--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 15:57:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pti: Make sure the user/kernel PTEs match
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+Meelis reported that his K8 Athlon64 emits MCE warnings when PTI is
+enabled:
+
+[Hardware Error]: Error Addr: 0x0000ffff81e000e0
+[Hardware Error]: MC1 Error: L1 TLB multimatch.
+[Hardware Error]: cache level: L1, tx: INSN
+
+The address is in the entry area, which is mapped into kernel _AND_ user
+space. That's special because we switch CR3 while we are executing
+there.
+
+User mapping:
+0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff82000000 2M ro PSE GLB x pmd
+
+Kernel mapping:
+0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff82000000 16M ro PSE x pmd
+
+So the K8 is complaining that the TLB entries differ. They differ in the
+GLB bit.
+
+Drop the GLB bit when installing the user shared mapping.
+
+Fixes: 6dc72c3cbca0 ("x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD")
+Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801031407180.1957@nanos
+(cherry picked from commit 52994c256df36fda9a715697431cba9daecb6b11)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8a95d206afc447d8461815c67e618bd8b2c6457f)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+index bce8aea65606..2da28ba97508 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+@@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ static void __init pti_setup_espfix64(void)
+ static void __init pti_clone_entry_text(void)
+ {
+ pti_clone_pmds((unsigned long) __entry_text_start,
+- (unsigned long) __irqentry_text_end, _PAGE_RW);
++ (unsigned long) __irqentry_text_end,
++ _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GLOBAL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 31 Dec 2017 10:18:06 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/dumpstack: Fix partial register dumps
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+The show_regs_safe() logic is wrong. When there's an iret stack frame,
+it prints the entire pt_regs -- most of which is random stack data --
+instead of just the five registers at the end.
+
+show_regs_safe() is also poorly named: the on_stack() checks aren't for
+safety. Rename the function to show_regs_if_on_stack() and add a
+comment to explain why the checks are needed.
+
+These issues were introduced with the "partial register dump" feature of
+the following commit:
+
+ b02fcf9ba121 ("x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully")
+
+That patch had gone through a few iterations of development, and the
+above issues were artifacts from a previous iteration of the patch where
+'regs' pointed directly to the iret frame rather than to the (partially
+empty) pt_regs.
+
+Tested-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me>
+Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: b02fcf9ba121 ("x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully")
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5b05b8b344f59db2d3d50dbdeba92d60f2304c54.1514736742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+(cherry picked from commit a9cdbe72c4e8bf3b38781c317a79326e2e1a230d)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3f159d02ecca1ffe81dc467767833dd6d0345147)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 17 +++++++++++++----
+ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
+index 38fa6154e382..e1c1cb5019bc 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
+@@ -55,18 +55,27 @@ void unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
+
+ #if defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) || defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
+ /*
+- * WARNING: The entire pt_regs may not be safe to dereference. In some cases,
+- * only the iret frame registers are accessible. Use with caution!
++ * If 'partial' returns true, only the iret frame registers are valid.
+ */
+-static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state)
++static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state,
++ bool *partial)
+ {
+ if (unwind_done(state))
+ return NULL;
+
++ if (partial) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
++ *partial = !state->full_regs;
++#else
++ *partial = false;
++#endif
++ }
++
+ return state->regs;
+ }
+ #else
+-static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state)
++static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state,
++ bool *partial)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+index 19a936e9b259..8da5b487919f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+@@ -76,12 +76,23 @@ void show_iret_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ regs->sp, regs->flags);
+ }
+
+-static void show_regs_safe(struct stack_info *info, struct pt_regs *regs)
++static void show_regs_if_on_stack(struct stack_info *info, struct pt_regs *regs,
++ bool partial)
+ {
+- if (on_stack(info, regs, sizeof(*regs)))
++ /*
++ * These on_stack() checks aren't strictly necessary: the unwind code
++ * has already validated the 'regs' pointer. The checks are done for
++ * ordering reasons: if the registers are on the next stack, we don't
++ * want to print them out yet. Otherwise they'll be shown as part of
++ * the wrong stack. Later, when show_trace_log_lvl() switches to the
++ * next stack, this function will be called again with the same regs so
++ * they can be printed in the right context.
++ */
++ if (!partial && on_stack(info, regs, sizeof(*regs))) {
+ __show_regs(regs, 0);
+- else if (on_stack(info, (void *)regs + IRET_FRAME_OFFSET,
+- IRET_FRAME_SIZE)) {
++
++ } else if (partial && on_stack(info, (void *)regs + IRET_FRAME_OFFSET,
++ IRET_FRAME_SIZE)) {
+ /*
+ * When an interrupt or exception occurs in entry code, the
+ * full pt_regs might not have been saved yet. In that case
+@@ -98,6 +109,7 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ struct stack_info stack_info = {0};
+ unsigned long visit_mask = 0;
+ int graph_idx = 0;
++ bool partial;
+
+ printk("%sCall Trace:\n", log_lvl);
+
+@@ -140,7 +152,7 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ printk("%s <%s>\n", log_lvl, stack_name);
+
+ if (regs)
+- show_regs_safe(&stack_info, regs);
++ show_regs_if_on_stack(&stack_info, regs, partial);
+
+ /*
+ * Scan the stack, printing any text addresses we find. At the
+@@ -164,7 +176,7 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+
+ /*
+ * Don't print regs->ip again if it was already printed
+- * by show_regs_safe() below.
++ * by show_regs_if_on_stack().
+ */
+ if (regs && stack == ®s->ip) {
+ unwind_next_frame(&state);
+@@ -200,9 +212,9 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unwind_next_frame(&state);
+
+ /* if the frame has entry regs, print them */
+- regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state);
++ regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state, &partial);
+ if (regs)
+- show_regs_safe(&stack_info, regs);
++ show_regs_if_on_stack(&stack_info, regs, partial);
+ }
+
+ if (stack_name)
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
+index 8dabd7bf1673..60244bfaf88f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int __save_stack_trace_reliable(struct stack_trace *trace,
+ for (unwind_start(&state, task, NULL, NULL); !unwind_done(&state);
+ unwind_next_frame(&state)) {
+
+- regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state);
++ regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state, NULL);
+ if (regs) {
+ /*
+ * Kernel mode registers on the stack indicate an
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 31 Dec 2017 10:18:07 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/dumpstack: Print registers for first stack frame
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+In the stack dump code, if the frame after the starting pt_regs is also
+a regs frame, the registers don't get printed. Fix that.
+
+Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Tested-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me>
+Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 3b3fa11bc700 ("x86/dumpstack: Print any pt_regs found on the stack")
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/396f84491d2f0ef64eda4217a2165f5712f6a115.1514736742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 3ffdeb1a02be3086f1411a15c5b9c481fa28e21f)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3aef1ce621ae2eb0bd58e07cf9e66a859faa17cd)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+index 8da5b487919f..042f80c50e3b 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+
+ unwind_start(&state, task, regs, stack);
+ stack = stack ? : get_stack_pointer(task, regs);
++ regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state, &partial);
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate through the stacks, starting with the current stack pointer.
+@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+ * - hardirq stack
+ * - entry stack
+ */
+- for (regs = NULL; stack; stack = PTR_ALIGN(stack_info.next_sp, sizeof(long))) {
++ for ( ; stack; stack = PTR_ALIGN(stack_info.next_sp, sizeof(long))) {
+ const char *stack_name;
+
+ if (get_stack_info(stack, task, &stack_info, &visit_mask)) {
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 12:39:52 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/process: Define cpu_tss_rw in same section as declaration
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+cpu_tss_rw is declared with DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED
+but then defined with DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED
+leading to section mismatch warnings.
+
+Use DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED consistently. This is necessary because
+it's mapped to the cpu entry area and must be page aligned.
+
+[ tglx: Massaged changelog a bit ]
+
+Fixes: 1a935bc3d4ea ("x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct")
+Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
+Cc: tklauser@distanz.ch
+Cc: minipli@googlemail.com
+Cc: me@kylehuey.com
+Cc: namit@vmware.com
+Cc: luto@kernel.org
+Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com
+Cc: tj@kernel.org
+Cc: cl@linux.com
+Cc: bp@suse.de
+Cc: thgarnie@google.com
+Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180103203954.183360-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
+
+(cherry picked from commit 2fd9c41aea47f4ad071accf94b94f94f2c4d31eb)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f45e574914ae47825d2eea46abc9d6fbabe55e56)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+index 3688a7b9d055..07e6218ad7d9 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
+ * section. Since TSS's are completely CPU-local, we want them
+ * on exact cacheline boundaries, to eliminate cacheline ping-pong.
+ */
+-__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss_rw) = {
++__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss_rw) = {
+ .x86_tss = {
+ /*
+ * .sp0 is only used when entering ring 0 from a lower
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 15:27:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
+isolation for mitigation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
+Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
+
+(cherry picked from commit de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit aefb6725ee33758a2869c37e22dbc7ca80548007)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
+ arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 6 +++---
+ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+index 9b0c283afcf0..b7900d26066c 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+@@ -340,6 +340,6 @@
+ #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
+ #define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
+ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+-#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
++#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+index 1854dd8071a6..142ab555dafa 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+
+ fpu__init_system(c);
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+index 2da28ba97508..43d4a4a29037 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@
+
+ static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+ {
+- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
++ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+ }
+
+ static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+ {
+- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+ }
+
+@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
+ }
+
+ autosel:
+- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return;
+ enable:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 22:35:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pti: Unbreak EFI old_memmap
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+EFI_OLD_MEMMAP's efi_call_phys_prolog() calls set_pgd() with swapper PGD that
+has PAGE_USER set, which makes PTI set NX on it, and therefore EFI can't
+execute it's code.
+
+Fix that by forcefully clearing _PAGE_NX from the PGD (this can't be done
+by the pgprot API).
+
+_PAGE_NX will be automatically reintroduced in efi_call_phys_epilog(), as
+_set_pgd() will again notice that this is _PAGE_USER, and set _PAGE_NX on
+it.
+
+Tested-by: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@hpe.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
+Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1801052215460.11852@cbobk.fhfr.pm
+(cherry picked from commit de53c3786a3ce162a1c815d0c04c766c23ec9c0a)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 31afacd8089f54061e718e5d491f11747755c503)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+index b104224d3d6c..987a38e82f73 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
++++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+@@ -133,7 +133,9 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)
+ pud[j] = *pud_offset(p4d_k, vaddr);
+ }
+ }
++ pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE)->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+ }
++
+ out:
+ __flush_tlb_all();
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 09:44:36 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides
+are, and how to debug it when things go wrong.
+
+Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
+Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
+Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
+Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
+Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
+Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com
+
+(cherry picked from commit 01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1acf87c45b0170e717fc1b06a2d6fef47e07f79b)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 21 ++-
+ Documentation/x86/pti.txt | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/pti.txt
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+index b4d2edf316db..1a6ebc6cdf26 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -2677,8 +2677,6 @@
+ steal time is computed, but won't influence scheduler
+ behaviour
+
+- nopti [X86-64] Disable kernel page table isolation
+-
+ nolapic [X86-32,APIC] Do not enable or use the local APIC.
+
+ nolapic_timer [X86-32,APIC] Do not use the local APIC timer.
+@@ -3247,11 +3245,20 @@
+ pt. [PARIDE]
+ See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.
+
+- pti= [X86_64]
+- Control user/kernel address space isolation:
+- on - enable
+- off - disable
+- auto - default setting
++ pti= [X86_64] Control Page Table Isolation of user and
++ kernel address spaces. Disabling this feature
++ removes hardening, but improves performance of
++ system calls and interrupts.
++
++ on - unconditionally enable
++ off - unconditionally disable
++ auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
++ vulnerable to issues that PTI mitigates
++
++ Not specifying this option is equivalent to pti=auto.
++
++ nopti [X86_64]
++ Equivalent to pti=off
+
+ pty.legacy_count=
+ [KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in
+diff --git a/Documentation/x86/pti.txt b/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..d11eff61fc9a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++Overview
++========
++
++Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a
++countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
++space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].
++
++To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
++page tables for use only when running userspace applications. When
++the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the
++page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy. When the system
++switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.
++
++The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel
++data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the
++entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table
++(IDT). There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped
++such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see
++comments in pti.c).
++
++This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
++the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled. It can be
++enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
++Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
++'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
++
++Page Table Management
++=====================
++
++When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.
++The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in
++kernels without PTI. This includes a complete mapping of userspace
++that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().
++
++Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is
++crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level. This ensures
++that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash
++userspace upon executing its first instruction.
++
++The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter
++and exit the kernel. This data is entirely contained in the 'struct
++cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives
++each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.
++
++For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its
++page tables like normal. The only difference is when the kernel
++makes entries in the top (PGD) level. In addition to setting the
++entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the
++userspace page tables' PGD.
++
++This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower
++layers of the page tables. This leaves a single, shared set of
++userspace page tables to manage. One PTE to lock, one set of
++accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...
++
++Overhead
++========
++
++Protection against side-channel attacks is important. But,
++this protection comes at a cost:
++
++1. Increased Memory Use
++ a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.
++ (Consumes an additional 4k per process).
++ b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB
++ aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD
++ entry. This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel
++ is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.
++
++2. Runtime Cost
++ a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies
++ must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry
++ and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,
++ though.) Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred
++ cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.
++ b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry. This
++ trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the
++ non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
++ things into the userspace page tables. The downside is
++ that stacks must be switched at entry time.
++ d. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
++ mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables. This
++ feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
++ entries mapping the kernel. Losing the feature means more
++ TLB misses after a context switch. The actual loss of
++ performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.
++ d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that
++ allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page
++ tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables
++ are changed. This makes switching the page tables (at context
++ switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper. But, on systems with
++ PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user
++ and kernel entries out of the TLB. The user PCID TLB flush is
++ deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.
++ See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.
++ e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new
++ process. Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings
++ are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each
++ new process. But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel
++ mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything
++ and one for the entry/exit structures. At fork(), we need to
++ copy both.
++ f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also
++ be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done
++ on a PGD used to map userspace. This ensures that the kernel
++ and userspace copies always map the same userspace
++ memory.
++ g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes
++ the entire TLB. That means that each syscall, interrupt
++ or exception flushes the TLB.
++ h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing
++ of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs. Some systems support
++ PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID. On these systems, addresses
++ can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID. When
++ flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a
++ single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3
++ write upon the next use of every PCID.
++
++Possible Future Work
++====================
++1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3
++ unless its value is actually changed.
++2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the
++ boot-time switching.
++
++Testing
++========
++
++To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,
++ideally doing all of these in parallel:
++
++1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
++2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests
++ (excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for
++ several minutes. These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the
++ kernel entry code. In general, old kernels might cause these tests
++ themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.
++3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many
++ frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"
++ in /proc/interrupts). This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which
++ is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be
++ interrupted, including nested NMIs. Using "-c" boosts the rate of
++ NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs
++ and less deterministic behavior.
++
++ while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done
++
++4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.
++5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.
++ This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.
++
++Debugging
++=========
++
++Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes
++that are worth noting here.
++
++ * Failures of the selftests/x86 code. Usually a bug in one of the
++ more obscure corners of entry_64.S
++ * Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup. Bugs
++ in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.
++ * Crashes at the first interrupt. Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,
++ like screwing up a page table switch. Also caused by
++ incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.
++ * Crashes at the first NMI. The NMI code is separate from main
++ interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect
++ normal interrupts. Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI
++ code. NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very
++ careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when
++ running perf.
++ * Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace. entry_64.S
++ bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.
++ * Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths
++ in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate
++ from the ones that return to the kernel.
++ * Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page
++ faults upon page faults. Caused by touching non-pti-mapped
++ data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel
++ CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.
++ * Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting
++ as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs. These have
++ tended to be TLB invalidation issues. Usually invalidating
++ the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.
++
++1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
++2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 11:49:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all
+cpus.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
+Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
+(cherry picked from commit 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit de861dbf4587b9dac9a1978e6349199755e8c1b1)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+index b7900d26066c..3928050b51b0 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+@@ -341,5 +341,7 @@
+ #define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
+ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+ #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
++#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
++#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+index 142ab555dafa..01abbf69d522 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+@@ -902,6 +902,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+
++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
++
+ fpu__init_system(c);
+ }
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 18:41:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
+page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it. PTI
+mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
+non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace.
+
+Undo the poison to allow execution.
+
+Fixes: 385ce0ea4c07 ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
+Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
+Cc: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108102805.GK25546@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 262b6b30087246abf09d6275eb0c0dc421bcbe38)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f03e9108405491791f0b883a2d95e2620ddfce64)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+index a4eb27918ceb..75869a4b6c41 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
+ p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
+ if (!p4d)
+ return -1;
++ pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+ pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
+ if (!pud)
+ return -1;
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 00:03:41 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/mm/pti: Remove dead logic in pti_user_pagetable_walk*()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+The following code contains dead logic:
+
+ 162 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+ 163 unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
+ 164 if (!new_p4d_page)
+ 165 return NULL;
+ 166
+ 167 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+ 168 set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
+ 169 new_p4d_page = 0;
+ 170 }
+ 171 if (new_p4d_page)
+ 172 free_page(new_p4d_page);
+ 173 }
+
+There can't be any difference between two pgd_none(*pgd) at L162 and L167,
+so it's always false at L171.
+
+Dave Hansen explained:
+
+ Yes, the double-test was part of an optimization where we attempted to
+ avoid using a global spinlock in the fork() path. We would check for
+ unallocated mid-level page tables without the lock. The lock was only
+ taken when we needed to *make* an entry to avoid collisions.
+
+ Now that it is all single-threaded, there is no chance of a collision,
+ no need for a lock, and no need for the re-check.
+
+As all these functions are only called during init, mark them __init as
+well.
+
+Fixes: 03f4424f348e ("x86/mm/pti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs")
+Signed-off-by: Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
+Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108160341.3461-1-albcamus@gmail.com
+
+(cherry picked from commit 8d56eff266f3e41a6c39926269c4c3f58f881a8e)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit de8ab6bea570e70d1478af2c1667714bc900ae70)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 32 ++++++--------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+index 43d4a4a29037..ce38f165489b 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+-static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
++static __init p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+ {
+ pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address));
+ gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+@@ -164,12 +164,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+ if (!new_p4d_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+- if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
+- new_p4d_page = 0;
+- }
+- if (new_p4d_page)
+- free_page(new_p4d_page);
++ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
+ }
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0);
+
+@@ -182,7 +177,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+-static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
++static __init pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+ {
+ gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
+ p4d_t *p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address);
+@@ -194,12 +189,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+ if (!new_pud_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+- if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
+- set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
+- new_pud_page = 0;
+- }
+- if (new_pud_page)
+- free_page(new_pud_page);
++ set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
+ }
+
+ pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
+@@ -213,12 +203,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+ if (!new_pmd_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+- if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+- set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
+- new_pmd_page = 0;
+- }
+- if (new_pmd_page)
+- free_page(new_pmd_page);
++ set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
+ }
+
+ return pmd_offset(pud, address);
+@@ -251,12 +236,7 @@ static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address)
+ if (!new_pte_page)
+ return NULL;
+
+- if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
+- new_pte_page = 0;
+- }
+- if (new_pte_page)
+- free_page(new_pte_page);
++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
+ }
+
+ pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 16:09:21 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+To aid in speculation control, make LFENCE a serializing instruction
+since it has less overhead than MFENCE. This is done by setting bit 1
+of MSR 0xc0011029 (DE_CFG). Some families that support LFENCE do not
+have this MSR. For these families, the LFENCE instruction is already
+serializing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220921.12580.71694.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
+
+(cherry picked from commit e4d0e84e490790798691aaa0f2e598637f1867ec)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit bde943193168fe9a3814badaa0cae3422029dce5)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+index 5573c75f8e4c..25147df4acfc 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+@@ -351,6 +351,8 @@
+ #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK 0xfffffffULL
+ #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT 20
+ #define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c
++#define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029
++#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1
+
+ /* K8 MSRs */
+ #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+index 2a5328cc03a6..c9a4e4db7860 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -785,6 +785,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
++ /*
++ * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
++ * use it for execution serialization. On families which
++ * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
++ * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
++ * is not present.
++ */
++ msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
++ MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
++
+ /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+ }
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 16:09:32 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+With LFENCE now a serializing instruction, use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference
+to MFENCE_RDTSC. However, since the kernel could be running under a
+hypervisor that does not support writing that MSR, read the MSR back and
+verify that the bit has been set successfully. If the MSR can be read
+and the bit is set, then set the LFENCE_RDTSC feature, otherwise set the
+MFENCE_RDTSC feature.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220932.12580.52458.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
+
+(cherry picked from commit 9c6a73c75864ad9fa49e5fa6513e4c4071c0e29f)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dc39f26bf11d270cb4cfd251919afb16d98d6c2b)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+index 25147df4acfc..db88b7f852b4 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@
+ #define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c
+ #define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029
+ #define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1
++#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
+
+ /* K8 MSRs */
+ #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+index c9a4e4db7860..99eef4a09fd9 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -785,6 +785,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
++ unsigned long long val;
++ int ret;
++
+ /*
+ * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
+ * use it for execution serialization. On families which
+@@ -795,8 +798,19 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
+ MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+
+- /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+- set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
++ /*
++ * Verify that the MSR write was successful (could be running
++ * under a hypervisor) and only then assume that LFENCE is
++ * serializing.
++ */
++ ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F10H_DECFG, &val);
++ if (!ret && (val & MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE)) {
++ /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
++ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
++ } else {
++ /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
++ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 12:28:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but
+with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it
+breaks the "optimized' test.
+
+Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there.
+
+Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
+Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic
+
+(cherry picked from commit 612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dc241f68557ee1929a92b9ec6f7a1294bbbd4f00)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+index 32e14d137416..5dc05755a044 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+@@ -344,9 +344,12 @@ recompute_jump(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *orig_insn, u8 *repl_insn, u8 *insnbuf)
+ static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr)
+ {
+ unsigned long flags;
++ int i;
+
+- if (instr[0] != 0x90)
+- return;
++ for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) {
++ if (instr[i] != 0x90)
++ return;
++ }
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 14:49:39 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+The inital fix for trusted boot and PTI potentially misses the pgd clearing
+if pud_alloc() sets a PGD. It probably works in *practice* because for two
+adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will
+clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear). The second
+call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.
+
+Defer the NX clearing to a point after it is known that all top-level
+allocations have occurred. Add a comment to clarify why.
+
+[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
+
+Fixes: 262b6b30087 ("x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled")
+Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
+Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
+Cc: "Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
+Cc: peterz@infradead.org
+Cc: ning.sun@intel.com
+Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
+Cc: andi@firstfloor.org
+Cc: luto@kernel.org
+Cc: law@redhat.com
+Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
+Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
+Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
+Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
+Cc: nickc@redhat.com
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com
+(cherry picked from commit 8a931d1e24bacf01f00a35d43bfe7917256c5c49)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9935124a5c771c004a578423275633232fb7a006)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+index 75869a4b6c41..a2486f444073 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
+ p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
+ if (!p4d)
+ return -1;
+- pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+ pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
+ if (!pud)
+ return -1;
+@@ -139,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
+ return -1;
+ set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
+ pte_unmap(pte);
++
++ /*
++ * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
++ * name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute
++ * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
++ *
++ * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
++ * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
++ */
++ pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:43 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] locking/barriers: introduce new memory barrier gmb()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+In constrast to existing mb() and rmb() barriers,
+gmb() barrier is arch-independent and can be used to
+implement any type of memory barrier.
+In x86 case, it is either lfence or mfence, based on
+processor type. ARM and others can define it according
+to their needs.
+
+Suggested-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6834bd7e6159da957a6c01deebf16132a694bc23)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 +++
+ include/asm-generic/barrier.h | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+index bfb28caf97b1..aae78054cae2 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
+ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")
+ #endif
+
++#define gmb() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
++ "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
+ #define dma_rmb() rmb()
+ #else
+diff --git a/include/asm-generic/barrier.h b/include/asm-generic/barrier.h
+index fe297b599b0a..0ee1345c9222 100644
+--- a/include/asm-generic/barrier.h
++++ b/include/asm-generic/barrier.h
+@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
+ #define wmb() mb()
+ #endif
+
++#ifndef gmb
++#define gmb() do { } while (0)
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef dma_rmb
+ #define dma_rmb() rmb()
+ #endif
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] bpf: prevent speculative execution in eBPF interpreter
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+This adds a generic memory barrier before LD_IMM_DW and
+LDX_MEM_B/H/W/DW eBPF instructions during eBPF program
+execution in order to prevent speculative execution on out
+of bound BFP_MAP array indexes. This way an arbitary kernel
+memory is not exposed through side channel attacks.
+
+For more details, please see this Google Project Zero report: tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dd13f73106c260dea7a689d33d1457639af820aa)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ kernel/bpf/core.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
+index 9a1bed1f3029..3f83c60e3e86 100644
+--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+ #include <asm/unaligned.h>
++#include <asm/barrier.h>
+
+ /* Registers */
+ #define BPF_R0 regs[BPF_REG_0]
+@@ -920,6 +921,7 @@ static unsigned int ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ DST = IMM;
+ CONT;
+ LD_IMM_DW:
++ gmb();
+ DST = (u64) (u32) insn[0].imm | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
+ insn++;
+ CONT;
+@@ -1133,6 +1135,7 @@ static unsigned int ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ *(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (DST + insn->off) = IMM; \
+ CONT; \
+ LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
++ gmb(); \
+ DST = *(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (SRC + insn->off); \
+ CONT;
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] x86, bpf, jit: prevent speculative execution when JIT is
+ enabled
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+When constant blinding is enabled (bpf_jit_harden = 1), this adds
+a generic memory barrier (lfence for intel, mfence for AMD) before
+emitting x86 jitted code for the BPF_ALU(64)_OR_X and BPF_ALU_LHS_X
+(for BPF_REG_AX register) eBPF instructions. This is needed in order
+to prevent speculative execution on out of bounds BPF_MAP array
+indexes when JIT is enabled. This way an arbitary kernel memory is
+not exposed through side-channel attacks.
+
+For more details, please see this Google Project Zero report: tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit cf9676859a05d0d784067072e8121e63888bacc7)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+index 4d50ced94686..879dbfefb66d 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
++++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ static void bpf_flush_icache(void *start, void *end)
+ set_fs(old_fs);
+ }
+
++static void emit_memory_barrier(u8 **pprog)
++{
++ u8 *prog = *pprog;
++ int cnt = 0;
++
++ if (bpf_jit_blinding_enabled()) {
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
++ /* x86 LFENCE opcode 0F AE E8 */
++ EMIT3(0x0f, 0xae, 0xe8);
++ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC))
++ /* AMD MFENCE opcode 0F AE F0 */
++ EMIT3(0x0f, 0xae, 0xf0);
++ else
++ /* we should never end up here,
++ * but if we do, better not to emit anything*/
++ return;
++ }
++ *pprog = prog;
++ return;
++}
++
+ #define CHOOSE_LOAD_FUNC(K, func) \
+ ((int)K < 0 ? ((int)K >= SKF_LL_OFF ? func##_negative_offset : func) : func##_positive_offset)
+
+@@ -399,7 +420,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
+ case BPF_ADD: b2 = 0x01; break;
+ case BPF_SUB: b2 = 0x29; break;
+ case BPF_AND: b2 = 0x21; break;
+- case BPF_OR: b2 = 0x09; break;
++ case BPF_OR: b2 = 0x09; emit_memory_barrier(&prog); break;
+ case BPF_XOR: b2 = 0x31; break;
+ }
+ if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64)
+@@ -646,6 +667,16 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ARSH | BPF_X:
+
++ /* If blinding is enabled, each
++ * BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW instruction
++ * is converted to 4 eBPF instructions with
++ * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32)
++ * always present(number 3). Detect such cases
++ * and insert memory barriers. */
++ if ((BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64)
++ && (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_LSH)
++ && (src_reg == BPF_REG_AX))
++ emit_memory_barrier(&prog);
+ /* check for bad case when dst_reg == rcx */
+ if (dst_reg == BPF_REG_4) {
+ /* mov r11, dst_reg */
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:46 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] uvcvideo: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 65d4588b16395360695525add0ca79fa6ba04fa5)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
+index 3e7e283a44a8..fcedd1798e9d 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
++++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
+@@ -821,6 +821,7 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_enum_input(struct file *file, void *fh,
+ }
+ pin = iterm->id;
+ } else if (index < selector->bNrInPins) {
++ gmb();
+ pin = selector->baSourceID[index];
+ list_for_each_entry(iterm, &chain->entities, chain) {
+ if (!UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(iterm))
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:47 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] carl9170: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dc218eba4fe8241ab073be41a068f6796450c6d0)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c
+index 988c8857d78c..7e2c1c870a1d 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c
+@@ -1388,6 +1388,7 @@ static int carl9170_op_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+
+ mutex_lock(&ar->mutex);
+ if (queue < ar->hw->queues) {
++ gmb();
+ memcpy(&ar->edcf[ar9170_qmap[queue]], param, sizeof(*param));
+ ret = carl9170_set_qos(ar);
+ } else {
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:48 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] p54: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 57b537e161bb9d44475a05b2b12d64bfb50319d3)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c
+index d5a3bf91a03e..7e6af1f67960 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/main.c
+@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ static int p54_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex);
+ if (queue < dev->queues) {
++ gmb();
+ P54_SET_QUEUE(priv->qos_params[queue], params->aifs,
+ params->cw_min, params->cw_max, params->txop);
+ ret = p54_set_edcf(priv);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:49 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] qla2xxx: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d71318e5f16371dbc0e89a786336a521551f8946)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c
+index 10b742d27e16..ca923d8803f9 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c
++++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c
+@@ -2304,10 +2304,12 @@ qlafx00_status_entry(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct rsp_que *rsp, void *pkt)
+ req = ha->req_q_map[que];
+
+ /* Validate handle. */
+- if (handle < req->num_outstanding_cmds)
++ if (handle < req->num_outstanding_cmds) {
++ gmb();
+ sp = req->outstanding_cmds[handle];
+- else
++ } else {
+ sp = NULL;
++ }
+
+ if (sp == NULL) {
+ ql_dbg(ql_dbg_io, vha, 0x3034,
+@@ -2655,10 +2657,12 @@ qlafx00_multistatus_entry(struct scsi_qla_host *vha,
+ req = ha->req_q_map[que];
+
+ /* Validate handle. */
+- if (handle < req->num_outstanding_cmds)
++ if (handle < req->num_outstanding_cmds) {
++ gmb();
+ sp = req->outstanding_cmds[handle];
+- else
++ } else {
+ sp = NULL;
++ }
+
+ if (sp == NULL) {
+ ql_dbg(ql_dbg_io, vha, 0x3044,
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:50 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] cw1200: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 30770297508b781f2c1e82c52f793bc4d2cb2356)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
+index a52224836a2b..bbff06a4263e 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
+@@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ int cw1200_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+ mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex);
+
+ if (queue < dev->queues) {
++ gmb();
+ old_uapsd_flags = le16_to_cpu(priv->uapsd_info.uapsd_flags);
+
+ WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(&priv->tx_queue_params, queue, 0, 0, 0);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:51 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Thermal/int340x: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3904f4cadeeaa9370f0635eb2f66194ca238325b)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c
+index 145a5c53ff5c..4f9917ef3c11 100644
+--- a/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c
++++ b/drivers/thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c
+@@ -57,15 +57,16 @@ static int int340x_thermal_get_trip_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *zone,
+ if (d->override_ops && d->override_ops->get_trip_temp)
+ return d->override_ops->get_trip_temp(zone, trip, temp);
+
+- if (trip < d->aux_trip_nr)
++ if (trip < d->aux_trip_nr) {
++ gmb();
+ *temp = d->aux_trips[trip];
+- else if (trip == d->crt_trip_id)
++ } else if (trip == d->crt_trip_id) {
+ *temp = d->crt_temp;
+- else if (trip == d->psv_trip_id)
++ } else if (trip == d->psv_trip_id) {
+ *temp = d->psv_temp;
+- else if (trip == d->hot_trip_id)
++ } else if (trip == d->hot_trip_id) {
+ *temp = d->hot_temp;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < INT340X_THERMAL_MAX_ACT_TRIP_COUNT; i++) {
+ if (d->act_trips[i].valid &&
+ d->act_trips[i].id == trip) {
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:52 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] userns: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1410678db6238e625775f7108c68a9e5b8d439a1)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+index 4eacf186f5bc..684cc69d431c 100644
+--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
++++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+@@ -549,8 +549,10 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos,
+ struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;
+ loff_t pos = *ppos;
+
+- if (pos < map->nr_extents)
++ if (pos < map->nr_extents) {
++ gmb();
+ extent = &map->extent[pos];
++ }
+
+ return extent;
+ }
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:53 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] ipv6: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fdb98114a31aa5c0083bd7cd5b42ea569b6f77dc)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ net/ipv6/raw.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
+index 60be012fe708..1a0eae661512 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
+@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
+ if (offset < rfv->hlen) {
+ int copy = min(rfv->hlen - offset, len);
+
++ gmb();
+ if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
+ memcpy(to, rfv->c + offset, copy);
+ else
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:54 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] fs: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1ca9e14b253a501f055c3ea29d992c028473676e)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ include/linux/fdtable.h | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
+index 6e84b2cae6ad..09b124542bb8 100644
+--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
++++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
+@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i
+ {
+ struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
+
+- if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
++ if (fd < fdt->max_fds) {
++ gmb();
+ return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
++ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:55 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] net: mpls: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 98a9550398f87c5430d5e893104e21caa1e2e8d3)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
+index ea4f481839dd..08dfb99e19f2 100644
+--- a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
++++ b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ static struct mpls_route *mpls_route_input_rcu(struct net *net, unsigned index)
+ if (index < net->mpls.platform_labels) {
+ struct mpls_route __rcu **platform_label =
+ rcu_dereference(net->mpls.platform_label);
++
++ gmb();
+ rt = rcu_dereference(platform_label[index]);
+ }
+ return rt;
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 13:11:56 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] udf: prevent speculative execution
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Real commit text tbd
+
+Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f575840dd363aa80a14faacddf90b95db1185e2c)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ fs/udf/misc.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fs/udf/misc.c b/fs/udf/misc.c
+index 3949c4bec3a3..4bd10b2e8540 100644
+--- a/fs/udf/misc.c
++++ b/fs/udf/misc.c
+@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ struct genericFormat *udf_add_extendedattr(struct inode *inode, uint32_t size,
+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr) {
+ uint32_t aal =
+ le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation);
++
++ gmb();
+ memmove(&ea[offset - aal + size],
+ &ea[aal], offset - aal);
+ offset -= aal;
+@@ -114,6 +116,8 @@ struct genericFormat *udf_add_extendedattr(struct inode *inode, uint32_t size,
+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr) {
+ uint32_t ial =
+ le32_to_cpu(eahd->impAttrLocation);
++
++ gmb();
+ memmove(&ea[offset - ial + size],
+ &ea[ial], offset - ial);
+ offset -= ial;
+@@ -125,6 +129,8 @@ struct genericFormat *udf_add_extendedattr(struct inode *inode, uint32_t size,
+ iinfo->i_lenEAttr) {
+ uint32_t aal =
+ le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation);
++
++ gmb();
+ memmove(&ea[offset - aal + size],
+ &ea[aal], offset - aal);
+ offset -= aal;
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 09:34:41 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/feature: Enable the x86 feature to control Speculation
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+cpuid ax=0x7, return rdx bit 26 to indicate presence of this feature
+IA32_SPEC_CTRL (0x48) and IA32_PRED_CMD (0x49)
+IA32_SPEC_CTRL, bit0 – Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
+IA32_PRED_CMD, bit0 – Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f1f160a92b70c25d6e6e76788463bbec86a73313)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
+ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++++
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+index 3928050b51b0..44be8fd069bf 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@
+ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+
+ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
++#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+19) /* Control Speculation Control */
+
+ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+index db88b7f852b4..4e3438a00a50 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
+ #define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e
+ #define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f
+
++#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048
++#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049
++
+ #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
+ #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
+ #define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
+@@ -437,6 +440,8 @@
+ #define FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX (1<<1)
+ #define FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX (1<<2)
+ #define FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE (1<<20)
++#define FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS (1<<0)
++#define FEATURE_SET_IBPB (1<<0)
+
+ #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE 0x0000001b
+ #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP (1<<8)
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+index 23c23508c012..9651ea395812 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
+ { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, CPUID_EBX, 25, 0x00000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CPUID_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 },
++ { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 26, 0x00000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 },
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2017 12:09:14 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/feature: Report presence of IBPB and IBRS control
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Report presence of IBPB and IBRS.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c41156d893e7f48bebf8d71cfddd39d8fb2724f8)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+index dfa90a3a5145..f1d94c73625a 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+@@ -627,6 +627,11 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ init_intel_energy_perf(c);
+
+ init_intel_misc_features(c);
++
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
++ else
++ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Not Present\n");
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2017 18:04:53 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/enter: MACROS to set/clear IBRS and set IBPB
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Setup macros to control IBRS and IBPB
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 171d754fe3b783d361555cf2569e68a7b0e0d54a)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..7f8bb09b6acb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++#ifndef _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H
++#define _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H
++
++#include <linux/stringify.h>
++#include <asm/msr-index.h>
++#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
++#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
++
++#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
++
++#define __ASM_ENABLE_IBRS \
++ pushq %rax; \
++ pushq %rcx; \
++ pushq %rdx; \
++ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx; \
++ movl $0, %edx; \
++ movl $FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS, %eax; \
++ wrmsr; \
++ popq %rdx; \
++ popq %rcx; \
++ popq %rax
++#define __ASM_ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER \
++ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx; \
++ movl $0, %edx; \
++ movl $FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS, %eax; \
++ wrmsr;
++#define __ASM_DISABLE_IBRS \
++ pushq %rax; \
++ pushq %rcx; \
++ pushq %rdx; \
++ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx; \
++ movl $0, %edx; \
++ movl $0, %eax; \
++ wrmsr; \
++ popq %rdx; \
++ popq %rcx; \
++ popq %rax
++
++.macro ENABLE_IBRS
++ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_ENABLE_IBRS), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
++.endm
++
++.macro ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
++ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
++.endm
++
++.macro DISABLE_IBRS
++ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_DISABLE_IBRS), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
++.endm
++
++#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
++#endif /* _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H */
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 14:25:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Set IBRS upon kernel entrance via syscall and interrupts. Clear it upon exit.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d7eb5f9ed26dbdc39df793491bdcc9f80d41325e)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+index b48f2c78a9bf..5f898c3c1dad 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
+ #include <asm/export.h>
+ #include <asm/frame.h>
++#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+
+ #include "calling.h"
+@@ -235,6 +236,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
+ sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS extra=0
+
++ ENABLE_IBRS
++
+ /*
+ * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do
+ * exit work, go straight to the slow path.
+@@ -286,6 +289,7 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
+ TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
+ movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx
+ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11
++ DISABLE_IBRS
+ addq $6*8, %rsp /* skip extra regs -- they were preserved */
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ jmp .Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret
+@@ -379,6 +383,8 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64:
+ * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
+ */
+ syscall_return_via_sysret:
++ DISABLE_IBRS
++
+ /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ POP_EXTRA_REGS
+@@ -660,6 +666,10 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
+ /*
+ * IRQ from user mode.
+ *
++ */
++ ENABLE_IBRS
++
++ /*
+ * We need to tell lockdep that IRQs are off. We can't do this until
+ * we fix gsbase, and we should do it before enter_from_user_mode
+ * (which can take locks). Since TRACE_IRQS_OFF idempotent,
+@@ -743,7 +753,7 @@ GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+ * We are on the trampoline stack. All regs except RDI are live.
+ * We can do future final exit work right here.
+ */
+-
++ DISABLE_IBRS
+ SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi
+
+ /* Restore RDI. */
+@@ -1277,6 +1287,7 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
+
+ 1:
+ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
++ ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
+
+ ret
+ END(paranoid_entry)
+@@ -1331,6 +1342,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+
++ ENABLE_IBRS
++
+ .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
+ /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
+ popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
+@@ -1377,6 +1390,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ */
+ SWAPGS
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
++ ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
+ jmp .Lerror_entry_done
+
+ .Lbstep_iret:
+@@ -1391,6 +1405,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ */
+ SWAPGS
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
++ ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
+
+ /*
+ * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
+@@ -1518,6 +1533,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+
++ ENABLE_IBRS
+ /*
+ * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
+ * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+index 2b5e7685823c..ee4f3edb3c50 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <asm/irqflags.h>
+ #include <asm/asm.h>
+ #include <asm/smap.h>
++#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+
+@@ -95,6 +96,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
+ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
+ cld
+
++ ENABLE_IBRS
++
+ /*
+ * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
+ * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
+@@ -194,6 +197,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
+
+ /* Use %rsp as scratch reg. User ESP is stashed in r8 */
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
++ ENABLE_IBRS
+
+ /* Switch to the kernel stack */
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+@@ -249,6 +253,7 @@ sysret32_from_system_call:
+ popq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
+ popq %rdi /* pt_regs->di */
+
++ DISABLE_IBRS
+ /*
+ * USERGS_SYSRET32 does:
+ * GSBASE = user's GS base
+@@ -348,6 +353,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
+ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
+ cld
+
++ ENABLE_IBRS
++
+ /*
+ * User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and the interrupt
+ * gate turned them off.
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 18:19:14 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/idle: Disable IBRS entering idle and enable it on wakeup
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Clear IBRS on idle entry and set it on idle exit into kernel on mwait.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5521b04afda1d683c1ebad6c25c2529a88e6f061)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h | 8 ++++++++
+ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+index bda3c27f0da0..f15120ada161 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
+ #include <linux/sched/idle.h>
+
+ #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
++#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
++#include <asm/microcode.h>
+
+ #define MWAIT_SUBSTATE_MASK 0xf
+ #define MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK 0xf
+@@ -105,9 +107,15 @@ static inline void mwait_idle_with_hints(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
+ mb();
+ }
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
++
+ __monitor((void *)¤t_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0);
+ if (!need_resched())
+ __mwait(eax, ecx);
++
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ }
+ current_clr_polling();
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+index 07e6218ad7d9..3adb3806a284 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+@@ -447,11 +447,19 @@ static __cpuidle void mwait_idle(void)
+ mb(); /* quirk */
+ }
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
++
+ __monitor((void *)¤t_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0);
+- if (!need_resched())
++ if (!need_resched()) {
+ __sti_mwait(0, 0);
+- else
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
++ } else {
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ local_irq_enable();
++ }
+ trace_cpu_idle_rcuidle(PWR_EVENT_EXIT, smp_processor_id());
+ } else {
+ local_irq_enable();
+diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+index cf2ac227c2ac..b088463973e4 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # include <asm/smp.h>
+ #endif
+
++#define IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD 1000
++
+ /* simple loop based delay: */
+ static void delay_loop(unsigned long loops)
+ {
+@@ -105,6 +107,10 @@ static void delay_mwaitx(unsigned long __loops)
+ for (;;) {
+ delay = min_t(u64, MWAITX_MAX_LOOPS, loops);
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
++ (delay > IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
++
+ /*
+ * Use cpu_tss_rw as a cacheline-aligned, seldomly
+ * accessed per-cpu variable as the monitor target.
+@@ -118,6 +124,10 @@ static void delay_mwaitx(unsigned long __loops)
+ */
+ __mwaitx(MWAITX_DISABLE_CSTATES, delay, MWAITX_ECX_TIMER_ENABLE);
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
++ (delay > IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
++
+ end = rdtsc_ordered();
+
+ if (loops <= end - start)
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 12:24:19 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/idle: Disable IBRS when offlining cpu and re-enable on
+ wakeup
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Clear IBRS when cpu is offlined and set it when brining it back online.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9bcf662c1690880b2464fe99d0f58dce53c0d89f)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+index 398e8324fea4..a652bff7add4 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
+ #include <asm/i8259.h>
+ #include <asm/realmode.h>
+ #include <asm/misc.h>
++#include <asm/microcode.h>
+
+ /* Number of siblings per CPU package */
+ int smp_num_siblings = 1;
+@@ -1692,9 +1693,15 @@ void native_play_dead(void)
+ play_dead_common();
+ tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_WFS);
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
++
+ mwait_play_dead(); /* Only returns on failure */
+ if (cpuidle_play_dead())
+ hlt_play_dead();
++
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ }
+
+ #else /* ... !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 12:56:29 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/mm: Set IBPB upon context switch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Set IBPB on context switch with changing of page table.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a3320203792b633fb96df5d0bbfb7036129b78e2)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+index 06f3854d0a4f..bb3ded3a4e5f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #include <asm/cache.h>
+ #include <asm/apic.h>
+ #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
++#include <asm/microcode.h>
+ #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+
+ /*
+@@ -218,6 +219,9 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
+ u16 new_asid;
+ bool need_flush;
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
++
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
+ /*
+ * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 13:52:42 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/mm: Only set IBPB when the new thread cannot ptrace
+ current thread
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+To reduce overhead of setting IBPB, we only do that when
+the new thread cannot ptrace the current one. If the new
+thread has ptrace capability on current thread, it is safe.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 65941af723059ffeeca269b99ab51b3c9e320751)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ include/linux/ptrace.h | 6 ++++++
+ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 5 ++++-
+ kernel/ptrace.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
+index 0e5fcc11b1b8..d6afefd5465b 100644
+--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
++++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
+@@ -63,12 +63,15 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10
++#define PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK 0x20
+
+ /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+ #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
++#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT \
++ | PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
+
+ /**
+ * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
+@@ -86,6 +89,9 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
+ */
+ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+
++extern int ___ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *cur, struct task_struct *task,
++ unsigned int mode);
++
+ static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
+ {
+ return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+index bb3ded3a4e5f..301e6efbc514 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/export.h>
+ #include <linux/cpu.h>
++#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -219,7 +220,9 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
+ u16 new_asid;
+ bool need_flush;
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ /* Null tsk means switching to kernel, so that's safe */
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) && tsk &&
++ ___ptrace_may_access(tsk, current, PTRACE_MODE_IBPB))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
+diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
+index 60f356d91060..f2f0f1aeabaf 100644
+--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
++++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
+@@ -268,9 +268,10 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+ }
+
+ /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
+-static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
++int ___ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *cur, struct task_struct *task,
++ unsigned int mode)
+ {
+- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
++ const struct cred *cred = __task_cred(cur), *tcred;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ kuid_t caller_uid;
+ kgid_t caller_gid;
+@@ -290,7 +291,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+ */
+
+ /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
+- if (same_thread_group(task, current))
++ if (same_thread_group(task, cur))
+ return 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) {
+@@ -328,7 +329,16 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+- return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
++ if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK))
++ return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(___ptrace_may_access);
++
++static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
++{
++ return ___ptrace_may_access(current, task, mode);
+ }
+
+ bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 17:16:30 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Stuff RSB for entry to kernel for non-SMEP
+ platform
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Stuff RSB to prevent RSB underflow on non-SMEP platform.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b82785ac1d33ce219c77d72b7bd80a21e1441ac8)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 18 ++++++++--
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 4 +++
+ 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+index 7f8bb09b6acb..55ee1f36bda2 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+@@ -35,6 +35,73 @@
+ popq %rdx; \
+ popq %rcx; \
+ popq %rax
++#define __ASM_STUFF_RSB \
++ call 1f; \
++ pause; \
++1: call 2f; \
++ pause; \
++2: call 3f; \
++ pause; \
++3: call 4f; \
++ pause; \
++4: call 5f; \
++ pause; \
++5: call 6f; \
++ pause; \
++6: call 7f; \
++ pause; \
++7: call 8f; \
++ pause; \
++8: call 9f; \
++ pause; \
++9: call 10f; \
++ pause; \
++10: call 11f; \
++ pause; \
++11: call 12f; \
++ pause; \
++12: call 13f; \
++ pause; \
++13: call 14f; \
++ pause; \
++14: call 15f; \
++ pause; \
++15: call 16f; \
++ pause; \
++16: call 17f; \
++ pause; \
++17: call 18f; \
++ pause; \
++18: call 19f; \
++ pause; \
++19: call 20f; \
++ pause; \
++20: call 21f; \
++ pause; \
++21: call 22f; \
++ pause; \
++22: call 23f; \
++ pause; \
++23: call 24f; \
++ pause; \
++24: call 25f; \
++ pause; \
++25: call 26f; \
++ pause; \
++26: call 27f; \
++ pause; \
++27: call 28f; \
++ pause; \
++28: call 29f; \
++ pause; \
++29: call 30f; \
++ pause; \
++30: call 31f; \
++ pause; \
++31: call 32f; \
++ pause; \
++32: \
++ add $(32*8), %rsp;
+
+ .macro ENABLE_IBRS
+ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_ENABLE_IBRS), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
+@@ -48,5 +115,9 @@ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
+ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_DISABLE_IBRS), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
+ .endm
+
++.macro STUFF_RSB
++ALTERNATIVE __stringify(__ASM_STUFF_RSB), "", X86_FEATURE_SMEP
++.endm
++
+ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+index 5f898c3c1dad..f6ec4ad5b114 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+@@ -214,8 +214,6 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64)
+ movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+
+- TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+-
+ /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
+ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
+ pushq PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch) /* pt_regs->sp */
+@@ -238,6 +236,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
+
+ ENABLE_IBRS
+
++ STUFF_RSB
++
++ TRACE_IRQS_OFF
++
+ /*
+ * If we need to do entry work or if we guess we'll need to do
+ * exit work, go straight to the slow path.
+@@ -658,6 +660,13 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
+ ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
+ SAVE_C_REGS
+ SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
++
++ /*
++ * Have to do stuffing before encoding frame pointer.
++ * Could add some unnecessary RSB clearing if coming
++ * from kernel for non-SMEP platform.
++ */
++ STUFF_RSB
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+
+ testb $3, CS(%rsp)
+@@ -1276,6 +1285,10 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
+ cld
+ SAVE_C_REGS 8
+ SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
++ /*
++ * Do the stuffing unconditionally from user/kernel to be safe
++ */
++ STUFF_RSB
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
+ movl $1, %ebx
+ movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
+@@ -1329,6 +1342,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ cld
+ SAVE_C_REGS 8
+ SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
++ STUFF_RSB
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx
+ testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+index ee4f3edb3c50..1480222bae02 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
+ cld
+
+ ENABLE_IBRS
++ STUFF_RSB
+
+ /*
+ * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
+@@ -227,6 +228,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
+ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */
+ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
+
++ STUFF_RSB
++
+ /*
+ * User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and SYSENTER
+ * turned them off.
+@@ -354,6 +357,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
+ cld
+
+ ENABLE_IBRS
++ STUFF_RSB
+
+ /*
+ * User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and the interrupt
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 16:47:53 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/kvm: add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD to kvm
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Add field to access guest MSR_IA332_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD state.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 15eb187f47ee2be44d34313bc89cfb719d82cb21)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+index b69af3df978a..1953c0a5b972 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+@@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
+ u64 mcg_ext_ctl;
+ u64 *mce_banks;
+
++ u64 spec_ctrl;
++
+ /* Cache MMIO info */
+ u64 mmio_gva;
+ unsigned access;
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+index 9b4256fd589a..daff9962c90a 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include <asm/apic.h>
+ #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
++#include <asm/microcode.h>
+
+ #include "trace.h"
+ #include "pmu.h"
+@@ -3247,6 +3248,9 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC:
+ msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
+ break;
++ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
++ msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl;
++ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
+ break;
+@@ -3351,6 +3355,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC:
+ kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
+ break;
++ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
++ vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl = msr_info->data;
++ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+ if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+ if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
+@@ -6146,6 +6153,7 @@ static int handle_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+
+ msr_info.index = ecx;
+ msr_info.host_initiated = false;
++
+ if (vmx_get_msr(vcpu, &msr_info)) {
+ trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(ecx);
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+@@ -6699,6 +6707,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false);
++ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, false);
++ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, false);
+
+ memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv,
+ vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+index 703cd4171921..eae4aecf3cfe 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
+ MSR_CSTAR, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR,
+ #endif
+ MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
+- MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
++ MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ };
+
+ static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 14:31:46 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/kvm: Set IBPB when switching VM
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Set IBPB (Indirect branch prediction barrier) when switching VM.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 665076ad780e8620505c742cfcb4b0f3fb99324a)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+index daff9962c90a..8df195bbb41d 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -1488,6 +1488,7 @@ static void vmcs_load(struct vmcs *vmcs)
+ if (error)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: vmptrld %p/%llx failed\n",
+ vmcs, phys_addr);
++
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+@@ -2268,6 +2269,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+ if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
+ per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+ vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+ }
+
+ if (!already_loaded) {
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 17:04:35 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/kvm: Toggle IBRS on VM entry and exit
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Restore guest IBRS on VM entry and set it to 1 on VM exit
+back to kernel.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3dc28210342f174270bcefac74ef5d0b52ffd846)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+index 8df195bbb41d..57d538fc7c75 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -9101,6 +9101,11 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ __write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
+
+ atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
++
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
++ vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
++
+ debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
+
+ vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 17:05:54 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/kvm: Pad RSB on VM transition
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Add code to pad the local CPU's RSB entries to protect
+from previous less privilege mode.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5369368d3520addb2ffb2413cfa7e8f3efe2e31d)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +
+ 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+index 1953c0a5b972..4117a97228a2 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,109 @@ static inline gfn_t gfn_to_index(gfn_t gfn, gfn_t base_gfn, int level)
+
+ #define ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU 64
+
++static inline void stuff_RSB(void)
++{
++ __asm__ __volatile__(" \n\
++ call .label1 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label1: \n\
++ call .label2 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label2: \n\
++ call .label3 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label3: \n\
++ call .label4 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label4: \n\
++ call .label5 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label5: \n\
++ call .label6 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label6: \n\
++ call .label7 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label7: \n\
++ call .label8 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label8: \n\
++ call .label9 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label9: \n\
++ call .label10 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label10: \n\
++ call .label11 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label11: \n\
++ call .label12 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label12: \n\
++ call .label13 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label13: \n\
++ call .label14 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label14: \n\
++ call .label15 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label15: \n\
++ call .label16 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label16: \n\
++ call .label17 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label17: \n\
++ call .label18 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label18: \n\
++ call .label19 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label19: \n\
++ call .label20 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label20: \n\
++ call .label21 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label21: \n\
++ call .label22 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label22: \n\
++ call .label23 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label23: \n\
++ call .label24 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label24: \n\
++ call .label25 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label25: \n\
++ call .label26 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label26: \n\
++ call .label27 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label27: \n\
++ call .label28 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label28: \n\
++ call .label29 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label29: \n\
++ call .label30 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label30: \n\
++ call .label31 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label31: \n\
++ call .label32 \n\
++ pause \n\
++.label32: \n\
++ add $(32*8), %%rsp \n\
++": : :"memory");
++}
++
+ enum kvm_reg {
+ VCPU_REGS_RAX = 0,
+ VCPU_REGS_RCX = 1,
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+index 57d538fc7c75..496884b6467f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -9228,6 +9228,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ #endif
+ );
+
++ stuff_RSB();
++
+ /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
+ if (debugctlmsr)
+ update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim@otc-grantley-02.jf.intel.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2017 04:47:48 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable SPEC_CTRL
+ feature
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+There are 2 ways to control IBPB and IBRS
+
+1. At boot time
+ noibrs kernel boot parameter will disable IBRS usage
+ noibpb kernel boot parameter will disable IBPB usage
+Otherwise if the above parameters are not specified, the system
+will enable ibrs and ibpb usage if the cpu supports it.
+
+2. At run time
+ echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled will turn off IBRS
+ echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled will turn on IBRS in kernel
+ echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled will turn on IBRS in both userspace and kernel
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+[marcelo.cerri@canonical.com: add x86 guards to kernel/smp.c]
+[marcelo.cerri@canonical.com: include asm/msr.h under x86 guard in kernel/sysctl.c]
+Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 23225db7b02c7f8b94e5d5050987430089e6f7cc)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 ++
+ arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h | 4 +-
+ arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 24 ++++-
+ include/linux/smp.h | 87 +++++++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 11 ++-
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 11 +++
+ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 6 +-
+ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 4 +-
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +-
+ arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 6 +-
+ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +-
+ kernel/smp.c | 41 ++++++++
+ kernel/sysctl.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 13 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+index 1a6ebc6cdf26..e7216bc05b3b 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -2566,6 +2566,16 @@
+ noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
+ noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
+
++ noibrs [X86]
++ Don't use indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
++ feature when running in secure environment,
++ to avoid performance overhead.
++
++ noibpb [X86]
++ Don't use indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB)
++ feature when running in secure environment,
++ to avoid performance overhead.
++
+ nosmap [X86]
+ Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
+ even if it is supported by processor.
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+index f15120ada161..d665daab3f84 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+@@ -107,14 +107,14 @@ static inline void mwait_idle_with_hints(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
+ mb();
+ }
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
+ __monitor((void *)¤t_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0);
+ if (!need_resched())
+ __mwait(eax, ecx);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ }
+ current_clr_polling();
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+index 55ee1f36bda2..4c69e51261cc 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
+
+ #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
++.extern use_ibrs
++.extern use_ibpb
++
+ #define __ASM_ENABLE_IBRS \
+ pushq %rax; \
+ pushq %rcx; \
+@@ -104,15 +107,30 @@
+ add $(32*8), %rsp;
+
+ .macro ENABLE_IBRS
+-ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_ENABLE_IBRS), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
++ testl $1, use_ibrs
++ jz 10f
++ __ASM_ENABLE_IBRS
++ jmp 20f
++10:
++ lfence
++20:
+ .endm
+
+ .macro ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
+-ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
++ testl $1, use_ibrs
++ jz 11f
++ __ASM_ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
++ jmp 21f
++11:
++ lfence
++21:
+ .endm
+
+ .macro DISABLE_IBRS
+-ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(__ASM_DISABLE_IBRS), X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
++ testl $1, use_ibrs
++ jz 9f
++ __ASM_DISABLE_IBRS
++9:
+ .endm
+
+ .macro STUFF_RSB
+diff --git a/include/linux/smp.h b/include/linux/smp.h
+index 68123c1fe549..e2935c0a1bb4 100644
+--- a/include/linux/smp.h
++++ b/include/linux/smp.h
+@@ -50,6 +50,93 @@ void on_each_cpu_cond(bool (*cond_func)(int cpu, void *info),
+
+ int smp_call_function_single_async(int cpu, struct call_single_data *csd);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++/* indicate usage of IBRS to control execution speculation */
++extern int use_ibrs;
++extern u32 sysctl_ibrs_enabled;
++extern struct mutex spec_ctrl_mutex;
++#define ibrs_supported (use_ibrs & 0x2)
++#define ibrs_disabled (use_ibrs & 0x4)
++static inline void set_ibrs_inuse(void)
++{
++ if (ibrs_supported)
++ use_ibrs |= 0x1;
++}
++static inline void clear_ibrs_inuse(void)
++{
++ use_ibrs &= ~0x1;
++}
++static inline int check_ibrs_inuse(void)
++{
++ if (use_ibrs & 0x1)
++ return 1;
++ else
++ /* rmb to prevent wrong speculation for security */
++ rmb();
++ return 0;
++}
++static inline void set_ibrs_supported(void)
++{
++ use_ibrs |= 0x2;
++ if (!ibrs_disabled)
++ set_ibrs_inuse();
++}
++static inline void set_ibrs_disabled(void)
++{
++ use_ibrs |= 0x4;
++ if (check_ibrs_inuse())
++ clear_ibrs_inuse();
++}
++static inline void clear_ibrs_disabled(void)
++{
++ use_ibrs &= ~0x4;
++ set_ibrs_inuse();
++}
++#define ibrs_inuse (check_ibrs_inuse())
++
++/* indicate usage of IBPB to control execution speculation */
++extern int use_ibpb;
++extern u32 sysctl_ibpb_enabled;
++#define ibpb_supported (use_ibpb & 0x2)
++#define ibpb_disabled (use_ibpb & 0x4)
++static inline void set_ibpb_inuse(void)
++{
++ if (ibpb_supported)
++ use_ibpb |= 0x1;
++}
++static inline void clear_ibpb_inuse(void)
++{
++ use_ibpb &= ~0x1;
++}
++static inline int check_ibpb_inuse(void)
++{
++ if (use_ibpb & 0x1)
++ return 1;
++ else
++ /* rmb to prevent wrong speculation for security */
++ rmb();
++ return 0;
++}
++static inline void set_ibpb_supported(void)
++{
++ use_ibpb |= 0x2;
++ if (!ibpb_disabled)
++ set_ibpb_inuse();
++}
++static inline void set_ibpb_disabled(void)
++{
++ use_ibpb |= 0x4;
++ if (check_ibpb_inuse())
++ clear_ibpb_inuse();
++}
++static inline void clear_ibpb_disabled(void)
++{
++ use_ibpb &= ~0x4;
++ set_ibpb_inuse();
++}
++#define ibpb_inuse (check_ibpb_inuse())
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+
+ #include <linux/preempt.h>
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+index f1d94c73625a..c69ea2efbed1 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+@@ -628,10 +628,17 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+
+ init_intel_misc_features(c);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
+- else
++ set_ibrs_supported();
++ set_ibpb_supported();
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 1;
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ } else {
+ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Not Present\n");
++ }
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+index c4fa4a85d4cb..6450aeda72fc 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+@@ -535,6 +535,17 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
+ }
+ if (!ret)
+ perf_check_microcode();
++
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
++ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
++ set_ibrs_supported();
++ set_ibpb_supported();
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 1;
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ }
++
+ mutex_unlock(µcode_mutex);
+ put_online_cpus();
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+index 3adb3806a284..3fdf5358998e 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+@@ -447,16 +447,16 @@ static __cpuidle void mwait_idle(void)
+ mb(); /* quirk */
+ }
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
+ __monitor((void *)¤t_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0);
+ if (!need_resched()) {
+ __sti_mwait(0, 0);
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ } else {
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ local_irq_enable();
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+index a652bff7add4..9317aa4a7446 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+@@ -1693,14 +1693,14 @@ void native_play_dead(void)
+ play_dead_common();
+ tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_WFS);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
+ mwait_play_dead(); /* Only returns on failure */
+ if (cpuidle_play_dead())
+ hlt_play_dead();
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+index 496884b6467f..d2168203bddc 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -2269,7 +2269,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+ if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
+ per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+ vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+ }
+
+@@ -9102,7 +9102,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+
+ atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+ vcpu->arch.spec_ctrl, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+index b088463973e4..72a174642550 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+@@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ static void delay_mwaitx(unsigned long __loops)
+ for (;;) {
+ delay = min_t(u64, MWAITX_MAX_LOOPS, loops);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+- (delay > IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD))
++ if (ibrs_inuse && (delay > IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
+ /*
+@@ -124,8 +123,7 @@ static void delay_mwaitx(unsigned long __loops)
+ */
+ __mwaitx(MWAITX_DISABLE_CSTATES, delay, MWAITX_ECX_TIMER_ENABLE);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+- (delay > IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD))
++ if (ibrs_inuse && (delay > IBRS_DISABLE_THRESHOLD))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+
+ end = rdtsc_ordered();
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+index 301e6efbc514..6365f769de3d 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
+ bool need_flush;
+
+ /* Null tsk means switching to kernel, so that's safe */
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) && tsk &&
++ if (ibpb_inuse && tsk &&
+ ___ptrace_may_access(tsk, current, PTRACE_MODE_IBPB))
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+
+diff --git a/kernel/smp.c b/kernel/smp.c
+index 3061483cb3ad..3bece045f4a4 100644
+--- a/kernel/smp.c
++++ b/kernel/smp.c
+@@ -498,6 +498,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(smp_call_function);
+ unsigned int setup_max_cpus = NR_CPUS;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_max_cpus);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++/*
++ * use IBRS
++ * bit 0 = indicate if ibrs is currently in use
++ * bit 1 = indicate if system supports ibrs
++ * bit 2 = indicate if admin disables ibrs
++*/
++
++int use_ibrs;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(use_ibrs);
++
++/*
++ * use IBRS
++ * bit 0 = indicate if ibpb is currently in use
++ * bit 1 = indicate if system supports ibpb
++ * bit 2 = indicate if admin disables ibpb
++*/
++int use_ibpb;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(use_ibpb);
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Setup routine for controlling SMP activation
+@@ -522,6 +542,27 @@ static int __init nosmp(char *str)
+
+ early_param("nosmp", nosmp);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++static int __init noibrs(char *str)
++{
++ set_ibrs_disabled();
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++early_param("noibrs", noibrs);
++
++static int __init noibpb(char *str)
++{
++ set_ibpb_disabled();
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++early_param("noibpb", noibpb);
++#endif
++
++
+ /* this is hard limit */
+ static int __init nrcpus(char *str)
+ {
+diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+index 7ab08d5728e6..69c37bd6251a 100644
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
++#include <asm/msr.h>
+ #include <asm/nmi.h>
+ #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -222,6 +223,15 @@ static int proc_dostring_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++int proc_dointvec_ibrs_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
++int proc_dointvec_ibpb_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
++int proc_dointvec_ibrs_dump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
+ /* Note: sysrq code uses it's own private copy */
+ static int __sysrq_enabled = CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE;
+@@ -258,6 +268,12 @@ extern struct ctl_table epoll_table[];
+ int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
+ #endif
+
++u32 sysctl_ibrs_dump = 0;
++u32 sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 0;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_ibrs_enabled);
++u32 sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 0;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
++
+ /* The default sysctl tables: */
+
+ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = {
+@@ -1241,6 +1257,35 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++ {
++ .procname = "ibrs_enabled",
++ .data = &sysctl_ibrs_enabled,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ibrs_ctrl,
++ .extra1 = &zero,
++ .extra2 = &two,
++ },
++ {
++ .procname = "ibpb_enabled",
++ .data = &sysctl_ibpb_enabled,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ibpb_ctrl,
++ .extra1 = &zero,
++ .extra2 = &one,
++ },
++ {
++ .procname = "ibrs_dump",
++ .data = &sysctl_ibrs_dump,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ibrs_dump,
++ .extra1 = &zero,
++ .extra2 = &one,
++ },
+ #endif
+ { }
+ };
+@@ -2585,6 +2630,86 @@ int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv, ¶m);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++int proc_dointvec_ibrs_dump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++ int ret;
++ unsigned int cpu;
++
++ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++ printk("sysctl_ibrs_enabled = %u, sysctl_ibpb_enabled = %u\n", sysctl_ibrs_enabled, sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
++ printk("use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
++ u64 val;
++
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
++ rdmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &val);
++ else
++ val = 0;
++ printk("read cpu %d ibrs val %lu\n", cpu, (unsigned long) val);
++ }
++ return ret;
++}
++
++int proc_dointvec_ibrs_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++ int ret;
++ unsigned int cpu;
++
++ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++ pr_debug("sysctl_ibrs_enabled = %u, sysctl_ibpb_enabled = %u\n", sysctl_ibrs_enabled, sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
++ pr_debug("before:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ if (sysctl_ibrs_enabled == 0) {
++ /* always set IBRS off */
++ set_ibrs_disabled();
++ if (ibrs_supported) {
++ for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
++ wrmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0x0);
++ }
++ } else if (sysctl_ibrs_enabled == 2) {
++ /* always set IBRS on, even in user space */
++ clear_ibrs_disabled();
++ if (ibrs_supported) {
++ for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
++ wrmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
++ } else {
++ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 0;
++ }
++ } else if (sysctl_ibrs_enabled == 1) {
++ /* use IBRS in kernel */
++ clear_ibrs_disabled();
++ if (!ibrs_inuse)
++ /* platform don't support ibrs */
++ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 0;
++ }
++ pr_debug("after:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ return ret;
++}
++
++int proc_dointvec_ibpb_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++ int ret;
++
++ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++ pr_debug("sysctl_ibrs_enabled = %u, sysctl_ibpb_enabled = %u\n", sysctl_ibrs_enabled, sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
++ pr_debug("before:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ if (sysctl_ibpb_enabled == 0)
++ set_ibpb_disabled();
++ else if (sysctl_ibpb_enabled == 1) {
++ clear_ibpb_disabled();
++ if (!ibpb_inuse)
++ /* platform don't support ibpb */
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 0;
++ }
++ pr_debug("after:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
++
+ struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param {
+ unsigned int *min;
+ unsigned int *max;
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 13:47:54 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/spec_ctrl: Add lock to serialize changes to ibrs and ibpb
+ control
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 85789933bc45a3e763823675bd0d80e3e617f234)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 2 ++
+ kernel/smp.c | 4 ++++
+ kernel/sysctl.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+index c69ea2efbed1..8d558e24783c 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+@@ -628,16 +628,18 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+
+ init_intel_misc_features(c);
+
+- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+- printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
+- set_ibrs_supported();
+- set_ibpb_supported();
+- if (ibrs_inuse)
+- sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 1;
+- if (ibpb_inuse)
+- sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
+- } else {
+- printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Not Present\n");
++ if (!c->cpu_index) {
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
++ printk(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
++ set_ibrs_supported();
++ set_ibpb_supported();
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 1;
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ } else {
++ printk(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Not Present\n");
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+index 6450aeda72fc..55086921d29e 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+@@ -538,12 +538,14 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
++ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ set_ibrs_supported();
+ set_ibpb_supported();
+ if (ibrs_inuse)
+ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 1;
+ if (ibpb_inuse)
+ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(µcode_mutex);
+diff --git a/kernel/smp.c b/kernel/smp.c
+index 3bece045f4a4..a224ec0c540c 100644
+--- a/kernel/smp.c
++++ b/kernel/smp.c
+@@ -519,6 +519,10 @@ int use_ibpb;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(use_ibpb);
+ #endif
+
++/* mutex to serialize IBRS & IBPB control changes */
++DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(spec_ctrl_mutex);
++
+ /*
+ * Setup routine for controlling SMP activation
+ *
+diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+index 69c37bd6251a..47a37792109d 100644
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
++#include <linux/mutex.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+@@ -2634,12 +2635,17 @@ int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ int proc_dointvec_ibrs_dump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+- int ret;
++ int ret, orig_inuse;
+ unsigned int cpu;
+
++
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ printk("sysctl_ibrs_enabled = %u, sysctl_ibpb_enabled = %u\n", sysctl_ibrs_enabled, sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
+ printk("use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
++ orig_inuse = use_ibrs;
++ /* temporary halt to ibrs usage to dump ibrs values */
++ clear_ibrs_inuse();
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ u64 val;
+
+@@ -2649,6 +2655,8 @@ int proc_dointvec_ibrs_dump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ val = 0;
+ printk("read cpu %d ibrs val %lu\n", cpu, (unsigned long) val);
+ }
++ use_ibrs = orig_inuse;
++ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -2661,6 +2669,7 @@ int proc_dointvec_ibrs_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ pr_debug("sysctl_ibrs_enabled = %u, sysctl_ibpb_enabled = %u\n", sysctl_ibrs_enabled, sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
+ pr_debug("before:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ if (sysctl_ibrs_enabled == 0) {
+ /* always set IBRS off */
+ set_ibrs_disabled();
+@@ -2684,6 +2693,7 @@ int proc_dointvec_ibrs_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ /* platform don't support ibrs */
+ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 0;
+ }
++ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ pr_debug("after:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
+ return ret;
+ }
+@@ -2696,6 +2706,7 @@ int proc_dointvec_ibpb_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ pr_debug("sysctl_ibrs_enabled = %u, sysctl_ibpb_enabled = %u\n", sysctl_ibrs_enabled, sysctl_ibpb_enabled);
+ pr_debug("before:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
++ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ if (sysctl_ibpb_enabled == 0)
+ set_ibpb_disabled();
+ else if (sysctl_ibpb_enabled == 1) {
+@@ -2704,6 +2715,7 @@ int proc_dointvec_ibpb_ctrl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ /* platform don't support ibpb */
+ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 0;
+ }
++ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ pr_debug("after:use_ibrs = %d, use_ibpb = %d\n", use_ibrs, use_ibpb);
+ return ret;
+ }
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 15:21:40 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on syscall entrance
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+To prevent the unused registers %r12-%r15, %rbp and %rbx from
+being used speculatively, we clear them upon syscall entrance
+for code hygiene.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7b5ea16f42b5e4860cf9033897bcdfa3e1209033)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 9 +++++++++
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 ++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+index 015e0a84bb99..d537818ad285 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+@@ -155,6 +155,15 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
+ popq %rbx
+ .endm
+
++ .macro CLEAR_EXTRA_REGS
++ xorq %r15, %r15
++ xorq %r14, %r14
++ xorq %r13, %r13
++ xorq %r12, %r12
++ xorq %rbp, %rbp
++ xorq %rbx, %rbx
++ .endm
++
+ .macro POP_C_REGS
+ popq %r11
+ popq %r10
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+index f6ec4ad5b114..1118a6256c69 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+@@ -231,10 +231,16 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
+ pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
+ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
+ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
+- sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not saved */
++ sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp, bx, r12-15 not used */
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS extra=0
+
+ ENABLE_IBRS
++ /*
++ * Clear the unused extra regs for code hygiene.
++ * Will restore the callee saved extra regs at end of syscall.
++ */
++ SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
++ CLEAR_EXTRA_REGS
+
+ STUFF_RSB
+
+@@ -292,7 +298,7 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
+ movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx
+ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11
+ DISABLE_IBRS
+- addq $6*8, %rsp /* skip extra regs -- they were preserved */
++ POP_EXTRA_REGS
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ jmp .Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret
+
+@@ -304,14 +310,12 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
+ */
+ TRACE_IRQS_ON
+ ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
+- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */
+ jmp return_from_SYSCALL_64
+
+ entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path:
+ /* IRQs are off. */
+- SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2017 19:41:24 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/syscall: Clear unused extra registers on 32-bit
+ compatible syscall entrance
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+To prevent the unused registers %r8-%r15, from being used speculatively,
+we clear them upon syscall entrance for code hygiene in 32 bit compatible
+mode.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 725ad2ef81ccceb3e31a7263faae2059d05e2c48)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 11 +++++++++++
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+index d537818ad285..0e34002bc801 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+@@ -155,6 +155,17 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
+ popq %rbx
+ .endm
+
++ .macro CLEAR_R8_TO_R15
++ xorq %r15, %r15
++ xorq %r14, %r14
++ xorq %r13, %r13
++ xorq %r12, %r12
++ xorq %r11, %r11
++ xorq %r10, %r10
++ xorq %r9, %r9
++ xorq %r8, %r8
++ .endm
++
+ .macro CLEAR_EXTRA_REGS
+ xorq %r15, %r15
+ xorq %r14, %r14
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+index 1480222bae02..8d7ae9657375 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
+ ENABLE_IBRS
+ STUFF_RSB
+
++ CLEAR_R8_TO_R15
++
+ /*
+ * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
+ * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
+@@ -223,10 +225,12 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
+ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
+ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
+ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp (will be overwritten) */
+- pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */
+- pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */
+- pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */
+- pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
++ pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
++ pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
++ pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
++ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
++
++ CLEAR_R8_TO_R15
+
+ STUFF_RSB
+
+@@ -245,6 +249,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
+ /* Opportunistic SYSRET */
+ sysret32_from_system_call:
+ TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
++ movq R15(%rsp), %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
++ movq R14(%rsp), %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
++ movq R13(%rsp), %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
++ movq R12(%rsp), %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
+ movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
+ movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
+ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
+@@ -359,6 +367,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
+ ENABLE_IBRS
+ STUFF_RSB
+
++ CLEAR_R8_TO_R15
++
+ /*
+ * User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and the interrupt
+ * gate turned them off.
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 16:30:06 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Use retpoline for syscall's indirect calls
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d2e0236f395e876f5303fb5021e4fe6eea881402)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+index 1118a6256c69..be7196967f9f 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+@@ -276,7 +276,15 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
+ * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX
+ * and all argument registers are clobbered.
+ */
+- call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8)
++ movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %r10
++ jmp 1f
++4: callq 2f
++3: nop
++ jmp 3b
++2: mov %r10, (%rsp)
++ retq
++1: callq 4b
++
+ .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call:
+
+ movq %rax, RAX(%rsp)
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:52:54 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/AMD: Add speculative control support for AMD
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Add speculative control support for AMD processors. For AMD, speculative
+control is indicated as follows:
+
+ CPUID EAX=0x00000007, ECX=0x00 return EDX[26] indicates support for
+ both IBRS and IBPB.
+
+ CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for
+ just IBPB.
+
+On AMD family 0x10, 0x12 and 0x16 processors where either of the above
+features are not supported, IBPB can be achieved by disabling
+indirect branch predictor support in MSR 0xc0011021[14] at boot.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8c3fc9e98177daee2281ed40e3d61f9cf4eee576)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
+ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+index 44be8fd069bf..a97b327137aa 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@
+ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR (13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */
++#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+
+ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+index 4e3438a00a50..954aad6c32f4 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@
+ #define MSR_F15H_NB_PERF_CTR 0xc0010241
+ #define MSR_F15H_PTSC 0xc0010280
+ #define MSR_F15H_IC_CFG 0xc0011021
++#define MSR_F15H_IC_CFG_DIS_IND BIT_ULL(14)
+
+ /* Fam 10h MSRs */
+ #define MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE 0xc0010058
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+index 99eef4a09fd9..42871c1a8da8 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -830,6 +830,45 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
++
++ /* AMD speculative control support */
++ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
++ pr_info_once("FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
++ set_ibrs_supported();
++ set_ibpb_supported();
++ if (ibrs_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibrs_enabled = 1;
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ } else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
++ pr_info_once("FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Not Present\n");
++ pr_info_once("FEATURE IBPB Present\n");
++ set_ibpb_supported();
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ } else {
++ pr_info_once("FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Not Present\n");
++ pr_info_once("FEATURE IBPB Not Present\n");
++ /*
++ * On AMD processors that do not support the speculative
++ * control features, IBPB type support can be achieved by
++ * disabling indirect branch predictor support.
++ */
++ if (!ibpb_disabled) {
++ u64 val;
++
++ switch (c->x86) {
++ case 0x10:
++ case 0x12:
++ case 0x16:
++ pr_info_once("Disabling indirect branch predictor support\n");
++ rdmsrl(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, val);
++ val |= MSR_F15H_IC_CFG_DIS_IND;
++ wrmsrl(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, val);
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ }
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/microcode: Extend post microcode reload to support IBPB
+ feature
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Add an IBPB feature check to the speculative control update check after
+a microcode reload.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 099878acd3738271fb2ade01f4649b1ed2fb72d5)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+index 55086921d29e..638c08350d65 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+@@ -546,6 +546,13 @@ static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
+ if (ibpb_inuse)
+ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
+ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
++ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
++ printk_once(KERN_INFO "FEATURE IBPB Present\n");
++ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
++ set_ibpb_supported();
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ sysctl_ibpb_enabled = 1;
++ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(µcode_mutex);
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept new speculative control MSRs
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Allow guest access to the speculative control MSRs without being
+intercepted.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ccaa77a824fd3e21f0b8ae6b5a66fc1ee7e35b14)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+index 92cd94d51e1f..94adf6becc2e 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
+ { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
+ #endif
++ { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
++ { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/svm: Set IBRS value on VM entry and exit
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Set/restore the guests IBRS value on VM entry. On VM exit back to the
+kernel save the guest IBRS value and then set IBRS to 1.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 72f71e6826fac9a656c3994fb6f979cd65a14c64)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+index 94adf6becc2e..a1b19e810c49 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
+
+ u64 next_rip;
+
++ u64 spec_ctrl;
++
+ u64 host_user_msrs[NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS];
+ struct {
+ u16 fs;
+@@ -3547,6 +3549,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+ case MSR_VM_CR:
+ msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
+ break;
++ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
++ msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
++ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+ msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
+ break;
+@@ -3702,6 +3707,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+ case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
+ vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx, data);
+ break;
++ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
++ svm->spec_ctrl = data;
++ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
+ if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+ avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
+@@ -4883,6 +4891,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+
+ local_irq_enable();
+
++ if (ibrs_inuse && (svm->spec_ctrl != FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS))
++ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
++
+ asm volatile (
+ "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
+ "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
+@@ -4975,6 +4986,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ #endif
+ );
+
++ if (ibrs_inuse) {
++ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
++ if (svm->spec_ctrl != FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS)
++ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
++ }
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
+ #else
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Set IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) when the current CPU is
+going to run a VCPU different from what was previously run.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0ba3eaabbb6666ebd344ee80534e58c375a00810)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+index a1b19e810c49..fade4869856a 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+@@ -518,6 +518,8 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
+ struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
+
+ struct page *save_area;
++
++ struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
+ };
+
+ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
+@@ -1685,11 +1687,19 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
+ kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
+ kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
++
++ /*
++ * The VMCB could be recycled, causing a false negative in svm_vcpu_load;
++ * block speculative execution.
++ */
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+ }
+
+ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+ {
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
++ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ int i;
+
+ if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
+@@ -1718,6 +1728,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
+
++ if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
++ sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
++ if (ibpb_inuse)
++ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
++ }
++
+ avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+ }
+
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Add speculative control CPUID support for guests
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Provide the guest with the speculative control CPUID related values.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit db7641e5f41cd517c4181ce90c4f9ecc93af4b2b)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+index 19adbb418443..f64502d21a89 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
+ /* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */
+ #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2
+ #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3
++#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_SPEC_CTRL 26
+ #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x)
+
+ int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+@@ -387,7 +388,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
+
+ /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
+ const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
+- KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS);
++ KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS) |
++ KF(SPEC_CTRL);
++
++ /* cpuid 0x80000008.0.ebx */
++ const u32 kvm_cpuid_80000008_0_ebx_x86_features =
++ F(IBPB);
+
+ /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
+ get_cpu();
+@@ -622,7 +628,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
+ if (!g_phys_as)
+ g_phys_as = phys_as;
+ entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
+- entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0;
++ entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_80000008_0_ebx_x86_features;
++ cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
++ entry->edx = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ case 0x80000019:
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/svm: Add code to clobber the RSB on VM exit
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Add code to overwrite the local CPU RSB entries from the previous less
+privileged mode.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9392e24469b71ff665cdbc3d81db215f9383219d)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+index fade4869856a..e99bdfcc6b01 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+@@ -5008,6 +5008,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
+ }
+
++ stuff_RSB();
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
+ #else
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 10:55:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove now unused definition of MFENCE_RDTSC
+ feature
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+With the switch to using LFENCE_RDTSC on AMD platforms there is no longer
+a need for the MFENCE_RDTSC feature. Remove it usage and definition.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6e6c998937329e9d13d4b239233cd058e8a7730f)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 +--
+ arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +--
+ arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 3 ---
+ 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+index aae78054cae2..d00432579444 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@
+ #define wmb() asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")
+ #endif
+
+-#define gmb() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
+- "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
++#define gmb() alternative("", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
+ #define dma_rmb() rmb()
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+index 898dba2e2e2c..3139098269f6 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+@@ -213,8 +213,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void)
+ * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a
+ * time stamp.
+ */
+- alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC,
+- "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
++ alternative("", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ return rdtsc();
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+index 879dbfefb66d..e20e304320f9 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
++++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+@@ -116,9 +116,6 @@ static void emit_memory_barrier(u8 **pprog)
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
+ /* x86 LFENCE opcode 0F AE E8 */
+ EMIT3(0x0f, 0xae, 0xe8);
+- else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC))
+- /* AMD MFENCE opcode 0F AE F0 */
+- EMIT3(0x0f, 0xae, 0xf0);
+ else
+ /* we should never end up here,
+ * but if we do, better not to emit anything*/
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Grant <wgrant@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 17:05:42 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/kvm: Fix stuff_RSB() for 32-bit
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5753
+CVE-2017-5715
+
+Signed-off-by: William Grant <wgrant@ubuntu.com>
+Acked-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 306dada4f850bf537dbd8ff06cf1522074b3f327)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+index 4117a97228a2..f39bc68efa56 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+@@ -223,9 +223,13 @@ static inline void stuff_RSB(void)
+ .label31: \n\
+ call .label32 \n\
+ pause \n\
+-.label32: \n\
+- add $(32*8), %%rsp \n\
+-": : :"memory");
++.label32: \n"
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
++" add $(32*8), %%rsp \n"
++#else
++" add $(32*4), %%esp \n"
++#endif
++: : :"memory");
+ }
+
+ enum kvm_reg {
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 15:18:44 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pti: Enable PTI by default
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2017-5754
+
+This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are
+doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line.
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+(cherry picked from commit 87faa0d9b43b4755ff6963a22d1fd1bee1aa3b39)
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 436cdbfed2112bea7943f4a0f6dfabf54088c8c6)
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ security/Kconfig | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
+index 91cb8f611a0d..529dccc22ce5 100644
+--- a/security/Kconfig
++++ b/security/Kconfig
+@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
+
+ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+ bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
++ default y
+ depends on X86_64 && !UML
+ help
+ This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 10:12:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.
+
+This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
+the vmcs_field_to_offset_table. This is related to
+CVE-2017-5753.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+index d2168203bddc..e6fa3df81fd8 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -882,8 +882,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
+ {
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
+
+- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
+- vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
++ if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
++ return -ENOENT;
++
++ /*
++ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
++ * generic mechanism.
++ */
++ asm("lfence");
++
++ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 18:41:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+commit 262b6b30087246abf09d6275eb0c0dc421bcbe38 upstream.
+
+This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
+page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it. PTI
+mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
+non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace.
+
+Undo the poison to allow execution.
+
+Fixes: 385ce0ea4c07 ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
+Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
+Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
+Cc: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108102805.GK25546@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+index a2486f444073..8337730f0956 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
+ p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
+ if (!p4d)
+ return -1;
++ pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+ pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
+ if (!pud)
+ return -1;
+--
+2.14.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 11:27:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+commit 99a9dc98ba52267ce5e062b52de88ea1f1b2a7d8 upstream.
+
+The intel_bts driver does not use the 'normal' BTS buffer which is exposed
+through the cpu_entry_area but instead uses the memory allocated for the
+perf AUX buffer.
+
+This obviously comes apart when using PTI because then the kernel mapping;
+which includes that AUX buffer memory; disappears. Fixing this requires to
+expose a mapping which is visible in all context and that's not trivial.
+
+As a quick fix disable this driver when PTI is enabled to prevent
+malfunction.
+
+Fixes: 385ce0ea4c07 ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
+Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
+Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: greg@kroah.com
+Cc: hughd@google.com
+Cc: luto@amacapital.net
+Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
+Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180114102713.GB6166@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+index ddd8d3516bfc..9a62e6fce0e0 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
++++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+@@ -582,6 +582,24 @@ static __init int bts_init(void)
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DTES64) || !x86_pmu.bts)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) {
++ /*
++ * BTS hardware writes through a virtual memory map we must
++ * either use the kernel physical map, or the user mapping of
++ * the AUX buffer.
++ *
++ * However, since this driver supports per-CPU and per-task inherit
++ * we cannot use the user mapping since it will not be availble
++ * if we're not running the owning process.
++ *
++ * With PTI we can't use the kernal map either, because its not
++ * there when we run userspace.
++ *
++ * For now, disable this driver when using PTI.
++ */
++ return -ENODEV;
++ }
++
+ bts_pmu.capabilities = PERF_PMU_CAP_AUX_NO_SG | PERF_PMU_CAP_ITRACE |
+ PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE;
+ bts_pmu.task_ctx_nr = perf_sw_context;
+--
+2.14.2
+