[pve-access-control.git] / src / PVE / AccessControl.pm

package PVE::AccessControl;

use strict;
use warnings;
use Encode;
use Crypt::OpenSSL::Random;
use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
use Net::SSLeay;
use Net::IP;
use MIME::Base32;
use MIME::Base64;
use Digest::SHA;
use IO::File;
use File::stat;
use JSON;
use Scalar::Util 'weaken';
use URI::Escape;

use PVE::Exception qw(raise_perm_exc raise_param_exc);
use PVE::OTP;
use PVE::Ticket;
use PVE::Tools qw(run_command lock_file file_get_contents split_list safe_print);
use PVE::Cluster qw(cfs_register_file cfs_read_file cfs_write_file cfs_lock_file);
use PVE::JSONSchema qw(register_standard_option get_standard_option);

use PVE::RS::TFA;

use PVE::Auth::Plugin;
use PVE::Auth::AD;
use PVE::Auth::LDAP;
use PVE::Auth::PVE;
use PVE::Auth::PAM;
use PVE::Auth::OpenId;

# load and initialize all plugins

PVE::Auth::AD->register();
PVE::Auth::LDAP->register();
PVE::Auth::PVE->register();
PVE::Auth::PAM->register();
PVE::Auth::OpenId->register();
PVE::Auth::Plugin->init();

# $authdir must be writable by root only!
my $confdir = "/etc/pve";
my $authdir = "$confdir/priv";

my $pve_www_key_fn = "$confdir/pve-www.key";

my $pve_auth_key_files = {
    priv => "$authdir/authkey.key",
    pub =>  "$confdir/authkey.pub",
    pubold => "$confdir/authkey.pub.old",
};

my $pve_auth_key_cache = {};

my $ticket_lifetime = 3600 * 2; # 2 hours
my $auth_graceperiod = 60 * 5; # 5 minutes
my $authkey_lifetime = 3600 * 24; # rotate every 24 hours

Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed();

cfs_register_file('user.cfg', \&parse_user_config, \&write_user_config);
cfs_register_file('priv/tfa.cfg', \&parse_priv_tfa_config, \&write_priv_tfa_config);

sub verify_username {
    PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_);
}

sub pve_verify_realm {
    PVE::Auth::Plugin::pve_verify_realm(@_);
}

# Locking both config files together is only ever allowed in one order:
#  1) tfa config
#  2) user config
# If we permit the other way round, too, we might end up deadlocking!
my $user_config_locked;
sub lock_user_config {
    my ($code, $errmsg) = @_;

    my $locked = 1;
    $user_config_locked = \$locked;
    weaken $user_config_locked; # make this scope guard signal safe...

    cfs_lock_file("user.cfg", undef, $code);
    $user_config_locked = undef;
    if (my $err = $@) {
	$errmsg ? die "$errmsg: $err" : die $err;
    }
}

sub lock_tfa_config {
    my ($code, $errmsg) = @_;

    die "tfa config lock cannot be acquired while holding user config lock\n"
	if ($user_config_locked && $$user_config_locked);

    my $res = cfs_lock_file("priv/tfa.cfg", undef, $code);
    if (my $err = $@) {
	$errmsg ? die "$errmsg: $err" : die $err;
    }

    return $res;
}

my $cache_read_key = sub {
    my ($type) = @_;

    my $path = $pve_auth_key_files->{$type};

    my $read_key_and_mtime = sub {
	my $fh = IO::File->new($path, "r");

	return undef if !defined($fh);

	my $st = stat($fh);
	my $pem = PVE::Tools::safe_read_from($fh, 0, 0, $path);

	close $fh;

	my $key;
	if ($type eq 'pub' || $type eq 'pubold') {
	    $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($pem); };
	} elsif ($type eq 'priv') {
	    $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($pem); };
	} else {
	    die "Invalid authkey type '$type'\n";
	}

	return { key => $key, mtime => $st->mtime };
    };

    if (!defined($pve_auth_key_cache->{$type})) {
	$pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
    } else {
	my $st = stat($path);
	if (!$st || $st->mtime != $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}->{mtime}) {
	    $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
	}
    }

    return $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type};
};

sub get_pubkey {
    my ($old) = @_;

    my $type = $old ? 'pubold' : 'pub';

    my $res = $cache_read_key->($type);
    return undef if !defined($res);

    return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
}

sub get_privkey {
    my $res = $cache_read_key->('priv');

    if (!defined($res) || !check_authkey(1)) {
	rotate_authkey();
	$res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
    }

    return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
}

sub check_authkey {
    my ($quiet) = @_;

    # skip check if non-quorate, as rotation is not possible anyway
    return 1 if !PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1);

    my ($pub_key, $mtime) = get_pubkey();
    if (!$pub_key) {
	warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n"  if !$quiet;
	return 0;
    } else {
	my $now = time();
	if ($now - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) {
	    warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;;
	    return 0;
	} elsif ($mtime > $now + $auth_graceperiod) {
	    # a nodes RTC had a time set in the future during key generation -> ticket
	    # validity is clamped to 0+5 min grace period until now >= mtime again
	    my (undef, $old_mtime) = get_pubkey(1);
	    if ($old_mtime && $mtime >= $old_mtime && $mtime - $old_mtime < $ticket_lifetime) {
		warn "auth key pair generated in the future (key $mtime > host $now),"
		    ." but old key still exists and in valid grace period so avoid automatic"
		    ." fixup. Cluster time not in sync?\n" if !$quiet;
		return 1;
	    }
	    warn "auth key pair generated in the future (key $mtime > host $now), rotating..\n" if !$quiet;
	    return 0;
	} else {
	    warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;;
	    return 1;
	}
    }
}

sub rotate_authkey {
    return if $authkey_lifetime == 0;

    PVE::Cluster::cfs_lock_authkey(undef, sub {
	# stat() calls might be answered from the kernel page cache for up to
	# 1s, so this special dance is needed to avoid a double rotation in
	# clusters *despite* the cfs_lock context..

	# drop in-process cache hash
	$pve_auth_key_cache = {};
	# force open/close of file to invalidate page cache entry
	get_pubkey();
	# now re-check with lock held and page cache invalidated so that stat()
	# does the right thing, and any key updates by other nodes are visible.
	return if check_authkey();

	my $old = get_pubkey();
	my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048);

	if ($old) {
	    eval {
		my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
		# mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation
		PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem);
	    };
	    die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
	}

	eval {
	    my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string();
	    # mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation,
	    # should be close to that of pubold above
	    PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
	};
	if ($@) {
	    if ($old) {
		warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
		warn "Reverting to previous auth key\n";
		eval {
		    my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
		    PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
		};
		die "Failed to restore old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
	    } else {
		die "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
	    }
	}

	eval {
	    my $pem = $new->get_private_key_string();
	    PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{priv}, $pem);
	};
	if ($@) {
	    warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
	    warn "Deleting auth key to force regeneration\n";
	    unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{pub};
	    unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{priv};
	}
    });
    die $@ if $@;
}

PVE::JSONSchema::register_standard_option('tokenid', {
    description => "API token identifier.",
    type => "string",
    format => "pve-tokenid",
});

our $token_subid_regex = $PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex;

# username@realm username realm tokenid
our $token_full_regex = qr/((${PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex})\@(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex}))!(${token_subid_regex})/;

our $userid_or_token_regex = qr/^$PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex\@$PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex(?:!$token_subid_regex)?$/;

sub split_tokenid {
    my ($tokenid, $noerr) = @_;

    if ($tokenid =~ /^${token_full_regex}$/) {
	return ($1, $4);
    }

    die "'$tokenid' is not a valid token ID - not able to split into user and token parts\n" if !$noerr;

    return undef;
}

sub join_tokenid {
    my ($username, $tokensubid) = @_;

    my $joined = "${username}!${tokensubid}";

    return pve_verify_tokenid($joined);
}

PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-tokenid', \&pve_verify_tokenid);
sub pve_verify_tokenid {
    my ($tokenid, $noerr) = @_;

    if ($tokenid =~ /^${token_full_regex}$/) {
	return wantarray ? ($tokenid, $2, $3, $4) : $tokenid;
    }

    die "value '$tokenid' does not look like a valid token ID\n" if !$noerr;

    return undef;
}


my $csrf_prevention_secret;
my $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
my $get_csrfr_secret = sub {
    if (!$csrf_prevention_secret) {
	my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($pve_www_key_fn);
	$csrf_prevention_secret = Digest::SHA::hmac_sha256_base64($input);
	$csrf_prevention_secret_legacy = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64($input);
    }
    return $csrf_prevention_secret;
};

sub assemble_csrf_prevention_token {
    my ($username) = @_;

    my $secret =  &$get_csrfr_secret();

    return PVE::Ticket::assemble_csrf_prevention_token ($secret, $username);
}

sub verify_csrf_prevention_token {
    my ($username, $token, $noerr) = @_;

    my $secret = $get_csrfr_secret->();

    # FIXME: remove with PVE 7 and/or refactor all into PVE::Ticket ?
    if ($token =~ m/^([A-Z0-9]{8}):(\S+)$/) {
	my $sig = $2;
	if (length($sig) == 27) {
	    # the legacy secret got populated by above get_csrfr_secret call
	    $secret = $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
	}
    }

    return PVE::Ticket::verify_csrf_prevention_token(
	$secret, $username, $token, -$auth_graceperiod, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr);
}

my $get_ticket_age_range = sub {
    my ($now, $mtime, $rotated) = @_;

    my $key_age = $now - $mtime;
    $key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0;

    my $min = -$auth_graceperiod;
    my $max = $ticket_lifetime;

    if ($rotated) {
	# ticket creation after rotation is not allowed
	$min = $key_age - $auth_graceperiod;
    } else {
	if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) {
	    if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) {
		# key should have been rotated, clamp range accordingly
		$min = $key_age - $authkey_lifetime;
	    } else {
		warn "Cluster not quorate - extending auth key lifetime!\n";
	    }
	}

	$max = $key_age + $auth_graceperiod if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime;
    }

    return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime;
    return ($min, $max);
};

sub assemble_ticket : prototype($;$) {
    my ($data, $aad) = @_;

    my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();

    return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data, $aad);
}

# Returns the username, "age" and tfa info.
#
# Note that for the new-style outh, tfa info is never set, as it only uses the `/ticket` api call
# via the new 'tfa-challenge' parameter, so this part can go with PVE-8.
#
# New-style auth still uses this function, but sets `$tfa_ticket` to true when validating the tfa
# ticket.
sub verify_ticket : prototype($;$$) {
    my ($ticket, $noerr, $tfa_ticket_aad) = @_;

    my $now = time();

    my $check = sub {
	my ($old) = @_;

	my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey($old);
	return undef if !$rsa_pub;

	my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old);
	return undef if !defined($min);

	return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
	    $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, $tfa_ticket_aad, $min, $max, 1);
    };

    my ($data, $age) = $check->();

    # check with old, rotated key if current key failed
    ($data, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($data);

    my $auth_failure = sub {
	if ($noerr) {
	    return undef;
	} else {
	    # raise error via undef ticket
	    PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE');
	}
    };

    if (!defined($data)) {
	return $auth_failure->();
    }

    if ($tfa_ticket_aad) {
	# We're validating a ticket-call's 'tfa-challenge' parameter, so just return its data.
	if ($data =~ /^!tfa!(.*)$/) {
	    return $1;
	}
	die "bad ticket\n";
    }

    my ($username, $tfa_info);
    if ($data =~ /^!tfa!(.*)$/) {
	# PBS style half-authenticated ticket, contains a json string form of a `TfaChallenge`
	# object.
	# This type of ticket does not contain the user name.
	return { type => 'new', data => $1 };
    }
    if ($data =~ m{^u2f!([^!]+)!([0-9a-zA-Z/.=_\-+]+)$}) {
	# Ticket for u2f-users:
	($username, my $challenge) = ($1, $2);
	if ($challenge eq 'verified') {
	    # u2f challenge was completed
	    $challenge = undef;
	} elsif (!wantarray) {
	    # The caller is not aware there could be an ongoing challenge,
	    # so we treat this ticket as invalid:
	    return $auth_failure->();
	}
	$tfa_info = {
	    type => 'u2f',
	    challenge => $challenge,
	};
    } elsif ($data =~ /^tfa!(.*)$/) {
	# TOTP and Yubico don't require a challenge so this is the generic
	# 'missing 2nd factor ticket'
	$username = $1;
	$tfa_info = { type => 'tfa' };
    } else {
	# Regular ticket (full access)
	$username = $data;
    }

    return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);

    return wantarray ? ($username, $age, $tfa_info) : $username;
}

sub verify_token {
    my ($api_token) = @_;

    die "no API token specified\n" if !$api_token;

    my ($tokenid, $value);
    if ($api_token =~ /^(.*)=(.*)$/) {
	$tokenid = $1;
	$value = $2;
    } else {
	die "no tokenid specified\n";
    }

    my ($username, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid);

    my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
    check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);
    check_token_exist($usercfg, $username, $token);

    my $user = $usercfg->{users}->{$username};
    my $token_info = $user->{tokens}->{$token};

    my $ctime = time();
    die "token '$token' access expired\n" if $token_info->{expire} && ($token_info->{expire} < $ctime);

    die "invalid token value!\n" if !PVE::Cluster::verify_token($tokenid, $value);

    return wantarray ? ($tokenid) : $tokenid;
}

my $assemble_short_lived_ticket = sub {
    my ($prefix, $username, $path) = @_;

    my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();

    $path = normalize_path($path);

    die "invalid ticket path\n" if !defined($path);

    my $secret_data = "$username:$path";

    return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket(
	$rsa_priv, $prefix, undef, $secret_data);
};

my $verify_short_lived_ticket = sub {
    my ($ticket, $prefix, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;

    $path = normalize_path($path);

    die "invalid ticket path\n" if !defined($path);

    my $secret_data = "$username:$path";

    my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey();
    if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0)) {
	if ($noerr) {
	    return undef;
	} else {
	    # raise error via undef ticket
	    PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, $prefix);
	}
    }

    return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
	$rsa_pub, $prefix, $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
};

# VNC tickets
# - they do not contain the username in plain text
# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
sub assemble_vnc_ticket {
    my ($username, $path) = @_;

    return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVEVNC', $username, $path);
}

sub verify_vnc_ticket {
    my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;

    return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVEVNC', $username, $path, $noerr);
}

# Tunnel tickets
# - they do not contain the username in plain text
# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100', '/socket/run/qemu-server/123.storage')
sub assemble_tunnel_ticket {
    my ($username, $path) = @_;

    return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVETUNNEL', $username, $path);
}

sub verify_tunnel_ticket {
    my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;

    return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVETUNNEL', $username, $path, $noerr);
}

sub assemble_spice_ticket {
    my ($username, $vmid, $node) = @_;

    my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();

    return PVE::Ticket::assemble_spice_ticket(
	$secret, $username, $vmid, $node);
}

sub verify_spice_connect_url {
    my ($connect_str) = @_;

    my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();

    return PVE::Ticket::verify_spice_connect_url($secret, $connect_str);
}

sub read_x509_subject_spice {
    my ($filename) = @_;

    # read x509 subject
    my $bio = Net::SSLeay::BIO_new_file($filename, 'r');
    die "Could not open $filename using OpenSSL\n"
	if !$bio;

    my $x509 = Net::SSLeay::PEM_read_bio_X509($bio);
    Net::SSLeay::BIO_free($bio);

    die "Could not parse X509 certificate in $filename\n"
	if !$x509;

    my $nameobj = Net::SSLeay::X509_get_subject_name($x509);
    my $subject = Net::SSLeay::X509_NAME_oneline($nameobj);
    Net::SSLeay::X509_free($x509);

    # remote-viewer wants comma as separator (not '/')
    $subject =~ s!^/!!;
    $subject =~ s!/(\w+=)!,$1!g;

    return $subject;
}

# helper to generate SPICE remote-viewer configuration
sub remote_viewer_config {
    my ($authuser, $vmid, $node, $proxy, $title, $port) = @_;

    if (!$proxy) {
	my $host = `hostname -f` || PVE::INotify::nodename();
	chomp $host;
	$proxy = $host;
    }

    my ($ticket, $proxyticket) = assemble_spice_ticket($authuser, $vmid, $node);

    my $filename = "/etc/pve/local/pve-ssl.pem";
    my $subject = read_x509_subject_spice($filename);

    my $cacert = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents("/etc/pve/pve-root-ca.pem", 8192);
    $cacert =~ s/\n/\\n/g;

    $proxy = "[$proxy]" if Net::IP::ip_is_ipv6($proxy);
    my $config = {
	'secure-attention' => "Ctrl+Alt+Ins",
	'toggle-fullscreen' => "Shift+F11",
	'release-cursor' => "Ctrl+Alt+R",
	type => 'spice',
	title => $title,
	host => $proxyticket, # this breaks tls hostname verification, so we need to use 'host-subject'
	proxy => "http://$proxy:3128",
	'tls-port' => $port,
	'host-subject' => $subject,
	ca => $cacert,
	password => $ticket,
	'delete-this-file' => 1,
    };

    return ($ticket, $proxyticket, $config);
}

sub check_user_exist {
    my ($usercfg, $username, $noerr) = @_;

    $username = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);
    return undef if !$username;

    return $usercfg->{users}->{$username} if $usercfg && $usercfg->{users}->{$username};

    die "no such user ('$username')\n" if !$noerr;

    return undef;
}

sub check_user_enabled {
    my ($usercfg, $username, $noerr) = @_;

    my $data = check_user_exist($usercfg, $username, $noerr);
    return undef if !$data;

    if (!$data->{enable}) {
	die "user '$username' is disabled\n" if !$noerr;
	return undef;
    }

    my $ctime = time();
    my $expire = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{expire};

    if ($expire && $expire < $ctime) {
	die "user '$username' access expired\n" if !$noerr;
	return undef;
    }

    return 1; # enabled and not expired
}

sub check_token_exist {
    my ($usercfg, $username, $tokenid, $noerr) = @_;

    my $user = check_user_exist($usercfg, $username, $noerr);
    return undef if !$user;

    return $user->{tokens}->{$tokenid}
	if defined($user->{tokens}) && $user->{tokens}->{$tokenid};

    die "no such token '$tokenid' for user '$username'\n" if !$noerr;

    return undef;
}

# deprecated
sub verify_one_time_pw {
    my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;

    die "missing one time password for two-factor authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp;

    # fixme: proxy support?
    my $proxy;

    if ($type eq 'yubico') {
	PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url},
				    $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy);
    } elsif ($type eq 'oath') {
	PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits});
    } else {
	die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n";
    }
}

# password should be utf8 encoded
# Note: some plugins delay/sleep if auth fails
sub authenticate_user : prototype($$$;$) {
    my ($username, $password, $otp, $tfa_challenge) = @_;

    die "no username specified\n" if !$username;

    my ($ruid, $realm);

    ($username, $ruid, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username);

    my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');

    check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);

    my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');

    my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
    die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg;
    my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});

    if ($tfa_challenge) {
	# This is the 2nd factor, use the password for the OTP response.
	my $tfa_challenge = authenticate_2nd_new($username, $realm, $password, $tfa_challenge);
	return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_challenge) : $username;
    }

    $plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password);

    # This is the first factor with an optional immediate 2nd factor for TOTP:
    $tfa_challenge = authenticate_2nd_new($username, $realm, $otp, undef);
    return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_challenge) : $username;
}

sub authenticate_2nd_new_do : prototype($$$$) {
    my ($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge) = @_;
    my ($tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm);

    # FIXME: `$tfa_cfg` is now usually never undef - use cheap check for
    # whether the user has *any* entries here instead whe it is available in
    # pve-rs
    if (!defined($tfa_cfg)) {
	return undef;
    }

    my $realm_type = $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type};
    # verify realm type unless using recovery keys:
    if (defined($realm_type)) {
	$realm_type = 'totp' if $realm_type eq 'oath'; # we used to call it that
	if ($realm_type eq 'yubico') {
	    # Yubico auth will not be supported in rust for now...
	    if (!defined($tfa_challenge)) {
		my $challenge = { yubico => JSON::true };
		# Even with yubico auth we do allow recovery keys to be used:
		if (my $recovery = $tfa_cfg->recovery_state($username)) {
		    $challenge->{recovery} = $recovery;
		}
		return to_json($challenge);
	    }

	    if ($tfa_response =~ /^yubico:(.*)$/) {
		$tfa_response = $1;
		# Defer to after unlocking the TFA config:
		return sub {
		    authenticate_yubico_new(
			$tfa_cfg, $username, $realm_tfa, $tfa_challenge, $tfa_response,
		    );
		};
	    }
	}

	my $response_type;
	if (defined($tfa_response)) {
	    if ($tfa_response !~ /^([^:]+):/) {
		die "bad otp response\n";
	    }
	    $response_type = $1;
	}

	die "realm requires $realm_type authentication\n"
	    if $response_type && $response_type ne 'recovery' && $response_type ne $realm_type;
    }

    configure_u2f_and_wa($tfa_cfg);

    my ($result, $tfa_done);
    if (defined($tfa_challenge)) {
	$tfa_done = 1;
	$tfa_challenge = verify_ticket($tfa_challenge, 0, $username);
	$result = $tfa_cfg->authentication_verify2($username, $tfa_challenge, $tfa_response);
	$tfa_challenge = undef;
    } else {
	$tfa_challenge = $tfa_cfg->authentication_challenge($username);

	die "missing required 2nd keys\n"
	    if $realm_tfa && !defined($tfa_challenge);

	if (defined($tfa_response)) {
	    if (defined($tfa_challenge)) {
		$tfa_done = 1;
		$result = $tfa_cfg->authentication_verify2($username, $tfa_challenge, $tfa_response);
	    } else {
		die "no such challenge\n";
	    }
	}
    }

    if ($tfa_done) {
	if (!$result) {
	    # authentication_verify2 somehow returned undef - should be unreachable
	    die "2nd factor failed\n";
	}

	if ($result->{'needs-saving'}) {
	    cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
	}
	if ($result->{'totp-limit-reached'}) {
	    # FIXME: send mail to the user (or admin/root if no email configured)
	    die "failed 2nd factor: TOTP limit reached, locked\n";
	}
	if ($result->{'tfa-limit-reached'}) {
	    # FIXME: send mail to the user (or admin/root if no email configured)
	    die "failed 1nd factor: TFA limit reached, user locked out\n";
	}
	if (!$result->{result}) {
	    die "failed 2nd factor\n";
	}
    }

    return $tfa_challenge;
}

# Returns a tfa challenge or undef.
sub authenticate_2nd_new : prototype($$$$) {
    my ($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge) = @_;

    my $result;

    if (defined($tfa_response) && $tfa_response =~ m/^recovery:/) {
	$result = lock_tfa_config(sub {
	    authenticate_2nd_new_do($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge);
	});
    } else {
	$result = authenticate_2nd_new_do($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge);
    }

    # Yubico auth returns the authentication sub:
    if (ref($result) eq 'CODE') {
	$result = $result->();
    }

    return $result;
}

sub authenticate_yubico_new : prototype($$$) {
    my ($tfa_cfg, $username, $realm, $tfa_challenge, $otp) = @_;

    $tfa_challenge = verify_ticket($tfa_challenge, 0, $username);
    $tfa_challenge = from_json($tfa_challenge);

    if (!$tfa_challenge->{yubico}) {
	die "no such challenge\n";
    }

    my $keys = $tfa_cfg->get_yubico_keys($username);
    die "no keys configured\n" if !defined($keys) || !length($keys);

    authenticate_yubico_do($otp, $keys, $realm);

    # return `undef` to clear the tfa challenge.
    return undef;
}

sub authenticate_yubico_do : prototype($$$) {
    my ($value, $keys, $realm) = @_;

    # fixme: proxy support?
    my $proxy = undef;

    PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($value, $keys, $realm->{url}, $realm->{id}, $realm->{key}, $proxy);
}

sub configure_u2f_and_wa : prototype($) {
    my ($tfa_cfg) = @_;

    my $rpc_origin;
    my $get_origin = sub {
	return $rpc_origin if defined($rpc_origin);
	my $rpcenv = PVE::RPCEnvironment::get();
	if (my $origin = $rpcenv->get_request_host(1)) {
	    $rpc_origin = "https://$origin";
	    return $rpc_origin;
	}
	die "failed to figure out origin\n";
    };

    my $dc = cfs_read_file('datacenter.cfg');
    if (my $u2f = $dc->{u2f}) {
	eval {
	    $tfa_cfg->set_u2f_config({
		origin => $u2f->{origin} // $get_origin->(),
		appid => $u2f->{appid},
	    });
	};
	warn "u2f unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
    }
    if (my $wa = $dc->{webauthn}) {
	$wa->{origin} //= $get_origin->();
	eval { $tfa_cfg->set_webauthn_config({%$wa}) };
	warn "webauthn unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
    }
}

sub domain_set_password {
    my ($realm, $username, $password) = @_;

    die "no auth domain specified" if !$realm;

    my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');

    my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
    die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg;
    my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
    $plugin->store_password($cfg, $realm, $username, $password);
}

sub iterate_acl_tree {
    my ($path, $node, $code) = @_;

    $code->($path, $node);

    $path = '' if $path eq '/'; # avoid leading '//'

    my $children = $node->{children};

    foreach my $child (sort keys %$children) {
	iterate_acl_tree("$path/$child", $children->{$child}, $code);
    }
}

# find ACL node corresponding to normalized $path under $root
sub find_acl_tree_node {
    my ($root, $path) = @_;

    my $split_path = [ split("/", $path) ];

    if (!$split_path) {
	return $root;
    }

    my $node = $root;
    for my $p (@$split_path) {
	next if !$p;

	$node->{children} = {} if !$node->{children};
	$node->{children}->{$p} = {} if !$node->{children}->{$p};

	$node = $node->{children}->{$p};
    }

    return $node;
}

sub add_user_group {
    my ($username, $usercfg, $group) = @_;

    $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
    $usercfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$username} = 1;
}

sub delete_user_group {
    my ($username, $usercfg) = @_;

    foreach my $group (keys %{$usercfg->{groups}}) {

	delete ($usercfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$username})
	    if $usercfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$username};
    }
}

sub delete_user_acl {
    my ($username, $usercfg) = @_;

    my $code = sub {
	my ($path, $acl_node) = @_;

	delete ($acl_node->{users}->{$username})
	    if $acl_node->{users}->{$username};
    };

    iterate_acl_tree("/", $usercfg->{acl_root}, $code);
}

sub delete_group_acl {
    my ($group, $usercfg) = @_;

    my $code = sub {
	my ($path, $acl_node) = @_;

	delete ($acl_node->{groups}->{$group})
	    if $acl_node->{groups}->{$group};
    };

    iterate_acl_tree("/", $usercfg->{acl_root}, $code);
}

sub delete_pool_acl {
    my ($pool, $usercfg) = @_;

    delete ($usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{pool}->{children}->{$pool});
}

# we automatically create some predefined roles by splitting privs
# into 3 groups (per category)
# root: only root is allowed to do that
# admin: an administrator can to that
# user: a normal user/customer can to that
my $privgroups = {
    VM => {
	root => [],
	admin => [
	    'VM.Config.Disk',
	    'VM.Config.CPU',
	    'VM.Config.Memory',
	    'VM.Config.Network',
	    'VM.Config.HWType',
	    'VM.Config.Options', # covers all other things
	    'VM.Allocate',
	    'VM.Clone',
	    'VM.Migrate',
	    'VM.Monitor',
	    'VM.Snapshot',
	    'VM.Snapshot.Rollback',
	],
	user => [
	    'VM.Config.CDROM', # change CDROM media
	    'VM.Config.Cloudinit',
	    'VM.Console',
	    'VM.Backup',
	    'VM.PowerMgmt',
	],
	audit => [
	    'VM.Audit',
	],
    },
    Sys => {
	root => [
	    'Sys.PowerMgmt',
	    'Sys.Modify', # edit/change node settings
	    'Sys.Incoming', # incoming storage/guest migrations
	    'Sys.AccessNetwork', # for, e.g., downloading ISOs from any URL
	],
	admin => [
	    'Sys.Console',
	    'Sys.Syslog',
	],
	user => [],
	audit => [
	    'Sys.Audit',
	],
    },
    Datastore => {
	root => [],
	admin => [
	    'Datastore.Allocate',
	    'Datastore.AllocateTemplate',
	],
	user => [
	    'Datastore.AllocateSpace',
	],
	audit => [
	    'Datastore.Audit',
	],
    },
    SDN => {
	root => [],
	admin => [
	    'SDN.Allocate',
	    'SDN.Audit',
	],
	user => [
	    'SDN.Use',
	],
	audit => [
	    'SDN.Audit',
	],
    },
    User => {
	root => [
	    'Realm.Allocate',
	],
	admin => [
	    'User.Modify',
	    'Group.Allocate', # edit/change group settings
	    'Realm.AllocateUser',
	],
	user => [],
	audit => [],
    },
    Pool => {
	root => [],
	admin => [
	    'Pool.Allocate', # create/delete pools
	],
	user => [
	    'Pool.Audit',
	],
	audit => [
	    'Pool.Audit',
	],
    },
    Mapping => {
	root => [],
	admin => [
	    'Mapping.Modify',
	],
	user => [
	    'Mapping.Use',
	],
	audit => [
	    'Mapping.Audit',
	],
    },
};

my $valid_privs = {
    'Permissions.Modify' => 1, # not contained in a group
};

my $special_roles = {
    'NoAccess' => {}, # no privileges
    'Administrator' => $valid_privs, # all privileges
};

sub create_roles {

    for my $cat (keys %$privgroups) {
	my $cd = $privgroups->{$cat};
	# create map to easily check if a privilege is valid
	for my $priv (@{$cd->{root}}, @{$cd->{admin}}, @{$cd->{user}}, @{$cd->{audit}}) {
	    $valid_privs->{$priv} = 1;
	}
	# create grouped admin roles and PVEAdmin
	for my $priv (@{$cd->{admin}}, @{$cd->{user}}, @{$cd->{audit}}) {
	    $special_roles->{"PVE${cat}Admin"}->{$priv} = 1;
	    $special_roles->{"PVEAdmin"}->{$priv} = 1;
	}
	# create grouped user and audit roles
	if (scalar(@{$cd->{user}})) {
	    for my $priv (@{$cd->{user}}, @{$cd->{audit}}) {
		$special_roles->{"PVE${cat}User"}->{$priv} = 1;
	    }
	}
	for my $priv (@{$cd->{audit}}) {
	    $special_roles->{"PVEAuditor"}->{$priv} = 1;
	}
    }

    # remove Mapping.Modify from PVEAdmin, only Administrator, root@pam and
    # PVEMappingAdmin should be able to use that for now
    delete $special_roles->{"PVEAdmin"}->{"Mapping.Modify"};

    $special_roles->{"PVETemplateUser"} = { 'VM.Clone' => 1, 'VM.Audit' => 1 };
};

create_roles();

sub create_priv_properties {
    my $properties = {};
    foreach my $priv (keys %$valid_privs) {
	$properties->{$priv} = {
	    type => 'boolean',
	    optional => 1,
	};
    }
    return $properties;
}

sub role_is_special {
    my ($role) = @_;
    return (exists $special_roles->{$role}) ? 1 : 0;
}

sub add_role_privs {
    my ($role, $usercfg, $privs) = @_;

    return if !$privs;

    die "role '$role' does not exist\n" if !$usercfg->{roles}->{$role};

    foreach my $priv (split_list($privs)) {
	if (defined ($valid_privs->{$priv})) {
	    $usercfg->{roles}->{$role}->{$priv} = 1;
	} else {
	    die "invalid privilege '$priv'\n";
	}
    }
}

sub lookup_username {
    my ($username, $noerr) = @_;

    $username =~ m!^(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex})\@(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex})$!;

    my $realm = $2;
    my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file("domains.cfg");
    my $casesensitive = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm}->{'case-sensitive'} // 1;
    my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');

    if (!$casesensitive) {
	my @matches = grep { lc $username eq lc $_ } (keys %{$usercfg->{users}});

	die "ambiguous case insensitive match of username '$username', cannot safely grant access!\n"
	    if scalar @matches > 1 && !$noerr;

	return $matches[0]
    }

    return $username;
}

sub normalize_path {
    my $path = shift;

    return undef if !$path;

    $path =~ s|/+|/|g;

    $path =~ s|/$||;

    $path = '/' if !$path;

    $path = "/$path" if $path !~ m|^/|;

    return undef if $path !~ m|^[[:alnum:]\.\-\_\/]+$|;

    return $path;
}

sub check_path {
    my ($path) = @_;
    return $path =~ m!^(
	/
	|/access
	|/access/groups
	|/access/groups/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/access/realm
	|/access/realm/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/nodes
	|/nodes/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/pool
	|/pool/[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+(?:/[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+){0,2}
	|/sdn
	|/sdn/controllers
	|/sdn/controllers/[[:alnum:]\_\-]+
	|/sdn/dns
	|/sdn/dns/[[:alnum:]]+
	|/sdn/ipams
	|/sdn/ipams/[[:alnum:]]+
	|/sdn/zones
	|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[1-9][0-9]{0,3}
	|/storage
	|/storage/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/vms
	|/vms/[1-9][0-9]{2,}
	|/mapping
	|/mapping/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
	|/mapping/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
    )$!xs;
}

PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-groupid', \&verify_groupname);
sub verify_groupname {
    my ($groupname, $noerr) = @_;

    if ($groupname !~ m/^[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+$/) {

	die "group name '$groupname' contains invalid characters\n" if !$noerr;

	return undef;
    }

    return $groupname;
}

PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-roleid', \&verify_rolename);
sub verify_rolename {
    my ($rolename, $noerr) = @_;

    if ($rolename !~ m/^[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+$/) {

	die "role name '$rolename' contains invalid characters\n" if !$noerr;

	return undef;
    }

    return $rolename;
}

PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_poolname);
sub verify_poolname {
    my ($poolname, $noerr) = @_;

    if (split("/", $poolname) > 3) {
	die "pool name '$poolname' nested too deeply (max levels = 3)\n" if !$noerr;

	return undef;
    }

    # also adapt check_path above if changed!
    if ($poolname !~ m!^[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+(?:/[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+){0,2}$!) {
	die "pool name '$poolname' contains invalid characters\n" if !$noerr;

	return undef;
    }

    return $poolname;
}

PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-priv', \&verify_privname);
sub verify_privname {
    my ($priv, $noerr) = @_;

    if (!$valid_privs->{$priv}) {
	die "invalid privilege '$priv'\n" if !$noerr;

	return undef;
    }

    return $priv;
}

sub userconfig_force_defaults {
    my ($cfg) = @_;

    foreach my $r (keys %$special_roles) {
	$cfg->{roles}->{$r} = $special_roles->{$r};
    }

    # add root user if not exists
    if (!$cfg->{users}->{'root@pam'}) {
	$cfg->{users}->{'root@pam'}->{enable} = 1;
    }

    # add (empty) ACL tree root node
    if (!$cfg->{acl_root}) {
	$cfg->{acl_root} = {};
    }
}

sub parse_user_config {
    my ($filename, $raw) = @_;

    my $cfg = {};

    userconfig_force_defaults($cfg);

    $raw = '' if !defined($raw);
    while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) {
	my $line = $1;
	my @data;

	foreach my $d (split (/:/, $line)) {
	    $d =~ s/^\s+//;
	    $d =~ s/\s+$//;
	    push @data, $d
	}

	my $et = shift @data;

	if ($et eq 'user') {
	    my ($user, $enable, $expire, $firstname, $lastname, $email, $comment, $keys) = @data;

	    my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
	    if (!$realm) {
		warn "user config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
		next;
	    }

	    $enable = $enable ? 1 : 0;

	    $expire = 0 if !$expire;

	    if ($expire !~ m/^\d+$/) {
		warn "user config - ignore user '$user' - (illegal characters in expire '$expire')\n";
		next;
	    }
	    $expire = int($expire);

	    #if (!verify_groupname ($group, 1)) {
	    #    warn "user config - ignore user '$user' - invalid characters in group name\n";
	    #    next;
	    #}

	    $cfg->{users}->{$user} = {
		enable => $enable,
		# group => $group,
	    };
	    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{firstname} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($firstname) if $firstname;
	    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{lastname} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($lastname) if $lastname;
	    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{email} = $email;
	    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
	    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{expire} = $expire;
	    # keys: allowed yubico key ids or oath secrets (base32 encoded)
	    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{keys} = $keys if $keys;

	    #$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
	    #$cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{$user} = 1;

	} elsif ($et eq 'group') {
	    my ($group, $userlist, $comment) = @data;

	    if (!verify_groupname($group, 1)) {
		warn "user config - ignore group '$group' - invalid characters in group name\n";
		next;
	    }

	    # make sure to add the group (even if there are no members)
	    $cfg->{groups}->{$group} = { users => {} } if !$cfg->{groups}->{$group};

	    $cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;

	    foreach my $user (split_list($userlist)) {

		if (!PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1)) {
		    warn "user config - ignore invalid group member '$user'\n";
		    next;
		}

		if ($cfg->{users}->{$user}) { # user exists
		    $cfg->{users}->{$user}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
		} else {
		    warn "user config - ignore invalid group member '$user'\n";
		}
		$cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$user} = 1;
	    }

	} elsif ($et eq 'role') {
	    my ($role, $privlist) = @data;

	    if (!verify_rolename($role, 1)) {
		warn "user config - ignore role '$role' - invalid characters in role name\n";
		next;
	    }

	    # make sure to add the role (even if there are no privileges)
	    $cfg->{roles}->{$role} = {} if !$cfg->{roles}->{$role};

	    foreach my $priv (split_list($privlist)) {
		if (defined ($valid_privs->{$priv})) {
		    $cfg->{roles}->{$role}->{$priv} = 1;
		} else {
		    warn "user config - ignore invalid privilege '$priv'\n";
		}
	    }

	} elsif ($et eq 'acl') {
	    my ($propagate, $pathtxt, $uglist, $rolelist) = @data;

	    $propagate = $propagate ? 1 : 0;

	    if (my $path = normalize_path($pathtxt)) {
		my $acl_node;
		foreach my $role (split_list($rolelist)) {

		    if (!verify_rolename($role, 1)) {
			warn "user config - ignore invalid role name '$role' in acl\n";
			next;
		    }

		    if (!$cfg->{roles}->{$role}) {
			warn "user config - ignore invalid acl role '$role'\n";
			next;
		    }

		    foreach my $ug (split_list($uglist)) {
			my ($group) = $ug =~ m/^@(\S+)$/;

			if ($group && verify_groupname($group, 1)) {
			    if (!$cfg->{groups}->{$group}) { # group does not exist
				warn "user config - ignore invalid acl group '$group'\n";
			    }
			    $acl_node = find_acl_tree_node($cfg->{acl_root}, $path) if !$acl_node;
			    $acl_node->{groups}->{$group}->{$role} = $propagate;
			} elsif (PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($ug, 1)) {
			    if (!$cfg->{users}->{$ug}) { # user does not exist
				warn "user config - ignore invalid acl member '$ug'\n";
			    }
			    $acl_node = find_acl_tree_node($cfg->{acl_root}, $path) if !$acl_node;
			    $acl_node->{users}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
			} elsif (my ($user, $token) = split_tokenid($ug, 1)) {
			    if (check_token_exist($cfg, $user, $token, 1)) {
				$acl_node = find_acl_tree_node($cfg->{acl_root}, $path) if !$acl_node;
				$acl_node->{tokens}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
			    } else {
				warn "user config - ignore invalid acl token '$ug'\n";
			    }
			} else {
			    warn "user config - invalid user/group '$ug' in acl\n";
			}
		    }
		}
	    } else {
		warn "user config - ignore invalid path in acl '$pathtxt'\n";
	    }
	} elsif ($et eq 'pool') {
	    my ($pool, $comment, $vmlist, $storelist) = @data;

	    if (!verify_poolname($pool, 1)) {
		warn "user config - ignore pool '$pool' - invalid characters in pool name\n";
		next;
	    }

	    # make sure to add the pool (even if there are no members)
	    $cfg->{pools}->{$pool} = { vms => {}, storage => {}, pools => {} }
		if !$cfg->{pools}->{$pool};

	    if ($pool =~ m!/!) {
		my $curr = $pool;
		while ($curr =~ m!^(.+)/[^/]+$!) {
		    # ensure nested pool info is correctly recorded
		    my $parent = $1;
		    $cfg->{pools}->{$curr}->{parent} = $parent;
		    $cfg->{pools}->{$parent} = { vms => {}, storage => {}, pools => {} }
			if !$cfg->{pools}->{$parent};
		    $cfg->{pools}->{$parent}->{pools}->{$curr} = 1;
		    $curr = $parent;
		}
	    }

	    $cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;

	    foreach my $vmid (split_list($vmlist)) {
		if ($vmid !~ m/^\d+$/) {
		    warn "user config - ignore invalid vmid '$vmid' in pool '$pool'\n";
		    next;
		}
		$vmid = int($vmid);

		if ($cfg->{vms}->{$vmid}) {
		    warn "user config - ignore duplicate vmid '$vmid' in pool '$pool'\n";
		    next;
		}

		$cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{vms}->{$vmid} = 1;

		# record vmid ==> pool relation
		$cfg->{vms}->{$vmid} = $pool;
	    }

	    foreach my $storeid (split_list($storelist)) {
		if ($storeid !~ m/^[a-z][a-z0-9\-\_\.]*[a-z0-9]$/i) {
		    warn "user config - ignore invalid storage '$storeid' in pool '$pool'\n";
		    next;
		}
		$cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{storage}->{$storeid} = 1;
	    }
	} elsif ($et eq 'token') {
	    my ($tokenid, $expire, $privsep, $comment) = @data;

	    my ($user, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid, 1);
	    if (!($user && $token)) {
		warn "user config - ignore invalid tokenid '$tokenid'\n";
		next;
	    }

	    $privsep = $privsep ? 1 : 0;

	    $expire = 0 if !$expire;

	    if ($expire !~ m/^\d+$/) {
		warn "user config - ignore token '$tokenid' - (illegal characters in expire '$expire')\n";
		next;
	    }
	    $expire = int($expire);

	    if (my $user_cfg = $cfg->{users}->{$user}) { # user exists
		$user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token} = {} if !$user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token};
		my $token_cfg = $user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token};
		$token_cfg->{privsep} = $privsep;
		$token_cfg->{expire} = $expire;
		$token_cfg->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
	    } else {
		warn "user config - ignore token '$tokenid' - user does not exist\n";
	    }
	} else {
	    warn "user config - ignore config line: $line\n";
	}
    }

    userconfig_force_defaults($cfg);

    return $cfg;
}

sub write_user_config {
    my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;

    my $data = '';

    foreach my $user (sort keys %{$cfg->{users}}) {
	my $d = $cfg->{users}->{$user};
	my $firstname = $d->{firstname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{firstname}) : '';
	my $lastname = $d->{lastname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{lastname}) : '';
	my $email = $d->{email} || '';
	my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
	my $expire = int($d->{expire} || 0);
	my $enable = $d->{enable} ? 1 : 0;
	my $keys = $d->{keys} ? $d->{keys} : '';
	$data .= "user:$user:$enable:$expire:$firstname:$lastname:$email:$comment:$keys:\n";

	my $user_tokens = $d->{tokens};
	foreach my $token (sort keys %$user_tokens) {
	    my $td = $user_tokens->{$token};
	    my $full_tokenid = join_tokenid($user, $token);
	    my $comment = $td->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($td->{comment}) : '';
	    my $expire = int($td->{expire} || 0);
	    my $privsep = $td->{privsep} ? 1 : 0;
	    $data .= "token:$full_tokenid:$expire:$privsep:$comment:\n";
	}
    }

    $data .= "\n";

    foreach my $group (sort keys %{$cfg->{groups}}) {
	my $d = $cfg->{groups}->{$group};
	my $list = join (',', sort keys %{$d->{users}});
	my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
	$data .= "group:$group:$list:$comment:\n";
    }

    $data .= "\n";

    foreach my $pool (sort keys %{$cfg->{pools}}) {
	my $d = $cfg->{pools}->{$pool};
	my $vmlist = join (',', sort keys %{$d->{vms}});
	my $storelist = join (',', sort keys %{$d->{storage}});
	my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
	$data .= "pool:$pool:$comment:$vmlist:$storelist:\n";
    }

    $data .= "\n";

    foreach my $role (sort keys %{$cfg->{roles}}) {
	next if $special_roles->{$role};

	my $d = $cfg->{roles}->{$role};
	my $list = join (',', sort keys %$d);
	$data .= "role:$role:$list:\n";
    }

    $data .= "\n";

    my $collect_rolelist_members = sub {
	my ($acl_members, $result, $prefix, $exclude) = @_;

	foreach my $member (keys %$acl_members) {
	    next if $exclude && $member eq $exclude;

	    my $l0 = '';
	    my $l1 = '';
	    foreach my $role (sort keys %{$acl_members->{$member}}) {
		my $propagate = $acl_members->{$member}->{$role};
		if ($propagate) {
		    $l1 .= ',' if $l1;
		    $l1 .= $role;
		} else {
		    $l0 .= ',' if $l0;
		    $l0 .= $role;
		}
	    }
	    $result->{0}->{$l0}->{"${prefix}${member}"} = 1 if $l0;
	    $result->{1}->{$l1}->{"${prefix}${member}"} = 1 if $l1;
	}
    };

    iterate_acl_tree("/", $cfg->{acl_root}, sub {
	my ($path, $d) = @_;

	my $rolelist_members = {};

	$collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'groups'}, $rolelist_members, '@');

	# no need to save 'root@pam', it is always 'Administrator'
	$collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'users'}, $rolelist_members, '', 'root@pam');

	$collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'tokens'}, $rolelist_members, '');

	foreach my $propagate (0,1) {
	    my $filtered = $rolelist_members->{$propagate};
	    foreach my $rolelist (sort keys %$filtered) {
		my $uglist = join (',', sort keys %{$filtered->{$rolelist}});
		$data .= "acl:$propagate:$path:$uglist:$rolelist:\n";
	    }

	}
    });

    return $data;
}

# Creates a `PVE::RS::TFA` instance from the raw config data.
# Its contained hash will also support the legacy functionality.
sub parse_priv_tfa_config {
    my ($filename, $raw) = @_;

    $raw = '' if !defined($raw);
    my $cfg = PVE::RS::TFA->new($raw);

    # Purge invalid users:
    foreach my $user ($cfg->users()->@*) {
	my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
	if (!$realm) {
	    warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
	    $cfg->remove_user($user);
	}
    }

    return $cfg;
}

sub write_priv_tfa_config {
    my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;

    return $cfg->write();
}

sub roles {
    my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_;

    # NOTE: we do not consider pools here.
    # NOTE: for privsep tokens, this does not filter roles by those that the
    # corresponding user has.
    # Use $rpcenv->permission() for any actual permission checks!

    return 'Administrator' if $user eq 'root@pam'; # root can do anything

    if (!defined($path)) {
	# this shouldn't happen!
	warn "internal error: ACL check called for undefined ACL path!\n";
	return {};
    }

    if (pve_verify_tokenid($user, 1)) {
	my $tokenid = $user;
	my ($username, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid);

	my $token_info = $cfg->{users}->{$username}->{tokens}->{$token};
	return () if !$token_info;

	my $user_roles = roles($cfg, $username, $path);

	# return full user privileges
	return $user_roles if !$token_info->{privsep};
    }

    my $roles = {};

    my $split = [ split("/", $path) ];
    if ($path eq '/') {
	$split = [ '' ];
    }

    my $acl = $cfg->{acl_root};
    my $i = 0;

    while (@$split) {
	my $p = shift @$split;
	my $final = !@$split;
	if ($p ne '') {
	    $acl = $acl->{children}->{$p};
	}

	#print "CHECKACL $path $p\n";
	#print "ACL $path = " . Dumper ($acl);
	if (my $ri = $acl->{tokens}->{$user}) {
	    my $new;
	    foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
		my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
		if ($final || $propagate) {
		    #print "APPLY ROLE $p $user $role\n";
		    $new = {} if !$new;
		    $new->{$role} = $propagate;
		}
	    }
	    if ($new) {
		$roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
		next;
	    }
	}

	if (my $ri = $acl->{users}->{$user}) {
	    my $new;
	    foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
		my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
		if ($final || $propagate) {
		    #print "APPLY ROLE $p $user $role\n";
		    $new = {} if !$new;
		    $new->{$role} = $propagate;
		}
	    }
	    if ($new) {
		$roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
		next; # user privs always override group privs
	    }
	}

	my $new;
	foreach my $g (keys %{$acl->{groups}}) {
	    next if !$cfg->{groups}->{$g}->{users}->{$user};
	    if (my $ri = $acl->{groups}->{$g}) {
		foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
		    my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
		    if ($final || $propagate) {
			#print "APPLY ROLE $p \@$g $role\n";
			$new = {} if !$new;
			$new->{$role} = $propagate;
		    }
		}
	    }
	}
	if ($new) {
	    $roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
	    next;
	}
    }

    return { 'NoAccess' => $roles->{NoAccess} } if defined ($roles->{NoAccess});
    #return () if defined ($roles->{NoAccess});

    #print "permission $user $path = " . Dumper ($roles);

    #print "roles $user $path = " . join (',', @ra) . "\n";

    return $roles;
}

sub remove_vm_access {
    my ($vmid) = @_;
    my $delVMaccessFn = sub {
	my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
	my $modified;

	if (my $acl = $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{vms}->{children}->{$vmid}) {
	    delete $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{vms}->{children}->{$vmid};
	    $modified = 1;
	}
	if (my $pool = $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid}) {
	    if (my $data = $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}) {
		delete $data->{vms}->{$vmid};
		delete $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid};
		$modified = 1;
	    }
	}
	cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg) if $modified;
    };

    lock_user_config($delVMaccessFn, "access permissions cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
}

sub remove_storage_access {
    my ($storeid) = @_;

    my $deleteStorageAccessFn = sub {
	my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
	my $modified;

	if (my $acl = $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{storage}->{children}->{$storeid}) {
	    delete $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{storage}->{children}->{$storeid};
	    $modified = 1;
	}
	foreach my $pool (keys %{$usercfg->{pools}}) {
	    delete $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{storage}->{$storeid};
	    $modified = 1;
	}
	cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg) if $modified;
    };

    lock_user_config($deleteStorageAccessFn,
		     "access permissions cleanup for storage $storeid failed");
}

sub add_vm_to_pool {
    my ($vmid, $pool) = @_;

    my $addVMtoPoolFn = sub {
	my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
	if (my $data = $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}) {
	    $data->{vms}->{$vmid} = 1;
	    $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid} = $pool;
	    cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg);
	}
    };

    lock_user_config($addVMtoPoolFn, "can't add VM $vmid to pool '$pool'");
}

sub remove_vm_from_pool {
    my ($vmid) = @_;

    my $delVMfromPoolFn = sub {
	my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
	if (my $pool = $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid}) {
	    if (my $data = $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}) {
		delete $data->{vms}->{$vmid};
		delete $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid};
		cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg);
	    }
	}
    };

    lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
}

my $USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES = {
    u2f => 1,
    oath => 1,
};

sub user_remove_tfa : prototype($) {
    my ($userid) = @_;

    my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
    $tfa_cfg->remove_user($userid);
    cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
}

my sub add_old_yubico_keys : prototype($$$) {
    my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $keys) = @_;

    my $count = 0;
    foreach my $key (split_list($keys)) {
	my $description = "<old userconfig key $count>";
	++$count;
	$tfa_cfg->add_yubico_entry($userid, $description, $key);
    }
}

my sub normalize_totp_secret : prototype($) {
    my ($key) = @_;

    my $binkey;
    # See PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp:
    if ($key =~ /^v2-0x([0-9a-fA-F]+)$/) {
	# v2, hex
	$binkey = pack('H*', $1);
    } elsif ($key =~ /^v2-([A-Z2-7=]+)$/) {
	# v2, base32
	$binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($1);
    } elsif ($key =~ /^[A-Z2-7=]{16}$/) {
	$binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($key);
    } elsif ($key =~ /^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$/) {
	$binkey = pack('H*', $key);
    } else {
	return undef;
    }

    return MIME::Base32::encode_rfc3548($binkey);
}

my sub add_old_totp_keys : prototype($$$$) {
    my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys) = @_;

    my $issuer = 'Proxmox%20VE';
    my $account = uri_escape("Old key for $userid");
    my $digits = $realm_tfa->{digits} || 6;
    my $step = $realm_tfa->{step} || 30;
    my $uri = "otpauth://totp/$issuer:$account?digits=$digits&period=$step&algorithm=SHA1&secret=";

    my $count = 0;
    foreach my $key (split_list($keys)) {
	$key = normalize_totp_secret($key);
	# and just skip invalid keys:
	next if !defined($key);

	my $description = "<old userconfig key $count>";
	++$count;
	eval { $tfa_cfg->add_totp_entry($userid, $description, $uri . $key) };
	warn $@ if $@;
    }
}

sub add_old_keys_to_realm_tfa : prototype($$$$) {
    my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys) = @_;

    # if there's no realm tfa configured, we don't know what the keys mean, so we just ignore
    # them...
    return if !$realm_tfa;

    my $type = $realm_tfa->{type};
    if ($type eq 'oath') {
	add_old_totp_keys($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys);
    } elsif ($type eq 'yubico') {
	add_old_yubico_keys($userid, $tfa_cfg, $keys);
    } else {
	# invalid keys, we'll just drop them now...
    }
}

sub user_get_tfa : prototype($$$) {
    my ($username, $realm) = @_;

    my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
    my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username}
	or die "user '$username' not found\n";

    my $keys = $user->{keys};

    my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
    my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
    die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;

    my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
    $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa)
	if $realm_tfa;

    my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
    if (defined($keys) && $keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)$/) {
	add_old_keys_to_realm_tfa($username, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys);
    }

    return ($tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa);
}

# bash completion helpers

register_standard_option('userid-completed',
    get_standard_option('userid', { completion => \&complete_username}),
);

sub complete_username {

    my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');

    return [ keys %{$user_cfg->{users}} ];
}

sub complete_group {

    my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');

    return [ keys %{$user_cfg->{groups}} ];
}

sub complete_realm {

    my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');

    return [ keys %{$domain_cfg->{ids}} ];
}

1;