WARN_ON(inode->i_blocks) followed by
clear_inode()'s BUG_ON(inode->i_data.nrpages) when the file was later
closed and unlinked.
khugepaged's collapse_shmem() was forgetting to update mapping->nrpages
on the rollback path, after it had added but then needs to undo some
holes.
There is indeed an irritating asymmetry between shmem_charge(), whose
callers want it to increment nrpages after successfully accounting
blocks, and shmem_uncharge(), when __delete_from_page_cache() already
decremented nrpages itself: oh well, just add a comment on that to them
both.
And shmem_recalc_inode() is supposed to be called when the accounting is
expected to be in balance (so it can deduce from imbalance that reclaim
discarded some pages): so change shmem_charge() to update nrpages
earlier (though it's rare for the difference to matter at all).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261523450.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: 800d8c63b2e98 ("shmem: add huge pages support") Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Huge tmpfs testing showed that although collapse_shmem() recognizes a
concurrently truncated or hole-punched page correctly, its handling of
holes was liable to refill an emptied extent. Add check to stop that.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261522040.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Huge tmpfs testing, on 32-bit kernel with lockdep enabled, showed that
__split_huge_page() was using i_size_read() while holding the irq-safe
lru_lock and page tree lock, but the 32-bit i_size_read() uses an
irq-unsafe seqlock which should not be nested inside them.
Instead, read the i_size earlier in split_huge_page_to_list(), and pass
the end offset down to __split_huge_page(): all while holding head page
lock, which is enough to prevent truncation of that extent before the
page tree lock has been taken.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261520070.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: baa355fd33142 ("thp: file pages support for split_huge_page()") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Huge tmpfs stress testing has occasionally hit shmem_undo_range()'s
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_to_pgoff(page) != index, page).
Move the setting of mapping and index up before the page_ref_unfreeze()
in __split_huge_page_tail() to fix this: so that a page cache lookup
cannot get a reference while the tail's mapping and index are unstable.
In fact, might as well move them up before the smp_wmb(): I don't see an
actual need for that, but if I'm missing something, this way round is
safer than the other, and no less efficient.
You might argue that VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_to_pgoff(page) != index, page) is
misplaced, and should be left until after the trylock_page(); but left as
is has not crashed since, and gives more stringent assurance.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261516380.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: e9b61f19858a5 ("thp: reintroduce split_huge_page()")
Requires: 605ca5ede764 ("mm/huge_memory.c: reorder operations in __split_huge_page_tail()") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
THP split makes non-atomic change of tail page flags. This is almost ok
because tail pages are locked and isolated but this breaks recent
changes in page locking: non-atomic operation could clear bit
PG_waiters.
As a result concurrent sequence get_page_unless_zero() -> lock_page()
might block forever. Especially if this page was truncated later.
Fix is trivial: clone flags before unfreezing page reference counter.
This race exists since commit 62906027091f ("mm: add PageWaiters
indicating tasks are waiting for a page bit") while unsave unfreeze
itself was added in commit 8df651c7059e ("thp: cleanup
split_huge_page()").
clear_compound_head() also must be called before unfreezing page
reference because after successful get_page_unless_zero() might follow
put_page() which needs correct compound_head().
And replace page_ref_inc()/page_ref_add() with page_ref_unfreeze() which
is made especially for that and has semantic of smp_store_release().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151844393341.210639.13162088407980624477.stgit@buzz Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The term "freeze" is used in several ways in the kernel, and in mm it
has the particular meaning of forcing page refcount temporarily to 0.
freeze_page() is just too confusing a name for a function that unmaps a
page: rename it unmap_page(), and rename unfreeze_page() remap_page().
Went to change the mention of freeze_page() added later in mm/rmap.c,
but found it to be incorrect: ordinary page reclaim reaches there too;
but the substance of the comment still seems correct, so edit it down.
When switching from auto to manual mode, V4L2 core is calling
g_volatile_ctrl() in manual mode in order to get the manual initial value.
Remove the manual mode check/return to not break this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Hugues Fruchet <hugues.fruchet@st.com> Tested-by: Jacopo Mondi <jacopo@jmondi.org> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
ov5640_set_mode_exposure_calc() is checking binning value but
binning value read is buggy, fix this.
Rename ov5640_binning_on() to ov5640_get_binning() as per other
similar functions.
Signed-off-by: Hugues Fruchet <hugues.fruchet@st.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Jacopo Mondi <jacopo@jmondi.org> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD gets a special treatment in fsnotify() because it is
not a flag specifying an event type, but rather an extra flags that may
be reported along with another event and control the handling of the
event by the backend.
FS_ISDIR is also an "extra flag" and not an "event type" and therefore
desrves the same treatment. With inotify/dnotify backends it was never
possible to set FS_ISDIR in mark masks, so it did not matter.
With fanotify backend, mark adding code jumps through hoops to avoid
setting the FS_ISDIR in the commulative object mask.
Separate the constant ALL_FSNOTIFY_EVENTS to ALL_FSNOTIFY_FLAGS and
ALL_FSNOTIFY_EVENTS, so the latter can be used to test for specific
event types.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The table load process omitted adding the operation region address
range to the global list. This omission is problematic because the OS
queries the global list to check for address range conflicts before
deciding which drivers to load. This commit may result in warning
messages that look like the following:
[ 7.871761] ACPI Warning: system_IO range 0x00000428-0x0000042F conflicts with op_region 0x00000400-0x0000047F (\PMIO) (20180531/utaddress-213)
[ 7.871769] ACPI: If an ACPI driver is available for this device, you should use it instead of the native driver
However, these messages do not signify regressions. It is a result of
properly adding address ranges within the global address list.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200011 Tested-by: Jean-Marc Lenoir <archlinux@jihemel.com> Signed-off-by: Erik Schmauss <erik.schmauss@intel.com> Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
At the request of the reporter, the Linux kernel security team offers to
postpone the publishing of a fix for up to 5 business days from the date
of a report.
While it is generally undesirable to keep a fix private after it has
been developed, this short window is intended to allow distributions to
package the fix into their kernel builds and permits early inclusion of
the security team in the case of a co-ordinated disclosure with other
parties. Unfortunately, discussions with major Linux distributions and
cloud providers has revealed that 5 business days is not sufficient to
achieve either of these two goals.
As an example, cloud providers need to roll out KVM security fixes to a
global fleet of hosts with sufficient early ramp-up and monitoring. An
end-to-end timeline of less than two weeks dramatically cuts into the
amount of early validation and increases the chance of guest-visible
regressions.
The consequence of this timeline mismatch is that security issues are
commonly fixed without the involvement of the Linux kernel security team
and are instead analysed and addressed by an ad-hoc group of developers
across companies contributing to Linux. In some cases, mainline (and
therefore the official stable kernels) can be left to languish for
extended periods of time. This undermines the Linux kernel security
process and puts upstream developers in a difficult position should they
find themselves involved with an undisclosed security problem that they
are unable to report due to restrictions from their employer.
To accommodate the needs of these users of the Linux kernel and
encourage them to engage with the Linux security team when security
issues are first uncovered, extend the maximum period for which fixes
may be delayed to 7 calendar days, or 14 calendar days in exceptional
cases, where the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts specifically
need to be accommodated. This brings parity with the linux-distros@
maximum embargo period of 14 calendar days.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Co-developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Co-developed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The Linux kernel security team has been accused of rejecting the idea of
security embargoes. This is incorrect, and could dissuade people from
reporting security issues to us under the false assumption that the
issue would leak prematurely.
Clarify the handling of embargoed information in our process
documentation.
Co-developed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Ensure that the shared_hcd pointer is valid when calling usb_put_hcd()
The shared_hcd is removed and freed in xhci by first calling
usb_remove_hcd(xhci->shared_hcd), and later
usb_put_hcd(xhci->shared_hcd)
Afer commit fe190ed0d602 ("xhci: Do not halt the host until both HCD have
disconnected their devices.") the shared_hcd was never properly put as
xhci->shared_hcd was set to NULL before usb_put_hcd(xhci->shared_hcd) was
called.
shared_hcd (USB3) is removed before primary hcd (USB2).
While removing the primary hcd we might need to handle xhci interrupts
to cleanly remove last USB2 devices, therefore we need to set
xhci->shared_hcd to NULL before removing the primary hcd to let xhci
interrupt handler know shared_hcd is no longer available.
xhci-plat.c, xhci-histb.c and xhci-mtk first create both their hcd's before
adding them. so to keep the correct reverse removal order use a temporary
shared_hcd variable for them.
For more details see commit 4ac53087d6d4 ("usb: xhci: plat: Create both
HCDs before adding them")
Fixes: fe190ed0d602 ("xhci: Do not halt the host until both HCD have disconnected their devices.") Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Cc: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com> Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com> Cc: Jianguo Sun <sunjianguo1@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.
Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.
To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.
Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.
Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")
The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the
filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in
packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow
distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing
format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not
include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so.
Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file
could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided
by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation.
Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never
be transformed into HMACs.
Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi.
This patch initialize stack variables which are used in
frag_lowpan_compare_key to zero. In my case there are padding bytes in the
structures ieee802154_addr as well in frag_lowpan_compare_key. Otherwise
the key variable contains random bytes. The result is that a compare of
two keys by memcmp works incorrect.
Fixes: 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly units") Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aring@mojatatu.com> Reported-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The per-CPU rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs variable communicates an urgent
need for an RCU quiescent state from the force-quiescent-state processing
within the grace-period kthread to context switches and to cond_resched().
Unfortunately, such urgent needs are not communicated to need_resched(),
which is sometimes used to decide when to invoke cond_resched(), for
but one example, within the KVM vcpu_run() function. As of v4.15, this
can result in synchronize_sched() being delayed by up to ten seconds,
which can be problematic, to say nothing of annoying.
This commit therefore checks rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs from within
rcu_check_callbacks(), which is invoked from the scheduling-clock
interrupt handler. If the current task is not an idle task and is
not executing in usermode, a context switch is forced, and either way,
the rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs variable is set to false. If the current
task is an idle task, then RCU's dyntick-idle code will detect the
quiescent state, so no further action is required. Similarly, if the
task is executing in usermode, other code in rcu_check_callbacks() and
its called functions will report the corresponding quiescent state.
Reported-by: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@amazon.de> Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ paulmck: Backported to make patch apply cleanly on older versions. ] Tested-by: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@amazon.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12.x - 4.19.x Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Userspace could have munmapped the area before doing unmapping from
the gmap. This would leave us with a valid vmaddr, but an invalid vma
from which we would try to zap memory.
Let's check before using the vma.
Fixes: 1e133ab296f3 ("s390/mm: split arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c") Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20180816082432.78828-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
There is a standard mechanism for locating and using a MAC address from
the Device Tree. Use this facility in the lan78xx driver to support
applications without programmed EEPROM or OTP. At the same time,
regularise the handling of the different address sources.
Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Tested-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the
directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose
is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned
on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like
the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's
"HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer.
This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented
by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:
This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all
vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any
mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before
hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite
vehicle to exploit them.
[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com
[keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future]
[keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Loic <hackurx@opensec.fr> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
If we are not echoing the data to userspace or the console is in icanon
mode, then perhaps it is a "secret" so we should wipe it once we are
done with it.
This mirrors the logic that the audit code has.
Reported-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build> Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Tested-by: Daniel Zatovic <daniel.zatovic@gmail.com> Tested-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
After moving all nodes under "soc" node in commit 5d99cc59a3c6 ("ARM:
dts: exynos: Move Exynos5250 and Exynos5420 nodes under soc"), the i2c20
alias in Peach Pit and Peach Pi stopped pointing to proper node:
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-peach-pit.dtb: Warning (alias_paths):
/aliases:i2c20: aliases property is not a valid node (/spi@12d40000/cros-ec@0/i2c-tunnel)
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5800-peach-pi.dtb: Warning (alias_paths):
/aliases:i2c20: aliases property is not a valid node (/spi@12d40000/cros-ec@0/i2c-tunnel)
Fixes: 5d99cc59a3c6 ("ARM: dts: exynos: Move Exynos5250 and Exynos5420 nodes under soc") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
FIMC LITE SYSMMU devices are defined in exynos5250.dtsi, but clocks for
them are not instantiated by Exynos5250 clock provider driver. Add needed
definitions for those clocks to fix IOMMU probe failure:
ERROR: could not get clock /soc/sysmmu@13c40000:sysmmu(0)
exynos-sysmmu 13c40000.sysmmu: Failed to get device clock(s)!
exynos-sysmmu: probe of 13c40000.sysmmu failed with error -38
ERROR: could not get clock /soc/sysmmu@13c50000:sysmmu(0)
exynos-sysmmu 13c50000.sysmmu: Failed to get device clock(s)!
exynos-sysmmu: probe of 13c50000.sysmmu failed with error -38
If i40iw_allocate_dma_mem fails when creating a QP, the
memory allocated for the QP structure using kzalloc is not
freed because iwqp->allocated_buffer is used to free the
memory and it is not setup until later. Fix this by setting
iwqp->allocated_buffer before allocating the dma memory.
Since struct pci_epf is used as an argument to pci_epc_add_epf() (to
bind an endpoint function to a controller), struct pci_epf.func_no
should be populated before calling pci_epc_add_epf().
Initialize the struct pci_epf.func_no member before calling
pci_epc_add_epf(), to fix the endpoint function binding to
an endpoint controller.
Fixes: d74679911610 ("PCI: endpoint: Introduce configfs entry for configuring EP functions") Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@axis.com>
[lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com: rewrote the commit log] Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Suggested-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com> Acked-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
When using a GCC cross toolchain which is not in a compiled in
Clang search path, Clang reverts to the system assembler and
linker. This leads to assembler or linker errors, depending on
which tool is first used for a given architecture.
It seems that Clang is not searching $PATH for a matching
assembler or linker.
Make sure that Clang picks up the correct assembler or linker by
passing the cross compilers bin directory as search path.
This allows to use Clang provided by distributions with GCC
toolchains not in /usr/bin.
From coreboot/BIOS:
Name ("WGDS", Package() {
Revision,
Package() {
DomainType, // 0x7:WiFi ==> We miss this one.
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup1PowerMax1, // Group 1 FCC 2400 Max
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup1PowerChainA1, // Group 1 FCC 2400 A Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup1PowerChainB1, // Group 1 FCC 2400 B Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup1PowerMax2, // Group 1 FCC 5200 Max
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup1PowerChainA2, // Group 1 FCC 5200 A Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup1PowerChainB2, // Group 1 FCC 5200 B Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup2PowerMax1, // Group 2 EC Jap 2400 Max
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup2PowerChainA1, // Group 2 EC Jap 2400 A Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup2PowerChainB1, // Group 2 EC Jap 2400 B Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup2PowerMax2, // Group 2 EC Jap 5200 Max
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup2PowerChainA2, // Group 2 EC Jap 5200 A Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup2PowerChainB2, // Group 2 EC Jap 5200 B Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup3PowerMax1, // Group 3 ROW 2400 Max
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup3PowerChainA1, // Group 3 ROW 2400 A Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup3PowerChainB1, // Group 3 ROW 2400 B Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup3PowerMax2, // Group 3 ROW 5200 Max
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup3PowerChainA2, // Group 3 ROW 5200 A Offset
WgdsWiFiSarDeltaGroup3PowerChainB2, // Group 3 ROW 5200 B Offset
}
})
When read the ACPI data to find out the WGDS, the DATA_SIZE is never
matched.
From the above format, it gives 19 numbers, but our driver is hardcode
as 18.
Fix it to pass then can parse the data into our wgds table.
Then we will see:
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init Sending GEO_TX_POWER_LIMIT
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init SAR geographic profile[0]
Band[0]: chain A = 68 chain B = 69 max_tx_power = 54
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init SAR geographic profile[0]
Band[1]: chain A = 48 chain B = 49 max_tx_power = 70
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init SAR geographic profile[1]
Band[0]: chain A = 51 chain B = 67 max_tx_power = 50
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init SAR geographic profile[1]
Band[1]: chain A = 69 chain B = 70 max_tx_power = 68
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init SAR geographic profile[2]
Band[0]: chain A = 49 chain B = 50 max_tx_power = 48
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: U iwl_mvm_sar_geo_init SAR geographic profile[2]
Band[1]: chain A = 52 chain B = 53 max_tx_power = 51
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+ Fixes: a6bff3cb19b7 ("iwlwifi: mvm: add GEO_TX_POWER_LIMIT cmd for geographic tx power table") Signed-off-by: Matt Chen <matt.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The "Xbox One PDP Wired Controller - Camo series" has a different
product-id than the regular PDP controller and the PDP stealth series,
but it uses the same initialization sequence. This patch adds the
product-id of the camo series to the structures that handle the other
PDP Xbox One controllers.
Adds support for a PDP Xbox One controller with device ID
(0x06ef:0x02a4). The Product string for this device is "PDP Wired
Controller for Xbox One - Stealth Series | Phantom Black".
Signed-off-by: Francis Therien <frtherien@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Without this flag, the ARM64 defconfig kernel successfully links with
lld and boots on Dragonboard 410c.
After digging through binutils source and changelogs, it turns out that
-p is only relevant to ancient binutils installations targeting 32-bit
ARM. binutils accepts -p for AArch64 too, but it's always been
undocumented and silently ignored. A comment in
ld/emultempl/aarch64elf.em explains that it's "Only here for backwards
compatibility".
Since this flag is a no-op on ARM64, we can safely drop it.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
the problem is that we only check for an out of bound order in the slow
path and the node reclaim might happen from the fast path already. This
is fixable by making sure that kvmalloc doesn't ever use kmalloc for
requests that are larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE but this also shows that
the code is rather fragile. A recent UBSAN report just underlines that
by the following report
Note that this is not a kvmalloc path. It is just that the fast path
really depends on having sanitzed order as well. Therefore move the
order check to the fast path.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113094305.GM15120@dhcp22.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pavel.tatashin@microsoft.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@intel.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Byoungyoung Lee <lifeasageek@gmail.com> Cc: "Dae R. Jeong" <threeearcat@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Other filesystems such as ext4, f2fs and ubifs all return ENXIO when
lseek (SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE) requests a negative offset.
man 2 lseek says
: EINVAL whence is not valid. Or: the resulting file offset would be
: negative, or beyond the end of a seekable device.
:
: ENXIO whence is SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, and the file offset is beyond
: the end of the file.
Make tmpfs return ENXIO under these circumstances as well. After this,
tmpfs also passes xfstests's generic/448.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: rewrite changelog] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1540434176-14349-1-git-send-email-yuyufen@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
When VPHN function is not supported and during cpu hotplug event,
kernel prints message 'VPHN function not supported. Disabling
polling...'. Currently it prints on every hotplug event, it floods
dmesg when a KVM guest tries to hotplug huge number of vcpus, let's
just print once and suppress further kernel prints.
Signed-off-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c: In function ‘kallsyms_symbol_next’:
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c:239:4: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound depends on the length of the source argument [-Wstringop-overflow=]
strncpy(prefix_name, name, strlen(name)+1);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c:239:31: note: length computed here
Use strscpy() with the destination buffer size, and use ellipses when
displaying truncated symbols.
v2: Use strscpy()
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Toppins <jtoppins@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net Reviewed-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Back in 2006 Ben added some workarounds for a misbehaviour in the
Spider IO bridge used on early Cell machines, see commit 014da7ff47b5 ("[POWERPC] Cell "Spider" MMIO workarounds"). Later these
were made to be generic, ie. not tied specifically to Spider.
The code stashes a token in the high bits (59-48) of virtual addresses
used for IO (eg. returned from ioremap()). This works fine when using
the Hash MMU, but when we're using the Radix MMU the bits used for the
token overlap with some of the bits of the virtual address.
This is because the maximum virtual address is larger with Radix, up
to c00fffffffffffff, and in fact we use that high part of the address
range for ioremap(), see RADIX_KERN_IO_START.
As it happens the bits that are used overlap with the bits that
differentiate an IO address vs a linear map address. If the resulting
address lies outside the linear mapping we will crash (see below), if
not we just corrupt memory.
virtio-pci 0000:00:00.0: Using 64-bit direct DMA at offset 800000000000000
Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xc000000080000014
...
CFAR: c000000000626b98 DAR: c000000080000014 DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000006c54fcc00000003e523378c0000000016de6000000000000000000
GPR04: c00c00008000001400000000000000070fffffff000affff0000000000000030
^^^^
...
NIP [c000000000626c5c] .iowrite8+0xec/0x100
LR [c0000000006c992c] .vp_reset+0x2c/0x90
Call Trace:
.pci_bus_read_config_dword+0xc4/0x120 (unreliable)
.register_virtio_device+0x13c/0x1c0
.virtio_pci_probe+0x148/0x1f0
.local_pci_probe+0x68/0x140
.pci_device_probe+0x164/0x220
.really_probe+0x274/0x3b0
.driver_probe_device+0x80/0x170
.__driver_attach+0x14c/0x150
.bus_for_each_dev+0xb8/0x130
.driver_attach+0x34/0x50
.bus_add_driver+0x178/0x2f0
.driver_register+0x90/0x1a0
.__pci_register_driver+0x6c/0x90
.virtio_pci_driver_init+0x2c/0x40
.do_one_initcall+0x64/0x280
.kernel_init_freeable+0x36c/0x474
.kernel_init+0x24/0x160
.ret_from_kernel_thread+0x58/0x7c
This hasn't been a problem because CONFIG_PPC_IO_WORKAROUNDS which
enables this code is usually not enabled. It is only enabled when it's
selected by PPC_CELL_NATIVE which is only selected by
PPC_IBM_CELL_BLADE and that in turn depends on BIG_ENDIAN. So in order
to hit the bug you need to build a big endian kernel, with IBM Cell
Blade support enabled, as well as Radix MMU support, and then boot
that on Power9 using Radix MMU.
Still we can fix the bug, so let's do that. We simply use fewer bits
for the token, taking the union of the restrictions on the address
from both Hash and Radix, we end up with 8 bits we can use for the
token. The only user of the token is iowa_mem_find_bus() which only
supports 8 token values, so 8 bits is plenty for that.
showing that we never complete that read request. The reason is that
the completion setup is racy - it initializes the completion event
AFTER submitting the IO, which means that the IO could complete
before/during the init. If it does, we are passing garbage to
complete() and we may sleep forever waiting for the event to
occur.
Fixes: 7b7b68bba5ef ("floppy: bail out in open() if drive is not responding to block0 read") Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
The simd wrapper's skcipher request context structure consists
of a single subrequest whose size is taken from the subordinate
skcipher. However, in simd_skcipher_init(), the reqsize that is
retrieved is not from the subordinate skcipher but from the
cryptd request structure, whose size is completely unrelated to
the actual wrapped skcipher.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
pcf2127_i2c_gather_write() allocates memory as local variable
for i2c_master_send(), after finishing the master transfer,
the allocated memory should be freed. The kmemleak is reported:
TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH and TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE are used by
<trace/define_trace.h>, so like that #include, they should
be outside #ifdef protection.
They also need to be #undefed before defining, in case multiple trace
headers are included by the same C file. This became the case on
book3e after commit cf4a6085151a ("powerpc/mm: Add missing tracepoint for
tlbie"), leading to the following build error:
CC arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.o
In file included from arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:51:0:
arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h:9:0: error: "TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH" redefined
[-Werror]
#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH .
^
In file included from arch/powerpc/kvm/../mm/mmu_decl.h:25:0,
from arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:48:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/trace.h:224:0: note: this is the location of
the previous definition
#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH asm
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Reported-by: Christian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de> Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
If a bias is enabled on a pin of an Amlogic SoC, calling .pin_config_set()
with PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_DISABLE will not disable the bias. Instead it will
force a pull-down bias on the pin.
Instead of the pull type register bank, the driver should access the pull
enable register bank.
pq_update() can only be called in two places: from the completion
function when the complete (npkts) sequence of packets has been
submitted and processed, or from setup function if a subset of the
packets were submitted (i.e. the error path).
Currently both paths can call pq_update() if an error occurrs. This
race will cause the n_req value to go negative, hanging file_close(),
or cause a crash by freeing the txlist more than once.
Several variables are used to determine SDMA send state. Most of
these are unnecessary, and have code inspectible races between the
setup function and the completion function, in both the send path and
the error path.
The request 'status' value can be set by the setup or by the
completion function. This is code inspectibly racy. Since the status
is not needed in the completion code or by the caller it has been
removed.
The request 'done' value races between usage by the setup and the
completion function. The completion function does not need this.
When the number of processed packets matches npkts, it is done.
The 'has_error' value races between usage of the setup and the
completion function. This can cause incorrect error handling and leave
the n_req in an incorrect value (i.e. negative).
Simplify the code by removing all of the unneeded state checks and
variables.
Clean up iovs node when it is freed.
Eliminate race conditions in the error path:
If all packets are submitted, the completion handler will set the
completion status correctly (ok or aborted).
If all packets are not submitted, the caller must wait until the
submitted packets have completed, and then set the completion status.
These two change eliminate the race condition in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Mitko Haralanov <mitko.haralanov@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
If the hi3110 shares the SPI bus with another traffic-intensive device
and packets are received in high volume (by a separate machine sending
with "cangen -g 0 -i -x"), reception stops after a few minutes and the
counter in /proc/interrupts stops incrementing. Bus state is "active".
Bringing the interface down and back up reconvenes the reception. The
issue is not observed when the hi3110 is the sole device on the SPI bus.
Using a level-triggered interrupt makes the issue go away and lets the
hi3110 successfully receive 2 GByte over the course of 5 days while a
ks8851 Ethernet chip on the same SPI bus handles 6 GByte of traffic.
Unfortunately the hi3110 datasheet is mum on the trigger type. The pin
description on page 3 only specifies the polarity (active high):
http://www.holtic.com/documents/371-hi-3110_v-rev-kpdf.do
When the socket is CAN FD enabled it can handle CAN FD frame
transmissions. Add an additional check in raw_sendmsg() as a CAN2.0 CAN
driver (non CAN FD) should never see a CAN FD frame. Due to the commonly
used can_dropped_invalid_skb() function the CAN 2.0 driver would drop
that CAN FD frame anyway - but with this patch the user gets a proper
-EINVAL return code.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Current CAN framework can't guarantee proper/chronological order
of RX and TX-ECHO messages. To make this possible, drivers should use
this functions instead of can_get_echo_skb().
Prior to echoing a successfully transmitted CAN frame (by calling
can_get_echo_skb()), CAN drivers have to put the CAN frame (by calling
can_put_echo_skb() in the transmit function). These put and get function
take an index as parameter, which is used to identify the CAN frame.
A driver calling can_get_echo_skb() with a index not pointing to a skb
is a BUG, so add an appropriate error message.
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
If the "struct can_priv::echo_skb" is accessed out of bounds would lead
to a kernel crash. Better print a sensible warning message instead and
try to recover.
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
This patch replaces the use of "struct can_frame::can_dlc" by "struct
canfd_frame::len" to access the frame's length. As it is ensured that
both structures have a compatible memory layout for this member this is
no functional change. Futher, this compatibility is documented in a
comment.
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>