+++ /dev/null
-From 3e4f09eef73ad12d4876e24daf52a0dc0891d7da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 14:53:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in
- the stack
-
-Commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") has
-introduced a regression in some rust and Java environments which are
-trying to implement their own stack guard page. They are punching a new
-MAP_FIXED mapping inside the existing stack Vma.
-
-This will confuse expand_{downwards,upwards} into thinking that the
-stack expansion would in fact get us too close to an existing non-stack
-vma which is a correct behavior wrt safety. It is a real regression on
-the other hand.
-
-Let's work around the problem by considering PROT_NONE mapping as a part
-of the stack. This is a gros hack but overflowing to such a mapping
-would trap anyway an we only can hope that usespace knows what it is
-doing and handle it propely.
-
-Fixes: 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
-Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170705182849.GA18027@dhcp22.suse.cz
-Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-Debugged-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
-Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
-Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
-Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
-Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
-CVE-2017-1000364
-
-(cherry picked from commit 561b5e0709e4a248c67d024d4d94b6e31e3edf2f)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
-index ef78a5ca5599..9fabd8c82f38 100644
---- a/mm/mmap.c
-+++ b/mm/mmap.c
-@@ -2240,7 +2240,8 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
- gap_addr = TASK_SIZE;
-
- next = vma->vm_next;
-- if (next && next->vm_start < gap_addr) {
-+ if (next && next->vm_start < gap_addr &&
-+ (next->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
- if (!(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
- return -ENOMEM;
- /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
-@@ -2324,7 +2325,8 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- if (gap_addr > address)
- return -ENOMEM;
- prev = vma->vm_prev;
-- if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr) {
-+ if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr &&
-+ (prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
- if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
- return -ENOMEM;
- /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From aea792ba99ba73a6b0c4e5aea3b4b6b3f9d821f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 14:53:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mm/mmap.c: expand_downwards: don't require the gap if
- !vm_prev
-
-expand_stack(vma) fails if address < stack_guard_gap even if there is no
-vma->vm_prev. I don't think this makes sense, and we didn't do this
-before the recent commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap,
-between vmas").
-
-We do not need a gap in this case, any address is fine as long as
-security_mmap_addr() doesn't object.
-
-This also simplifies the code, we know that address >= prev->vm_end and
-thus underflow is not possible.
-
-Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628175258.GA24881@redhat.com
-Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
-Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
-CVE-2017-1000364
-
-(cherry picked from commit 32e4e6d5cbb0c0e427391635991fe65e17797af8)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- mm/mmap.c | 10 +++-------
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
-index 9fabd8c82f38..09c728a1eeee 100644
---- a/mm/mmap.c
-+++ b/mm/mmap.c
-@@ -2312,7 +2312,6 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- {
- struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
- struct vm_area_struct *prev;
-- unsigned long gap_addr;
- int error;
-
- address &= PAGE_MASK;
-@@ -2321,15 +2320,12 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- return error;
-
- /* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
-- gap_addr = address - stack_guard_gap;
-- if (gap_addr > address)
-- return -ENOMEM;
- prev = vma->vm_prev;
-- if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr &&
-+ /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
-+ if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
- (prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
-- if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
-+ if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
- return -ENOMEM;
-- /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
- }
-
- /* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 6b44f156198491839655077fc7f3a469c67e1f8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 15:30:39 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
-
-When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
-the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
-that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
-limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
-pointers to the strings.
-
-For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
-single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
-4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
-remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).
-
-The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
-entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
-pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).
-
-[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
-Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
-Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
-Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
-Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
-CVE-2017-1000365
-
-(cherry-picked from commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- fs/exec.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
-index 9fb90c37c37f..8cf76e2a0b83 100644
---- a/fs/exec.c
-+++ b/fs/exec.c
-@@ -225,8 +225,26 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
-
- if (write) {
- unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
-+ unsigned long ptr_size;
- struct rlimit *rlim;
-
-+ /*
-+ * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
-+ * must account for them as well.
-+ *
-+ * The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is
-+ * built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it
-+ * is currently (rather than each call being just the newly
-+ * added size from the arg page). As a result, we need to
-+ * always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the
-+ * last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire
-+ * correct size.
-+ */
-+ ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
-+ if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
-+ goto fail;
-+ size += ptr_size;
-+
- acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
-
- /*
-@@ -244,13 +262,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
- * to work from.
- */
- rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-- if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
-- put_page(page);
-- return NULL;
-- }
-+ if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
-+ goto fail;
- }
-
- return page;
-+
-+fail:
-+ put_page(page);
-+ return NULL;
- }
-
- static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From de1c3d4474562e9d9dc9952f9283f07d8d58ef98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:35:52 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] drm/virtio: don't leak bo on drm_gem_object_init failure
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170406155941.458-1-kraxel@redhat.com
-
-CVE-2017-10810
-
-(cherry picked from commit 385aee965b4e4c36551c362a334378d2985b722a)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c
-index 1483daebe057..6f66b7347cd0 100644
---- a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c
-+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c
-@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ int virtio_gpu_object_create(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
- return -ENOMEM;
- size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE);
- ret = drm_gem_object_init(vgdev->ddev, &bo->gem_base, size);
-- if (ret != 0)
-+ if (ret != 0) {
-+ kfree(bo);
- return ret;
-+ }
- bo->dumb = false;
- virtio_gpu_init_ttm_placement(bo, pinned);
-
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 453b5039843f7dac534ee23af6b34c2d0a116416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:30:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked
- in ticket decode
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-This fixes CVE-2017-7482.
-
-When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
-rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
-variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
-overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
-four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could
-lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
-over the end of the buffer.
-
-Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
-length.
-
-Reported-by: 石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com>
-Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-
-CVE-2017-7482
-
-(cherry-picked from commit 5f2f97656ada8d811d3c1bef503ced266fcd53a0)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- net/rxrpc/key.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c
-index 18c737a61d80..7fc340726d03 100644
---- a/net/rxrpc/key.c
-+++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c
-@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_principal(struct krb5_principal *princ,
- unsigned int *_toklen)
- {
- const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
-- unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, n_parts, loop, tmp;
-+ unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, n_parts, loop, tmp, paddedlen;
-
- /* there must be at least one name, and at least #names+1 length
- * words */
-@@ -247,16 +247,16 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_principal(struct krb5_principal *princ,
- toklen -= 4;
- if (tmp <= 0 || tmp > AFSTOKEN_STRING_MAX)
- return -EINVAL;
-- if (tmp > toklen)
-+ paddedlen = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
-+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
- return -EINVAL;
- princ->name_parts[loop] = kmalloc(tmp + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!princ->name_parts[loop])
- return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(princ->name_parts[loop], xdr, tmp);
- princ->name_parts[loop][tmp] = 0;
-- tmp = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
-- toklen -= tmp;
-- xdr += tmp >> 2;
-+ toklen -= paddedlen;
-+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
- }
-
- if (toklen < 4)
-@@ -265,16 +265,16 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_principal(struct krb5_principal *princ,
- toklen -= 4;
- if (tmp <= 0 || tmp > AFSTOKEN_K5_REALM_MAX)
- return -EINVAL;
-- if (tmp > toklen)
-+ paddedlen = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
-+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
- return -EINVAL;
- princ->realm = kmalloc(tmp + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!princ->realm)
- return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(princ->realm, xdr, tmp);
- princ->realm[tmp] = 0;
-- tmp = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
-- toklen -= tmp;
-- xdr += tmp >> 2;
-+ toklen -= paddedlen;
-+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
-
- _debug("%s/...@%s", princ->name_parts[0], princ->realm);
-
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_tagged_data(struct krb5_tagged_data *td,
- unsigned int *_toklen)
- {
- const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
-- unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len;
-+ unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len, paddedlen;
-
- /* there must be at least one tag and one length word */
- if (toklen <= 8)
-@@ -307,15 +307,17 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_tagged_data(struct krb5_tagged_data *td,
- toklen -= 8;
- if (len > max_data_size)
- return -EINVAL;
-+ paddedlen = (len + 3) & ~3;
-+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
-+ return -EINVAL;
- td->data_len = len;
-
- if (len > 0) {
- td->data = kmemdup(xdr, len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!td->data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-- len = (len + 3) & ~3;
-- toklen -= len;
-- xdr += len >> 2;
-+ toklen -= paddedlen;
-+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
- }
-
- _debug("tag %x len %x", td->tag, td->data_len);
-@@ -387,7 +389,7 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
- const __be32 **_xdr, unsigned int *_toklen)
- {
- const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
-- unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len;
-+ unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len, paddedlen;
-
- /* there must be at least one length word */
- if (toklen <= 4)
-@@ -399,6 +401,9 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
- toklen -= 4;
- if (len > AFSTOKEN_K5_TIX_MAX)
- return -EINVAL;
-+ paddedlen = (len + 3) & ~3;
-+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
-+ return -EINVAL;
- *_tktlen = len;
-
- _debug("ticket len %u", len);
-@@ -407,9 +412,8 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
- *_ticket = kmemdup(xdr, len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!*_ticket)
- return -ENOMEM;
-- len = (len + 3) & ~3;
-- toklen -= len;
-- xdr += len >> 2;
-+ toklen -= paddedlen;
-+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
- }
-
- *_xdr = xdr;
-@@ -552,7 +556,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- {
- const __be32 *xdr = prep->data, *token;
- const char *cp;
-- unsigned int len, tmp, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix;
-+ unsigned int len, paddedlen, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
- int ret;
-
-@@ -578,22 +582,21 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- if (len < 1 || len > AFSTOKEN_CELL_MAX)
- goto not_xdr;
- datalen -= 4;
-- tmp = (len + 3) & ~3;
-- if (tmp > datalen)
-+ paddedlen = (len + 3) & ~3;
-+ if (paddedlen > datalen)
- goto not_xdr;
-
- cp = (const char *) xdr;
- for (loop = 0; loop < len; loop++)
- if (!isprint(cp[loop]))
- goto not_xdr;
-- if (len < tmp)
-- for (; loop < tmp; loop++)
-- if (cp[loop])
-- goto not_xdr;
-+ for (; loop < paddedlen; loop++)
-+ if (cp[loop])
-+ goto not_xdr;
- _debug("cellname: [%u/%u] '%*.*s'",
-- len, tmp, len, len, (const char *) xdr);
-- datalen -= tmp;
-- xdr += tmp >> 2;
-+ len, paddedlen, len, len, (const char *) xdr);
-+ datalen -= paddedlen;
-+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
-
- /* get the token count */
- if (datalen < 12)
-@@ -614,10 +617,11 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
- sec_ix = ntohl(*xdr);
- datalen -= 4;
- _debug("token: [%x/%zx] %x", toklen, datalen, sec_ix);
-- if (toklen < 20 || toklen > datalen)
-+ paddedlen = (toklen + 3) & ~3;
-+ if (toklen < 20 || toklen > datalen || paddedlen > datalen)
- goto not_xdr;
-- datalen -= (toklen + 3) & ~3;
-- xdr += (toklen + 3) >> 2;
-+ datalen -= paddedlen;
-+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
-
- } while (--loop > 0);
-
---
-2.11.0
-
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../kvm-dynamic-halt-polling-disable-default.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../cgroup-cpuset-add-cpuset.remap_cpus.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../0001-netfilter-nft_set_rbtree-handle-re-addition-element-.patch # DoS from within (unpriv) containers
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-do-not-blow-on-PROT_NONE-MAP_FIXED-holes-i.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-expand_downwards-don-t-require-the-gap-if-.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000365-fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-10810-drm-virtio-don-t-leak-bo-on-drm_gem_object_init-fail.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7482-rxrpc-Fix-several-cases-where-a-padded-len-isn-t-che.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../0001-block-fix-bio_will_gap-for-first-bvec-with-offset.patch
sed -i ${KERNEL_SRC}/Makefile -e 's/^EXTRAVERSION.*$$/EXTRAVERSION=${EXTRAVERSION}/'
touch $@
projects / pve-kernel.git / commitdiff