debian/patches/CVE-2016-1981-e1000-eliminate-infinite-loop.patch

   1 From e55bfae32b6e3ea1e9a8a318e1b9e76acbcdd50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
   2 From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
   3 Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:17:20 +0100
   4 Subject: [PATCH] e1000: eliminate infinite loops on out-of-bounds transfer
   5  start
   6
   7 The start_xmit() and e1000_receive_iov() functions implement DMA transfers
   8 iterating over a set of descriptors that the guest's e1000 driver
   9 prepares:
  10
  11 - the TDLEN and RDLEN registers store the total size of the descriptor
  12   area,
  13
  14 - while the TDH and RDH registers store the offset (in whole tx / rx
  15   descriptors) into the area where the transfer is supposed to start.
  16
  17 Each time a descriptor is processed, the TDH and RDH register is bumped
  18 (as appropriate for the transfer direction).
  19
  20 QEMU already contains logic to deal with bogus transfers submitted by the
  21 guest:
  22
  23 - Normally, the transmit case wants to increase TDH from its initial value
  24   to TDT. (TDT is allowed to be numerically smaller than the initial TDH
  25   value; wrapping at or above TDLEN bytes to zero is normal.) The failsafe
  26   that QEMU currently has here is a check against reaching the original
  27   TDH value again -- a complete wraparound, which should never happen.
  28
  29 - In the receive case RDH is increased from its initial value until
  30   "total_size" bytes have been received; preferably in a single step, or
  31   in "s->rxbuf_size" byte steps, if the latter is smaller. However, null
  32   RX descriptors are skipped without receiving data, while RDH is
  33   incremented just the same. QEMU tries to prevent an infinite loop
  34   (processing only null RX descriptors) by detecting whether RDH assumes
  35   its original value during the loop. (Again, wrapping from RDLEN to 0 is
  36   normal.)
  37
  38 What both directions miss is that the guest could program TDLEN and RDLEN
  39 so low, and the initial TDH and RDH so high, that these registers will
  40 immediately be truncated to zero, and then never reassume their initial
  41 values in the loop -- a full wraparound will never occur.
  42
  43 The condition that expresses this is:
  44
  45   xdh_start >= s->mac_reg[XDLEN] / sizeof(desc)
  46
  47 i.e., TDH or RDH start out after the last whole rx or tx descriptor that
  48 fits into the TDLEN or RDLEN sized area.
  49
  50 This condition could be checked before we enter the loops, but
  51 pci_dma_read() / pci_dma_write() knows how to fill in buffers safely for
  52 bogus DMA addresses, so we just extend the existing failsafes with the
  53 above condition.
  54
  55 This is CVE-2016-1981.
  56
  57 Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
  58 Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
  59 Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
  60 Cc: Prasad Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
  61 Cc: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
  62 Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
  63 Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
  64 RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1296044
  65 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
  66 Reviewed-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
  67 Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
  68 ---
  69  hw/net/e1000.c | 6 ++++--
  70  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
  71
  72 diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
  73 index bec06e9..34d0823 100644
  74 --- a/hw/net/e1000.c
  75 +++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
  76 @@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ start_xmit(E1000State *s)
  77           * bogus values to TDT/TDLEN.
  78           * there's nothing too intelligent we could do about this.
  79           */
  80 -        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start) {
  81 +        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start ||
  82 +            tdh_start >= s->mac_reg[TDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
  83              DBGOUT(TXERR, "TDH wraparound @%x, TDT %x, TDLEN %x\n",
  84                     tdh_start, s->mac_reg[TDT], s->mac_reg[TDLEN]);
  85              break;
  86 @@ -1165,7 +1166,8 @@ e1000_receive_iov(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt)
  87          if (++s->mac_reg[RDH] * sizeof(desc) >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN])
  88              s->mac_reg[RDH] = 0;
  89          /* see comment in start_xmit; same here */
  90 -        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start) {
  91 +        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start ||
  92 +            rdh_start >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
  93              DBGOUT(RXERR, "RDH wraparound @%x, RDT %x, RDLEN %x\n",
  94                     rdh_start, s->mac_reg[RDT], s->mac_reg[RDLEN]);
  95              set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO);
  96 --
  97 2.1.4
  98