The good news is that LXC uses many kernel security features like
AppArmor, CGroups and PID and user namespaces, which makes containers
-usage quite secure. We distinguish two types of containers:
-
-
-Privileged Containers
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Security is done by dropping capabilities, using mandatory access
-control (AppArmor), SecComp filters and namespaces. The LXC team
-considers this kind of container as unsafe, and they will not consider
-new container escape exploits to be security issues worthy of a CVE
-and quick fix. So you should use this kind of containers only inside a
-trusted environment, or when no untrusted task is running as root in
-the container.
-
-
-Unprivileged Containers
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-This kind of containers use a new kernel feature called user
-namespaces. The root UID 0 inside the container is mapped to an
-unprivileged user outside the container. This means that most security
-issues (container escape, resource abuse, ...) in those containers
-will affect a random unprivileged user, and so would be a generic
-kernel security bug rather than an LXC issue. The LXC team thinks
-unprivileged containers are safe by design.
-
+usage quite secure.
Guest Operating System Configuration
------------------------------------
Modification of a file can be prevented by adding a `.pve-ignore.`
file for it. For instance, if the file `/etc/.pve-ignore.hosts`
exists then the `/etc/hosts` file will not be touched. This can be a
-simple empty file creatd via:
+simple empty file created via:
# touch /etc/.pve-ignore.hosts
group/others model.
+Backup of Containers mount points
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+By default additional mount points besides the Root Disk mount point are not
+included in backups. You can reverse this default behavior by setting the
+*Backup* option on a mount point.
+// see PVE::VZDump::LXC::prepare()
+
+Replication of Containers mount points
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+By default additional mount points are replicated when the Root Disk
+is replicated. If you want the {pve} storage replication mechanism to skip a
+ mount point when starting a replication job, you can set the
+*Skip replication* option on that mount point. +
+As of {pve} 5.0, replication requires a storage of type `zfspool`, so adding a
+ mount point to a different type of storage when the container has replication
+ configured requires to *Skip replication* for that mount point.
+
+
[[pct_settings]]
Container Settings
------------------
+[[pct_general]]
+General Settings
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+[thumbnail="gui-create-ct-general.png"]
+
+General settings of a container include
+
+* the *Node* : the physical server on which the container will run
+* the *CT ID*: a unique number in this {pve} installation used to identify your container
+* *Hostname*: the hostname of the container
+* *Resource Pool*: a logical group of containers and VMs
+* *Password*: the root password of the container
+* *SSH Public Key*: a public key for connecting to the root account over SSH
+* *Unprivileged container*: this option allows to choose at creation time
+if you want to create a privileged or unprivileged container.
+
+
+Privileged Containers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Security is done by dropping capabilities, using mandatory access
+control (AppArmor), SecComp filters and namespaces. The LXC team
+considers this kind of container as unsafe, and they will not consider
+new container escape exploits to be security issues worthy of a CVE
+and quick fix. So you should use this kind of containers only inside a
+trusted environment, or when no untrusted task is running as root in
+the container.
+
+
+Unprivileged Containers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+This kind of containers use a new kernel feature called user
+namespaces. The root UID 0 inside the container is mapped to an
+unprivileged user outside the container. This means that most security
+issues (container escape, resource abuse, ...) in those containers
+will affect a random unprivileged user, and so would be a generic
+kernel security bug rather than an LXC issue. The LXC team thinks
+unprivileged containers are safe by design.
+
+NOTE: If the container uses systemd as an init system, please be
+aware the systemd version running inside the container should be equal
+or greater than 220.
+
[[pct_cpu]]
CPU
~~~
- Directories: passing `size=0` triggers a special case where instead of a raw
image a directory is created.
+NOTE: The special option syntax `STORAGE_ID:SIZE_IN_GB` for storage backed
+mount point volumes will automatically allocate a volume of the specified size
+on the specified storage. E.g., calling
+`pct set 100 -mp0 thin1:10,mp=/path/in/container` will allocate a 10GB volume
+on the storage `thin1` and replace the volume ID place holder `10` with the
+allocated volume ID.
+
Bind Mount Points
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
attempt with `pct start`, you need to run `pct start` at least once to also
update the configuration used by `lxc-start`.
+[[pct_migration]]
+Migration
+---------
+
+If you have a cluster, you can migrate your Containers with
+
+ pct migrate <vmid> <target>
+
+This works as long as your Container is offline. If it has local volumes or
+mountpoints defined, the migration will copy the content over the network to
+the target host if there is the same storage defined.
+
+If you want to migrate online Containers, the only way is to use
+restart migration. This can be initiated with the -restart flag and the optional
+-timeout parameter.
+
+A restart migration will shut down the Container and kill it after the specified
+timeout (the default is 180 seconds). Then it will migrate the Container
+like an offline migration and when finished, it starts the Container on the
+target node.
[[pct_configuration]]
Configuration
projects / pve-docs.git / blobdiff