+++ /dev/null
-From 38e360ea72f11241adede7ea2b22d8d536fe490b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 15:41:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] net: Zeroing the structure ethtool_wolinfo in
- ethtool_get_wol()
-
-CVE-2014-9900
-
-memset() the structure ethtool_wolinfo that has padded bytes
-but the padded bytes have not been zeroed out.
-
-Change-Id: If3fd2d872a1b1ab9521d937b86a29fc468a8bbfe
-Signed-off-by: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
-(cherry-picked from commit 63c317dbee97983004dffdd9f742a20d17150071
- https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10)
-Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- net/core/ethtool.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
-index d92de0a1f0a4..c06c6acf78c5 100644
---- a/net/core/ethtool.c
-+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
-@@ -1449,11 +1449,13 @@ static int ethtool_reset(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
-
- static int ethtool_get_wol(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
- {
-- struct ethtool_wolinfo wol = { .cmd = ETHTOOL_GWOL };
-+ struct ethtool_wolinfo wol;
-
- if (!dev->ethtool_ops->get_wol)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-+ memset(&wol, 0, sizeof(struct ethtool_wolinfo));
-+ wol.cmd = ETHTOOL_GWOL;
- dev->ethtool_ops->get_wol(dev, &wol);
-
- if (copy_to_user(useraddr, &wol, sizeof(wol)))
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 993c7c14bbc4bf51025bb5c83c1c130417e0e823 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:56:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at
- SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
-
-snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
-it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
-concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
-buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
-kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
-
- BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
- CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
- Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
- Call Trace:
- __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
- dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
- kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
- kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
- copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
- snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
- do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
- __do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
- do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
- vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
- do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
- SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
- SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
-
-This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
-previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
-
-Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
-Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
-
-CVE-2017-1000380
-
-(cherry-picked from commit ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- sound/core/timer.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
-index 3c11a6983f54..e5ddc475dca4 100644
---- a/sound/core/timer.c
-+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
-@@ -1622,6 +1622,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
- if (err < 0)
- goto __err;
-
-+ tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
- kfree(tu->queue);
- tu->queue = NULL;
- kfree(tu->tqueue);
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From 425e11483546f928109e5871a2c8b0fba3ddb3b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:56:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
-
-The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
-may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
-read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
-snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
-among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
-between read vs ioctl.
-
-This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
-range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
-race window.
-
-Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
-Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
-
-CVE-2017-1000380
-
-(cherry-picked from commit d11662f4f798b50d8c8743f433842c3e40fe3378)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- sound/core/timer.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
-index ad153149b231..3c11a6983f54 100644
---- a/sound/core/timer.c
-+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
-@@ -1963,6 +1963,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
-
- tu = file->private_data;
- unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
-+ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
- spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
- while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
- while (!tu->qused) {
-@@ -1978,7 +1979,9 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
- add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
-
- spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
-+ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
- schedule();
-+ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
- spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
-
- remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
-@@ -1998,7 +2001,6 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
- tu->qused--;
- spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
-
-- mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
- if (tu->tread) {
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
- sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
-@@ -2008,7 +2010,6 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
- sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
- err = -EFAULT;
- }
-- mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
-
- spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
- if (err < 0)
-@@ -2018,6 +2019,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
- }
- _error:
- spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
-+ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
- return result > 0 ? result : err;
- }
-
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From ab13cf852828060a7d9550c05197e5303de7aefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 11:09:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] drm/vmwgfx: limit the number of mip levels in
- vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl()
-
-CVE-2017-7346
-
-The 'req->mip_levels' parameter in vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is
-a user-controlled 'uint32_t' value which is used as a loop count limit.
-This can lead to a kernel lockup and DoS. Add check for 'req->mip_levels'.
-
-References:
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1437431
-
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
-
-(cherry picked from commit ee9c4e681ec4f58e42a83cb0c22a0289ade1aacf)
-Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
-index 8da50fce3b77..56b803384ea2 100644
---- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
-+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
-@@ -1280,6 +1280,9 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
- if (req->multisample_count != 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
-+ if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
- if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
- vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
- 128;
---
-2.11.0
-
+++ /dev/null
-From a2285dfad4c68beb9a8376fa2a2df905319b11fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
-Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 17:28:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
-
-When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
-we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
-
-The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
-second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
-req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
-
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
-Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
-Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
-
-CVE-2017-9605
-
-(cherry picked from commit 07678eca2cf9c9a18584e546c2b2a0d0c9a3150c)
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
-index 05fa092c942b..8da50fce3b77 100644
---- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
-+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
-@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
- struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
- int ret;
- uint32_t size;
-- uint32_t backup_handle;
-+ uint32_t backup_handle = 0;
-
- if (req->multisample_count != 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-@@ -1315,12 +1315,16 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
- ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
- &res->backup,
- &user_srf->backup_base);
-- if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
-- res->backup_size) {
-- DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
-- vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
-- ret = -EINVAL;
-- goto out_unlock;
-+ if (ret == 0) {
-+ if (res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
-+ res->backup_size) {
-+ DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
-+ vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
-+ ret = -EINVAL;
-+ goto out_unlock;
-+ } else {
-+ backup_handle = req->buffer_handle;
-+ }
- }
- } else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
- ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
---
-2.11.0
-
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../kvm-dynamic-halt-polling-disable-default.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../cgroup-cpuset-add-cpuset.remap_cpus.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../0001-netfilter-nft_set_rbtree-handle-re-addition-element-.patch # DoS from within (unpriv) containers
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
- cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-do-not-blow-on-PROT_NONE-MAP_FIXED-holes-i.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-expand_downwards-don-t-require-the-gap-if-.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000365-fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch
projects / pve-kernel.git / commitdiff