]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/commitdiff
EVM: Add support for portable signature format
authorMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Tue, 7 Nov 2017 15:17:42 +0000 (07:17 -0800)
committerSultan Alsawaf <sultan.alsawaf@canonical.com>
Wed, 24 Jul 2019 15:44:54 +0000 (09:44 -0600)
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1836968
commit 50b977481fce90aa5fbda55e330b9d722733e358 upstream.

The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the
filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in
packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow
distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing
format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not
include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so.

Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file
could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided
by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation.

Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never
be transformed into HMACs.

Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
include/linux/integrity.h
security/integrity/evm/evm.h
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
security/integrity/integrity.h

index c2d6082a1a4cf0f37bcabad5c7e84c5bedd86f31..858d3f4a22415c2bd72858521bced40a498525d5 100644 (file)
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 enum integrity_status {
        INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
+       INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE,
        INTEGRITY_FAIL,
        INTEGRITY_NOLABEL,
        INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS,
index 241aca315b0c351d6897e4e6d9ee2261cbbb3bcb..946efffcc389f706c4c327f4a82a52785e1ab5c1 100644 (file)
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
                  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
 int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
                  const char *req_xattr_value,
-                 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+                 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest);
 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
                  char *hmac_val);
 int evm_init_secfs(void);
index cf4efa8cb3ca7719f78b3439efe080334d34e537..63d725833e6b106ad53b440bdc043ea0bd26160a 100644 (file)
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ out:
  * protection.)
  */
 static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
-                         char *digest)
+                         char type, char *digest)
 {
        struct h_misc {
                unsigned long ino;
@@ -150,8 +150,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
        } hmac_misc;
 
        memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
-       hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
-       hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
+       /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
+        * signatures
+        */
+       if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+               hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
+               hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
+       }
        /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
         * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
         * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
@@ -164,7 +169,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
        hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
        hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
        crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
-       if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)
+       if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
+           type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
                crypto_shash_update(desc, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid.b[0],
                                    sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
        crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
@@ -190,6 +196,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
        char *xattr_value = NULL;
        int error;
        int size;
+       bool ima_present = false;
 
        if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
            inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
@@ -201,11 +208,18 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 
        error = -ENODATA;
        for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
+               bool is_ima = false;
+
+               if (strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+                       is_ima = true;
+
                if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
                    && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
                        error = 0;
                        crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
                                             req_xattr_value_len);
+                       if (is_ima)
+                               ima_present = true;
                        continue;
                }
                size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
@@ -220,9 +234,14 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
                error = 0;
                xattr_size = size;
                crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
+               if (is_ima)
+                       ima_present = true;
        }
-       hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest);
+       hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest);
 
+       /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
+       if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
+               return -EPERM;
 out:
        kfree(xattr_value);
        kfree(desc);
@@ -234,17 +253,45 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
                  char *digest)
 {
        return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
-                               req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
+                              req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
 }
 
 int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
                  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
-                 char *digest)
+                 char type, char *digest)
 {
        return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
-                               req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
+                                    req_xattr_value_len, type, digest);
+}
+
+static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+       const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+       int rc = 0;
+
+       iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+       if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
+               return 1;
+
+       /* Do this the hard way */
+       rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
+                               GFP_NOFS);
+       if (rc <= 0) {
+               if (rc == -ENODATA)
+                       return 0;
+               return rc;
+       }
+       if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+               rc = 1;
+       else
+               rc = 0;
+
+       kfree(xattr_data);
+       return rc;
 }
 
+
 /*
  * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
  *
@@ -257,6 +304,16 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
        struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
        int rc = 0;
 
+       /*
+        * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
+        * is of an immutable type
+        */
+       rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
+       if (rc < 0)
+               return rc;
+       if (rc)
+               return -EPERM;
+
        rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
                           xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
        if (rc == 0) {
@@ -282,7 +339,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
        }
 
        crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
-       hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val);
+       hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
        kfree(desc);
        return 0;
 }
index 9826c02e2db8f789eea2dc9d209db7e605839de0..16e5a448afb2733b840d3a88a4ccaa6e5093232b 100644 (file)
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 int evm_initialized;
 
 static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
-       "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+       "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
 };
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
 char *evm_hash = "sha1";
@@ -123,7 +123,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
        enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
        int rc, xattr_len;
 
-       if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
+       if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
+                    iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
                return iint->evm_status;
 
        /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
@@ -164,22 +165,26 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
                        rc = -EINVAL;
                break;
        case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+       case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
                rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-                               xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
+                                  xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type,
+                                  calc.digest);
                if (rc)
                        break;
                rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
                                        (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
                                        calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
                if (!rc) {
-                       /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
-                        * not immutable
-                        */
-                       if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
-                           !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))
+                       if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+                               if (iint)
+                                       iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
+                               evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
+                       } else if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
+                                  !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) {
                                evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
                                                    xattr_value,
                                                    xattr_value_len);
+                       }
                }
                break;
        default:
@@ -280,7 +285,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
  * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
  * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
  * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
- * doesn't exist, to be updated.
+ * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
  */
 static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
                             const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
@@ -348,7 +353,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
        if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
                if (!xattr_value_len)
                        return -EINVAL;
-               if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)
+               if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+                   xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
                        return -EPERM;
        }
        return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
@@ -425,6 +431,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 /**
  * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
+ * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
  */
 int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
index d32e6a1d931ae66ec562e16026fbdbf7552c37e1..084c19e45668121236642afadc344d228ccb72ee 100644 (file)
@@ -230,7 +230,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
        }
 
        status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
-       if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
+       if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
+           (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
+           (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
                if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
                    || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
                        cause = "missing-HMAC";
index e1bf040fb110959bcc53a2be840ffd32a31d8c3d..e324bf98c856c48d496fe49d04650b0a00621a75 100644 (file)
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED    0x02000000
 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO    0x04000000
 #define IMA_NEW_FILE           0x08000000
+#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG   0x10000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK            (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
                                 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
        EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
        EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
        IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
+       EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
        IMA_XATTR_LAST
 };